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The Adventure of the Book: Jabès, Derrida, Levinas is an intellectual history of Jewish writers and 
philosophers in France during the decades after the Second World War, exploring questions of 
Jewish identity, writing, and exile. Egyptian-born poet Edmond Jabès, Algerian-born philosopher 
Jacques Derrida, and Lithuanian-born philosopher Emmanuel Levinas were displaced from their 
home countries and resettled in Paris, where they fortuitously crossed paths in the early 1960s. For 
three decades, Jabès, Derrida, and Levinas continued to reflect on questions of Judaism, exile, and 
writing together in published texts and private correspondences, as interlocutors, critics, and 
friends. Informed by the dissolution of idealist philosophy as well as the diasporic history of the 
Jewish people, The Adventure of the Book illuminate the stakes of Jewish affiliation in post-war 
France. Jabès, Derrida, and Levinas treat the question of Jewish identity as a problem of language, 
and they confront the metaphor of “the book” as a proxy for their experiences of exile and 
estrangement in relation to nationality, language, and identity. Critically re-appropriating the 
Jewish tradition endowed by the “Book of Books,” as well as Hegel’s philosophical idealism, 
Levinas, Derrida, and Jabès frame the book as the site of an adventure. This adventure articulates 
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I. Entering the Book 
 
“The philosopher speaks of phenomena and noema,” notes Gaston Bachelard, “so why wouldn’t 
he also devote attention to the being of the book, or bibliomenon [bibliomène]?”1 At first glance, 
the question of “the book” might seem like an ancillary concern for philosophy. Philosophy is 
supposed to take place “out there” in the world of lived experience, whereas the book is the staging 
area for theoretical arguments. The book, one might think, is merely the formal container for 
information, a tool or technology for efficiently and durably storing written marks. As a relatively 
recent invention in the scope of intellectual history, the question of the book must be extrinsic to 
the substantive concerns of philosophy. This realist conception of the book is subservient to lived 
experience: even the most lifelike book presents an artificial, mimetic facsimile of the “real world,” 
and the question of the book is a merely formal affair. Consequently, readers typically bracket the 
question of the book to plunge into its content and enter the world of the text. François Laruelle 
describes the “forgetting of the essence of the book in the book,” where the reader suspends the 
theoretical aspects of reading for the sake of the continuity of reading.2 Philosophy’s focus on the 
structure of experience reinforces the view of the book as a kind of tool used in the service of the 
“real world,” but this brackets the crucial role of the book in structuring philosophical thought, and 
																																																						
1 Gaston Bachelard, L’activité rationaliste (Paris: PUF, 1965), 6: “Le philosophe parle des phénomènes et de noèmes. 
Pourquoi ne donnerait-il pas son attention à l’être du livre ou bibliomène?” 
2 François Laruelle, “Projet d’une philosophie du livre,” Edmond Jabès: Les Cahiers Obsidianes no. 5. (Paris : 




parsing reality from representation. Emmanuel Levinas remarked in a 1982 interview with Philippe 
Nemo, “in the great fear of bookishness [la grande peur du livresque], one underestimates the 
‘ontological’ reference of the human to the book that one takes for a source of information, or for 
a ‘tool’ of learning, a textbook, even though it is a modality of our being.”3 The book is not simply 
a tool, it is a category of human existence. Far from a mere formal question, the conceptual 
demarcations that give rise to “the book” compose a central nexus of philosophical, literary, and 
religious reflection. 
What makes a book a special kind of object?  Edmund Husserl answers this question in 
Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy II, where he 
describes the phenomenology of “spiritual objects,” endowed with a special value that discloses 
the “unity of Body and sense.”4 In subjective experience, the presence of another person is 
perceived not as a mere assemblage of physical parts – a nose, two feet, a chin, etc. – but as a 
physical-spiritual unity. There is no initial perception of a physical body which is then secondarily 
viewed with a special value; perception immediately endows the unity of a person with 
significance. The value of “spiritual objects” stems from subjective modes of apperception which 
project certain ideals onto these objects. Husserl draws an analogy between the body and the book 
as spiritual objects: “the book is a body, the pages are sheets of paper, the lines are black marks 
and physical imprints at certain spots of these papers, etc. Is that what I grasp when I ‘see’ the 
book, when I ‘read’ the book, when I ‘see’ that what is written is written, what is said is said?” Of 
course, the book is a physical object with specific physical attributes and qualities, but when I see 
																																																						
3 Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1985), 21-
22 [Ethique et Infini (Paris : Fayard and Radio-France, 1982), 15-16]. The translation of livresque as “bookish” capture 
the pejorative associations of the term, including its English connotation as a certain character type akin to “nerdy”; 
Levinas seeks to rehabilitate the term to suggest the novelistic, literary character of existence. 
4 Edmund Husserl. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book: 
Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Scuwer (Dordrecht, Boston, 




a book, “this is precisely what I am not focused on.” Rather, Husserl continues, “I see what is 
thingly about it insofar as it appears to me, but I ‘live in the sense, comprehending it.’” The 
empiricist might object that the physical appearance of the book, which Husserl calls “a first 
Objectivity,” is the necessary substratum to describe “the sense ‘animating’ the physical,” which 
he calls a “second Objectivity.”5 For Husserl, the spiritual object immediately exceeds the 
parameters of a mere physical thing. When I perceive the presence of a book, “am I focused on a 
second Objectivity only externally linked to the first? Is not rather that upon which I am focused a 
unity that is fused together throughout and not something that just stands there next to the 
physical?” As a spiritual object, the special significance of the book is disclosed immediately: it is 
infused with intention, it exists precisely for the sake that it is read. Husserl writes, “the spiritual 
sense is, by animating the sensuous appearances, fused with them in a certain way instead of just 
being bound with them side by side.” 6 The spiritual value of the book brackets its “thingly” 
character as an object, and expresses its sublime power in human life. “A book can never be 
reduced to the nudity of the written signs – or others – that it mobilizes,” explains Jocelyn Benoist, 
“what is distinctive about the book is that its signs are put in play in their being as signs, or in the 
trickery of what surrounds the sign, its overcoming or effacement.” 7 Resisting its decomposition 
into its parts – words, letters, or pages – the constitutive unity of the book as spiritual object renders 
it the site for a certain kind of human transcendence.  
The existential relation to the book stands at the intersection of religious and philosophical 
thought. In a 1982 interview entitled “Philosophy, Justice, and Love,” Levinas describes the book 
																																																						
5 Ibid, 237. 
6 Ibid, 238. 




as a modality of human existence, whose importance in philosophy echoes the place of the “Book 
of Books” in the Abrahamic religions: 
But we forget our relation to books—that is, to inspired language—which speaks of 
nothing else. The book of books, and all literature, which is perhaps only a premonition or 
recollection of the Bible. One is easily led to suspect pure bookishness [pur livresque] and 
the hypocrisy of bookishness in our books, forgetting the depth of our relationship to the 
book. All humanity has books, be they but books before books: the inspired language of 
proverbs, fables, and even folklore. The human being is not only in the world, not only an 
in-der-Welt-Sein, but also Zum-Buch-Sein [being-toward-the-book] in relationship to the 
inspired Word, an ambiance as important for our existence as streets, houses, and clothing. 
The book is wrongly interpreted as pure Zuhandenes, as what is at hand, a manual. My 
relation to the book is definitely not pure use; it doesn't have the same meaning as the one 
I have with the hammer or the telephone.8 
 
The book is a central modality of existence and the site of human transcendence: philosophy cannot 
limit itself to an understanding of what Heidegger calls In-der-Welt-Sein, “Being-in-the-world,” 
but crucially it must also account for Zum-Buch-Sein, “Being-towards-the-Book.” Where 
Heidegger sketches Being-in-the-world as one of the “existentials” that describes Dasein’s 
ontological situation as “thrown” into the world, Levinas’ quite radical proposition entails the 
human relationship to the book holds the same fundamental importance. Being-towards-the-book 
must therefore be analyzed with the same rigor as the phenomenological description of Being-in-
the-world and Being-with-others. “My condition - or my un-condition - is my relation to books,” 
Levinas writes in his 1982 book Beyond the Verse, “it is the very movement-towards-God [l’à-
Dieu même].”9 The transcendence of the book is an expression of the relation to God, the “à-Dieu.” 
This is expressed both in the Abrahamic religions that place the Bible as the central locus of 
knowledge, as well as philosophical and literary traditions of writing that attempt to faithfully 
																																																						
8 Emmanuel Levinas, “Philosophy, Justice, and Love,” Entre Nous: On Thinking of the Other, trans. Michael B. Smith 
and Barbara Harshav (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 109 [“Philosophie, Justice et Amour” in Entre 
Nous: Essais sur le penser-à-l’autre (Paris : Grasset, 1991), 127]. 
9 Emmanuel Levinas, Beyond the Verse: Talmudic Readings and Lectures, trans. Gary D. Mole (Bloomington: Indiana 




represent the world in the pages of a book. The question of language manifests itself concretely in 
the book. Levinas elliptically describes, “language and the book, arising and already read in 
language, is phenomenology [Le langage et le livre surgissant et déjà lu dans le langage est la 
phénoménologie], the ‘mise en scène’ in which the abstract is made concrete.”10 The book is thus 
the site for the phenomenological analysis of language, and the prophetic impulse in human beings 
connected to the idea of infinity. Before the Aristotelean determination of the human being as 
animal rationale, Levinas wonders if the human being isn’t first and foremost “animal capable of 
inspiration, a prophetic animal.” By the same token, “one may wonder whether the book, as a 
book, before becoming a document, is not the modality by which what is said [le dit] lays itself 
open to exegesis, calls for it; and where meaning, immobilized in the characters, already tears the 
texture in which it is held.”11 As an expression of the prophetic character of human beings, the 
book is the site of language’s transcendence which exceeds the ontological limitations of what 
Levinas calls the Said, le Dit, and discloses the power of inspired language, the Saying, le Dire. 
What is involved in “starting” a book? When we pick up a book and “enter” the narrative, 
what shift does it provoke in our perception of the world? Folding back the book’s cover, leafing 
through its opening pages, and finding entry into the text, one does not know what one will find. 
Jean-Luc Nancy describes “opening” the book as akin to a negotiation with an unknown 
interlocutor: “the opening of the book is the raising of the curtains on the stage of these send-offs 
[gestes d’envoi].”12 The unknowability of what awaits is part of the thrill. Sometimes, we “get 
into” a book and passionately turn page after page without pause or distraction; sometimes, the 
book fails to spark interest, its content is off-putting, or distractions intervene, and we put the book 
																																																						
10 Ibid, xii [9]. 
11 Ibid, 110 [136-137]. 




down. The book seemingly chooses its reader as much as the reader chooses the book. Didier 
Cahen writes, “Who among us, book in hand, provisionally abandoning the spectator’s pause, the 
programmed attitude of the simple consumer, has not felt this sort of intoxication which seems to 
correspond to nothing else? […] Who has not experienced at least once while reading the certainty 
of being chosen by the book [l’élu du livre]?”13 The ecstatic, rapturous feeling of total absorption 
in a book evokes a sense of election, as if the book were written specifically for that reader. 
Entering a book requires a leap of faith, it is an encounter with an alterity that cannot be known 
beforehand, and it demands a certain hospitality.  
Franz Kafka’s parable “Before the Law,” a mise-en-abîme of Josef K.’s nightmarish story 
in The Trial, presents an arresting metaphor for “entering” the book. “Before the law stands a 
gatekeeper,” the well-known story begins, repeating its title in its opening words.14 A “man from 
the country” approaches the door, but the gatekeeper refuses to admit him. We never learn what 
law the man stands before, what has led the man from the country to this impasse, or where this 
scene takes place. No matter what questions the man asks, he cannot convince the gatekeeper to 
let him to pass: standing before the gate, he does not find the secret words that would permit him 
access to the law. The gatekeeper warns the man that even if he could pass through this initial gate 
before the law, further gatekeepers await, each stronger than the last. The man grows old standing 
before the door, but to no avail as the law remains impenetrable to him. In his dying breathes, the 
man asks why no one else has ever come through this door, to which the gatekeeper responds, “No 
one else could ever be admitted here, since this gate was made only for you. I am now going to 
shut it.” The man is never able to pass through the door and access the law – even though, 
apparently, it had been open the whole time. The law remains inaccessible, shrouded in mystery.  
																																																						
13 Didier Cahen. À livre ouvert, 25. 




Jacques Derrida presented his reading of Kafka’s parable in a text also called “Before the 
Law” at a colloquium at Cérisy-La-Salle in 1982, in which he sketches the metaphoric resonance 
between the regimes of law and textuality. Both are undergirded by the dynamic between the secret 
they conceal and the promise they hold. For Derrida, Kafka’s story presents nothing less than the 
parable of literature itself. He writes, “we know neither who nor what is the law, das Gesetz. This, 
perhaps, is where literature begins.”15 The reader who seeks to enter the book does not know what 
awaits: the unknowability of the book and its governing law looms over the reader at its precipice. 
“The text would be the door, the entrance (Eingang), what the doorkeeper has just closed,” Derrida 
writes, “as he closes the object, he closes the text. Which, however, closes on nothing. The story 
Before the Law does not tell or describe anything but itself as text.”16 Kafka’s parable, then, 
expresses the situation of the reader standing before the law of the book. Derrida continues, “The 
text guards itself, maintains itself – like the law, speaking only of itself, that is to say, of its non-
identity with itself. It neither arrives nor lets anyone arrive. It is the law, makes the law and leaves 
the reader before the law.”17The text is autonomous in the literal sense of giving itself its own 
law—a law which remains inaccessible or unknowable to the reader. “In its very act,” Derrida 
explains, “the text produces and pronounces the law that protects it and renders it intangible. It 
does and says, saying what it does by doing what it says.” Literature creates its rules by the 
performativity of its language; by determining its own laws, literature can then subvert them. 
Derrida writes, “literature can play the law, repeating it while diverting or circumventing it.”18 
Like the man in Kafka’s story, by entering the book, the reader stands before the unknowable law 
of literature, until the gatekeeper declares, “I am now going to shut it,” and the book is closed.  
																																																						
15 Jacques Derrida, “Before the Law,” Acts of Literature (New York: Routledge, 1992), 207. 
16 Ibid, 210-211. 
17 Ibid, 211. 




The opening pages of Edmond Jabès’ 1963 The Book of Questions recount a similar 
negotiation with a gatekeeper to gain access to the book. The author addresses an unknown 
interlocutor in dialogue, who stands guard at the entry to a house, which is the book: “‘What is 
going on behind this door?’ / ‘A book is shedding its leaves’ / ‘What is the story of the book?’ / 
‘Becoming aware of a scream.’ / ‘I saw rabbis go in.’ […] ‘Have they read the book?’ / ‘They are 
reading it’” [“-Que se passe-t-il derrière cette porte? / -Un livre est en train d’être effeuillé. / - 
Quel est l’histoire de ce livre? / - La prise de conscience d’un cri. / - Mais j’ai vu entrer des 
rabbins. […] Ont-ils lu le livre? / - Il le lisent”].19 Behind the door, the rabbis - who are fictional 
characters in Jabès’ book – are reading Jabès’ book. In the opening pages of Jabès’ The Book of 
Questions, paradoxically, The Book of Questions already exists, where it is interpreted by its 
fictional characters. One of his earliest English-language proponents, novelist Paul Auster 
observes, “the book for Jabès is a place where the past and the present meet and dissolve into each 
other,” where there is “nothing strange about the fact that ancient rabbis can converse with a 
contemporary writer.”20 The law of Jabès’ text is determined by a world of books, which are 
commentaries on other books, and commentaries on those commentaries—a textual mise-en-
abîme. Unlike Kafka’s parable, Jabès’ interlocutor in The Book of Questions exhorts him to pass 
through the door to gain entry to the book: “‘Where is the book set?’ / ‘In the book.’ / ‘Who are 
you?’ / ‘I am the keeper of the house.’ / ‘Where do you come from?’ / ‘I have wandered’ / ‘Is 
Yukel your friend?’ / ‘I am like Yukel’ / ‘What is your lot?’ / ‘To open the book.’ / ‘Are you in 
the book?’ / ‘My place is at the threshold.’” [-Où se situe le livre? / -Dans le livre. / -Qui es-tu? / 
																																																						
19 Edmond Jabès, The Book of Questions, Tome I, trans. Rosmarie Waldrop (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University 
Press, 1991), 16 [Le Livre des Questions, Tome I, (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), 18]. 
20 Paul Auster, “Book of the Dead,” Collected Prose (New York: Picador, 2003), 370. Auster discovered Jabès’ work 
while living in Paris in the 1970s, and he became one of the poet’s first and most important champions in the United 
States, including his translation of Blanchot’s essay “Edmond Jabès' Book of Questions” (European Judaism: A 




-Le gardien de la maison / - D’où viens tu? / - J’ai erré / -Yukel est-il ton ami? / - Je ressemble à 
Yukel / Quel est ton destin? / - Ouvrir le livre / -Es-tu dans le livre? / -Ma place est au seuil.].21 
The anonymous gatekeeper standing at the precipice of Jabès’ book is, in fact, already in the book; 
the conflation of the author Jabès and the protagonist Yukel suggests the meta-textual stakes from 
the opening pages of The Book of Questions. As Derrida comments on this passage, “Every exit 
from the book is made within the book.”22 The house is the book, and the gatekeeper stands guard 
at its entry. Derrida adds, “The writer, builder, and guardian of the book posts himself at the 
entrance to the house. The writer is a ferryman and his destination always has a liminal 
signification.”23 Later in The Book of Questions, Jabès cites one of the fictional rabbis behind the 
door, Rabbi Éphraïm, who writes, “A door—a book. / Open. Closed. / You pass. You read. / You 
pass. It endures [Une porte comme un livre / Ouverte, fermée. / Tu passes et tu lis. / Tu passes. Elle 
demeure].”24 The entryway to the book, like the door before the law, is conditioned by the 
possibility that its secret will never be revealed, the door will never be unlocked, and it will remain 
closed off to the reader. Maurice Blanchot describes Jabès’ writing as “the empty, desertlike 
waiting that holds back the writer who works at the threshold of the book, making him the guardian 
of the threshold, his writing a desert, and from his very being the void and absence of a promise.”25 
This structural possibility takes place in Kafka and Jabès’ narratives, but it is the condition of them 
as well. In this sense, Blanchot writes, “The Book of Questions is always written twice.”26 The 
opening words of Jabès’ text announce this reflexivity: “You are the one who writes and the one 
																																																						
21 Edmond Jabès, The Book of Questions, Tome I, 16-17 [19]. 
22 Jacques Derrida, “Edmond Jabès and the Question of the Book,” Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (New 
York: Routledge, 2001), 92 [“Edmond Jabès et la question du livre,” L’Écriture et la différence (Paris: Seuil, 1967) 
113]. 
23 Ibid, 93 [113]. 
24 Edmond Jabès, The Book of Questions, tome 1, 63 [70].  
25 Maurice Blanchot, Friendship, trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 224. 




who is written [tu es celui qui écrit et qui est écrit].”27The writer and the book are inextricably 
knotted together, undermining any neat delineation of fact and fiction.  
 
For Derrida, Jabès, and Levinas, the question of the book orients the relationship between 
lived experience and textuality, the livresque or “bookish” character of subjective experience, and 
the relationship to the book that undergirds biblical, literary, and philosophical traditions. Despite 
the salient disagreements that arise between these three singular voices of Jewish diaspora, 
crucially, their reflections on the philosophical notion of writing and the difficult affiliation with 
Judaism dovetails in the metaphor of “the book.”  
 
These themes echo the well-known depiction of the Jewish people as the “people of the 
book.” The expression in fact originates with Islamic descriptions of fellow adherents to 
Abrahamic monotheism as Ahl Al-Kitab, but it has come to be associated more specifically with 
the Jewish people as followers of the Torah, as Am HaSefer. Moshe Halbertal explains in People 
of the Book: Canon, Meaning, and Authority, “the Jews became the ‘people of the book’ after a 
long history that defined the relationship of the community toward the canonized texts and 
established the diverse functions of texts.”28 The Jews became what Halbertal calls a “text-centered 
community” during the period of the Second Temple (538 BCE – 70 CE) when “text-centeredness 
manifested itself more forcefully and affected the nature of authority, the basic institutions of 
society, and spiritual life as a whole.” In lieu of a national homeland, Jewish life in diaspora has 
long held together through its canonical books and practices of textual interpretation. Halbertal 
																																																						
27 Edmond Jabès, The Book of Questions, tome 1, 11 [13]. 





writes, “the dominant mode of intellectual creativity in a text-centered community is interpretative. 
This is true of many aspects of Jewish culture.”29 This cultivation of the book imbues a reverence 
in for writing, reading, and interpretation at the heart of Judéité. If Jewish text-centeredness 
originates in religious practices, it also extends beyond religion in the “Jewish” culture of the book. 
Despite their nuanced critiques of essentialism with regards to Jewish identity, the narrative 
of the “people of the book” reverberates for Jabès, Derrida, and Levinas. Jabès succinctly explains 
in a 1985 interview, “Judaism and writing entail a single hope.” In the absence of a homeland 
during two millennia of diaspora, the Jewish people “remains what it immemorially has been: a 
people of the book, of the book that they possess in lieu of a land. […] So where has the Jew lived? 
In his book, of course”30 For these thinkers, the question of the book is intimately connected to the 
stories of diaspora, exile, and marginalization that, in broad strokes, mark the history of the Jewish 
people. “The volume of the book as a form of living space!” Levinas writes in Beyond the Verse, 
“it is in this sense, too, that Israel is a people of the Book, and that its relation to the Revelation is 
unique of its kind. Its actual land is based on the Revelation. Its nostalgia for the land is fed on 
texts.”31 Rather than the idealist philosophical tradition which considers the book as the closed, 
unified receptacle for absolute knowledge, Levinas, Derrida, and Jabès treat the book as the site of 
an adventure, as a function of its narrative possibilities but also as an expression of the 
interconnected domains of lived experience and textuality. Writing, interpretation, and 
commentary are integrally connected to the Jewish history of exile; the book is the proxy for this 
experience. As Derrida writes in his commentary on Jabès’ Book of Questions, “Once more begins 
the adventure of the text as weed, as outlaw [Recommence l'aventure du texte comme mauvaise 
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herbe, hors la Loi] far from ‘the fatherland of the Jews,’ which is a ‘sacred text surrounded by 
commentaries.’ The necessity of commentary, like poetic necessity, is the very form of exiled 
speech.”32 In different ways, this motif of the “people of the Book,” applies to all three writers.  
As thinkers attuned to questions of language, but also as products of Jewish diaspora 
shaped by the experiences of exile, Derrida’s, Jabès’, and Levinas’ reflections on the “adventure 
of the book” illuminate the stakes of Jewish affiliation in post-war France in terms of a question 
of writing. By critically reframing the limits of textuality and the world, the “adventure of the 
book” addresses the heritage endowed by the “Book of Books,” and the idealist philosophical 
tradition that culminates in Hegel’s absolute book of knowledge.  
 
 
II. Unlikely Encounters 
 
An unlikely series of events led Jacques Derrida, Emmanuel Levinas, and Edmond Jabès to cross 
paths in Paris in the early 1960s. Levinas was born in 1906 to a practicing if assimilated Jewish 
family in Kovno, Lithuania; Jabès was born in 1912 in Cairo, Egypt to a Jewish, French-speaking 
family with Italian nationality; Derrida was born in 1930 in colonial Algiers, an olive-skinned, 
French-speaking, Jewish pied noir with a French passport. These thinkers were born in three far 
flung countries on different continents, controlled by different colonial empires; they claimed 
different nationalities, spoke different languages, and adopted quite different relationships to 
Judaism. Yet their trajectories would ultimately lead them to Paris, where they fortuitously 
encountered one another in a span of several months in 1963 and 1964 at a crucial moment in their 
																																																						




careers. The paths that led these authors to meet in Paris reflect common experiences of war, 
trauma, and exile that profoundly mark their lives and writing. 
 Derrida, Levinas, and Jabès were brought together by good timing. On the heels of the 
publication of Totality and Infinity in 1961, Levinas published Difficult Freedom: Essays on 
Judaism in 1963, his first major volume on Jewish thought.33 At the time, Levinas was teaching at 
the Sorbonne, in addition to his role as the director of the Ecole Normale Israélite Orientale. 
Concurrently, the first volume of Jabès’ The Book of Questions was published in the winter of 
1963.34 Jabès had read Levinas’ work, and although they had not met, he sent him a copy of The 
Book of Questions soon after its release. Levinas wrote to thank him, and already in his initial 
response, he expresses apprehension with Jabès’ invocation of the Jewish tradition. “At first, I was 
rather disoriented by the originality of your inspiration, I did not understand its relations with the 
evocation of the Jewish world,” Levinas wrote in a letter to the Egyptian poet in April 1963, “I 
was ultimately convinced by the authentic poetry of your verb, but for this I had to stop pressing 
the notion of Judaism, which I am convinced is contingent in your expression.”35 His enthusiasm 
for Jabès’ poetry is tempered by confusion with his eccentric writing on the Jewish tradition. The 
invented proverbs and imaginary rabbis filling the pages of Jabès’ prose offered an aesthetic 
representation of Judaism, detached from its actual commandments and traditions. To appreciate 
“the authentic poetry of [his] verb” Levinas must treat his evocation of Judaism as “contingent.” 
This thorny appreciation prefigures Levinas and Jabès’ interactions for decades to follow. 
Derrida happened upon Jabès’ Book of Questions in a newsstand by chance in the spring 
of 1963, a “chance or distracted gesture in the direction of a ‘gallimard’ whose author was 
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unknown to me.”36 Immediately entranced by Jabès’ labyrinthine prose, he drafted and submitted 
his text, “Edmond Jabès and the Question of the Book” for publication by the fall.37 Derrida had 
been teaching as an assistant at the Sorbonne, and following a productive year of writing, including 
the publication of his translation of Husserl’s Origin of Geometry with his impressive introduction, 
he was named maître de conférence at the École Normale Supérieure in the fall of 1963. Though 
Derrida was still a young scholar with few publications to his name, when Jabès caught wind of 
the impending publication – the first contribution to the critical reception of Jabès’ work – he 
initiated a correspondence. In his essay on The Book of Questions, the young Algerian philosopher 
offered a riveting philosophical interpretation of Jabès’ book, arguing alongside, with, and against 
the text itself, in an almost Talmudic style of debate; it was immediately clear that Jabès had found 
a singularly insightful and sympathetic reader of his work. “C’est de l’excellent,” Jabès exclaimed 
in a letter to Derrida dated October 10, 1963, “the pathways that you open are those that I have not 
visited without knowing in advance where they would take me. Reading you, I discover these 
pathways traced so well that it seems to me that I have always known your book.”38 Derrida’s 
essay displayed a probity and insight into The Book of Questions that previewed the dialogue 
between them that would continue in publications, correspondences, and face to face meetings for 
three decades. “Edmond Jabès and the Question of the Book,” published in Critique in January 
1964, also contains Derrida’s first reference to Levinas. Where Jabès writes, “I attach great value 
to what is said, more, perhaps, than to what is written; for in what is written my voice is missing 
and I believe in it – I mean the creative voice, not the auxiliary voice which is a servant [j'entends 
la voix créatrice, non la voix complice qui est une servante],”39 Derrida comments, “In the work 
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of Emmanuel Levinas can be found the same hesitation, the same anxious movement within the 
difference between the Socratic and the Hebraic, the poverty and the wealth of the letter, the 
pneumatic and the grammatical.”40 He returns to the same line from Jabès concerning voice and 
written language in “Violence and Metaphysics,” but it is reversed as a challenge to Levinas 
concerning the creative power of the spoken word to escape the phenomenality of being.  
Derrida met Levinas early in 1964, inaugurating an important relationship for the two 
philosophers that continued for decades. At the recommendation of Paul Ricoeur, Derrida read 
Totality and Infinity in 1962, and he began crafting his monumental essay on Levinas, “Violence 
and Metaphysics,” in the summer of 1963. He started attending Levinas’ Tuesday night seminar 
at the Sorbonne in the winter of 1964. Though initially hesitant, he would speak to Levinas at the 
end of the class sessions. Derrida recalled that in one of their first conversations, they discussed 
Jabès’ recent book. “I have long hesitated – even after they had been published – to send you these 
‘dead leaves,’” Derrida wrote to Levinas in the spring of 1964 concerning “Violence and 
Metaphysics.”41 But, he continues, “then we talked about Jabès, and then I thought that what I 
occasionally try to say in these pages is sometimes linked, in another way, with what I ventured in 
the text you will soon read in the R[evue] de M[étaphysique].” It seems that Jabès’ provocative 
book allowed Derrida to overcome his reticence and speak with Levinas. “Violence and 
Metaphysics” was published in two parts in the Revue de Métaphysique later in 1964. Derrida 
reads Levinas’ work against the backdrop of his former teachers Husserl and Heidegger, offering 
keen insights but also stinging criticism of Totality and Infinity, interpreting him back into the very 
existential philosophy from which he sought to depart.42 It was the first publication devoted to 
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Levinas’ first major work. Despite the severity of his assessment, Sarah Hammerschlag notes, “as 
he must also have known, Derrida was doing Levinas a great service,” since the essay raised the 
profile of Levinas’ book.43 Even in disagreement, they recognized each other’s value as a critical 
interlocutor. Derrida wrote him that he viewed their relationship as both “as close to your thought 
and as far from it as it is possible to be; which is contradictory only in terms of what you call 
‘formal logic’”44 By the same token, Levinas concludes his fiercely critical essay “Jacques 
Derrida: Wholly Otherwise” by “emphasizing the primordial importance of the questions raised 
by Derrida,” and acknowledging “the pleasure of a contact at the heart of a chiasmus [un contact 
au coeur d’un chiasme].”45 This extreme tension, the paradoxical simultaneity of proximity and 
distance, marked Derrida and Levinas’ interactions for decades. 
Derrida makes a point of linking his texts on Jabès and Levinas. “Edmond Jabès and the 
Question of the Book” and “Violence and Metaphysics” appear consecutively in Derrida’s 1967 
book Writing and Difference, but there is also a noteworthy intertextual melding of these essays. 
Just as the first reference in Derrida’s work to Levinas is found in the essay on Jabès, the very first 
mention of Levinas in “Violence and Metaphysics” is framed by the distinctly Jabèsian metaphor 
of the desert: against the backdrop of the Hellenic influence over philosophy, Derrida writes that 
Levinas’ thought emerges from “the heart of the desert, in the growing wasteland.”46 The thinking 
of infinity that arises from the vast nothingness of the desert represents Levinas’ rebuttal to the 
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Hellenic philosophical tradition. As Jabès writes, “in the desert the sense of the infinite is 
unconditional,” “in the desert, you are divested of everything—even language, which counts for 
nothing, makes no more sense, in a world from which man has been erased. There, language balks, 
comes to an end.”47 The nothingness of the desert as the total desolation of language and meaning 
echoes Levinas’ evaluation of the philosophy of Being in what he calls the “il y a.” Derrida’s 
description of Levinas’ thought as emerging from the desert therefore calls upon the Jabèsian 
image par excellence. Later in Derrida’s essay, the connection to Jabès is made explicitly, when 
he asks if Levinas would subscribe to the “infinitely ambiguous sentence” from The Book of 
Questions: “All faces are His; this is why HE has no face [Tout les visages sont le Sien; c’est 
pourquoi IL n’a pas de visage].”48 Interlacing these texts, Derrida weaves Levinas’ emphasis on 
the face and Jabès’ obsession with the book, suggesting an unexplored proximity and salient 
comparison. Derrida uses Jabès’ words as a foil to challenge the limits of Levinas’ discourse; 
inversely, he alludes to Levinas in his commentary of Jabès’ text to highlight their shared concerns, 
pushing back against the distancing that Levinas had expressed in his own letter to Jabès. Linking 
his argumentative strategy in these respective essays, it is almost as if Derrida were trying to bring 
about a conversation between Jabès and Levinas, two of his foremost philosophical and literary 
interlocutors from the period, by playing them off one another. 
Derrida, Levinas, and Jabès’ first encounters between 1963 and 1964 inaugurated an 
uncanny triangular relationship. Each interaction between two of these thinkers was in some sense 
mediated by the third: Derrida and Levinas discussed Jabès; Derrida refers to Levinas in his essay 
on Jabès, and vice-versa; Levinas’ reproach to Jabès’ Book of Questions prefaces his eventual 
																																																						
47 Edmond Jabès and Benjamin Taylor, “The Question of Jewishness and the Question of Writing: An Exchange with 
Edmond Jabès” The Threepenny Review, No. 21 (Spring, 1985), 16. 




criticism of Derrida. The overlaps and contingencies of these writers reveal a fascinating 
triangulation of shared perspectives and obdurate differences.49 During the years that immediately 
followed, Derrida, Jabès, and Levinas emerged as important voices for a new generation of 
philosophical and literary exploration, representing different perspectives of Jewish diaspora, and 
a new understanding of language, exile, and hospitality. This dialogue continued and evolved over 
the course of three decades, winding through published texts, private correspondences, but also 
through social interactions at aperitifs, dinner, and even family events. Even in their fiercest 
disagreements regarding Judaism, language, or ethics, Jabès, Derrida, and Levinas remain linked, 
returning time and again to engage each other’s interrogations. Through an exploration of their 
published and private exchanges, this project seeks to illustrate the triangle between these thinkers 
through the perspective of the “adventure of the book,” the crucial site for questions of language, 
nationality, and Judaism. 
 
 
III. Derrida and Jabès: A Friendship of Letters 
  
The friendship between Derrida and Jabès is perhaps best understood from the perspective of its 
end. On April 16, 1992, the day that would have marked his eightieth birthday, the Collège 
International de Philosophie hosted a colloquium in Paris honoring Edmond Jabès, in the presence 
of his wife Arlette and many of his friends and collaborators. The Egyptian-born writer had died 
the previous year on January 2, 1991. Organized by director of the Collège International de 
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Philosophie Michel Deguy, and Jabès’ friend and collaborator Didier Cahen, the event featured 
several lectures and a round-table discussion of Jabès’ writing, as well as a reading from his final 
publication, The Book of Hospitality. Over two dozen writers, philosophers, and critics contributed 
texts to the volume that was subsequently published in his honor, Saluer Jabès.50 Derrida was 
unable to attend the event in person due to his concurrent teaching obligations at the University of 
Irvine in California, but Cahen requested that he nonetheless contribute a short text in the spirit of 
“sharing, memory, friendship,” which would be read as an opening to the colloquium. “We know 
the connections that unite you with Edmond Jabès” Cahen wrote to Derrida, “and we would 
therefore be very touched by your participation.”51 Derrida responded to Cahen with a letter 
entitled, “From the Other Side of the World.”52 That Derrida was absent from Paris on the day of 
the colloquium and his contribution therefore came in the form of a letter was, in a certain sense, 
all too appropriate for his friendship with Jabès: their relationship began with an exchange of letters 
before they met face to face, and even as they saw each other with some regularity, their 
correspondence continued for nearly thirty years. Derrida remarks that his dialogue with Jabès had 
concerned death and mourning from the beginning: “Friendship had thus already come to be 
reflected in mourning, in the eyes of the poem, even before friendship.”53 Their friendship began 
as a reflection on death and writing. “When friendship begins before friendship, it touches upon 
death, indeed, it is born in mourning,” writes Derrida, but it is also “doubly affirmed, twice sealed.” 
Derrida’s friendship with Jabès, “this recognition, this gratitude before all knowledge” was 
destined to survive even death. 54 If Jabès and Derrida’s friendship was initially forged in letters 
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through a discussion of death, in what sense does Jabès’ death bring an end to their friendship? By 
commemorating Jabès’ work in a letter addressed to their mutual friend Didier Cahen, Derrida 
prolonged their epistolary exchange beyond death. Their friendship survives as a written trace. 
 The event at the Collège International de Philosophie was held on Jabès’ actual eightieth 
birthday, but Derrida recalled that this was not the date officially recorded on his birth certificate. 
Jabès had alluded to this discrepancy in Elya, the fifth volume of Le Livre des Questions published 
in 1969: “Although I was born on April 16 in Cairo, my father inadvertently declared to the 
consul’s office making out my birth certificate that I was born on the 14th of that month [Né le 16 
avril au Caire, mon père par inadvertence, aux autorités consulaires chargées d’établir mon acte 
de naissance, me déclara né le 14 du même mois].”55 The date recorded on Jabès’ birth certificate 
was two days before he was actually born. While such an administrative mistake was not terribly 
rare in Egypt at the time, it suggests something more profound about the way that birth is 
memorialized. Jabès asked, “is it to this error in calculation I unconsciously owe the feeling that I 
have always been separated from my life by forty-eight hours? The two days added to mine could 
only be lived in death? [Dois-je inconsciemment à cette erreur de calcul, le sentiment que 
quarante-huit heures m’ont toujours séparé de ma vie? Les deux jours ajoutés aux miens ne 
pouvaient être vécus que dans la mort?]” His official birthday would always be two days ahead of 
his life, and only in death could he finally catch up with this deferral. The first declaration of Jabès’ 
existence was an absence. Like the silent aleph with which God begins the work of creation, “as 
with the book, as with God in the world, the first manifestation of my existence was an absence 
which bore my name. [comme pour le livre, comme pour Dieu dans le monde, la première 
manifestation de mon existence fut celle d’une absence qui portait mon nom].” In a certain sense, 
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a birthday is the most concrete fact regarding an individual’s life; in another sense, it is a 
completely unimportant marker that signifies nothing beyond an arbitrary date on the calendar. 
Jabès elaborated in his 1980 interview with Marcel Cohen, “behind the completely banal anecdote, 
it is the arbitrariness of birth that find itself at issue. When are we really born?”56 Conversely, we 
can wonder when a person really dies, and if the commemoration of the moment of death isn’t 
arbitrary in its own respect. Derrida recalled that Jabès frequently evoked this deferral, “as if the 
difference of a day or two made his birth just as unlocatable, just as unthinkable, as death itself.”57 
Jabès’ mistaken birthday illustrates what Derrida calls “différance”: the legal record of his 
existence was always-already displaced and decentered from its origin.  
By the same token, we might wonder at what moment we commemorate the beginning of 
a friendship—or even its end. Derrida recognized in Jabès’ exploration of negativity “a certain 
experience of apophatic silence, of absence, the desert, paths opened up off all the beaten tracks, 
deported memory—in short, mourning, every impossible mourning.” Soon after discovering The 
Book of Questions in 1963, Derrida wrote “Edmond Jabès and the Question of the Book,” which 
he sent the poet before its publication, inaugurating a friendship between the two francophone, 
North-African-born writers. This friendship unfolded in published books and essays, in private 
letters, postcards, and phone calls, as well as during dinners and aperitifs at Edmond and Arlette 
Jabès’ home in Paris on the rue de l’Epée-de-Bois in the Latin Quarter, just minutes from Derrida’s 
office at the Ecole Normale Supérieure on rue d’Ulm, as well as at Marguerite and Jacques 
Derrida’s home in the Parisian suburbs of Ris Orangis. The intimacy of their friendship is revealed 
in the forms of address animating their correspondence. In their first exchanges, Derrida and Jabès 
write each other in the formal address, “Cher Monsieur”; soon enough, Derrida would address 
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“mon cher Eddie,” just as Jabès addressed “mon cher ami Jacques.” The friendship extended to 
their wives Marguerite Derrida and Arlette Jabès. Derrida sent Jabès postcards from the Swiss 
Alps, Venice, and Baltimore, and Jabès addressed Derrida postcards from trips in Tunisia, 
Jerusalem, and Mallorca; Arlette and Marguerite often contributed their own notes. Their letters 
include condolences after the death of parents, news of growing children, propositions for dinners 
and lunches in Paris, as well as reflections on unpublished manuscripts, criticisms and 
interrogations of publications, and, of course, admiration and affection. Jabès wrote in a 1967 letter 
to Derrida, “Our friendship is – in its entirety – beautiful. It is based on the best of each of us, and 
I am quite happy about it.”58 Though Jabès was almost twenty years Derrida’s senior, their 
friendship was unhindered by generational divide. Their exchanges reveal two thinkers with 
uncanny insight into the other’s writing.  
 Despite the importance that Derrida placed on this friendship, the expansive scholarship 
on the philosopher has marginalized Jabès’ role to a footnote, as the source for two curious essays 
in his 1967 Writing and Difference, “Jabès et La Question du Livre” and “Ellipse,” which highlight 
young Derrida’s flirtations with Jewish mysticism and experimental literature.59 To offer an 
example of the elision of Jabès’ place in Derrida’s thought, in his essay “Mosaic Fragment: If 
Derrida were an Egyptian…” Geoff Bennington writes, “Jewgreek is greekjew: but greekjew is 
Egyptian.”60 He argues that Derrida should be understood neither as Greek, nor as Jewish, nor as 
a combination or synthesis of the two, but rather that Derrida is, at least symbolically, Egyptian. 
Yet Bennington sidesteps Derrida’s most important Egyptian interlocutor, Edmond Jabès, whose 
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reflections on exile, Egypt, and Judaism are central metaphors for both his life and work. 
Bennington frequently quotes Derrida’s essay on Jabès in Writing and Difference, but he avoids 
engaging the Egyptian writer’s place in Derrida’s thought or life. I would posit that to understand 
Derrida as an Egyptian, we need look no further than his relationship with Edmond Jabès, whose 
complicated relation to the nation of his birth is, in many ways, reminiscent of Derrida’s own 
difficult relationship to Algeria and France. In her 2016 book Broken Tablets: Levinas, Derrida, 
and the Literary Afterlife of Religion, Sarah Hammerschlag emphasizes Derrida’s engagement 
with questions of Judaism and literature at the earliest moments of his philosophical trajectory in 
“Edmond Jabès and the Question of the Book.”61 But her book’s focus is the relationship between 
Derrida and Levinas, relegating Jabès to a relatively minor character in this intellectual 
constellation. The interpretation of Derrida’s texts on Jabès in Writing and Difference that she 
proposes highlights their trajectory towards the critical reading of Levinas in “Violence and 
Metaphysics.” I will argue that Derrida, Levinas, and Jabès’ reflections on Judaism and writing 
are best understood together, by reorienting the perspective to include Jabès as a crucial 
interlocutor in reflections on the “broken tablets,” which Hammerschlag takes as a central motif 
in the debate between Derrida and Levinas on religion and literature. Most recently, Didier Cahen’s 
2019 book Trois Pères: Jabès, Derrida, Du Bouchet, recounts the author’s personal relation with 
these three thinkers. He recalls, “it was Derrida who introduced me to Jabès, the Jewish-non-Jew, 
I would say about one and the other.”62 An important interlocutor for both, Cahen’s first-hand 
accounts of Derrida and Jabès illustrates their proximity over the course of three decades. 
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A careful reexamination of Derrida and Jabès’ exchanges reveals a greater affiliation 
between these thinkers than suggested in existing scholarship, particularly regarding their eccentric 
reflections on writing and Judaism. Derrida proffered the audacious claim in 1973, “in 
contemporary literary production, there is nothing that been written which doesn’t have its 
precedent somewhere in Jabès’ texts.”63 His texts on Jabès disclose a significant philosophical 
reckoning. It is impossible to classify Jabès’ writing according to the traditional genres of poetry 
or literature, and he refused to describe himself as a philosopher, even if his writing garnered 
particular interest amongst philosophers. As if somewhat surprised, Jabès remarked in 1986, “even 
in the universities here in France, all the doctoral theses that have been done on my books are in 
philosophy.”64 If there was a reader of who grasped its philosophical import, it was Derrida. “You 
are constantly at the sources of this book and its interrogations. What lucidity, from beginning to 
end!” Jabès wrote him in 1964 after reading “Edmond Jabès and the Question of the Book,” “from 
now on, those who have read you, will know how to read me in depth [en profondeur].”65 The 
Book of Questions was also, in fact, deeply influenced by Derrida’s commentaries, and a dialogue 
between them extends through its seven volumes: Derrida even becomes a character in Jabès’ 
texts. Reciprocally, Derrida was one of Jabès’ earliest commentators, whose writing he described 
as illustrating “the unanticipatable [l’inanticipable], that is to say, the most repressed, most 
familiar, most intolerably close and known, most awaited, henceforth, to have presented itself even 
before time is able to offer it a monument.”66 Derrida’s uncanny recognition in Jabès’ writing is 
illustrative of their intellectual proximity and friendship.  
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The published exchanges do not fully account for the personal and intellectual relationship 
that developed between the Jewish-Franco-Algerian Derrida and the Jewish-Franco-Egyptian 
Jabès. Their mutual understanding surely relates to their personal histories, as fellow Jewish, 
North-African, French-speaking émigrés living in some sense “in exile” in Paris, but their 
intellectual affinity clearly extended beyond their backgrounds. As Derrida expressed in his 1996 
Monolingualism of the Other, “a Judeo-Franco-Maghrebian genealogy does not clarify everything, 
far from it. But could I explain anything without it, ever?”67 Jabès found in Derrida an ideal reader, 
whose own project of deconstruction resonated strongly with the reflections on the book and 
textuality that are the lifeblood of Jabès’ poetry. Here, we may recall what Montaigne says in “De 
l’Amitié” of his friendship with La Boëtie: “parce que c’était lui, parce que c’était moi.”68 The 
basis of their epistolary friendship was, for them, self-evident. Derrida and Jabès regularly sent 
each other manuscripts of their work before publication, and discussed them in letters and in 
person. Derrida was notably one of the first to read the manuscript for Return to the Book, the third 
volume of The Book of Questions, and Jabès offered extensive commentary on many of Derrida’s 
texts in their correspondences. Cultivated for nearly three decades in both published and private 
exchanges, this friendship was formative for both writers. 
 
 
IV. Levinas and the “Third Party”  
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There is a methodological complexity to articulating the constellation of ideas formed by three 
thinkers. Whereas the monograph squarely focuses on an aspect of a specific individual, and 
philosophy’s much-loved dialectical approach pits one thinker against another, lassoing three 
thinkers under the rubric of one conceptual heading imposes a unique difficulty. Such a triadic 
comparison can identify agreement between the three individuals, or it can align two against the 
unlucky third to highlight contrast. Both tendencies risk flattening the unique differences of the 
three individuals to more clearly highlight the pertinence of the comparison. I will guard against 
this sort of reductive reading in search of neat contrasts, and rather I emphasize the polyphony and 
multiple perspectives on Judaism, language, and exile that marked the relationship between 
Levinas, Jabès, and Derrida. The advantage of comparing three thinkers is that it offers a fuller 
picture of a philosophical issue by presenting multiple views of it which don’t necessarily align. 
Further, this approach acknowledges that philosophy is a dialogue between two interlocutors, but 
it is always-already in the presence of what Levinas calls the “third party,” who interrupts the face-
to-face. Following the same logic, this project embraces the irreducible multiplicity of the views 
presented by these three intellectuals without reducing them to false allegiances or oppositions. 
Much has been written about the relationship between Levinas and Derrida. Relevant 
contributions to this expansive corpus include Simon Critchley’s 1992 The Ethics of 
Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas,69 several texts by Robert Bernasconi,70 Hent de Vries’ 2001 
Religion and Violence,71 John Llewelyn’s 2002 Appositions of Jacques  Derrida and Emmanuel 
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Levinas,72 as well as Sarah Hammerschlag’s Broken Tablets. Yet just as there is limited scholarship 
on the relationship between Derrida and Jabès, only a few scant words have been written about 
Levinas and Jabès. Gary D. Mole’s 1997 Lévinas, Blanchot, Jabès: Figures of Estrangement is 
one of the few texts that bring together Jabès and Levinas in relation to the theme of estrangement, 
where the direct exchanges between the two are often mediated by Blanchot.73 It is my contention 
that not only do Jabès’ exchanges with Levinas and Derrida merit closer analysis, but furthermore, 
Jabès’ poetry sheds new light on the much-studied rapport between the two philosophers. Derrida 
and Jabès sometimes described each other in their correspondences as almost kindred spirits 
marked by mutual understanding, while Levinas held himself at a distance from both. This may be 
related to Levinas’ geographical, generational, and cultural differences. Derrida and Jabès were 
North-African born, French-speaking Sephardic Jews who came to France after the Second World 
War, whereas Levinas was a Russian-speaking Ashkenazi Jew from Lithuania, who grew up in the 
shadows of pogroms and the Bolshevik Revolution, emigrated to France and studied with Husserl 
and Heidegger in the 1920s, and survived the war as a prisoner in a Nazi work camp. Levinas 
represented a prior generation and different history.74 But if Levinas is indeed the more distant 
point in the triangle he forms with Jabès and Derrida, for this very reason his philosophical 
perspectives also exerts more pushback against the other two.  
In fact, Levinas has a concept that illustrates this status of the third mediating voice, which 
he calls le tiers, the “third party.” For Levinas, the singularity of the face to face encounter reveals 
the infinity of the other. However, ethics cannot be limited to the singularity of the dialogical and 
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already asymmetrical I-Thou encounter; rather, the face to face is ipso facto perturbed, deepened, 
and extended, by the presence of the “third party.” He explained in 1986: 
Human multiplicity does not allow the I —let us say does not allow me—to forget the third 
party who pulls me away from the proximity of the other: away from responsibility prior 
to all judgment, from the prejudicial responsibility for my fellowman, in his immediacy of 
uniqueness and incomparability, away from original sociality. The third party, different 
from my fellowman, is also my fellowman. And he is also the fellowman of the 
fellowman.75  
 
The third party interrupts the singular encounter of the face-to-face, it is the intervening voice of 
justice, or language. In the same manner, Jabès, Derrida, and Levinas’ disagreements variably 
condense into dialogical relationships that are interrupted by the third party. Levinas may be more 
distant from Jabès and Derrida, but each at times becomes the third party in the dialogue with the 
other two. As Levinas explains in Totality and Infinity, “The third party looks at me in the eyes of 
the Other-language is justice,” the third interrupts the singular exchange of the face-to-face, and 
bears witnesses to the ethical encounter. He equates this to the intervention of language or justice 
in the dialogical face-to-face relation. Levinas continues, “The presence of the face, the infinity of 
the other, is a destituteness, a presence of the third party (that is, of the whole of humanity which 
looks at us), and a command that commands commanding.”76 The third party interrupts the face-
to-face and enjoins the self and Other to look beyond the ethical to the question of justice. If 
Levinas is often the third party in the relationship with Jabès and Derrida, it is because of his 
reckoning with the ethical and religious.  
Levinas’ assertion of the positivity of metaphysics and the ethico-religious importance of 
Judaism serves as a counterpoint to Derrida’s deconstruction of the history of metaphysics, and 
Jabès’ poetics of negativity. In his 1995 panegyric address Adieu, Derrida recounts that Levinas 
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would tell him, "You know, one often speaks of ethics to describe what I do, but what really 
interests me in the end is not ethics, not ethics alone, but the holy, the holiness of the holy [le saint, 
la sainteté du saint].”77 Indeed, Derrida notes that Levinas’ reflections on ethics are inseparable 
from “an incessant reflection upon the destiny and thought of Israel: yesterday, today, and 
tomorrow. Such reflection consisted of requestioning and reaffirming the legacies not only of the 
biblical and Talmudic tradition but of the terrifying memory of our time.”78 As Derrida had 
observed in “Violence and Metaphysics,” Levinas’ ethical thought contests the uniquely Greek 
origin of philosophy, and instead his notion of infinity calls upon an ethical messianic force that 
draws from the Jewish tradition. In this sense, Levinas’ Talmudic perspective offers a counterpoint 
to the eccentric discussions of Judaism in Jabès’ poetry and Derrida’s interpretations. 
 This project is an intellectual history of the dialogue and friendship between Derrida, 
Levinas, and Jabès, and what they describe as the “adventure” of the book. The backdrop for the 
exchanges between these three principal figures calls upon a common cast of thinkers who share 
in their intellectual constellation. The philosophical legacies of Edmund Husserl’s 
phenomenology, Martin Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, and Jean-Paul Sartre’ existentialism 
are constantly at issue for these thinkers. Furthermore, behind their reflections on French Judéité 
after the Shoah, there are echoes of a prior generation of German-speaking Jewish thinkers 
including Franz Rosenzweig, Gershom Scholem, Walter Benjamin, Franz Kafka, and debates from 
the Weimar era concerning the possibility of Deutsch-Judentum. This legacy, both avowed and 
unavowed, haunts this dialogue across history. Perhaps most decisvely, writer and literary theorist 
Maurice Blanchot was a crucial interlocutor for Derrida, Jabès, and Levinas, and his reflections 
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the possibility of literature in the wake of catastrophe foreground essential questions for this 
project. To be sure, these names all figure in the ideas that are at stake here. However, the 
specificity of this project highlights the relationship between writing, exile, and Judaism for these 
three thinkers in France beginning in the 1960s. As we will see, this problematic unfolds through 
the question of the book. 
 
 
V. Structure of the Project 
 
“The Adventure of the Book” is composed of five chapters that analyze the constellation of ideas 
formed by Derrida, Jabès, and Levinas. Its chapters explore the generative roots of these questions 
in the history of philosophy, leading through the exchanges of these three thinkers across several 
decades, revealing different aspects of their relation to writing and Judaism. 
The first chapter is entitled “The Writing of Exile.” I will introduce the three central figures 
of the project, offering a brief biographical sketch of the formative events in their early lives, 
notably their respective experiences of displacement and exile which brought them to France. This 
chapter explores the connection between writing and exile for Derrida, Levinas, and Jabès, and 
frames their narratives of displacement in terms of the Greek valorization of homecoming, nostos, 
and the Jewish history of exile, galut. I suggest that these thinkers treat “the book” as a proxy for 
questions of exile and estrangement. Their reflections on the overlapping questions of language, 
nationality, religion, and birthplace reveal the contingency of identity and affiliation, and the 
fraught lines of exclusion they impose. I situate these narratives of exile in terms of Jewish diaspora 




Chapter two, “The Jew, the Pariah, the Writer,” explores the question of Jewish 
identification and affiliation, and the stakes of the “Jewish” writer. From 19th century debates over 
the “Jewish Question” to the search for redefinition for Jews in France following the Shoah, Jewish 
identity is caught between the double-sided exclusion of Jewish self-definition and the externally 
imposed projection of the anti-Semite. We will look at the figure of the Jewish pariah, and Bernard 
Lazare’s re-appropriation of this anti-Semitic trope as the “conscious pariah,” which Hannah 
Arendt called a “hidden tradition” of modern Jewish history. Through Levinas’ critical reading of 
Sartre’s Réflexions sur la question juive, he reformulates Judaism as an existential orientation, as 
part of post-war reflections on Judaism and Jewish identity in France. For Levinas, the fact of 
Jewish “election” inaugurates a form of subjectivity founded on an ethical responsibility to the 
Other. By contrast, Jabès and Derrida’s reflections on the intractable aporia of Jewish identity 
discloses what the latter calls “hyperbolic Judaism,” which follows the paradoxical logic of the 
“too much” or “not enough,” as a form of questioning, rather than a substantive identity.  
The third chapter, “The Absolute Book and its Demise,” analyzes the “absolute” book in 
Hegel’s idealism, with a focus on Alexander Kojève’s influential course on the Phenomenology of 
Spirit in Paris during the 1930s. For Levinas who attended the seminar and Derrida who avidly 
read it in the 1950s, Kojève’s commentary on Hegel’s absolute book marks the apotheosis of 
philosophical idealism. In Totality and Infinity, Levinas stakes his opposition to the philosophical 
tradition of totality, which culminates with Hegel’s philosophy. Derrida’s reading of Hegel in Of 
Grammatology dismantles the absolute book in favor of an understanding of writing as text and 
trace. The deconstruction of the book liberates writing from the metaphysics of presence, and 
unleashes the free play of signifiers. I contrast Derrida and Levinas’ notions of the trace to illustrate 




The fourth chapter, “Writing After the Broken Tablets,” explores the motif of Moses’ 
shattered tablets from the Book of Exodus. I analyze interpretations of this pivotal scene in the 
Jewish tradition, and how they dovetail with philosophical reflections on the broken tablets from 
Spinoza, Nietzsche, and others. The shattered tablets become the symbol for human writing, a 
power symbolically wrested from God in the moment that Moses shattered the tablets inscribed 
with the original commandments. For Jabès and Derrida, the shattered tablets presents the 
ambivalence of the book pulled between its biblical heritage and the freedom of poetic expression. 
Tussling with the legacy of the broken tablets, their reflections on the question of the book are 
connected to the biblical tradition, even as they seek freedom from this tradition. In Derrida’s 
Writing and Difference and Jabès’ The Book of Questions, the broken tablets become the image 
for a new understanding of writing that embraces fragmentation and the apophatic language of the 
unsayable, as an expression of the ambivalent, impossible, yet inescapable affiliation of the writer 
and Judaism, the poet and the prophet. 
The fifth chapter, “The Adventure of the Book,” retraces the theme of adventure in Derrida, 
Jabès, and Levinas’ reflection on writing and the book. Revisiting philosophical debates over 
adventure in Kant and Goethe, but also Nietzsche, Simmel, Jankélévitch, Sartre, Beauvoir, and 
others, adventure stands in opposition to a certain rationalist conception of philosophy and its 
writing. Analyzing the exchanges between Derrida, Jabès, and Levinas during the 1970s, we will 
see how their reconceptualization of philosophy is inspired by a certain adventurous spirit that is 
distinct from that of Odysseus and the Greek tradition. Whereas Derrida describes the history of 
philosophy as a prolonged metaphysical adventure which is built on certain illusions and fictions, 
Jabès describes his process of writing in terms of an adventure whose destination remains 




adventure which either turns towards the self and nostos (Odysseus), or towards the infinity of 
alterity (Abraham). We will see that Levinas, Derrida, and Jabès’ reflections on the adventure of 
the book disclose philosophical thought in movement,  
The conclusion of the project explores the connection between writing and hospitality. For 
Derrida, Jabès, and Levinas, the “adventure of the book” is a reflection on displacement and exile, 
but the book reciprocally poses the question of hospitality to the stranger: books can be welcoming, 
they can be offered as gifts, and they can serve as invitations, but books can also be ignored, 
banned, or burned. These authors draw an analogy between the book and the treatment of the Other 
through in reflections on the persistence of anti-Semitism, xenophobia, and racism in France, as 
well as questions posed by the state of Israel. Revisiting Jabès’ final book, The Book of Hospitality, 
along with Derrida and Levinas’ writing on the possibility of pure hospitality and its conditioned 






Chapter I: The Writing of Exile 
 
 
I. Introduction  
 
Levinas, Derrida, and Jabès are products of Jewish diaspora. Despite the vast differences in their 
respective engagements with religion, and eschewing any pretention of a symptomatic reading of 
their “Jewishness,” they were each profoundly shaped by exile, dislocation, and exclusion. Levinas 
left Lithuania for France in 1923 to pursue his studies; Jabès was forced to leave his native Cairo 
for Paris in 1957 following the Suez Crisis; Derrida was born a French citizen in colonial Algiers, 
but moved to Paris in 1949. Their stories reflect modern experiences of exile, where nationality is 
interwoven with questions of language, religion, and culture. In each case, they were born in 
countries claimed by colonial empires, they mainly spoke the languages of the colonizers and they 
were educated in their schools, but they represented neither the indigenous populations nor the 
colonizers. As a Jew, Levinas was not considered Lithuanian or Russian; Derrida did not identify 
as simply Algerian or French; Jabès was not accepted as Egyptian, he spoke French, and yet he 
was born an Italian citizen. They were from largely assimilated Jewish families, but it was political 
turmoil directly or indirectly threatening Jews that provoked them to leave their home countries 
for France. Their experiences of exile attest to the contingency of nationality, language, and 
religion, and the precariousness of the claim to a homeland, regardless of the territory one inhabits. 
“So where has the Jew lived?” Jabès writes, “In his book, of course. It was after all a book that 




had a book; and once deprived of their land, their book alone was left to them.”79 For Jabès, 
Derrida, and Levinas, the book becomes a proxy for the adventure of departure and the condition 
of galut, exile. This chapter explores the narratives of exile which led these three thinkers from 
their birthplaces to Paris, and the legacy of galut that frames questions of Judaism and “the book.”  
 
 
II. Nostos and Galut 
  
“Odysseus, the greatest adventurer of all time, is also the greatest nostalgic,” writes Milan 
Kundera.80 Against the formidable obstacles that the hero of Homer’s epic confronts in his quest 
to return from Troy, Odysseus is tirelessly driven by “the return, the return, the great magic of the 
return,” so that he might rejoin Penelope and Telemachus in Ithaca, and assume his throne.81 From 
nostos, return, and algos, suffering, nostalgia signifies the pain of exile and the yearning for return. 
The Greek reverence for nostalgia is expressed in the tradition of epic poetry which places 
tremendous value in nostos, the homecoming. Emily Wilson describes The Odyssey as “the story 
of a man whose grand adventure is simply to go back to his own home, where he tries to turn 
everything back to the way it was before he went away.”82 For Homer and the poetic tradition that 
follows, nostos is a literary genre featuring shipwrecks and sea-monsters encountered during the 
adventure home. The overarching plot of the Odyssey is the emblematic form of the nostos tale, 
and it includes many smaller nostos tales. During his journey, Odysseus recounts his own nostos 
																																																						
79 Edmond Jabès, “The Question of Jewishness and The Question of Writing: An Exchange With Edmond Jabès” The 
Threepenny Review, No. 21 (Spring, 1985), 16. 
80 Milan Kundera, Ignorance, trans. Linda Asher (New York: Perennial, 2002), 7. 
81 Ibid, 5. 




to others he encounters, just as other characters including Menelaus and Nestor tell him their own 
homecoming stories.83 In the Odyssey, Anna Bonifazi notes, “the performance of a micro nostos 
tale is embedded in the performance of a macro nostos tale.”84 The layering of homecoming stories 
illustrates that the experience of exile is inextricably bound to its modes of memorialization, in 
storytelling and performance. For the Greek poetic tradition, “the experience of nostos is 
inseparable from performing nostos, to the extent that every nostos tale retains memory of the 
successful experience of getting life again; it makes memory survive time and gives the hero 
afterlife.”85 The experience of nostos is validated by its performance, which permits its hero to 
transcend the ephemerality of individual memory, and follow Odysseus’ path. “Homer glorified 
nostalgia with a laurel wreath,” Kundera writes, “and thereby laid out a moral hierarchy of 
emotions.”86 The Greek tradition lionizes the hero of the successful nostos with moral approbation, 
organizing activities of memory, storytelling, and performance according to its logic.  
By contrast, the patriarchs of the Hebrew Bible are commanded to shed their attachment to 
the land of their birth, and go forth into the unknown. Delphine Horvilleur explains the crucial 
place of departure in Jewish identity:  
If there is a strong lesson in Judaism, it is that pure, authentic, and static identity does not 
exist. All the founding narratives tell the story of people who leave the place they were 
born because they have a duty to not be identical to who they were. Their veritable identity 
is to have left their identity. Abraham accedes to his destiny when he leaves the Chaldea 
of his birth. The Hebrew people is born when it leaves Egypt. The origin of Jewish thought 
is that one must not be identical to one’s origin.87  
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Against Odysseus’ will to return home, Judaism is a story of departure. Emmanuel Levinas writes 
in his 1963 essay “The Trace of the Other,” "to the myth of Ulysses returning to Ithaca, we wish 
to oppose the story of Abraham who leaves his fatherland forever for a yet unknown land, and 
forbids his servant even to bring back his son to the point of departure.”88 In contrast to Greek 
nostos, the Bible highlights departure. In the Book of Genesis, God commands Abram “lech 
lecha,” to “go forth” and leave his birthplace in Ur of the Chaldeans and bring his wife Sarai to 
Canaan, an unknown land, promising him, "I will make you into a great nation.”89 In Abraham’s 
covenant with God, departure is thereby linked to the promise of redemption. After the birth of 
Sarah’s son Isaac, when Abraham sends away his handmaiden Hagar and their son Ishmael, God 
tells Abraham, “the son of the handmaid I will make into a nation, because he is your seed.”90 For 
Abraham and his progeny, departure is linked to commandment and election, and it extirpates the 
nostalgia for a return to the mythical (pagan) past. 
Exile, Galut in Hebrew or Golus in Yiddish, has served as the existential condition of the 
Jewish people. The Bible and the subsequent history of the Jewish people are marked by the 
repeated narrative of exile and return from the Holy Land. Exile has often been associated with 
sin, as punishment for the moral failings of the Jewish people, and traditional rabbinic sources 
have long contrasted Galut with Geula, redemption. Humanity’s exile begins in the Book of 
Genesis when Adam and Eve are banished from Paradise for eating from the Tree of Knowledge.91 
But in a stricter sense, the cycle of exile and return is inaugurated in the Book of Exodus: Joseph 
and his family descend from Canaan due to famine and settle in Egypt, where the Jews are 
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eventually enslaved, until Moses leads the people out of Egypt and to the edge of the Promised 
Land. The pattern of exile and return becomes the hallmark of subsequent Jewish history. 
Four main periods of exile, arba galuyot, mark the history of the Jewish people from 
antiquity to the present day, named after the four civilizations which seized Israel and expulsed 
the Jews: Babylon, Persia, Greece, and Rome. These four exiles were supposedly prophesized in 
the Book of Daniel, in which Daniel dreams of four beasts: a lion, a bear, a leopard, and a fourth 
beast too “awesome and dreadful and exceedingly strong” to name, which represent the four 
exiles.92 The Babylonian king Nebuchadnezzar prompted the first exile when he captured Israel, 
destroyed Solomon’s Temple in Jerusalem, and exiled the Jews at the end of the 6th century BCE. 
The Purim Megillah recounts that in the middle of the 4th century BCE the Persian king Ahaseurus 
ordered the execution of all Jews in the Holy Land, following his advisor Haman, only to be 
undermined by the king’s Jewish wife Esther and her cousin, the leader of the Jews, Mordechai. 
The Greek Seleucid dynasty reigned in Israel after the death of Alexander the Great in 323 BCE. 
The last of these Greek rulers was King Antiochus IV of the Syrian Hasmonean kingdom, whose 
persecution of Jews and attempt to outlaw their practices provoked the Maccabee Revolt from 167 
to 160 BCE. This is recounted in the Hanukkah story, in which Judah Maccabee and the vastly 
outnumbered Jews overcome the Seleucids, and rededicate the Second Temple with the miracle of 
the oil which was said to last eight days. The fourth exile of the Jewish people was precipitated by 
the Romans conquest of Judea in the first century of the common era. The Romans destroyed the 
second Temple in Jerusalem in 70 CE, and emperor Hadrian expulsed the Jews from Jerusalem in 
132 CE following the suppression of the Bar Kokhba rebellion. This began two millennia of exile 
which saw the diaspora of the Jewish people across the world. Just as exile is traditionally 
																																																						




associated with sin, the end of the Jewish exile is closely associated with the eschatological hope 
for the coming of the Maschiach. Some view the end to exile as a political imperative for the 
Jewish people. Indeed, the “negation” of galut has long been a key tenet of certain strains of 
Zionism, which in a certain sense has become a political reality since the establishment of the state 
of Israel in 1948, the latest twist in the drama of exile and return. This dynamic becomes a 
structural feature of Jewish history, primed in the Bible, and repeated in world history.  
The cycle of exile and return is memorialized in the Jewish liturgical calendar on Tisha 
B’Av, the holiday that commemorates five tragic events that befell the Jews on this day, including 
the destruction of both the first and second temples. In Yosef Yerushalmi’s Zahkor, a study of 
Jewish practices of memory and historiography, he references a lament written by an unknown 
author for Tisha B’Av which weaves together the past and present exiles of the Jewish people, 
inscribing this structural repetition of exile and return as a kind of Jewish collective memory: 
A fire kindles within me as I recall—when I left Egypt, 
But I raise laments as I remember—when I left Jerusalem. 
 
Moses sang a song that would never be forgotten—when I left Egypt, 
Jeremiah mourned and cried out in grief—when I left Jerusalem. 
 
The sea-waves pounded but stood up like a wall—when I left Egypt, 
The waters overflowed and ran over my head—when I left Jerusalem. 
 
Moses led me and Aaron guided me—when I left Egypt, 
Nebuchadnezzar and the Emperor Hadrian—when I left Jerusalem…93 
 
This section of a longer lament weaves the archetypal Exodus narrative in the refrain with the 
subsequent exiles of the Jews at the hands of Nebuchadnezzar and Hadrian, suggesting the 
continuity of this history pattern in Jewish memory. The personal identification with these 
historical memories – when I left Egypt, when I left Jerusalem – is significant. The catastrophe of 
																																																						




exile and the hope of return are not based on discrete historical events which befell particular Jews 
at particular moments in the past; rather, they illustrate the condition of the Jewish people across 
history, and the continued reverberations of the past in the present. In the Book of Deuteronomy, 
Moses exhorts the Jewish people to keep the rituals of the Passover because “you shall remember 
that you were a slave in Egypt.”94 By the same token, an important Talmudic refrain from Rabbi 
Gamaliel included in the Passover Haggadah notes, “In each and every generation let each person 
regard himself as though he had emerged from Egypt.”95 The repetition of exile occurs for Jews 
of every generation because the Torah insists that all Jews, past and future, were present at Sinai 
when God’s covenant was sealed with the Jewish people. Every individual personally undergoes 
the experience of exile and return as part of the collective history of Jewish people, with a personal 
stake in the covenant with God. Yerushalmi writes, “That which is remembered here transcends 
the recollection of any particular episode in an ancient catastrophe. It is rather the realization of a 
structural contrast in Jewish historical experience, built around the dramatic polarity of two great 
historical ‘departures.’”96 This pattern of exile and return structures the Jewish liturgical calendar. 
Halbertal explains that this becomes the “framework narrative” which connecting the “people of 
the book” across its diaspora through its shared canonical texts: 
In text-centered societies the framework shared by a community is intimately connected to 
a canonical text, which in its turn may be a framework narrative, one that members of a 
society identify as their own. Framework narratives usually concern the events that 
constituted the community, and their protagonists are founding fathers, characters larger 
then life who shaped the society when things were still fluid, like the gods in creation myths 
who formed the cosmos out of chaos. The American Revolution, the French Revolution, 
the Exodus from Egypt are but three examples of framework narratives. However, these 
narratives are not tied to a single canonical text unless the society itself is text-centered. 
The story of the American Revolution is not connected to any canonical text; it is an event 
that is taught, told, and commemorated through a variety of texts (though a canonical 
history of the American Revolution may exist within academic circles). In text-centered 
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societies, by contrast, the framework narrative is intimately connected to a specific text. 
Allegiance and identity with a narrative are mediated through allegiance to a text. Belief in 
the Exodus and belief in the Book of Exodus are basically indistinguishable.97  
 
The framework narrative of exile is constitutive of the Jewish people as a “text-centered” society, 
and the bond between this framework narrative and its textual corpus is absolute. Practices of 
textual interpretation articulate and invigorate this connection of the Jewish people to its books.  
 The Jewish history of exile and text-centeredness reverberates long after the biblical and 
ancient narratives of departure and return from the Holy Land. Following the Roman destruction 
of the Second Temple and the expulsion of the Jews from Judea, the Medieval history of Jewish 
communities living in diaspora across Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East is marked by a 
long series of forced conversions, expulsions, and massacres. Accused of blood libel, poisoning 
wells, propagating the Black Plague, and other nefarious plots, the Medieval history of European 
Jews is marked by a rolling series of expulsions. The Jews were expelled from Upper Bavaria for 
the first time in 1276, from Naples in 1288, and Edouard I banished the Jews from England in 
1290. The Jews were repeatedly expelled from France during the 14th century, their property and 
valuables were taken to enrich the throne, and then they were allowed to return at a cost. There 
were expulsions of French Jews from Paris ordered by Philip Augustus in 1182, and edicts banning 
Jews from all of France issued by Louis IX in 1254, Philip IV in 1306, Charles IV in 1322, Charles 
V in 1359, and ultimately Charles VI’s expulsion in 1394 which remained in effect until the 18th 
century. But the most significant and catastrophic event in the pre-modern history of Jewish 
diaspora was the 1492 Alhambra Decree issued by Ferdinand II and Isabella which ordered the 
expulsion of the Jews from the Kingdom of Spain, capping a century of persecution and forced 
																																																						




conversions.98 After forcing Jews in Spain to convert on penalty of death during the Inquisition, 
the remaining Jews were exiled from Spain for fear that they might cause the conversos who had 
adopted Catholicism to revert. It is thought that approximately 200,000 Spanish Jews converted – 
including many who continued to secretly practice Jewish traditions as “crypto-Jews’” or 
marranos – and up to 100,000 were exiled from Spain, fleeing north towards the Netherlands, 
south towards the North African Maghreb, and east towards Italy, as well as areas controlled by 
the Ottoman Empire in Egypt and the Fertile Crescent.99 Both Derrida‘s family in Algeria and 
Jabès’ family in Egypt could trace their arrivals to the expulsion of Jews from Spain. 
 Diaspora is a historical fact for the Jewish people, whether one embraces diaspora or 
bemoans life in exile in search of return. Erich S. Gruen explains, 
Diaspora lies deeply rooted in Jewish consciousness. It existed in one form or another 
almost from the start, and it persists as an integral part of the Jews’ experience of history. 
The status of absence from the center has demanded time and again that Jews confront and, 
in some fashion, come to terms with a seemingly inescapable concomitant of their being. 
The images of uprootedness, dispersal, and wandering haunt Jewish identity throughout. 
Jews have written about it incessantly, lamented it or justified it, dismissed it or grappled 
with it, embraced it or deplored it.100  
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An interesting relation emerges between the terms exile and diaspora. Exile traditionally holds a 
negative connotation. “To be in galut,” Howard Wettstein explains, “is to be in the wrong place; 
it is to be dislocated, like a limb out of socket”; by contrast, the related term diaspora, “does not 
connote anything so hauntingly negative.”101 The opposing valences of exile and diaspora 
discloses a profound theological-political question for modern Jews: can there be diaspora that 
isn’t caught in the deleterious sense of exile? Gruen describes Jewish diaspora in terms of two 
views: the “gloomy approach” holds that “diaspora dissolves into galut, exile, a bitter and doleful 
image, offering a bleak vision that issues either in despair or in a remote reverie of restoration.”102 
According to this view, diaspora is a problem to be overcome, in the form of a return to “a real or 
mythical homeland.” This dim view of diaspora is connected to the development of Zionism and 
the political and spiritual need for a Jewish national homeland. The opposing view embraces 
diaspora as a positive development which has even contributed to Jewish life. According to this 
perspective, Gruen continues, “Jews require no territorial sanctuary or legitimation. They are ‘the 
people of the Book.’” Diaspora is not a weakened state of Jewish existence, rather, “their homeland 
resides in the text,” and in the absence of a state and a temple, “their ‘portable Temple’ serves the 
purpose,” rendering a national homeland “superfluous, even subversive.” In modernity – because 
the moral opposition of diaspora and return is a modern creation – Jewish text-centeredness and a 
positive assessment of diaspora largely go hand in hand, against the correlation of the negative 
view of diaspora, the desire for return, and Zionism.103  
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The history of exile for the Jewish people instills as a correlative an ethical imperative to 
show hospitality to the stranger. The commandment to remember the Exodus from Egypt is 
reciprocally paired with the commandment to care for the Other in one’s midst. As Moses reminds 
the Jewish people in the Book of Deuteronomy, “You shall love the stranger, for you were 
strangers in the land of Egypt.”104 These two commandments to remember the Exodus and respond 
to the stranger exemplify the central ethical-messianic message of the Hebrew Bible. Alluding to 
the personal stakes of the Exodus from Egypt, Levinas explains in a short text entitled “Judaism”: 
One follows the Most High God, above all by drawing near to one's fellow man, and 
showing concern for 'the widow, the orphan, the stranger and the beggar', an approach that 
must not be made 'with empty hands'. It is therefore on earth, amongst men, that the spirit's 
adventure unfolds. The traumatic experience of my slavery in Egypt constitutes my very 
humanity, a fact that immediately allies me to the workers, the wretched, and the persecuted 
peoples of the world. My uniqueness lies in the responsibility I display for the Other.105  
 
Referencing the verse in Deuteronomy commanding that one feed the hungry stranger,106 Levinas 
connects the ethical imperative to respond to the Other with the Jewish condition of exile. The 
lasting lesson of the Exodus narrative is that the commandment to remember the shared experience 
of exile is reflected in the ethical commandment to welcome the stranger. Exile, then, is connected 
to the question of hospitality, which is a central topic of concern for Jabès, Derrida, and Levinas. 
Between the Hellenic tradition of nostos and the Hebraic tradition of galut, we confront 
the classic opposition of Athens and Jerusalem, the two principal taproots of Western thought. 
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Narratives of exile and return are inextricably related to practices of memory and performance, 
and they are framed by the value ascribed to them by the Greek and Jewish traditions. The personal 
experience of exile is irremediably framed by the structuring narratives of exile memorialized in 
both Jewish and Greek literature, shaping these narratives which echo across historical eras. 
Levinas, Derrida, and Jabès’ respective stories of displacement recall aspects of the Jewish history 
of galut, while highlighting contrasts with the countervailing forces of Greek nostos. Here, we may 
recall the question that Derrida poses in the closing passage of his 1964 essay “Violence and 
Metaphysics,” regarding the ambivalence of the Hellenic and Hebraic elements in Levinas’ 
philosophy: “Are we Greeks? Are we Jews? But who, we? Are we (not a chronological, but a pre-
logical question) first Jews or first Greeks?”107 This opposition between Odysseus and Abraham, 
nostos and galut, haunts Derrida’s, Levinas’, and Jabès’ reflections on exile and return. Joyce 
writes in his Ulysses, “Jewgreek is greekjew. Extremes meet.”108 This striking formulation 
suggests the antithetical opposition of Greek and Jewish traditions, as well as the possibility of 
their synthesis. Derrida concludes his essay by quoting Joyce’s words, implying that Levinas’ 
ethical philosophy reveals a similar stricture, even if “Levinas does not care for Ulysses, nor for 
the ruses of this excessively Hegelian hero, this man of nostos and the closed circle, whose 
adventure is always summarized in its totality.”109 For Odysseus, the adventure ends with the 
triumphant return home. The nostos marks the hero’s return to himself, to the familiar, shirking 
the unknown. Kundera describes Odysseus’ nostalgia as a renunciation of adventure, and a return 
to the finite: “Rather than ardent exploration of the unknown (adventure), he chose the apotheosis 
of the known (return). Rather than the infinite (for adventure never intends to finish), he chose the 
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finite (for the return is a reconciliation with the finitude of life).”110 Odysseus’ decision to embrace 
the finitude of the return home and renounce the infinite adventure of the unknown represents, for 
Kundera, a lack of ambition. Indeed, if the nostos tale indicates a priority in the Greek tradition of 
the return, the narrative of departure and galut suggests an encounter with the unknown, the Other, 
and the stranger—and, in some capacity, an engagement with the infinite. 
 
 
III. Levinas, Exile, and Being 
 
Emmanuel Levinas was born in 1906 in the city of Kovno, Lithuania, part of the Czarist Russian 
Empire. The city was known both for its yeshivas and history of Talmudic scholars, including the 
Gaon of Vilna and Chaim of Volon, as well as the city’s embrace of the values of Enlightenment. 
About a third of Kovno’s eighty thousand inhabitants were Jewish. The Levinas family was from 
a milieu of largely assimilated bourgeois Jews who represented the tension between Russian and 
Jewish traditions. They did not live in the Jewish quarter of the city, nor did the children attend 
Yeshivas; the father owned a Russian book store, the children attended Russian schools, and they 
spoke Russian in daily life. While Levinas’ parents spoke to their children exclusively in Russian, 
they would speak in Yiddish between themselves.111 The children did not receive a formal religious 
education, but the family observed Jewish holidays and traditions, they socialized with other Jews, 
and they learned Hebrew. The family cultivated their children in Russian culture in the hopes of 
gaining access to the Russian school system, and ultimately to advance to European cultural life. 
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When the Germans invaded Lithuania in 1915, the Levinas family fled to Kharkov in the Ukraine; 
the next year, to the delight of his family, Emmanuel was one of the few Jewish students accepted 
to the city’s Russian secondary school. However, the Bolshevik Revolution in 1918 threw the 
status of Jewish families like Levinas’ into doubt, and the family returned to Kovno after Lithuania 
declared its independence in 1919. The Russian school in the city had closed, and Levinas 
continued his studies in the Jewish secondary school. He had returned to a changed Kovno, as “a 
Jew in an age of Christianity, a litvak in a world of Jews, a Russian speaker among people who 
spoke Yiddish, enlightened and observant at the same time, rationalist and sympathetic, 
panhumanist and an exile.”112 The milieu of Russian-speaking assimilated Jews that the Levinas 
family had once inhabited was no more. Denied the possibility of graduating from the Russian 
school system, and with his situation in Kovno untenable, Levinas sought other paths to the West. 
 Levinas ultimately decided to continue his studies in France. He had learned German, but 
he was dissuaded from moving to Germany due in part to the threat of anti-Semitism. Though he 
did not yet speak French, he moved to Strasbourg in 1923, “the city in France closest to 
Lithuania.”113 The decision proved fortuitous. The disputed territory of Alsace was effectively 
bilingual, and despite its militarized past, its capital city Strasbourg embodied the possibility of a 
Europe beyond borders. As Ethan Kleinberg describes in Generation Existential: Heidegger's 
Philosophy in France, “neither fully German nor fully French, the Alsatian capital was unheimlich 
in the sense that it called the notions of borders and national identity into question.”114 After 
regaining the territory at the end of the First World War, the French Third Republic had dedicated 
substantial resources into developing the university in Strasbourg, to fully re-integrate the territory 
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which had been lost since 1871. Levinas studied under Maurice Pradines and Henri Carteron in 
the Department of Philosophy, as well as Charles Blondel in psychology and Maurice Halbwachs 
in sociology. Through Pradines, Levinas read the work of Henri Bergson, which for him held the 
future of philosophy. As Levinas later remarked, “It is Bergson who taught us the spirituality of 
the new ‘being’ disengaged from the phenomenon in an ‘otherwise than being.’”115 Pradines’ 
lectures on ethics and politics also brought into focus the continued legacy of the Dreyfus Affair 
on the French Republic. Howard Caygill explains in Levinas and the Political, “French 
philosophical culture continued to be marked by the reverberations of the Dreyfus Affair. More 
than an example in Pradines’s lectures on ethics and politics, the Dreyfus Affair was the site of the 
battle for the soul of French Republicanism and, as such, determined the climate of French 
thought.116 For Levinas, the historical repercussions of the Dreyfus Affair highlighted the need to 
rethink the values of French Republicanism, liberté, égalité, fraternité, and particularly the third 
principle of fraternity. Rather than understanding fraternity in the Jacobin sense of armed struggle 
of class and nation, Levinas was inspired by his professors in Strasbourg to think of fraternity in 
ethical terms, as a question of solidarity and responsibility. 
It was also in Strasbourg that Levinas developed an unlikely friendship with a right-wing 
bourgeois Catholic named Maurice Blanchot. “Straightaway, I had the impression of an extreme 
intelligence, of an aristocratic cast of mind,” Levinas recalled of meeting Blanchot, “very distanced 
politically from me during that epoch, he was a monarchist, but we very soon got too understand 
each other.”117 Nonetheless, Levinas reports they “think alike on many matters,” and he praises 
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Blanchot for pursuing “the least expected, most noble and difficult path,” which Levinas describes 
as a kind of “moral elevation.” For his part, Blanchot wrote, “meeting Emmanuel Levinas when I 
was a student at the University of Strasbourg was the happy encounter that illuminates what is 
darkest in a life.”118 He described Levinas in a letter to Salomon Malka published in L’Arche as 
“my oldest friend, the only one with whom I feel authorized to use the familiar address [le 
tutoiement].”119 Levinas’ friendship with Blanchot continued for the following half century, even 
as the latter became reclusive and ostensibly abandoned public life after 1970. As Derrida would 
later describe in his eulogy for Levinas, “the friendship between Maurice Blanchot and Emmanuel 
Levinas was an instance of grace, a gift; it remains a blessing on our time.”120 In the 1960s, 
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Blanchot also developed important relationships with Jabès and Derrida both in correspondences 
and published textual exchanges. Jabès reported in 1980 of their peculiar friendship, “I never met 
Maurice Blanchot, whose proximity is so important for me. He never showed a desire to meet, 
despite – our friendship is more than fifteen years old – one or two discrete calls on my part. In his 
eyes, which he did not leave a mystery, certain friendships have nothing to gain from a tête-à-
tête.”121 While Blanchot is not a central character in this project, he is a constant presence at its 
periphery: Levinas read Jabès in a sense through Blanchot, and Blanchot offered a bridge between 
Levinas and Derrida’s thinking of writing and the trace.  
The crucial juncture in Levinas’ early philosophical development was his discovery of 
Husserl’s phenomenology. In Strasbourg, Levinas encountered a young pastor named Jean Hering, 
a member of the Göttingen Circle, who introduced him to Husserl’s work in 1925 before it was 
translated into French. Levinas enrolled in Hering’s course at the Faculty of Protestant Theology, 
where he was exposed to some of the developments in phenomenology that had emerged from just 
over the Rhine in Freiburg. Levinas’ education did not follow the typical cursus for a French 
philosophy student: his interest in phenomenology and the Bible did not fit squarely into the 
institutionalized philosophical debates in France. Kleinberg writes, “Levinas had no stake in the 
French debates over Bergsonianism and neo-Kantianism. For him, the future of philosophy was 
phenomenology and the home of phenomenology was Freiburg. Levinas decided to go to the 
source.”122 Levinas spent the 1928-1929 academic year at the University of Freiburg, where he 
studied under Husserl during his final year of teaching at the university. Husserl had announced 
his retirement, but he taught a final year of courses that year on “the notion of psychology in 
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phenomenology” and "the constitution of intersubjectivity.” Particularly the topic of the latter 
course became a central aspect of Levinas’ work. Husserl frequently invited him for dinner at his 
home, and Levinas gave his wife French lessons. It was also Husserl who suggested that the 
Lithuanian-born Jew read the work by his successor at the University of Freiburg, Martin 
Heidegger. At the time of his retirement, Husserl viewed his former student almost as a son, and 
Heidegger had dedicated his 1927 Being and Time to his esteemed teacher.  
Yet Levinas came to see Husserl’s phenomenology as too closely aligned with idealism, 
and his critique of the objectifying dimension of his notion of intentionality led him to embrace 
the existential phenomenology in Heidegger’s Being and Time. He viewed Husserl’s 
phenomenology as too rigidly constrained by the subjective perspective of the “I,” leaving it 
incapable of making room for the existence of others. After attending his seminar in Freiburg, 
Levinas recognized in Heidegger’s philosophy, particularly the concept of Mitsein that he 
presented in Being and Time, the possibility of a phenomenological thinking not restricted by the 
egoistic subjective “I.” Written at twenty-three years old, Levinas’ 1930 book Theory of Intuition 
in Husserl’s Phenomenology was one of the first publications in French to address the 
developments in phenomenology in Husserl’s early work.  
Heidegger was impressed by Levinas during his time in Freiburg, and invited him to attend 
the highly-anticipated event in Davos, Switzerland in 1929 as a student representative of the 
University of Strasbourg. The short-lived Davoser Hochschulkurse gathered thinkers from around 
Europe for an annual series of lectures and workshops intended to foster inter-European dialogue 
and understanding in the aftermath of the First World War. The 1929 session featured a debate 
between Heidegger and Ernst Cassirer, the reputed Jewish Neo-Kantian philosopher from 




which Rüdiger Safranski described as “a metaphysical clash of arms on the sparkling snowy 
heights of Davos,” has come to be viewed as one of the defining events in 20th century European 
philosophy.123 But the stakes of the event at Davos were much greater than technical differences 
concerning interpretations of Kant’s philosophy. The debate saw a clash between two 
philosophical approaches, phenomenology and Neo-Kantianism, but also two generations. Where 
Heidegger stood for a new generation of philosophers, revolting against the orthodoxies of Neo-
Kantianism, Cassirer represented traditional European intellectual culture. He had recently been 
named rector of the University of Hamburg, the first Jew to hold the title in Germany, and he 
passionately defended the liberal ideals of the Weimar Republic. By contrast, Heidegger’s closely 
guarded political conservativism and his discontent with Weimar liberalism – inmixed, already at 
the time, with anti-Semitic tropes – has come into fuller view in his recently published Schwartze 
Hefte. Even physically, there was a stark contrast between Cassirer, a tall, well-dressed man with 
a thick head of white hair, and the short, mustachioed Heidegger, who wore the sometimes dowdy 
garb of a rural Swabian. Rumors also exist pertaining to several sleights on Heidegger’s part 
towards Cassirer that were perceived as anti-Semitic. For the several hundred professors and 
students who traveled to Davos and many more following the event in newspapers, it seemed the 
future of philosophy – if not European culture itself – was hanging in the balance. Levinas reported, 
“a young student could have had the impression that he was witness to the creation and the end of 
the world.”124 With his skills in French and German and his knowledge of Heidegger’s work, he 
helped the French students in Davos by translating passages of Being and Time and explaining its 
convoluted terminology. For Levinas, Peter Gordon explains in Continental Divide: Heidegger, 
																																																						
123 Rüdiger Safranski, Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil, trans. Ewald Osers (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1999), 184.  




Cassirer, Davos, “perhaps more than any other eyewitness, the disputation was to represent a true 
milestone in his career, and his complicated assessment of its significance reveals a great deal 
about both his own divided consciousness as a philosopher and the greater division of European 
history he had witnessed firsthand.”125 While Levinas admired Cassirer, he believed that it was 
Heidegger’s thought that represented the future of philosophy. 
Levinas sided with his teacher Heidegger over Cassirer. In an inglorious moment at Davos, 
the attending students performed a play, a mise-en-abime of the debate between the eminent 
philosophers. Levinas wrote the play, and played the role of Cassirer, and Otto Bulnow portrayed 
Heidegger. The depiction was unflattering: Levinas dipped his hair in white powder to mimic 
Cassirer’s white hair which stood on his head “like an ice cream cone,” and his character parodied 
the eminent Hamburg philosopher’s humanism by repeatedly exclaiming, “Humboldt, Culture, 
Humboldt, Culture!” and “I am a pacifist,” to mock what he viewed as his "non-combative and 
somewhat desolate attitude," compared to the pugnacious Heidegger.126 Levinas described 
Cassirer as “too easy to mimic.” Reportedly, Cassirer was quite hurt by the derisive portrayal. 
After 1933, Levinas came to regret the play, as he regretted siding with Heidegger. He later told 
François Poirié, “during the Hitler years I reproached myself for having preferred Heidegger at 
Davos.”127 Levinas’ reflections on the Davos disputation were split between his adherence at the 
time to Heidegger’s thinking, and his radical reassessment of the event in light of subsequent 
history. “What made the memory so difficult for Levinas,” Gordon explains, “was the impossibility 
of resolving the dispute to his own satisfaction.”128 He was “riven in two,” between his respect for 
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Cassirer’s ethical humanism of a certain universalism, and his abiding belief that it was Heidegger 
who represented philosophy’s future. Levinas never resolved this tension between the ethical 
humanism embodied by Cassirer and the phenomenological method he learned from Husserl and 
Heidegger; this undercurrent persists in different guises throughout his work. 
 Following his year in Freiburg, Levinas moved to Paris in 1930. He worked at the Alliance 
Israélite Universelle (AIU), an organization founded by Adolphe Crémieux to advocate for the 
rights of Jews. Although he was outside of the French philosophical establishment, he taught 
classes at the École Normale Israélite Orientale, and audited classes from Léon Brunschvicg at the 
Sorbonne. Levinas’ 1932 article "Martin Heidegger and Ontology” in the Revue Philosophique 
attracted the attention of Jean Wahl and Gabriel Marcel, which helped bring him into the fold of 
the philosophical establishment in Paris. He also met fellow Russian émigrés Alexandre Koyré 
and Alexandre Kojève, who were also influential in bringing German phenomenology to France. 
Crucially, Levinas was introduced to the philosophy of Franz Rosenzweig in 1935 by Jacob 
Gordin, a student of Hermann Cohen who had fled the Nazis to France and also worked at the 
AIU.129 Rosenzweig’s work had a profound effect on Levinas, as he wrote in the preface to Totality 
and Infinity, this author was “too often present in this book to be cited.”130 The outsized if 
understated influence of Rosenzweig’s Star of Redemption is decisive for understanding the 
relation of philosophy and religion in Levinas’ thought.131 
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Levinas was rocked by the political developments in Germany in the early 1930s. He was 
keenly aware of the mythical forces activated by the Nazi appeal to “blood and soil,” and the dire 
consequences this would spell for Europe’s Jews. Following Hitler’s rise to power, Levinas was 
particularly shaken by Heidegger’s embrace of National Socialism. When Heidegger called for the 
revitalization of the German university according to the spirit of National Socialism in his 
infamous Rectorship Address in May 1933 at the University of Freiburg, Levinas felt personally 
betrayed that his former teacher would embrace such barbarism. Levinas was also one of the 
earliest to write about the threat to the world posed by Nazism in his article “Reflections on the 
Philosophy of Hitlerism,” which appeared in Esprit in 1934. He presciently diagnosed the 
“primitive powers” at work in Hitler’s philosophy, which “awaken the secret nostalgia within the 
German soul” and its “elementary feelings.”132 The feelings called upon by “Hitlerism” inspire a 
kind of mythology, they “express a soul's principal attitude towards the whole of reality and its 
own destiny,” and “predetermine or prefigure the meaning of the adventure that the soul will face 
in the world.” What Levinas perhaps over-generously called “Hitlerism” offered an encompassing 
world view that challenged the liberal notion of freedom which had taken root in Europe since the 
Enlightenment, and which had allowed for the eventual emancipation of Jews in Western Europe. 
For Levinas, the Nazi’s biological racism challenged the notion of freedom itself: “the mysterious 
urgings of the blood, the appeals of heredity and the past for which the body serves as an enigmatic 
vehicle, lose the character of being problems that are subject to a solution put forward by a 
sovereignly free Self.”133 Consequently, Hitlerism suggests that “man's essence no longer lies in 
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freedom, but in a kind of bondage [enchaînement].” Levinas diagnoses the philosophy of Hitlerism 
as a rebuke to the notion of human freedom, which the project of Enlightenment had left unrealized 
or unfinished. By abandoning the ideal of freedom in the service of the total engagement of oneself 
in the demands of a leader, the Nazi reordering of human freedom to serve a kind of “bondage” 
had raised the stakes of the threat to the Jews. While it was not possible to imagine the full extent 
of the horrors that would be unleashed by the Nazis, Levinas’ early reflections proved insightful 
for the dark path ahead. Already in 1934 Levinas had observed that Hitler’s worldview was not 
simply an affront to a particular form of liberalism or democratic government, but a challenge to 
“the very humanity of man.”134 In the decades following the war, Levinas would come to see a 
closer connection between the rise of Nazism and Heidegger’s philosophy of Being. As he would 
describe in 1990, the philosophy of Nazism stemmed from an “elemental Evil,” a possibility 
“inscribed within the ontology of a being concerned with being [de l'être soucieux d'être]—a 
being, to use the Heideggerian expression, ‘dem es in seinem Sein um dieses Sein selbst geht.’”135 
Levinas came to see the deep inadequacy of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, turning towards 
a new thinking of ethics based on the phenomenological method he had learned from Husserl. 
The storm brewing in Germany would soon engulf Europe. As France anxiously awaited 
the inevitable German attack during the “drôle de guerre” in 1939, Levinas was called up to the 
French army as an interpreter and officer, stationed in the city of Rennes. On June 10, 1940, the 
German Blitzkrieg met little resistance as Hitler’s army crossed into the Netherlands, Luxemburg, 
and Belgium. By June 13, the Germans had broken through the French defenses at Sedan, leaving 
a path of death and destruction as they advanced through northern French cities. Levinas was taken 
prisoner by the Nazis during the early days of the fighting. Over one hundred thousand French 
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soldiers were killed, and nearly two million were taken prisoner as the Nazis asserted control over 
Northern France. In an episode commonly referred to as l’exode, eight to ten million civilians took 
to the road, literally walking south in a desperate attempt to flee the German invasion.136 The 
devastating French defeat was described by general André Beaufre as “une débâcle sans 
précédent.”137 The French government soon crumbled, and on June 22, the hero of the Great War 
Maréchal Philippe Pétain signed the armistice ceding French sovereignty to the Germans. The 
chaos and confusion of these days reflected a world that had come apart seemingly overnight.  
In his Carnets de Captivité, written during his imprisonment in a German Stalag, Levinas 
reflected on the devastation of the débâcle of 1940, as a formative moment for understanding ethics 
when tested by the utmost desolation and hopelessness. Levinas’ Carnets include several literary 
texts, an exception in his oeuvre. The semi-autobiographical novella entitled Eros ou Triste 
Opulence recounts a French solider taken prisoner by the Germans in Rennes amidst the débâcle. 
Jean-Luc Nancy notes the protagonist’s exagerated nationalism in the novella’s opening pages:  
It is completely nationalist, that of a Frenchman who loves France viscerally, with all his 
strength, and who is unhappy about the war. More than a Frenchman, he is an ultra-
Frenchman. As [his son] Michaël Levinas said to me in a private conversation this summer, 
it is the little Lithuanian who has arrived and for whom France is everything.138 
 
The tone in the novella’s opening pages is of someone plus que français, as Derrida might say: an 
immigrant who valorizes France more than even the native French. The narrator reflects, “What is 
France? An immense stability,” it is a place where “no catastrophe could keep the public service 
employees from their retirement benefits,” just like “Paris which follows a rhythm of flux and 
																																																						
136 See: Éric Alary, L'exode : un drame oublié (Paris, Perrin, 2013). 
137 See: André Beaufre, 1940: The Fall of France, trans. Desmond Flower (London: Cassell, 1967), and Marc Bloch, 
Strange Defeat, trans. Gerard Hopkins (New York: Norton, 1999). General Beaufre’s account of the French military 
disaster, which he called the most important event of the 20th century and Bloch’s historical account of the fallout 
offer two dueling perspectives on the climactic events of June 1940.  
138 Jean-Luc Nancy, “Eros, Emmanuel Levinas’s Novel?” Levinas and Literature, eds. Michael Fagenblat and Arthur 




reflux.”139 In the chaos unleashed in the débâcle, this stability disappeared overnight: 
France was no more. It left during the night, like an immense circus tent, leaving a clearing 
scattered with debris. During the bustle of the previous night, where had all the cables, 
nets, seats, departments, offices, administrations, bailiffs, and compartments gone? They 
designated a space now disencumbered, empty, homogeneous, without a place to hide. 
Everything is permitted. 140 
 
The débâcle rendered France a non-place, like the outline of a circus tent disappeared during the 
night, pulling the rug of stability out from under the entire country. Summoning Ivan Karamazov’s 
famous words to the Grand Inquisitor in Dostoevksy’s Brothers Karamazov, the narrator from 
Levinas’ story remarks that in the aftermath of the débâcle, “everything is permitted.” The collapse 
of civil order and the sheer terror in the face of the imminent German approach revealed a world 
bereft of its former sense, where the chaos of the present threatens to cast aside the demands of the 
ethical obligation. He described the débâcle as a situation bereft of any semblance of order: “I do 
not mean to describe a situation where values are overturned – the change of authority – but rather 
the human nudity of the absence of authority.” 141 The chaos and confusion reflected the 
senselessness of a world whose meaning had been shattered. Nancy describes, “everything Levinas 
wanted to narrate […] takes place here, in this absolute interval. An order is dismantled, another 
order has not been reconstituted. It is at the same time a kind of loss, an immense privation, and 
an opening up of possibilities.”142 Levinas’ exceptional attempt at literature in Eros ou Triste 
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Opulence yields an image of the deprivation of meaning and the crumbling of order which perhaps 
only literature can imagine. Nancy describes this unpublished novel as an attempt “to touch, in 
some way, the mystery through literature, rather than to make a sort of literary shutter onto what 
one would otherwise view through a philosophical shutter, even if this attempt fails.”143 Levinas 
was drawn to literature by “the possibility of touching the mystery through narration and not of 
illustrating a theory.” Narrative has the unique capability of probing this mystery.  
For Levinas, explains Michael Fagenblat, “the advantage of literature consists not so much 
in showing the moral sense of the other—since its truth is strictly ‘invisible,’ falling outside the 
limits of consciousness, beyond empathy and intuition—but in attesting to the formidable 
difficulty of discerning this sense.”144 This is evident in Levinas’ description of the breakdown of 
sense during the débâcle and a specific image he calls his “Alençon scene.” In Eros ou Triste 
Opulence, Levinas describes a scene of German soldiers plundering a French government building 
in the northern city of Alençon. He highlights “the sound of the drapery falling,” revealing a large 
hall where “all that remained were bare walls, bare columns, with hard lines. The drapery, that was 
the country.”145 The pregnant image of the fallen drapery is symbolic of the collapse of France: 
the hall is stripped to its brute structure, revealing “things made of cardboard and stucco, bare 
walls,” which transformed the “resplendent and magnificent” hall into a “vast hovel.”146 The 
“Alençon scene” doesn’t depict the carnage of war, it simply illustrates how the world is stripped 
of its meaning and reduced to its physical nudity. In his Carnets, Levinas repeatedly invokes this 
scene of the fallen drapery to illustrate the disappearance of the world of sense during the débâcle:  
The falling drapery in my Alençon scene also concerns things. Things are decomposed, 
they lose their meaning: forests become trees – everything which forest signifies in French 
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literature – disappears. Subsequent decomposition of elements – pieces of wood which 
remain after the departure of the circus or on the stage – the throne is a piece of wood, 
jewels are pieces of glass, etc. But I don’t mean to simply speak of the end of illusions, but 
rather the end of meaning. {Meaning itself as an illusion.} The concrete form of this 
situation: empty houses and the rifling through these houses. Cheese and champagne at 
five in the morning.147  
 
The falling drapery leaves behind only a brute structural outline. For Levinas, this image represents 
the breakdown of sense itself, as illustrated by the utter senselessness of the German soldiers who 
plundered cheese and champagne at five in the morning amidst the chaos of the débâcle.  
In Ethics of the Survivor: Levinas and the Philosophy of the Debacle, François-David 
Sebbah argues that the Alençon scene enacts a specifically Levinasian form of the 
phenomenological reduction. Unlike the Husserlian epoché which hones in on the intentional 
structures of consciousness by suspending existential questions concerning the objective nature of 
perceived things, the Levinasian epoché radically “suspends the thesis concerning the existence of 
the world.”148 From the perspective of the scene of the fallen drapery, Levinas’ reduction reveals 
that “Being at its core, revealed for what it ‘is,’ which hardly exists and, in the same movement, 
‘is’ senseless.”149 In the “cold light” of the débâcle, people are reduced to mere things bereft of 
any spiritual value, and the meaning of the world has fallen away, suspended, or set aside. Sebbah 
explains that the Levinasian epoché reveals that “being is not sufficient, it is not sufficient for 
sense – for meaning – and not even, from a certain point of view, for being.”150 The Alençon scene 
reveals the abyss of a world without ground, which swallows sense and meaning like quicksand. 
Levinas’ reduction reveals that the situation confronted in the debacle is none other than the nudity 
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of human existence, which is “always-already at the edge of the abyss.”151 This is the thinking of 
totality, where the world is reducible to its minimal ontological coordinates. As Levinas writes in 
the preface to his 1961 Totality and Infinity, “Harsh reality (this sounds like a pleonasm!), harsh 
object-lesson, at the very moment of its fulguration when the drapery of illusion burns, war is 
produced as the pure experience of pure being.”152 The fallen drapery is a metonym for the 
reduction of the world to its bare ontological structure. In the face of catastrophe, this reduction 
strips the world of its meaning, it becomes senseless. The reduction of the world to the “il y a,” the 
brutish world of impersonal being, is the foil for the ethical calling. Out of the emptiness of 
undifferentiated being, Levinas discovers the source of ethics in the notion of infinity, which arises 
from an entirely different order than being. The Alençon scene revealed the world reduced to the 
“il y a,” laying bare that the origin of responsibility cannot derive from the existence of the world. 
Levinas was imprisoned in Nazi work camps through the duration of the war, notably at 
Stalag 11B at Fallingbostel near Magdeburg in Germany from 1942 until 1945. His French army 
uniform saved him from deportation to a death camp. Levinas and other Jewish prisoners of war 
were separated from their compatriots in the camp and forced to wear yellow stars, but following 
the Geneva Convention, they were not killed. During his imprisonment, Levinas was forced to do 
manual labor for most of the day, but his status as a prisoner of war afforded him the right to send 
and receive packages. He was also able to read, as he recounted in 1987: 
I was in a Jewish commando. It was not a period of torture. We went to work in the forest; 
we spent the day in the forest. Materially supported by care packages, morally by letters, 
like all the French prisoners […] Books would arrive; one didn’t know from where […] I 
read Hegel, of course, but also philosophical texts of all types. Plenty of things I had not 
had the time to read before: more Proust than ever, the authors of the eighteenth century: 
Diderot, Rousseau, and then random authors. And all of a sudden I would ask myself, 
“What good is all this?” But in this life of daily physical work in the forest – under 
surveillance of guards who were without brutality – from the point of view of culture, the 
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time was not wasted.153  
 
While Levinas endured the daily indignities and dehumanization of life in captivity, he survived 
the war. In an episode that long remained secret, after the imposition of the anti-Semitic Vichy 
Laws in France, Maurice Blanchot arranged to hide Levinas’ wife Raissa and daughter Simone in 
the Sisters of St. Vincent de Paul convent near Orléans, where they survived the occupation. 
Despite the proximity of Bergen-Belsen to Fallingbostel, Levinas remained unaware of the extent 
of the Nazi atrocities during his time in captivity. When he was liberated at the war’s end, he was 
reunited with his wife and daughter in Paris. Over the course of the ensuing months, the full extent 
of the Nazi atrocities was slowly revealed, and images of the death camps began to circulate in 
newspapers. Levinas soon discovered the fate of family members who were murdered by the Nazis 
following the German invasion of Lithuania in 1941. The personal toll was compounded by the 
revelations of the full scope of the Shoah.  
Significantly, Levinas described the dehumanization he experienced as a prisoner of war 
in terms of a kind of exile from humanity, which he situated in terms of the historical exile of the 
Jews. He writes in “The Name of a Dog, or Natural Rights”: 
There were seventy of us in a forestry commando unit for Jewish prisoners of war in Nazi 
Germany. An extraordinary coincidence was the fact that the camp bore the number 1492, 
the year of the expulsion of the Jews from Spain under the Catholic Ferdinand V. The 
French uniform still protected us from Hitlerian violence. But the other men, called free, 
who had dealings with us or gave us work or orders or even a smile - and the children and 
women who passed by and sometimes raised their eyes - stripped us of our human skin. 
We were subhuman, a gang of apes.154  
 
Levinas notes the coincidence of the camp number in the Stalag with the year the Jews were 
expulsed from Spain, connecting the two greatest catastrophes of the past millennium for the 
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Jewish people through the experience of exile. However, it is not only a geographical exile that 
Levinas has in mind, his experiences further revealed a kind of exile from the human condition 
itself. Imprisoned in the Stalag, the stares from civilians which “stripped us of our human skin,” 
and rendered the prisoners “subhuman, a gang of apes,” represents an exile from humanity in a 
world come undone. Here, we can see the connection between the Jewish history of exile and the 
enigmatic notion of impersonal being that Levinas calls the “il y a.” Both entail a disconnection 
from social order, and the breakdown of a world that fosters a sense of shared humanity. The “il y 
a” is anathema to the commandment to care for the stranger. 
 It was clear to Levinas that philosophy must advance beyond the thinking of being, by 
working through individual being to understand the ethical relation to the Other. In 1947, Levinas 
published a short book entitled Existence and Existents, in which he formalized his critical 
reflections developed during his imprisonment regarding Heidegger’s fundamental ontology and 
the inescapable moment of non-sense of the “il y a.” It is a preparatory book, laying the 
groundwork for the ethical philosophy that Levinas would subsequently develop, most notably, in 
Totality and Infinity. In Existence and Existents, Levinas argues that “all of modern philosophy 
from Descartes to Heidegger”155 has attempted to remove the particularities of the individual from 
his or her present situation, “to avoid the reification of spirit,” and describe the totality of existence 
in some sort of neutral or even “objective” manner. Philosophy has long attempted to understand 
existence through a particular existant, as if the existant were separate from and able to reflect 
upon existence as a whole. Descartes inaugurates this tradition by separating the cogito from the 
world, subject from object, but Levinas argues that it remains in effect through Heidegger’s 
“ontological difference” between Being and beings, Sein and Seiendes, or être and existants. They 
																																																						




are not independent terms. Levinas explains, “’A being’ has already made a contract with Being; 
it cannot be isolated from it. It is. It already exercises over Being the domination a subject exercises 
over its attributes.”156 Heidegger makes this same argument against the idealist tradition, but 
Levinas extends the argument to include his former teacher, disputing the primacy of the 
distinction between existence and existents. He describes the strangeness of the question of Being, 
which is by essence unanswerable, but which is always a guise for a specific view of Being:  
The questioning of Being is an experience of Being in its strangeness. It is then a way of 
taking up Being. That is why the question about Being — What is Being? — has never 
been answered. There is no answer to Being. It is absolutely impossible to envisage the 
direction in which that answer would have to be sought. The question is itself a 
manifestation of the relationship with Being. Being is essentially alien and strikes against 
us. We undergo its suffocating embrace like the night, but it does not respond to us. There 
is a pain in Being. If philosophy is the questioning of Being, it is already a taking on of 
Being.157  
 
For Levinas, Being is not an attribute of the subject which absolutely determines its conceptual 
schemas and determinations, as in the case of Heidegger’s Dasein.  The notion that existence is 
the ultimate substratum of subjective reality which he calls the “il y a” is a critical reinterpretation 
of Heidegger’s “es gibt.” Levinas explains, “for the Being which we become aware of when the 
world disappears is not a person or a thing, or the sum total of persons and things; it is the fact that 
one is, the fact that there is [il y a].”158 The il y a appears in the nudity of the world in the 
Levinassian époché: this is the world undone that Levinas witnessed in the débâcle attesting to 
“the human nudity of the absence of authority.”159 Ethan Kleinberg explains the inevitability of the 
il y a in Existence and Existents “must be read in the historical context of Levinas's own experience 
in the POW camp, the persecution of his family in France, and the tragic fate of his family in 
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Lithuania and of the Jewish people in Europe. Levinas transfers his own sense of unease, 
insecurity, and persecution to the philosophical fear that there is no escape from anonymous 
being.”160 The pessimistic tone of the il y a is understandable: the exile from humanity that Levinas 
felt during his captivity had not disappeared with his release from the camp, it was woven into the 
experience of being which he now confronted as a “survivor.” 
While the word “ethics” is absent from Existence and Existents, it lays the groundwork for 
his ethics as first philosophy. Levinas explains that he follows the Platonic approach according to 
which the Good must lie “beyond being,” in an “an ex-cendence” of being: 
The movement which leads an existent toward the Good is not a transcendence by which 
that existent raises itself up to a higher existence, but a departure from Being and from the 
categories which describes it: an ex-cendence. But excendence and the Good necessarily 
have a foothold in being, and that is why Being is better than non-being.161  
 
In Existence and Existents, Levinas discovers the ex-cendence, the departure from Being, which 
sets the stage for his critique of Heideggerian ontology, and paves the way for Totality and Infinity. 
The il y a reveals that, like Abraham, it is only in departure – departure from Being, departure 
from one’s home – that the ethical commandment can be fulfilled. 
During the 1950s, Levinas principally occupied himself with developing his ethical 
philosophy laid out in Totality and Infinity, and studying the Talmud under the guidance of 
Monsieur Shoshani. While his real name and origins remain unknown, this mysterious sage 
appeared in Paris after the war, where he studied the Talmud in sessions whose attendees included 
Levinas and Eli Wiesel. The renowned gynecologist Henri Nerson (to whom Difficult Freedom is 
dedicated) introduced Levinas to M. Shoshani, a man he described as “an exceptional being, 
exceptional in all senses.”162 Levinas told François Poirié, “he was not a hobo, but it happened 
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that, according to a common – very common – sense of mortals, he resembled a hobo.” His 
disheveled appearance did not impede M. Shoshani’s unparalleled knowledge of the Talmud, 
which he had entirely committed to memory. Levinas recounts that he would lead his sessions 
without any books in front of him, lasting five or six hours, sometimes late into the night. The 
mysterious sage subsisted on the little he made from his courses and the generosity of others, 
trading room and board for his wisdom. For several years after the war, Levinas housed M. 
Shoshani once or twice a week, until he disappeared without notice, such was his manner. He 
remained in France until 1962, when he went to Israel, and eventually to South America. Monsieur 
Shoshani died in 1968 in La Paz, Uruguay, where he is buried. It was only later that Levinas spoke 
of his study with the Talmudic master during the 1950s, but it was perhaps the most formal Jewish 
education that Levinas had received in his life. “What remained for me of this contact, made out 
of restlessness, marvels, and insomnia?” For Levinas, M. Shoshani had given him “new access to 
a rabbinic wisdom and to its signification for the human. Judaism is not the Bible; it is the bible 
seen through the Talmud, through the rabbinical wisdom, interrogation, and religious life.”163 In 
1957, Levinas delivered his first Talmudic reading at the Colloque des Intellectuels Juifs de 
Langue Française, a tradition that he continued at this formative event for decades. 
Levinas’ breakthrough came in the early 1960s with the publication of his Doctorat d’Etat, 
Totality and Infinity, in 1961, followed by Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism in 1963. His 
second major work, if one can use such terms, was his 1974 Otherwise than Being, or Beyond 
Essence.164 After toiling for many years as a relative outsider in the French university system, 
Levinas assumed a professorship at the Université de Poitiers in 1961, followed by the Université 
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de Nanterre in 1967, and the Sorbonne in 1973. Throughout his career, Levinas maintained two 
tracks of his work: his philosophical writing and his Jewish writing. For reasons both political and 
philosophical, Levinas treated them as separate domains of his thought, going as far as to publish 
his philosophical work with Martinus Nijhoff, J. Vrin, and Fata Morgana, whereas he published 
his numerous collections of Talmudic readings exclusively with Éditions de Minuit.165 The 
relationship between philosophy and Judaism is a key dynamic in Levinas’ thought: while he 
strenuously refuses to conflate religion and philosophy, there is a productive tension between 
philosophical universalism and Jewish particularity in his work. Levinas would constantly wrestle 
with this question over the course of his life and work. He remarked to François Poirié, “I have 
always been Jewish, you know! I took the religious and the historical adventure of Judaism to 
heart, taking it as the central adventure of the human.”166 This adventure would take many twists 
and turns in Levinas’ thinking of Judaism and philosophical ethics.  
 
 
IV. Jabès, Egypt, and Exile 
 
The decisive event of Edmond Jabès’ life was his exile from Egypt in 1957. Following the Suez 
Crisis, due to mounting threats to Jews and European nationals, Jabès was forced to flee Cairo for 
Paris. He never returned to his homeland. In France, Jabès’ writing evolved in no small measure 
due to his dramatic departure his Egypt, crystalizing around motifs of the Jew, the Book, and exile, 
which are for him three iterations of the same figure. In a 1987 text entitled “My Itinerary,” Jabès 
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writes, “if it is true that the condition of exile has never been experienced over so long a period 
nor been pushed to such extremes, both individually and collectively, then the Jewish condition in 
its epitome is certainly an exemplary symbol.” 167 For Jabès, the figure of the Jew is synonymous 
with the condition of exile, which he equates to the practice of questioning: “Questioning means 
breaking apart, means pitching inside against outside, and dwelling now in one, now in the 
other.”168 Questioning is the embodiment of exile, it requires inhabiting a foreign territory, staking 
claim to something which is claimed by someone else. It is also of the utmost importance to the 
Jewish tradition, which has always drawn inspiration from the questioning of its own sacred texts. 
Jabès’ seven-part cycle The Book of Questions is ostensibly a response to the Book of Books, it is 
an interrogation of the Jew, the book, and the condition of exile.  
Edmond Jabès was born in Cairo on April 14th in 1912 to a French-speaking, middle-class, 
Jewish family. His father was a banker and his mother raised the three children; Edmond had an 
older sister and a younger brother. Though the Jabès family had been settled in Egypt for 
generations, his grandfather had opted for Italian citizenship as security against rising xenophobia 
during the 1882 Orabi Pasha Revolt against European and Ottoman control of Egypt. Jabès was 
consequently born in Egypt with Italian nationality, and a French-speaking family.169 Educated in 
French schools in Cairo, Jabès discovered his passion for poetry in his teenage years, when he 
began reading Musset, Vigny, and Verlaine before advancing to Baudelaire, Mallarmé, and 
Rimbaud; soon after, he began writing poems and plays. For the Jabès family, Dider Cahen writes, 
Judaism held “both an important and secondary place.”170 The family held a place of some stature 
in the Jewish community of Cairo; they attended services at the local Ben Zimra synagogue, which 
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was also called the Jabès Synagogue, after Edmond’s grandfather who had once been at its helm. 
They would celebrate major holidays such as Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur at the Grand 
Synagogue of Cairo. The synagogue composed an important center of social life for the Jabès 
family, where “mondainetés and social life found its coherence and maybe even its cohesion.”171  
When Jabès was twelve years old, his older sister Marcelle died of tuberculosis. He was 
alone at her bedside when she died, as he recalled, “My sister died practically in my arms.” In her 
waning moments, she told her inconsolable brother Edmond, “Don’t think of death. Don’t cry. 
One does not escape destiny.” Jabès recalled these indelible words half a century later in his 1980 
dialogue with Marcel Cohen: “It was that day that I understood that there is a language for death, 
just as there is a language for life.”172 The family grieved Marcelle’s death for some time, and the 
loss hung over the family for many years to come; his mother never recovered from the loss, and 
turned inward afterwards. Given his proximity to Marcelle and his impressionable age, Edmond 
Jabès admitted this trauma “is found buried at the very Heart of my books.”173 In important ways, 
he never ceased searching for the words to represent this trauma of loss, to speak the language of 
death with the words available to the living. Edmond’s brother took his own life in 1964 in Rome. 
The most important figure through nearly the totality of Jabès’ life was his wife Arlette. 
Edmond met Arlette Cohen when they were teenagers on a boat returning to Alexandria after a 
family trip in France; he was seventeen and she was fifteen. Edmond and Arlette were inseparable 
during the ship’s four-day Mediterranean crossing, and they were later married in 1935. Jabès later 
remarked, “I have constantly, since then, built on this connection.”174 His unshakable bond with 
Arlette through his life was vitally important; she was the first reader and critic for all his books. 
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Edmond described Arlette as the “center of my relation to the world, to beings, to things, to 
origins.” They had two daughters, Vivienne and Nimet, both born in France. Arlette passed away 
just over a year after Edmond’s death in January 1991, and their remains lie together in the 
columbarium of Père Lachaise Cemetery in Paris. 
The question of national identity was always fraught for Jabès. Though his family had been 
established in Cairo for several centuries by the time of Edmond’s birth, they were not immune 
from the political upheaval that set the world ablaze in the middle of the 20th century. As the 
political situation across Europe deteriorated during the thirties, its effects began to reverberate 
across North Africa. Egypt declared its independence in 1922, and it had been formally ruled by 
King Farouk since 1936, but the British nonetheless maintained a great deal of political and 
economic influence. Notably, the British retained a large military presence in Egypt due to their 
vital interest in the Suez Canal, which connected England to its colonial empire in India and East 
Asia. Edmond and Arlette both took active roles in Jewish anti-fascist groups in Cairo in the mid-
thirties, as they continued to receive grim news from their friends in occupied Europe. When Italy 
entered the war and threatened to invade Egypt via Libya, Jabès was briefly arrested by the British 
authorities in Egypt on account of his Italian nationality, but he was soon released due to his 
sympathies with the allies and his anti-fascist activities. Much of the population of Egypt was 
favorable to the Nazis due to their resentment of the British, and as general Rommel’s Afrika Korps 
advanced from Libya to within reach of Cairo in 1942, Jabès was briefly evacuated by the British 
to Jerusalem. Arlette worked through the war in a hospital for the British Red Cross. Ultimately, 
the Nazis were unable to take Egypt, and in this sense Cairo was spared. Jabès was all too aware 
of what could have occurred had the British wavered, and the battles went differently. News of the 




France by mail and telegraph. As details of the Nazi crimes became known in Egypt, Jabès 
discovered his mentor Max Jacob had been arrested by the Gestapo and died at the camp at Drancy. 
With the end of hostilities in Europe declared in 1945, Jabès was able to return to writing 
and traveling. Dider Cahen notes that Jabès considered the freedom to write and travel as 
interrelated: “freedom discovered in the book, thanks to the book, freedom rediscovered more 
practically with the end of the war, which permitted him to move about and travel once more.”175 
Though the war in Europe had ended, the situation for the Jews of Cairo became increasingly 
precarious in the years that followed, specifically after the 1948 foundation of the state of Israel 
and the subsequent war against Egypt and its Arab League allies. King Farouk accused Egyptian 
Jews of siding with their Israeli enemy, and they were increasingly persecuted and subject to 
attacks. By 1950, the Egyptian-Jewish population of approximately seventy-five thousand had 
shrunk by two thirds, with most leaving for Israel and the United States.  
The ascension of Nasser in 1954 as the president of Egypt initially raised both hopes and 
worries for Egyptian Jews. Jabès initially cheered the movement that brought Nasser to power 
because he held out the prospect of a modern, independent Egypt; others worried that he would 
bring further tension to Cairo’s shrinking community of Jews. Despite Jabès’ early optimism, the 
situation for Egyptian Jews worsened and soon became untenable In the autumn of 1956, Nasser 
nationalized the Suez Canal, provoking a joint military response from Israel, France and the United 
Kingdom. Nasser subsequently imposed strict restrictions on the rights of European nationals and 
Jews in Egypt, and ordered hundreds of expulsions and arrests of those accused of acting as 
“Zionist agents.” Arlette and their younger daughter Viviane were already in Paris, and Edmond 
sent his older daughter Nimet to France on the first available flight. Jabès was arrested by the 
																																																						




Egyptian authorities due to his many affiliations with French officials and intellectuals, but he was 
able to secure his release, ironically, when he proved his Italian nationality. He set about 
liquidating his family’s assets, but he was forced to abandon most of his posessions. With all 
correspondences stopped between Egypt and France, Jabès was unable to speak with his anxious 
family in Paris. Meanwhile, his octogenarian father refused to leave Cairo. Ultimately, Jabès was 
forced to leave Egypt with little more than what he carried with him, though he was able to save 
his cherished first edition of Balzac’s complete works with the help of Swiss friend. At forty-five 
year old, Jabès left Cairo in June 1957 and joined his family in Paris. They rented a small apartment 
on the rue Condé in the Odéon quarter of the 6th Arrondissement. He never returned to Egypt. 
Jabès did not received a formal Jewish education as a child, and was not particularly 
observant. But he was forced to leave Egypt because he was Jewish, and he considered his exile 
the mark or condition of his Jewishness. He recounted, “I left Egypt because I was Jewish. I was 
thereby led, despite myself, to live a certain Jewish condition, that of the exile.”176 Prior to his 
departure from Egypt, Jabès had not considered his affiliation with the religion of his ancestors to 
be a particularly sensitive aspect of his life. “Constrained to leave Egypt on account of my Jewish 
origins, I was forced for the first time to live my Jewishness,” Jabès explained in a 1985 interview, 
“until then I had managed to remain ‘unproblematically’ Jewish. I had been virtually untouched 
by anti-Semitism.”177 It was in his condition of exile in France that he experienced anti-Semitism 
and it was during this period that he also began his study of Talmud and Kabbalah. There is a 
certain irony that Jabès, as a Jew, was forced into exile by leaving Egypt, which spurred him to 
study Judaism. Nonetheless, the expulsion of Cairo’s Jews was a massive trauma felt across a 
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deeply rooted community. It echoed expulsions of the past from the biblical exiles, to the expulsion 
of Spanish Jews during the Inquisition, to the Jews who fled from the Nazis. His exile in France 
forced Jabès to experience the Jewish condition which he had not confronted in Egypt. 
For Jabès, the condition of exile is intimately linked to both the figure of the Jew, as well 
as the writing of the book. “We had to abandon all of our belongings in Egypt,” he recalled, “this 
loss contributed to reinforcing in me the idea that my déracinement affected the oldest attachments 
in my culture.”178 Indeed, Jabès lived the condition of Galut in intensely personal terms. Didier 
Cahen describes that the reality of exile reinforced Jabès’ attachment to questions of Judaism: “if 
a man who loses his native land – in an exile that takes, we must insist, the highly symbolic form 
of an escape from Egypt – seems, in a certain way, to be born to the shared fate of the Jew, the 
writer who enters the country of his book becomes more of a stranger to himself and his writing.”179 
It was only when he left Egypt for France that Jabès’ writing began to crystalize around the 
connection between the Jew, the book, and the condition of exile. As he said in a 1985 interview, 
“Severance from native ground has marked me profoundly, and is perhaps the cause of all I've 
written and become since that time.”180 Exiled from his home, Jabès sought refuge in the space 
opened by the book. His writing inhabits the universe of the book as an unmediated experience of 
textuality, an ontological relationship between the book and human existence. We might recall 
Levinas’ analogy between Heidegger’s in-der-Welt-Sein and what he described as the existential 
character of zum-Buch-Sein. Jabès decided in 1956 to go to France rather than Israel “not because 
I'm any more at home in Paris than I would be in Jerusalem. My home was Egypt; now it is 
nowhere.” Rather, he explained, “if I'm Egyptian, the same can't be said of my books. They are 
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French, and if I chose France for shelter, it was above all to shelter them, to give them a place to 
live.” Jabès’ exile fueled his writing in France: “my homelessness has enabled my books to come.”  
Jabès’ arrival in Paris in 1957 was certainly not as rude as many who seek refuge in strange 
lands, speaking foreign tongues: French was his first language, he had extensive connections in 
Paris, and his wife and daughters were French citizens. But even if his writing found shelter in 
France, Jabès’ arrival was far from a homecoming. As he writes in A Foreigner Carrying in the 
Crook of His Arm a Tiny Book, “I left a land not mine / for another, not mine either [J’ai quitté 
une terre qui n’était pas la mienne, pour une autre qui, non plus, ne l’est pas].”181 The perception 
that he was a foreigner, an outsider, followed him from Egypt to France, though it took new forms. 
Jabès acquired French citizenship in 1967, but, in a sense, this made him no more French than he 
had previously been Italian—after all, despite his great affinity for the country of his birth, he had 
never been legally Egyptian. Exile was not strictly a question of geography, but a condition of 
existence. Jabès repeats the sentiment expressed to him by a fellow Egyptian exile: 
In Cairo, it never occurred to me to say that I was Jewish. Living in France, when one asked 
me about my origins, I responded at first, naturally – since I was born in Cairo – that I was 
Egyptian. Until an Arab student entered our little group. In front of him, I could not claim 
to be Egyptian. Referring to my father, who had Greek nationality, I clarified that I was, 
like him, Greek…until the day that a Greek from Athens, Orthodox Christian and 
somewhat nationalist, entered our little group of friends. Not speaking a word of the 
language myself, it became impossible for me to continue to pass for Greek. Can I say 
without reserve today to my French friends that I am one of them? [Puis-je dire sans 
réserve, aujourd’hui, à mes amis français que je suis un des leurs?]182  
 
Leaving Egypt did not end the exclusive boundaries of national identity and cultural affiliation: 
every claim to identity can be questioned both from within and from without. He concludes, “What 
to take from all this if not that, for a chauvinist nationalist, wherever he is from, every minority is 
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fatally a ‘foreigner.’”183 Jabès’ story reveals the perfidy of identity and the ubiquity of exclusion: 
despite claims to belonging to a nation, a language, a religion, there is always the possibility that 
these claims to identity will be denied, and turned against them.184 In France, the tectonics 
movement of religion, culture, and nationality collided: he was exiled from Egypt because he was 
European and Jewish, but in France he was an outsider because he was Egyptian and Jewish. 
A dozen years had elapsed since the end of the Second World War when Jabès arrived in 
France in 1957, and while the immediate signs of the Nazi occupation of Paris had long been 
covered over or rebuilt, the scars left by this period remained intact just below the surface. Jabès 
was acutely sensitive to the traces of this recent past, and the enduring legacy of anti-Semitism in 
France. In his interview with Marcel Cohen, he recounted a formative encounter with anti-
Semitism in his early days in Paris:  
I was returning home one night, the headlamps of an automobile swept across a section of 
wall which faced me. I had the time to read “Mort aux Juifs,” and, next to it, in English, 
which still seems inexplicable to me: “Jews go home.” Surely these were old graffiti. What 
hurt me was that nobody had thought to erase them.185  
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The traces of a traumatic past were not gone, and hardly even under erasure, but merely ignored 
and out of sight. In the early pages of The Book of Questions, Jabès alludes to this episode as the 
direct provocation for writing the book: “A few graffiti on a wall were enough for the dormant 
memories in my hand to take over my pen, for my fingers to determine what I see [il a suffi de 
quelques graffiti sur un mur pour que les souvenirs qui sommeillaient dans mes mains s’emparent 
de ma plume. Et pour que les droits commande la vue].” 186 He returns to this painful scene more 
explicitly when he describes these words engraved in Yukel’s memory: “All he saw any more were 
those three words on the walls.[…] those twelve letters, transparent, on the glass pane of his 
memory [Il ne voyait plus que ces trois mots sur les murs […] ces douze lettres, en transparence, 
sur le tableau de verre de sa mémoire].”187 These toxic words – “Mort aux juifs” – emblazoned 
on a street in Paris offered a jarring reminder that, after his exile from Egypt for being a Jew, Jabès 
confronted a situation in Paris where he was still a Jew, where the latent memories of the Shoah 
were perhaps not directly visible, but remained just barely papered over. In that moment, Jabès 
recalled, it was as if “France, where I had invested so much through its culture, seemed to abruptly 
reject me.”188 We might compare this formative moment for Jabès with the falling drapery in 
Levinas’ “Alençon scene”: it reveals the nudity of a world gone awry, stripped of sense. The 
epiphany of this traumatic scene for Jabès was that one can be treated as foreign anywhere. These 
poisonous words recall the connection between exile and the standing possibility of the return to 
violence against Jews.  
Jabès had published poetry in Egypt and France when he lived in Cairo, but he worked by 
day at the Cairo stock exchange – a modest affair, compared to the same lucrative métier today. 
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When he arrived in Paris having lost most of his possessions, he had to take whatever job he could 
find. Jabès worked for several years in an administrative position at an advertising film agency in 
the Parisian suburb of Neuilly, and he would write in the métro during his commute. Amazingly, 
Jabès sketched early drafts of The Book of Questions in crowded Parisian train cars. “I wrote a lot 
in the metro,” Jabès later recalled; but he preferred to write at home, “for lack of space, I could not 
isolate myself.”189 Any resident of Paris can appreciate the irony of leaving one’s own apartment 
to find the space to write in the purported isolation of the métro! Amidst the bustle of his daily 
commute, Jabès’ writing explores themes of displacement and itinerancy, and the solitude that one 
can find even in a crowded train. Sometimes writing notes on the back of metro tickets, calendar 
pages, or scrap paper from the production company, he began sketching several short stories that 
eventually grew into the first volume of The Book of Questions.  
Jabès published a volume of poetry entitled Je bâtis ma demeure, I Build My House, with 
Gallimard in 1959, which compiled the poems he wrote in Egypt from 1943 to 1957. In a sense, 
to turn the page on his life in Egypt, Jabès first had to finish this compilation of his Egyptian 
poetry. The book included a preface by Gabriel Bounoure, the influential poetry critic at the N.R.F 
(Nouvelle Revue Française), whom Jabès had befriended years earlier when he visited Cairo. Jabès 
later introduced Derrida to Bounoure, who became an important interlocutor for the philosopher.190 
This first publication in France did not come without challenges. After encountering difficulties 
convincing the editors at Gallimard to publish the work, Jabès sought help from recent Nobel 
laureate Albert Camus, who was a close friend of the Gallimard family. The Algerian-born novelist 
and philosopher appreciated Jabès’ poetry, and he was able to push through the publication, writing 
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to Jabès in July of 1958, “I looked into the matter with [Robert] Mallet. It seems to me that we can 
lessen these difficulties,” assuring him “I will see with [Michel] Gallimard and I hope you’ll get 
satisfaction.”191 In February of 1959, the writer and university professor Robert Mallet wrote to 
Jabès, “A simple note to reassure you of the publication of your volume.”192 Jabès sent him a copy 
of I Build My House after its publication in May, and Camus wrote Jabès in June 1959 to “heartily 
thank you for this precious publication, and [I] wish you all the success that you wonderful volume 
deserves.”193 The relationship between these two North-African francophone writers was cut short 
when Albert Camus and Michel Gallimard were tragically killed in a car crash returning to Paris 
on New Year’s Day 1960. The volume was received with little fanfare, but positive critical 
responses. In a review of the volume published in Critique in 1960, Robert Bréchon described in 
Jabès’ poems an “irrepressible word,” and “a response to the world” which challenges speech with 
silence.194 After I Build My House, Jabès described, “it seemed that I had definitively turned a page 
of my life.”195 His life in exile in France had unleashed a force of creativity that allowed him to 
set out from the shadows of his literary influences, and discover his singular style of writing.  
From 1963 until 1973, Jabès embarked on his seven-volume series, Le Livre des Questions. 
“Henceforth, we will better understand Je bâtis ma demeure,” Derrida opens his 1964 essay, 
“Edmond Jabès and the Question of the Book.” He suggests that an element of Jabès’ writing was 
still germinating in his poetry from his years in Egypt: Jabès had not yet found “its true root,” his 
poetry still “bent a bit in the wind.” However, he found his singular voice in the first installment 
of his second major publication, The Book of Questions, which was published by Gallimard in 
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February of 1963. “The voice has not been altered,” writes Derrida,  but “the accent is more 
serious.”196 The decisive change provoking the evolution of his writing was his exile from Egypt. 
As Derrida writes, “what Jabès teaches us is that roots speak, that words want to grow, and that 
poetic discourse takes root in a wound.” Tellingly, he never mentions Egypt in I Build My House: 
the geography of Egypt is so firmly ingrained in the fabric of Jabès’ words that it is superfluous to 
name it. Exile from Egypt becomes a central motif in The Book of Questions, unleashing the 
unvarnished creative spark of Jabès’ writing, which attempts to speak the unspeakable, advancing 
through unceasing self-interrogation. The condition of exile is intimately linked with the practices 
of commentary and interpretation: the absence or dislocation from one’s homeland is akin to the 
questioning of the text and its foundations.  
 
 
V. Derrida, El Biar, and PaRDes 
 
For many years, little was publicly known about Jacques Derrida’s early years beyond the fact that 
he was born in Algiers and came to Paris to study at the prestigious Lycée Louis-le-Grand. He was 
particularly reticent to discuss his childhood. Derrida told Didier Cahen in a March 1986 radio 
interview that a blockage prevented him from publicly revisiting his early life in Algeria:  
I wish that a narration were possible. Right now, it’s not. I dream, not of managing, one 
day, to recount this legacy, this past experience, this history, but at least of giving a 
narrative account of it among other possible accounts. But, in order to get there, I’d have 
to undertake a particular kind of work, I’d have to set out on an adventure that up until now 
I’ve not managed. To invent, to invent a language, to invent modes of anamnesis…197 
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Derrida describes the difficulty of setting out on the “adventure” of writing the narrative of these 
years of his life, and the need to “invent a language” and “modes of anamnesis” for him to do so. 
He was not withholding the details of his early life solely in the interest of his family’s privacy or 
a desire for secrecy, some further trauma inhibited him from recounting these formative years in 
Algiers. These difficulties are irremediably connected to the traumas of the Second World War, 
and then the Algerian War. Nonetheless, the memory of Algeria eventually entered Derrida’s 
writing more explicitly. His friend and fellow Jewish Algerian-born philosopher Hélène Cixous 
described “the power of places,” in contrast to “the impotence of human consciousness.” While 
Derrida may have turned away from Algeria for a time, Cixous suggests that the haunting memory 
of Algiers persists: “We have forgotten everything, but eucalyptus-scented El Biar remembers. 
The grounds the winds the trees are haunted.”198 It would take Derrida until the late 1980s before 
he set out on this “adventure” to narrate the story of his early years, à sa façon, particularly in texts 
from the 1990s including Monolingualism of the Other, Circumfessions, and Points…199 While 
Derrida freely left Algiers to pursue his studies in Paris, his difficult and sometimes traumatic 
experiences in Algeria echo the story of Jabès’ departure from Egypt: from the difficult separation 
from the nations of their birth, provoked in large part due to their Jewish family origins, to the 
permanent sense of foreignness they confronted in France, the paths that led Derrida and Jabès’ to 
eventually meet in the Latin Quarter in Paris bear salient points of intersection.  
“Alger la Blanche” was a city of approximately three hundred thousand people in 1930, 
the shining hub of France’s colonial holdings in the North African Maghreb. It was constructed 
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with wide avenues bearing the names of French generals and politicians, complete with its glorified 
colonial museum and cathedral. The French captured Algiers in 1830, and subsequently extended 
their colonial rule across the Maghreb. Algeria became one of the world’s largest wine producers, 
which accounted for its main source of revenue, and its territory was integrated as three 
départments of France. In Algiers, European “pieds noirs” slightly outnumbered the local Arab 
population, which was marked by great inequality and segregation. Exactly one hundred years 
after Algiers was captured by the French, Jackie Derrida was born at daybreak on July 15, 1930 in 
a home in the El-Biar district of Algiers, to Haïm Aaron Prosper Charles, dit Aimé Derrida and 
Georgette Safar. They were a petit bourgeois family of assimilated Jews, whose roots traced back 
to the expulsions of Jews from Spain centuries earlier; Aimé Derrida supported the family working 
in the wine export business out of the port of Algiers. Without ever stepping foot in the hexagone, 
Derrida was born a French citizen. The 1870 Crémieux Decree, named after the justice minister of 
France’s Third Republic Adolphe Crémieux, granted French nationality to the approximately 
thirty-five thousand Jews in Algeria. The same privilege was not afforded to the Muslim 
population. The Crémieux Decree was intended to protect commercial interests with Jewish 
merchants, solidify the allegiance of Algerian Jews as a bulwark against the Arab population, and 
one outcome was increased assimilation and gallicization of many Algerian Jews. Derrida’s family 
was in many respects a prime example of the milieu of Jewish pieds noirs created by the decree.  
Jackie had an older brother named René and a younger sister named Janine; a second 
brother Paul had died at three months old a year before Jackie’s birth, and a third, younger brother 
Norbert died in 1940 at age two of tubercular meningitis. Derrida was named after actor Jackie 




abandoned the moniker in favor of Jacques when he began to publish in the early 1960s.200 At his 
brit milah on the seventh day of his life, Jackie was given the middle name Élie, after his uncle 
Eugène Eliahou Derrida, who held him during the circumcision ceremony. Derived from the 
Hebrew prophet Eliyahu, Élie was inexplicably left off Jackie’s birth certificate. Like Jabès’ 
misdated birth certificate, the absence of Derrida’s middle name on his birth certificate carries with 
it an almost messianic symbolic charge. The prophet Eliyahu is reserved a chair at the brit milah 
to witness the sign of the covenant. He is poured an extra glass of wine at the Passover Seder, and 
the possibility of his coming is a symbol of hope for future redemption. The absence of Élie from 
his birth certificate made it a kind of secret name, absent from legal documents and formalities, 
but known to a select few. Derrida used this secret name as a kind of code-word or encrypted 
signature in several texts. He writes in Schibboleth in reference to Paul Celan’s poetry,  
A word opened to whomever in the figure as well, perhaps, of some prophet Elijah [Élie], 
of his phantom or double. He is unrecognizable, through this monstration of monstrosity, 
but one must know how to recognize him. Elijah is the one to whom hospitality is due, 
promised, prescribed. He may come, one must know this, at any moment. He may cause 
the event of his coming to happen at each instant.201  
 
The symbolically charged absence of Derrida’s middle name from his birth certificate echoes the 
mistaken date recorded on Jabès’ birth certificate. The official records of their births had omitted 
or mistaken a crucial detail, leaving a gaping absence in the legal proof of their very existence. 
In 1934, the Derrida family moved from their home on the rue Saint-Augustin in Algiers, 
to a modest villa in the affluent suburb of El Biar, sitting at the hilly edges of the city. El Biar is 
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Arabic for “the well.” Their home was at the edge of a Christian cemetery and an Arab 
neighborhood, and it included a garden which Derrida would later call the Orchard, PaRDes, the 
image of paradise from the Kabbalah. In Circonfessions, Derrida recalls, “13, rue d'Aurelle-de-
Paladines, El-Biar, it's still the orchard, the intact PaRDeS, the seamless present which continues 
you, the imperturbable phenomenon that you will never see age.”202 Derrida’s timeless memory of 
his childhood home was frozen in the past; his family was forced to leave Algeria in 1962, and the 
Algerian state seized and repatriated their home. It is significant that he refers to this home as the 
Orchard, PaRDes, which is the acronym for the four modes of textual exegesis in the Kabbalah: 
Peshat, the “surface” or literal meaning; Remez, “hints,” the allegorical meaning; Derash, “seek,” 
the midrashic or comparative meaning; finally, Sod, “mystery,” concerns the mystical or esoteric 
meaning of a text. Derrida’s childhood memories of the PaRDes in El Biar suggest his education 
in textual interpretation was already underway. The family was not particularly observant of 
Jewish practices and the children did not receive a formal Jewish education, but Jackie and his 
siblings would attend synagogue with their maternal grandfather for the High Holidays. He loved 
the singing and music of the celebrations, and fondly recalled lighting candles and eating pastries 
during the holidays, though he bristled at the association with any kind of group identity. 
There is an uncanny synchronicity to Derrida’s birth falling on the centennial anniversary 
of the French conquest of Algeria. Cixous observes that critical themes which appeared decades 
later in Derrida’s writing were already present to him in Algiers: “Hostipitality, pardon, perjury, 
the death sentence, sovereignty, the animal and the slave, all this began its course toward his light 
from the rue d’Aurelle de Paladine in El Biar then from the lycée Ben Aknoun and thereafter from 
the lycée Bugeaud, passing by the Place du Gouvernement and before that among the ruins of 
																																																						




Algiers bombed in July 1830.”203 Between the conquest of Algiers in 1830 and Derrida’s birth in 
1930, it is as if he was born in a repetition of a historical trauma, whose roots stretched back a 
century and reverberated into the future. “It has already happened. Already has already happened,” 
Cixous writes, “he comes to the event that has already happened to him. He comes to the event 
that is already happening to him. The déjarrivance from Al Djezaïr.”204 The coincidence of 
Derrida’s birth and France’s conquest of Algeria highlight the sense that he had “always-already” 
experienced this event, a kind of inherited trauma reverberating for a century. His connection to 
Algiers parallels the arc of the French colonial presence in Algeria: from the centenary of the 
Algerian conquest at his birth, to the anti-Jewish laws imposed by the Vichy government during 
his childhood, to his service in Algiers during the Algerian War, to his trip to help his parents move 
to France in 1962 after Algeria declared its independence.  
In his 1996 Monolingualism of the Other, Derrida connects the contingency of nationality 
and language. As a child he received a French education, and while he learned French and Latin 
in school, the local languages Berber and Arab were taboo, considered foreign languages. He was 
raised speaking French, he was cultivated by the French education system, and though he had 
never left Algerian soil – which was legally French soil – he was effectively forbidden from 
speaking the languages of the people native to Algeria. Linguistically estranged from his home 
soil, geographically estranged from his “home” language, Derrida’s account reveals the 
contingency of one’s attachment to a so-called “mother” or “native tongue.” The politics of 
language are irreparably intertwined with questions of citizenship, national identification, as well 
as cultural and religious difference. What is Derrida’s native language? The language of his 
nationality (French), the language of his birth nation (Arab or Berber), or perhaps the language of 
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his cultural nation (Hebrew)? Derrida describes his monolingualism in the paradoxical 
formulation, “Oui, je n'ai qu'une langue, or ce n'est pas la mienne,” "Yes, I only have one 
language, yet it is not mine.”205 Derrida’s antinomian claim asserts both possession and 
dispossession of language, the simultaneous ownership of one’s language as well as the debt it 
incurs to the Other: one is condemned to live one’s monolingualism, even as that language is 
contingent, revocable, and beyond ownership. He affirms the performative contradiction of a 
language that is both mine and never mine. His “ownership” of the French language is as tenuous 
as his French passport; his alienation from “native” Algerian languages belies his childhood 
growing up in Algiers; his ignorance of Hebrew speaks to the diaspora of the Jewish people, and 
his estrangement from religion. Rather, Derrida renounces the concept of “native” or “mother” 
tongues: “For never was I able to call French, this language I am speaking to you, ‘my mother 
tongue.’”206 As the language he grew up speaking and in which he is evidently most comfortable, 
we may be tempted to simplify the matter and say that his native language is, malgré tout, French. 
In a 2004 dialogue with Cixous, Derrida confessed his “strange and stormy passion for the French 
language,” to which he is irremediably bound: “I remain obstinately monolingual, without any 
natural access to another language. I read German, I can teach in English, but my attachment to 
French is absolute. Inflexible.”207 Nonetheless, in Monolingualism, Derrida describes French, “the 
language of the Metropole,” as “the substitute for a mother tongue (is there ever anything else?) 
as the language of the other.”208 The contingency of one’s ownership and estrangement from a 
language, one’s monolingualism, is irreducible to a mother tongue, rooted in blood and soil, and 
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validated by nationality. Derrida’s limit case rather starkly reveals the perils of identification with 
one’s “home” language, and its imbrication in questions of national and religious affiliation. 
Like the right to speak a language, Derrida’s nationality also proved revocable. “Along 
with others,” he writes, “I lost and then gained back French citizenship.”209 Following the Nazi 
invasion of France in January 1940, the country was divided between the German occupied 
Northern half of the country, and the so-called “Zone Libre,” composing the Southern half of the 
country including the three départements of Algeria, which was administered by Pétain’s Vichy 
government. In October 1940, the Crémieux decree and the French nationality of Algerian Jews 
was revoked. With the ease and anonymity of a proclamation from across the Mediterranean, 
Algerian Jews became stateless overnight. Further anti-Semitic laws imposed by Vichy restricted 
the number of Jews who could work or attend schools. Pushing back against the tendency to blame 
the Germans and obfuscate French collaboration during the war, Derrida reminds this was a 
decision made by the French authorities: “Algeria has never been occupied. I mean that if it has 
ever been occupied, the German Occupant was never responsible for it. The withdrawal of French 
citizenship from the Jews of Algeria, with everything that followed, was the deed of the French 
alone.” 210 The French cannot shirk responsibility for the treatment of the Jews in Algeria because 
these actions were called for and obeyed by the French authorities on their own volition. He recalls, 
“we never saw a German uniform in Algeria. None.”211 Though it was legally under the authority 
of Pétain’s Vichy regime, if there was any foreign nation occupying Algeria during the Second 
World War, it was the French themselves.  
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 Derrida was perhaps too young to fully grasp losing his citizenship at ten years old, but he 
was devastated by his expulsion from school. In his 1980 text The Postcard, he alludes to the 
traumatic event which occurred in October 1942 at the Lycée Ben Aknoun: “Did they not expel 
me from school when I was 11, no German having set foot in Algeria? The only school official 
whose name I remember today: he has me come into his office: ‘You are going to go home, my 
little friend, your parents will get a note.’”212 Derrida’s siblings were expelled the previous year, 
and when the Vichy government installed tighter quotas on Jews in the fall of 1942, Jackie was 
expelled as well. Particularly because he was a good student, the trauma remained with him for 
many years. “It is an experience that leaves nothing intact, an atmosphere that one goes on 
breathing forever,” he told Cathérine David in a 1983 interview: “Jewish children expulsed from 
school.” 213 Social exclusion left deep scars. He recalled, “friends who no longer knew you, insults, 
the Jewish high school with its expulsed teachers and never a whisper of protest from their 
colleagues.”214 While Derrida was not observant, he found himself excluded from school and 
stripped of his French nationality due to his association with this term “Jew.” In a 2000 text 
“Abraham, the Other,” Derrida recalls that he first encountered the word “Jew” was as an insult: 
As for the word Jew, I do not believe I heard it first in my family […]. I believe I heard it 
at school in El Biar, already charged with what, in Latin, one would call an insult [injure], 
injuria, in English, injury, both an insult, a wound, and an injustice […] Before 
understanding any of it, I received this word like a blow, a denunciation, a de-legitimation 
prior to any legality.215 
 
After his expulsion, Derrida enrolled at the Lycée Maïmonide-Émile-Maupas, a provisionary 
school of Jewish students and teachers expelled from public schools. However, Derrida bristled at 
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the group identification in this school, remarking that he felt “just as out-of-place in a closed Jewish 
community as I did on the other side,” and he skipped school for the better part of a year. 216 
American forces arrived in Algiers in November of 1942, liberating the territory from 
Vichy control. Derrida recalled that on the morning of November 8, “the Americans arrived in 
force, as always handing out cigarettes, chewing gum, chocolates […]. This first disembarkation 
was like a caesura, a break in life, a new point of arrival and departure.”217 As the war continued 
in Europe, Algiers was established as the base for the exile government of “Free France,” under 
the power-sharing agreement of the provisionary “two-headed” government headed by Generals 
Charles de Gaulle and Henri Giraud. However, the Vichy-imposed racial laws discriminating 
against Jews were nonetheless maintained for six months even under the auspices of “free” France. 
Giraud was in favor of maintaining the Vichy restrictions, and it was only when de Gaulle ousted 
him in a putsch that the anti-Jewish restrictions were abolished in March of 1943; the Crémieux 
Decree was only re-instated in October 1943 by the French Committee on National Liberation, 
headed by de Gaulle. In the interim, though still legally a stateless person, Derrida was allowed to 
return to Lycée Ben Aknoun at the end of cinquième classe. The school had been transformed by 
the British into a military hospital and a POW camp for captured Italians, and because most of the 
male teachers had been called into the army, classes were taught by replacement teachers in 
makeshift barracks. Derrida returned to school a different student. He described himself as a 
“voyou,” a rogue, preferring to play soccer than concentrate on his studies; to his embarrassment, 
he failed the baccalauréat in 1947. Upon retaking and passing the exam, Derrida was rededicated, 
motivated by his discovery of philosophy in the final year of lycée, particularly after reading Sartre.  
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Derrida passed the qualifying exam to enroll in classes préparatoires, and he began his 
residence at the elite Lycée Louis-le-Grand in Paris in the fall of 1949. He was subsequently 
attended the École Normale Supérieure from 1952 to 1956. Derrida later recounted that when he 
left Algeria for France, he hoped to put the central drama of his adolescence – anti-Semitism – 
behind him. This, he reflected, pushed him to seek out a non-Jewish milieu in France: 
In France, the suffering subsided. At nineteen, I naively thought that anti-Semitism had 
disappeared, at least there where I was living at the time. But during adolescence, it was 
the tragedy, it was present in everything else […] Paradoxical effect, perhaps, of this 
brutalization: a desire for integration in the non-Jewish community, a fascinated but painful 
and suspicious desire, nervously vigilant, an exhausting aptitude to detect signs of racism, 
in its most discreet configurations or its noisiest disavowals. Symmetrically, sometimes, 
an impatient distance with regards to the Jewish communities, whenever I have the 
impression that they are closing themselves off by posing themselves as such.218  
 
Integrating himself in a non-Jewish milieu in France, Derrida sought to escape the principal trauma 
of his youth. Despite his efforts to put anti-Semitism behind him, questions of marginality and 
exclusion remained central to his thinking in Algeria just as in France, in Jewish and non-Jewish 
communities, in philosophy and literature. Derrida did not often refer to his “exile,” and he refused 
the unambiguous affirmation, “I am Jewish,” but his story evokes key aspects of the legacy of 
galut. In France, he could not avoid the history of anti-Semitism or the question of Algeria.  
 In November 1954, the FLN, Front de Libération Nationale, a violent anti-colonial 
political faction in Algeria, orchestrated a series of attacks on French police and military targets 
that killed thirty people. This marked the opening salvo in the bloody eight-year guerilla war for 
independence waged by the FLN against the French colonial forces, and most notably against the 
notorious French renegades of the OAS, the Organisation armée secrete. After completing his 
studies at the École Normale Supérieure and spending a year as a visiting student at Harvard 
University, Derrida and his new bride Marguerite Aucouturier were sent to Koléa, a small town 
																																																						




outside of Algiers, for twenty-seven months beginning in 1957 to fulfil his mandatory French 
military service. He was able to secure a non-combat role as a teacher at a collège, a middle school, 
for the children of French soldiers. Life in Koléa was difficult for the couple, who lived amongst 
French military service families of quite divergent ideological perspectives. They purchased a 
Citroën 2CV, allowing them to travel freely through Algiers; they routinely spent Shabbat dinners 
with Derrida’s parents in El Biar, and socialized with friends whose service overlapped, including 
his friend from Louis Le Grand Pierre Bourdieu, and his friend from the ENS Lucien Bianco. Even 
if Derrida managed to avoid a combat role and carried out his service in civilian clothes, the 
intensity of the fighting took its toll. Marguerite told biographer Benoit Peeters, 
At night-time, it was a real war. We could regularly hear gunfire. Horrible things happened. 
One evening, an FLN leader was executed; they then dragged him into the Kasbah, his 
neck tied to a jeep, before leaving the body outside a mosque. They were probably trying 
to intimidate the Algerians, but of course this kind of provocation merely stoked their 
hatred. To crown it all, the dogs in the barracks started barking every time Jackie passed 
by. ‘They take me for an Arab,’ he used to say, and he was probably right, as his 
complexion was very dark, as usual when he came back to Algeria.219  
 
The war became increasingly brutal during the time Derrida was in Koléa, as attacks by the FLN 
and the French OAS reached new heights of violence. Given his personal imbrication in Algiers 
and his role as a teacher for the children of French soldiers, the conflict deeply rattled Derrida.  
In May 1958, tensions rose in Algiers amongst the French military leadership leading to an 
attempted coup, and provoking a political crisis that brought about the collapse of the French 
Fourth Republic. During this period of intense uncertainty, Derrida worried that other French 
soldiers questioned his loyalties. The situation left him literally nauseated. As he remarked 
privately, “the stupidity around us was particularly aggressive.”220 The other French military 
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service members accepted the French government’s just cause to maintain control over Algeria, 
despite the growing evidence that French rule was doomed. They looked at the Algerian-born, 
dark-skinned, Jewish philosopher with suspicion. Derrida wrote to his friend Lucian Bianco, 
“never had my faith and my fear as a democrat seemed so very ‘gross’, and the fascist danger so 
close, so concrete, so invasive. And all this at a time when I am so alone, without friends, without 
any prospect of getting away, a soldier in a land that’s ‘sealed off.’”221 Amidst the fighting, his 
isolation from Algiers on the military base in Koléa was compounded by his isolation from the 
others living on the base. This double exclusion echoes the traumas of his rescinded nationality, 
his expulsion from school, and his social exclusion in Algiers during the previous war. 
The National Assembly voted on June 1, 1958 to grant Charles de Gaulle full powers for a 
period of six months to craft a new constitution. Derrida was ambivalent towards the General: he 
was to the left of de Gaulle in terms of France’s domestic affairs, but he also knew that he had 
ended the anti-Jewish laws in Algeria and reinstated the Crémieux Decree in 1943. The 
constitution was ratified by a national vote in September 1958, and de Gaulle became the first 
president of the Fifth Republic on December 21. The war in Algeria reached a major turning point 
on September 16, 1959 when he spoke of Algerian “autodétermination” for the first time in a 
televised speech. While it did not spell out the immediate end of the French presence in Algeria, 
these words were much feared by the proponents of l’Algérie Française. De Gaulle announced, 
“the route has been laid out. The decision has been made.”222 The fighting continued, but Derrida’s 
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military service graciously ended, and he and Marguerite returned to France in 1959.223  
The Évian agreements in March 1962 imposed a cease-fire between the Algerian FLN and 
the OAS, ending a spate of attacks and assassination attempts both in Algeria and France. On July 
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rather he unleashed a stinging critique of French liberals who he accused of complicity in perpetuating the conflict. 
For Nora, “the situation of the French of Algeria carries in it the seed of all extremisms” (206). Even the French 
liberals who sought to improve the abysmal economic situation and abhorred the violence committed against the 
Algerians were, for Nora, still complicit in France’s colonial machinations. With some audacity, he criticized the 
positions taken by liberal national heroes Germaine Tillon as well as Albert Camus. Nora depicts Meursault, Camus’ 
character in The Stranger, as an example of the repressed desire to commit violence against the Algerians. Nora 
claimed that if French of Algeria could simply rid themselves of the “Arabs,” they would: “if one offered them 
genocide with the push of a button, how many of the French of Algeria would refuse it?” (206) Nora demanded nothing 
short of full independence for Algeria, and a “New Deal pour l’Algérie,” a massive investment in social, political, and 
economic programs to lift the war-torn, impoverished country. He also called for the end of the pieds noirs in Algeria: 
“for the current French of Algeria, c’est l’adieu” (266). The book provoked fierce criticism. Raymond Aron told Nora, 
“18 over 20 for the writer, zero for the citizen!” (18). André Bénichou was reportedly so incensed that he threw the 
book out the window, striking a passing police officer. Derrida’s letter, dated April 27, 1961, begins, “Mon cher 
Nora…”. In the intimacy of a private address to an old friend, Derrida is at times highly complementary, and at others, 
fiercely critical of Nora’s book. He never explicitly speaks in favor of Algerian independence, nor he does he support 
the French war; he clearly felt targeted by Nora’s book and disagreed vehemently with its description of the pieds 
noirs, and yet Derrida agrees with many of the solutions that Nora proposes for Algeria. Derrida enthusiastically 
agrees with Nora’s historical and psychological interpretation of Camus’ The Stranger. He writes, “I found the 
intention in the several pages that you consecrate to The Stranger to be excellent. I always read this book as an Algerian 
book, and the whole critical-philosophical edifice which Sartre constructed around it always seemed to me, in effect, 
to diminish or hide its meaning and its ‘historical’ originality” (292). Nonetheless, he reproaches Nora for his 
extremely unsympathetic depiction of Camus’ efforts on behalf of Algeria. Derrida argued it was grossly unfair to 
compare Camus to the hardline colonists who dream of the “Algérie-de-papa” and the unrepentant submission of 
French Algeria. Where Nora accuses Camus of selectively disengaging with the Algerian question for reasons of 
convenience, Derrida reproached that this argument “is really unworthy of Camus. And of you” (293). He also pushed 
back against Nora’s reductive and unfair depiction of the French of Algeria, which lumped the pieds noirs along with 
the hardcore colonists. Derrida chides Nora, if there is no meaningful difference between the French liberals and the 
colonists, “what a shame that the Nazis or the Americans weren’t racist enough or that their racism didn’t have 
sufficient resources!” (298) For Derrida, Nora paints the pieds noirs with too broad a brush, which was manifestly 
unfair to many liberals, including Camus, who had fought to help improve the conditions of the Algerians. While Nora 
derided the tepid position of French liberals regarding the future of Algeria, Derrida warned that they would be 
important allies of Algeria in any future move towards independence. Derrida writes, “Algerian liberalism will be 
powerless exactly to the extent that totalitarianism takes root in Algeria” (284). Despite significant disagreements 
concerning the future of Algeria, Derrida welcomes the program that Nora describes as the “New Deal for Algeria.” 
Describing his preferred path for Algeria as one of “real socialism,” Derrida anticipates the need for a long period of 
transition to independence in which liberal pieds noirs that remained in Algeria would be crucial. Derrida’s own 
position, if we can say that he takes one, cannot be described as adhering to the liberal French position towards Algeria, 
nor does he adopt the more radical line of Nora’s book. Rather, Derrida emphasized that moderate Algerians who did 
not support the FLN and liberal pieds noirs who did not follow the “ultras,” would need to reemerge in a new Algerian 
society. The liberals should not shoulder the blame for the extremism on both sides of the conflict. See : Pierre Nora, 
Les Français d’Algérie, (Paris: Christian Bourgeois, 2012) ; Edward Baring, “Liberalism and the Algerian War: The 




1, 1962, six million Algerians voted overwhelmingly in favor of a referendum for independence. 
With the end of the French presence in sight, and with many fearing retribution from a post-
colonial Algerian government, pied noir families began streaming out of the country. Derrida’s 
siblings Janine and René and their families left Algiers in the spring, amidst a chaotic rush of 
departures. Derrida had hoped that there might be peaceful coexistence between the Algerians and 
pieds noirs who had lived in Algiers for generations, and he initially advised his parents to stay in 
El Biar. However, the remaining French in Algeria were soon offered a rather stark choice between 
leaving with “la valise ou le cerceuil,” “with the suitcase or in the coffin.” At some risk to himself, 
Derrida returned to El Biar two weeks later to help his parents settle their affairs from the home 
on rue d’Aurelle-de-Paladines. Aimée and Georgette hoped they would be able to return to the 
house when the situation had calmed; they never dreamed of leaving Algeria, and they had only 
recently paid off the mortgage on the house. When they left, the house was repatriated by the 
Algerian state. Derrida’s parents re-settled in Nice along with many who fled Algeria. 
The year 1962 constituted a turning point in Derrida’s life. As he told Évelyne Grossman 
in 2004, “my adolescence lasted until I was thirty-two.”224 That year, Algeria declared its 
independence from France, Derrida published his first book, and he assumed his new name, 
Jacques. These events mark an unmistakable symbolic break from his past in Algeria: the path 
back to his childhood home had been foreclosed, and he had cut ties with his identity as Jackie and 









VI. Conclusion  
 
Maurice Blanchot writes in The Writing of Disaster, “Whoever writes is exiled from writing, which 
is the country – his own – where he is not a prophet.”225 For Derrida, Levinas, and Jabès, the exile 
of writing is intertwined with the writing of exile. Their experiences of exile were provoked by the 
legacy of colonialism, world wars, and the unmitigated catastrophes of the 20th century. These 
narratives are inseparable from the question of Jewish identity, and the historical legacy of Jewish 
galut. For these writers, there was no possibility of nostos. The communities they had departed for 
France were subsequently uprooted or destroyed. If Levinas, Derrida, and Jabès were born 
diaspora, they would depart their homes bound for a new galut in France: they are thinkers of 
departure and dislocation, rather than nostalgic return. The condition of exile is not only a 
reflection of their lived experiences, but the situation which they confront in writing in the question 
of the book. Drawing on their own experiences, Jabès, Derrida, and Levinas characterized exile as 
a kind of existential condition. For Jabès, exile is a synonym for the Jew, and the activity of writing 
is an expression of this dislocation. He writes, “for me the two conditions, Judaism and writing, 
are utterly bound up with each other.”226 Levinas, as we’ve seen, describes the “il y a” as an 
experience of exile from the world, a kind of a flight from humanity that he witnessed during the 
débâcle of 1940 and as a prisoner in the Nazi Stalag. Derrida’s reflections on his difficult affiliation 
to the French language reveal the imminent condition of exile contained in one’s relation to a 
“homeland” and “mother tongue.” As Derrida insists, “I only have one language, yet it is not 
mine.” The exile from language, like the exile from the homeland and the world or even being as 
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such, represents an affront to the intrinsic value of the nostos tale, the fidelity of memory, and the 
singular attachment to native language. The paths that led Derrida, Levinas, and Jabès to France 
represent vastly different experiences of exile, but each confronts the condition of exile through 
the proxy of the question of the book. Jabès writes in A Foreigner Carrying in the Crook of his 
Arm a Tiny Book, “the place of language is language. Exile from his language is the exile’s fate. 
[La langue a, pour lieu, la langue. L’exil de la langue est la condition de l’exilé].”227   
																																																						




Chapter II: The Jew, the Pariah, and the Writer 
 
 
I. Introduction  
 
What does it mean to describe someone as a “Jewish” writer? Is this label applied based on the 
writer’s heritage or familial affiliation, his or her observance of Jewish practices, or is it a quality 
of writing itself that is distinctively Jewish? Is this identity mutable, or does the writer carry this 
mark of Jewishness in all activities? Who defines this affiliation to Judaism, and on what terms? 
Is it a choice? It is hopelessly problematic to identify a characteristic or trait that is symptomatic 
of “Jewish” writing. The diverse forms of life encompassed by Judaism cannot be reduced to a 
genetic trace or identifying mark that would define a necessary and sufficient standard by which 
to qualify a “Jewish” writer. This question composes a subset of the broader difficulty concerning 
the slippery notion of “Jewish identity.” One point where there is broad agreement, Howard 
Wettstein writes, is that “any attempt to locate anything like the correct account of Jewish identity, 
or the correct Jewish identity, is doomed to failure. There is no—and from the ancient world there 
never has been— single or uniquely correct Jewish identity. One is reminded of the old joke 
concerning n Jews and n+1 synagogues.”228 This specific problem of determining the “essence” 
of Jewish identity highlights the general question of identity claims and affiliation. 
The boundaries of identity are imposed both internally and externally: being Jewish is 
defined both from within, from the perspective of the Jewish community’s own self-identification 
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and its determination of who counts among its members, and from without, by non-Jews, who 
have historically projected the figure of the Jew as a target for exclusion and discrimination. The 
Jew is pulled and pushed between these opposing dynamics. Even if there is no “essence” to being 
Jewish, this does not prevent the reification of such an identity through its double-edged modes of 
affiliation. The history of Jewish life in Christian Europe has long entailed a tussle to define the 
boundaries of Jewish identity. These strictures connect the social and political questions regarding 
the inclusion or exclusion of Jews in Christian society – the “Jewish Question” – with the 
ontological question of what it means to be a Jew, that is, the specific character of Jewish existence. 
Indeed, the character of “Jewish” consciousness is inflected with the same double-edged mode of 
exclusion: the social alienation of the Jewish people is related to the self-alienation of Jewish 
consciousness. Franz Kafka wrote in his diary in 1914, “What have I in common with Jews? I have 
hardly anything in common with myself.”229 The difficulty of assigning Jewish identity, or 
defining the essential character of the “Jewish” writer, illustrates the divided or fractured 
consciousness of the Jew, the differential character of all identity, and the ineradicable otherness 
contained in the self. Kafka’s remark discloses the aberration of substantive identity as a signal of 
wholeness, and it suggests the aporia of Jewish identity, among all others. 
The question of Jewish identity in France has long focused on its compatibility with 
Republican ideals. Irwin Wall writes, “the dilemma facing French Jewry since the Revolution of 
1789 has been that of a community trying to affirm its specificity in a society whose Jacobin 
tradition has seemed to demand complete assimilation and uniformity.”230 Jewish particularism in 
the context of the universal ideals of the French Republic was always viewed with suspicion, 
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wavering between uneasy coexistence and hostility. The relative peace and prosperity of the 
French Third Republic, born out of the wreckage of the 1871 Franco-Prussian War and the 
Commune, saw assimilated Jews rise to positions of power, even if the nation’s deep-seated anti-
Semitism remained intact. These dynamics produced certain ironic outcomes. France was the 
country where a Jewish military official like Alfred Dreyfus could ascend to a high-ranking post 
in the army, only to be felled by specious claims based in anti-Semitism, and where a Jewish 
socialist like Léon Blum – himself a Dreyfussard – could become prime minister, both before and 
after Pétain’s Vichy government.231 Of course, if the Dreyfus affair revealed the stubborn 
persistence of anti-Semitism in the French Third Republic, it was only a glimpse of the frightful 
potential unleashed during the Nazi occupation. Wall writes, “that Jews could accede to the highest 
office of the French government did not lessen the sense of rupture between France and its Jews 
created by the war and the Vichy regime.”232 The sense of betrayal led to a painstaking reevaluation 
of French-Jewish identity after the war. The pragmatic and existential stakes of Jewish identity in 
post-war France reflected the need to memorialize the Shoah and Dreyfus, and to reconstruct a 
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cultural identity that had been so nearly destroyed. This chapter explores the modes of exclusion 
that structure Jewish identity in 20th century France, from the legacy of the “Jewish Question” and 
the Dreyfus Affair – notably, Bernard Lazare’s “conscious pariah” – to the post-war reckoning 
with anti-Semitism in France and the traumatic memory of the Shoah. For Levinas, Derrida, and 
Jabès, the difficulty of Jewish identity illustrates the fragility of affiliation and belonging.  
Post-war philosophical reflections on anti-Semitism in France were inaugurated by Sartre’ 
study Réflexions sur la question juive, which reflects on the anti-Semite’s projection of the Jew. 
But as many critics have noted, his phenomenology of anti-Semitism ignores the existential reality 
of what Levinas calls “being Jewish.” For Levinas and others involved in the Colloque des 
intellectuels juifs de langue française, there was a sense of obligation to reflect on the history of 
Jewish life and thought in France, which was nearly extinguished in the Shoah. Levinas identifies 
in the facticity of Jewish existence a “metaphysical sentiment” of election, which implies a unique 
sensitivity to the threat of violence realized in its most terrible form during the Nazi era, and gives 
rise to a notion of existence as a form of ethical subjectivity. By contrast, Derrida and Jabès explore 
the paradox of identity and the aporia of affiliation and belonging, and even as they engage 
questions related to Judaism, they refuse any simple identification as “Jewish” writers. Derrida 
and Jabès extend Lazare’s figure of the conscious pariah, as critical voices at the limits of tradition, 
who question orthodoxy and dare to reimagine the Jewish tradition otherwise, through the modality 
of the comme si, the as if. Between the ethical subjectivity of Levinas’ “being Jewish” and Jabès’ 
literary re-imagination of Judaism in the mode of what Derrida calls “hyperbolic Judaism,” the 






II. The Jew and the Conscious Pariah 
 
The double-sided modes of exclusion that police the boundaries of Jewish identity are brought to 
the fore in the historical figure of the Jewish pariah. In his 1920 Sociology of Religion, Max Weber 
described the Jewish people as the quintessential Paria-Volk, who are subjected to “negative 
privileges” – that is, discrimination – due to their perceived differences from Christian society.233 
The figure of the outcast or pariah has long been used both as a justification to exclude and 
discriminate against Jews, but it also has a counter-history which Hannah Arendt called the 
“hidden tradition” of the “conscious pariah.” The “conscious pariah” originates in the writing of 
Bernard Lazare, a late 19th century French Jewish journalist, outspoken defender of Alfred 
Dreyfus, anarchist, and Zionist. When Lazare died in 1903 at thirty-eight years old, he left behind 
an unfinished manuscript on the political destiny of the Jews in Europe entitled Job’s Dunghill, 
which the author’s brother published in 1927. The notion of the “conscious pariah” turns the 
traditional sense of the Jewish pariah on its head, re-appropriating the pejorative stereotype as a 
virtue. Lazare’s conscious pariah is a kind of political rebel, who dares to question authority. 
After the 19th century political emancipation of many Western European Jews, Lazare 
noted the stubborn persistence of the figure of the Jewish pariah in the French Third Republic. “I 
am a Jew and Christian society rejects me,” he writes, “it makes of me a pariah. Even amongst my 
friends, at certain times I sense that the moral and intellectual communication is interrupted by the 
survival of prejudice.”234 Even as the political situation of French Jews had markedly improved 
over the course of the 19th century, Lazare evokes the stubborn persistence of prejudice even 
amongst those he considers friends. The Dreyfus Affair had brought to the surface the 
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undercurrents of anti-Semitism orienting political allegiances in the French Third Republic, and 
Lazare was one of Dreyfus’ earliest and most vocal defenders. In Job’s Dunghill, he wonders what 
is the distinctive character of the Jew that provokes such obdurate resentment. Lazare succinctly 
illustrates what it means to be a Jew, as the perennial Other of Christian society: 
There are two. One, sad and surprised ; he is called Jew; what is that ?  
The other : “I will teach you what it means to be a Jew.” 
Shouts of death in the streets: Mort aux Juifs!  
The second opens the Emek Abaka; he reads and the breath of long ago returns; it comes 
from the depths of the past, always the same. “Why this against us, and always this?” 
says the first. “Becomes we are others.”235 
 
For Lazare, the gains made by European Jews in the 19th century by way of political emancipation 
had not remove age-old stigma. When the first character hears the cries of this timeless anti-Semitic 
slogan in the street, in a highly symbolic gesture, the second opens the “Emek Abaka,” “The Vale 
of Tears,” a history of the persecution of the Jews compiled by Joseph HaCohen in the 15th century. 
To recall the historical connection between the discrimination of the present day and the past—
this is what it means to be a Jew. The Jews have “never found the garden of rest, or its chosen 
land,” Lazare writes, “When we think we’ve found a haven, the promised land, cities of refuge, 
persecution returns: we must flee, flee from Spain, flee from Poland, etc.”236 It is the implacability 
of anti-Semitism, the persistence of the murderous chant “Mort aux juifs,” and the permanent 
possibility that they will be forced to flee that binds Jews across generations.  
Lazare reasons that there must be something unique to being Jewish which consistently 
solicit such hatred. Rather than concealing his Jewishness and running from the label of pariah, he 
embraces the charge. “What bitter pride to feel this universal hatred,” he exclaims, “to be detested 
by the entire human race, we must carry something great inside of us.”237 He embraces the role of 
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the conscious pariah who intentionally speaks from his unenviable position as other or outsider, to 
re-appropriate the stigmatizing figure of the pariah. “The pride of being the pariah” is the 
distinctiveness of the Jew in Christian society: “What delight to create a nobility from his infamy, 
a royalty from his debasement.” The conscious pariah does not flee his label, rather he or she 
transforms the pariah into a political dissident, a kind of rebel. Enzo Traverso writes, “For Lazare, 
the pariah was not simply someone excluded; he was the proscribed who transforms himself into 
rebel, who does not accept passively suffering his oppressed condition but makes it the point of 
departure for a political revolt. In other words, a ‘conscious pariah.’”238 Lazare embraces the 
conscious pariah who dares to speak truthfully even at the risk of marginalization.  
Hannah Arendt expanded upon the figure of the conscious pariah in several wartime essays 
written in exile in the United States. In her 1944 essay “We Refugees,” Arendt recalls the figure 
of the conscious pariah as a counter-tradition in modern Jewish history: 
Modern Jewish history, having started with court Jews and continuing with Jewish 
millionaires and philanthropists, is apt to forget about this other thread of Jewish tradition-
the tradition of Heine, Rahel Varnhagen, Sholom Aleichem, of Bernard Lazare, Franz 
Kafka, or even Charlie Chaplin. It is the tradition of a minority of Jews who have not 
wanted to become upstarts, who preferred the status of "conscious pariah." All vaunted 
Jewish qualities-the "Jewish heart," humanity, humor, disinterested intelligence- are pariah 
qualities. All Jewish shortcomings-tactlessness, political stupidity, inferiority complexes, 
and money-grubbing-are characteristic of upstarts. There have always been Jews who did 
not think it worthwhile to change their humane attitude and their natural insight into reality 
for the narrowness of caste spirit or the essential unreality of financial transactions.239 
 
From Heinrich Heine and Rahel Varnhagen to Franz Kafka and Charlie Chaplin, the conscious 
pariah stands at the fringes of the tradition, representing the revolutionary spirit of the outcast. In 
“The Jew as Pariah: A Hidden Tradition,” Arendt writes that the pariah has become "a human type 
– a concept of supreme importance for the evaluation of mankind.”240 The tradition of the 
																																																						
238 Enzo Traverso, The End of Jewish Modernity (London: Pluto Press, 2016), 64. 
239 Hannah Arendt “We Refugees,” The Jewish Writings (New York: Schocken Books, 2007), 274. 




conscious pariah in modern Jewish history is “tacit and latent, and its continuance automatic and 
unconscious,” populated by rebellious figures who dare to say that the emperor has no clothes. The 
pariah pledges no allegiance to a group or nation, and he is refused entry by all: the pariah 
represents the rebellious spirit of all oppressed people. While the figure of the conscious pariah 
starts with this Jewish “hidden tradition," Arendt suggests it becomes a universal figure, “a human 
type,” who exists as a thorn in the side of authority. She identifies a forerunner to the conscious 
pariah in Heinrich Heine’s character the “schlemiel,” who identifies “the essential kinship of the 
pariah to the poet – both alike excluded from society and never quite at home in this world.”241 
However, the schlemiel is defined by his essential innocence before the cruelties of the world. It 
was Lazare who translated the political significance of the conscious pariah: Arendt explains, “in 
contrast to his unemancipated brethren who accept their pariah status automatically and 
unconsciously, the emancipated Jew must awake to an awareness of his position and, conscious of 
it, become a rebel against it – the champion of an oppressed people.” The conscious pariah is a 
rebel against the political order as a representative of the oppressed, whose “fight for freedom is 
part and parcel of that which all the downtrodden of Europe must wage to achieve national and 
social liberation.” The conscious pariah appeals to humanity beyond the bounds of politics. 
 Until the 20th century, there was at least a semblance of escape for the Jewish pariah. “So 
long as the Jews of Western Europe were pariahs only in a social sense,” Arendt wrote in 1944, 
“they could find salvation, to a large extent, by becoming parvenus.”242 The Jewish parvenu found 
a means of largely escaping discrimination through financial success and by masking the outward 
signs of his or her Jewishness. However, biological anti-Semitism obviated the distinction between 
the pariah and parvenu. The Nazis did not distinguish between practicing and secular Jews, 
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between those who actively identified as Jews and others with distant Jewish ancestry, or between 
pariahs and parvenus. The Jew belonged to a biological race whose destiny was inalterable and 
inescapable. “Today the bottom has dropped out of the old ideology,” Arendt writes, “the pariah 
Jew and the parvenu Jew are in the same boat, rowing desperately in the same angry sea,” “both 
are branded with the same mark; both alike are outlaws.” The innocence of Heine’s schlemiel no 
longer has a place in this world, where there is no reprieve for the rebellious pariah, and the Jew 
cannot escape his or her existential affiliation. Rather, as Arendt identifies in “Guests from No-
Mans-Land,” today, the quintessential figure of the pariah is the refugee. Cast into the legal abyss 
of exile, occupying a liminal zone of non-recognition, the refugee is forced to flee his or her 
homeland and seek refuge in a foreign and likely unsympathetic land. Unable to escape his or her 
fate, sealed in Jewish blood, the refugee is tossed into a desperate limbo, with no assurance of 
survival. Nonetheless, Arendt notes, “those few refugees who insist upon telling the truth, even to 
the point of ‘indecency,’ get in exchange for their unpopularity one priceless advantage: history is 
no longer a closed book to them and politics is no longer the privilege of gentiles.”243 Writing these 
words in New York in 1943 as the Nazi war machine tightened its grip over Europe, Arendt 
certainly appreciated the irony. Refugees who speak out frankly against the powers that expulsed 
them have the rare opportunity to act as true witnesses to history in the making.  
 The exile, the pariah, the refugee – these figures are deeply intertwined with the historical 
legacy of the Jew, without being exhausted by the association. These social outcasts are not 
exclusively Jews, they do not define what it means to be a Jew, and yet the associations are 
profoundly entangled. The aporia of Jewish identity, its double-sided mode of exclusion from 
within and from without, defines the stakes of these associations. The history of the Jewish people 
																																																						




is intertwined with a narrative of exile and social exclusion, which extends from the biblical 
narrative to modern history; yet, the figures of the pariah and refugee are also the source for anti-
Semitic depictions of Ahasuerus, the “wandering Jew,” and the view of the Jewish people as an 
untrustworthy “state within a state.” Lazare’s effort to re-appropriate the Jewish pariah as a 
political rebel is emblematic of this tussle between Jewish self-definition and the externally 
imposed figure of the Jew. A writer in exile is no more “Jewish” than a writer who has not been 
exiled, and yet it cannot fail to recall the history of the Jewish people. Whether this identity is 
determined by the Jewish community or by the anti-Semite, the individual is subsumed by group 
affiliation. This is the double-sided exclusion that complicates claims of identity. It is also the great 
virtue of Lazare’s conscious pariah, whose unyielding truth-telling questions both the prevailing 
powers of the Christian state, as well as the orthodoxy of the Jewish community. Excluded by 
both, the conscious pariah is the marginalized free thinker who questions authority in all its guises. 
 
 
III. Sartre and the Anti-Semite’s Jew 
 
As France celebrated its liberation from German occupation in the second half of 1944, Jean-Paul 
Sartre noted that the public spoke little of the fate of France’s Jews. “Now all France rejoices and 
fraternizes in the streets,” Sartre wrote, “Do we say anything about the Jews? Do we give a thought 
to those who died in the gas chambers at Lublin? Not a word.”244 Supposedly to assert a semblance 
of national unity in the aftermath of the liberation from Nazi occupation, few dared to speak of the 
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French complicity in the murderous campaign against the Jews, or the fate of seventy-five 
thousand French Jews deported to Auschwitz. In truth, Sartre believed that many in France did not 
care what had happened to Europe’s Jews; worse, some preferred that they not return. Charles de 
Gaulle’s speech following the liberation of Paris on August 25, 1944 planted the myth of a unified 
French nation which had been occupied by a foreign invader, and which was eventually liberated 
by its own hands. “Paris! Paris outraged! Paris broken! Paris martyred! But Paris liberated! 
Liberated by itself, liberated by its people with the help of the French armies,”245 he declared. The 
full history of the German occupation of France was, of course, more complicated. Calls for 
national unity accompanied silence concerning the crimes committed against the Jews. To heal the 
fractures of war-torn France, Sartre sarcastically remarked, “we must not irritate the anti-Semites; 
more than ever, we need unity.”246 This allowed certain revisionist histories to take root in the 
French public imagination following the Liberation: the pernicious “myth of the French resistance” 
largely indemnified Pétain and the Vichy government for its collaboration with the Nazis in the 
murder of French Jews. Irvin Wall explains that according to this revisionist myth, 
Pétain was to be regarded as the shield, and de Gaulle the sword, of French liberation. If 
de Gaulle, as leader of the Free French, could lay claim to the title of French liberator by 
the force of arms, Pétain, although imprisoned as a collaborator, had at least tried to protect 
the French, and particularly French Jews, from a worse fate than the one they actually 
endured from 1940 to 1944. Pétain’s regime had allowed the deportation of foreign Jews 
resident in France, but it allegedly had done so without knowledge of their ultimate fate, 
while French Jews remained protected.247 
 
This sanitized version of the Vichy collaboration in the murder of French Jews remained largely 
intact for a quarter century, until a series of publications including Robert O. Paxton’s 1972 
bombshell Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order began unraveling the myth by revealing the 
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extent of the Vichy collaboration.248 Nonetheless, in the immediate aftermath of the war, fortified 
by the myth of the French resistance, silence reigned concerning the 75,000 Jewish French citizens 
deported to Auschwitz, or the cruel round-up of 12,000 Parisian Jews – including over one 
thousand children – by French police in the Vél’ d’Hiver in the 15th Arrondissement of Paris on 
July 16, 1942 before they were sent to the Drancy camp and deported to Auschwitz. Police chief 
René Bosquet organized the Vél’ d’Hiver roundup, and he was tried for treason after the war, but 
he was acquitted and his sentence for lighter crimes was commuted.249 For many years, the desire 
to move on from the dark years of the Occupation superseded the need for a thorough public 
accounting of France’s history of anti-Semitism, including its collaboration in the Shoah. 
Sartre published "Portrait de l'antisémite" in Les Temps Modernes in 1945 and the full text 
of Réflexions sur la question juive in 1946 with a small Parisian publisher, Paul Morihien.250 The 
first printing of Sartre’s book was limited to three thousand copies due to paper shortages. "It had 
an impact but didn't sell much," Morihien later recalled, "It took a few years for the first printing 
to sell.”251 Rather inelegantly translated in English as Anti-Semite and Jew: An Exploration of the 
Etiology of Hate, Sartre’s study offers fascinating insights into the historical dynamics that drive 
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the anti-Semite’s passionate hatred.252 His critique is rooted in his humanism, and his call to 
genuinely uproot anti-Semitism in France following the war is well-intentioned. With that said, as 
the French title attests, Sartre’s text responds above all to the dynamics of the “Jewish Question,” 
as it was articulated and lived in the French Third Republic, in terms of social and political forms 
of exclusion and discrimination, largely ignoring the developments in anti-Semitism since the rise 
of Nazism. The inadequacies of his constructivist approoach, and the frequent reliance on anti-
Semitic stereotypes that echo right-wing French writers such as Edouard de Drumont, Maurice 
Barrès, or Charles Maurras – not to mention Heidegger – are quite regrettable. Michael Walzer 
aptly remarks that Sartre’s study demonstrates that “theoretical sophistication and practical 
ignorance can, sometimes, usefully combine.”253 Sartre’s famously contentious thesis is that “it is 
the anti-Semite who makes the Jew.”254 The figure of the Jew is a projection of the anti-Semite, 
rather than a substantive identity defined by certain essential characteristics.  
Anti-Semitism, Sartre writes, “is first of all a passion.”255 This passion is a way of 
designating an enemy, the other, such that it can be the target of aggression. Anti-Semitism is a 
rejection of modernity, and an irrational fear of difference. It is “a form of Manichaeism” which 
“explains the course of the world by the struggle of the principle of Good with the principle of 
Evil.”256 The Jew allows the anti-Semite to identify a source for his woes. For Sartre, while anti-
Semitism is the product of ignorance and ideology, it is also a choice. The anti-Semite “chooses 
the irremediable out of fear of being free; he chooses mediocrity out of fear of being alone.” The 
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inferiority of the Jew satisfies the anti-Semite’s own need for validation. Indeed, the anti-Semite 
“finds the existence of the Jew absolutely necessary. Otherwise to whom would he be superior?”257 
Even if the anti-Semite needs the Jew to serve as the object of his passionate hatred, this is not a 
conscious reflection. For Sartre, anti-Semitism represents a choice that rejects the humanity of the 
Jew, but it is also a denial of the humanity of the anti-Semite himself. The anti-Semite “is afraid. 
Not of the Jews, to be sure, but of himself, of his own consciousness, of his liberty, of his instincts, 
of his responsibilities, of solitariness, of change, of society, and of the world.”258 Anti-Semitism is 
ostensibly a choice in favor of ignorance and fear over humanity, it is the “fear of the human 
condition.” This kind of anti-Semitism was recognizable for those in the French Third Republic, 
which came crashing down in 1940 with the Nazi invasion.  
For Sartre, the figure of the Jew is a response to external conditions, a projection of the 
irrationalism of the anti-Semite. To satisfy the need for a scapegoat, “if the Jew did not exist, the 
anti-Semite would invent him.”259 Yet the depiction of the Jew as the mirroring board for the anti-
Semite seemingly dispossesses the reality of Jew identity and history. Sartre confirms, “the Jew is 
one whom other men consider a Jew.”260 While there is no denying that the anti-Semite constructs 
the figure of the Jew as the Other, Sartre shows no interest in the reality proper to the Jew, much 
less how such a reality is informed by Jewish history and practices. If he deftly analyzes the anti-
Semite’s projection of the Jew, he ignores the other side of the dynamic: how the Jew constructs 
him or herself apart from these external pressures. For this reason, at times Sartre risks cozying up 
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too close to the perspective of the anti-Semite: he often draws on traditional anti-Semitic tropes 
that depict the Jew as a pariah in a foreign land, whose untrustworthy and selfish habits are the 
product of a social malignancy. In defense of the Jew, Sartre writes, “the Jew remains the stranger, 
the intruder, the unassimilated at the very heart of our society.”261 Following Hegel’s description 
of the stateless Jewish people as removed from the movement of world history, Sartre describes 
the Jewish people as an “abstract historical community” whose rootlessness in the nation has led 
to their passivity in world history. He writes, “If it is true, [as] Hegel says, that a community is 
historical to the degree that it remembers its history, then the Jewish community is the least 
historical of all, for it keeps a memory of nothing but a long martyrdom, that is, of a long 
passivity.”262 Hegel’s description of the Jewish people as outside of history is not as anodyne as 
Sartre seems to believe. Even if his intent in using the tropes of the pariah, the wandering Jew, and 
other stereotypes is to overturn their meanings, it is hard not to view Sartre as passively endorsing 
these pejorative images. There is no rehabilitating, for example, his description of “typical 
characteristics of the French Jew—a hooked nose, protruding ears, etc.”263 
Borrowing the terminology of Heidegger’s philosophy, Sartre writes that “to be a Jew is to 
be thrown into — to be abandoned to — the situation of a Jew.”264 Depending on how the Jew 
responds to this situation of Jewish Being-in-the-world, Sartre introduces the categories of the 
“authentic” and “inauthentic” Jew. This distinction ostensibly calques Arendt’s delineation of the 
Jewish pariah and parvenu. Inauthentic Jews “deal with their situation by running away from it,”265 
by hiding their Jewishness, or denying their condition. The “inauthentic” Jew is reminiscent of the 
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Jewish “parvenu” of the later 19th century who was also able to ascend the social hierarchy by 
hiding his Jewishness. On the other hand, Sartre describes the “authentic” Jew who embraces his 
or her situation: “Jewish authenticity consists in choosing oneself as Jew— that is, in realizing 
one's Jewish condition,” the authentic Jew affirms his condition, he “makes himself a Jew, in the 
face of all and against all.”266 It seems that only by embracing the role of pariah can the Jew become 
what he authentically “is.” While it is unlikely that Sartre had read Job’s Dunghill, his notion of 
the authentic Jew strongly echoes Lazare’s conscious pariah. The authentic Jew, like the conscious 
pariah, is condemned to revulsion, exclusion, and the threat of violence. For Sartre, between these 
two unenviable possibilities, the Jew is “destined from the start to either inauthenticity or 
martyrdom.” The Jew’s tragic fate is either to hide from him or herself, or embrace the role of 
pariah; either way, “the situation of the Jew is such that everything he does turns against him.”267 
 The reception of Sartre’s study was mixed.268 Aimé Patri’s review of the book applauded 
Sartre’s good intentions, but questioned his “chicken-and-egg” approach which “is resolved by 
Sartre in a direction that is the opposite of the one Bernard Lazare took in L’Antisemitisme.”269 By 
describing the figure of the Jew as created by the anti-Semite, rather than the converse, he denied 
the possibility that Jewish identity has its own reality apart from the anti-Semite’s projection. 
Sartre writes, “we must ask, not ‘What is a Jew?’ but ‘What have you made of the Jews?’”270 
However, he seems to deny the space to respond to the first question. In Portrait of a Jew – a book 
dedicated to Sartre – Jewish French-Tunisian writer Albert Memmi recounted “his book so 
disturbed me that I immediately picked up my pen. I tried to explain that he was mistaken, that he 
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had not gone far enough. […] I ended my letter with the words: 'Now, believe me, the Jew does 
exist, Jewishness survives!"'271 In The Liberation of the Jews, Memmi further commented, “to 
affirm my Jewishness without giving it a specific content would have been an empty proposition 
and in the final analysis contradictory.” 272 While Sartre’s phenomenological analysis of the 
“situation” of the Jew yields a schematic or formal understanding of the relation between the Jew 
and the anti-Semite, his description of the Jew as the projection of the anti-Semite strikes of a 
certain ignorance of Jewish history, as if he had never thought to ask a Jew’s perspective on what 
it means to be a Jew. As Levinas would later exclaim, “of course, we do not owe Judaism to anti-
Semitism, no matter what Sartre may say!”273 
Perhaps the most confounding aspect of Sartre’s Réflexions sur la question juive, as Enzo 
Traverso notes, is “his almost total silence about Auschwitz.”274 Sartre’s impetus for writing his 
book was the silence regarding the French complicity in the Nazi crimes against the Jews, and he 
acknowledges the existence of the death camps at the outset of the text; however, as the original 
French title suggests, his analysis of anti-Semitism remains based in the tropes of the 19th century 
“Jewish Question,” which reached their apogee with the Dreyfus Affair. “Applied to the France of 
the Third Republic, Sartre’s analysis is quite apt,” Traverso writes, but “such a formulation – anti-
Semitism as a passion – cannot, however, integrate Auschwitz.”275 In his 1947 review of the book 
in Critique, George Bataille criticized Sartre’s overly rigid distinctions in light of the Shoah: “there 
is an epic of reason and the Jews have written some of its most authentic pages; moreover doesn't 
Jewish authenticity consist precisely in the fact that in Auschwitz it was reason itself that suffered 
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through their bodies?”276 Sartre’s distinctions between the Jew and the anti-Semite, rationality and 
irrationality, or the authentic and inauthentic Jew were ill-fitting in light of the realities ushered in 
by Nazism. Traverso explains, “the ‘banality of evil’ escapes Sartre's phenomenology of anti-
Semitism. Eugenics, racial biology, völkisch nationalism, social Darwinism do not constitute for 
Sartre the ideological premises of a plan to exterminate the Jews.”277 Sartre’s analysis of anti-
Semitism focuses on social relations in the Third Republic, but it is totally inadequate to integrate 
the developments hastened by the Nazi campaign against the Jews.278 Indeed, Sartre’s account of 
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the construction of the Jew by the anti-Semite is of a piece with the book’s near omission of the 
Shoah. He argues that even the casual anti-Semite ultimately seeks the death of the Jew, but the 
typical forms of anti-Semitism are mere “symbolic murders.”279 The fact that anti-Semitism had 
been responsible for millions of actual murders during the preceding years seems beyond the 
explanatory powers of Sartre’s study. 
In the final interviews conducted before Sartre’s death in 1980 with his assistant Benny 
Lévy, he returned to the question of a properly Jewish existence.280 Notwithstanding questions 
pertaining to Sartre’s apparent change of heart on certain topics in these interviews, his framing of 
Reflections on the Jewish Question is useful.281 Sartre describes his central argument that the Jew 
is the construction of the anti-Semite as “a superficial description of the Jew as he is in the Christian 
world,” who is “constantly being dragged down on all sides by anti-Semitic ideas, which are trying 
to devour him, to take over his thinking and capture him at the core of his being.”282 In his dialogue 
with Lévy, Sartre confirms that according to his 1946 study, there is nothing proper to the existence 
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of the Jew beyond this externally imposed construction. He describes this as merely a question of 
focus: “I was hostile primarily to anti-Semitism, and that book is a declaration of war against anti-
Semites, nothing more.” The purpose of Reflections on the Jewish Question was to critique the 
anti-Semite, rather than to examine the being proper to the Jew. As Sartre admits to Lévy, “I wrote 
without any documentation, without reading one book about Jews […] I wrote what I thought. […] 
Based on nothing, based on anti-Semitism, which I wanted to combat.” This, of course, confirms 
the criticism that Sartre had ignored any notion of what Levinas calls “being-Jewish.” In his 
interview with Lévy, Sartre apparently reverses course on this point, declaring, “I now think there 
is a Jewish reality beyond the ravages that anti-Semitism has inflicted on Jews; there is a profound 
Jewish reality as well as a Christian reality.” This Jewish reality involves a particular “destiny,” 
which Sartre appreciates “precisely because it possesses no Marxist element,” but rather it is an 
“ethical end”: Sartre tells Lévy, “The Jew thinks that the end of the world, of this world, and the 
upsurge of the other will result in the appearance of the ethical existence of men who live for one 
another.”283 Sartre’s warming to an idea of Jewish messianism distinct from Marxism may raise 
eyebrows, but his framing of Reflections on the Jewish Question in terms of the anti-Semite’s 
perspective confirm the criticism that Sartre’s study had ignored the reality proper to the Jew.  
If Sartre emphasizes the construction of the Jew by the anti-Semite in Reflections on the 
Jewish Question, perhaps it is because he recognizes his own perspective as a non-Jew. In its 
closing passages, he quotes Richard Wright: “there is no Negro problem in the United States, there 
is a White problem." By the same token, Sartre writes, “anti-Semitism is not a Jewish problem; it 
is our problem.”284 As a non-Jew, he takes ownership of the problem of anti-Semitism as 
principally one of gentiles, or perhaps humanists more generally. The target audience for 
																																																						
283 Ibid, 106. 




Reflections on the Jewish Question was a sector of French society that had long accepted a casual 
form of anti-Semitism. Sartre demonstrates ignorance – perhaps a willing ignorance – regarding 
the actual content of Jewish history, and there are elements of latent anti-Semitic thinking in the 
more unflattering and problematic aspects of the text. Still, he addressed the urgent need to 
confront the silence regarding anti-Semitism in the aftermath of the Shoah, during the triumphant 
moment of France liberation, as the histories of the occupation were being written – and re-written 
– and the crimes against France’s Jews were all too quickly being forgotten, revised, or negated.  
 
 
IV. Levinas, Election, and “Being Jewish”  
 
Levinas published “Être juif,” “Being Jewish,” in the journal Confluences in 1947 in response to 
Sartre’s Reflections on the Jewish Question. In this short but rich text, Levinas criticizes Sartre’s 
study as an insufficient account of “Being Jewish.” “If Judaism only had to resolve the ‘Jewish 
Question,’” Levinas writes, “it would have a lot to do, but it wouldn’t be too much.”285 Beyond 
the social and political stakes of the “Jewish Question” imposed on the Jew by the anti-Semite, 
Levinas sketches a view of the existential facticity of “being Jewish,” describing the specific 
character of “Jewish existence.” Against Sartre’s image of the Jew defined by non-Jews, Levinas 
portrays being Jewish as “not only seeking out a refuge in the world, but feeling that one has a 
place in the economy of being.” The facticity of being Jewish is not defined by a set of enumerated 
dogmas or tenets, it “does not take stock, does not enumerate the ideas contained in its heritage. It 
																																																						




places its spiritual work in its existence more than in its sermon.”286 Levinas’ objective in “Being 
Jewish” is, contra Sartre, to sketch the situation of Jewish reality from the standpoint of the Jew.287  
To unpack the variegated notion of Jewish existence, one must first understand the 
originality of Judaism, in contrast to the continuities inherited by Christianity. Echoing themes 
from Franz Roseznweig’s “neues Denken” addressing the revitalization of Jewish life, Levinas 
suggests that Judaism must highlight its originality if it is to avoid becoming a reliquary religion 
starved of life through assimilation.288 To this end, he identifies a fundamental distinction between 
the temporalities of Jewish and Christian existence. Whereas the disposition of Jewish existence 
is turned towards the past, Christian existence is theologically anchored in the present moment:  
Its originality consists in relegating the Father to whom the Jew is attached to a secondary 
position, to the past, and only acceding to the Father through the incarnated Son, that is, as 
a presence, as his presence amongst us. It is not a question of dogma but emotion. Whereas 
Jewish existence refers to a privileged moment of the past and its absolute position in being 
is assured by his filiality, Christian existence has this privileged attachment in the present. 
God is his brother, that is, his contemporary.289  
 
Jewish existence is turned towards the past, in reverence of God’s creation and the revelation of 
the commandments, whereas the Christian God is the incarnated Son, whose presence is revealed 
in a moment of human history. The work of Christian salvation is reaffirmed in an eternal present, 
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which accompanies “an attenuation of the notion of origin.”290 Just as Pascal and Kierkegaard 
question the truth of salvation in an eternally renewed moment of doubt, Christian existence 
implies the refreshing novelty of the constant reaffirmation of faith. Levinas explains that Christian 
faith in salvation “can never be acquired, but presents a conquest.” The recurring affirmation of 
faith orients Christian existence, demonstrating “the need to repeat the mystery of Golgotha, to 
become contemporaneous with God once more.” The need to symbolically relive the crucifixion 
in the present, to renew the bonds of faith, distinguishes Christian and Jewish reality. For Levinas, 
this difference in temporal dispositions is essential to the place of Jews in Christian society. 
 The temporality of Jewish existence is inflected in the “irremissibility” of identity. For 
Levinas, Nazism had revealed in the starkest terms the inescapability of Jewish affiliation: “the 
recourse of Hitlerian anti-Semitism to racial myth reminds the Jew of the irremissibility of his 
being. Unable to flee his condition – for many, this felt like vertigo.” Whereas persecuted Jews 
were once able escape this “condition” through conversion or assimilation, the racial science 
propagated by the Nazis rendered “being Jewish” inescapable. Perhaps, Levinas reflects, the 
irremissibility of Jewish existence is a symbol for the human condition: “the human situation, 
surely – and in this sense, perhaps the human soul is naturally Jewish.” But if the human soul 
contains this purported “Jewish” quality, the facticity of Jewish existence is something more—
namely, an indelible anxiety, stemming from the irrepressible possibility that the world will turn 
once more against the Jews. Levinas describes, “pure anxiety as much as it is foreign to the 
complacency of the self, the Jewish soul is lived in a halo of affectivity which cannot be translated 
with exactitude in terms of joy or pain.” This affective quality of the Jewish soul responds to the 
permanent risk of undue suffering. Benny Lévy highlights the parallel between the irremissibility 
																																																						




of being Jewish and the il y a:  
Jewish facticity is a mode of existing, and we see it is not that of the il y a. The same 
irremissibility on both sides, the same fact of being handed over without the possibility of 
escape. Levinas always cites Racine’s verse: I flee in the night; where to flee? Where to 
find refuge? But the father holds the fatal urn. I cannot flee, I cannot flee into the il y a. I 
cannot fall asleep in ceaseless insomnia. I cannot not be Jewish. Simply: we exist in it.291 
 
The irremissibility of Jewish existence parallels the developments of the il y a, without being 
reducible to it, as a condition that one cannot escape.  
Levinas alludes to the “strange resonance” of this affective quality in the Book of Isaiah 
and the Book of Job. In both texts, righteous characters are faced with the question of theodicy: 
God allows the innocent to suffer without explanation. Chapter 53 in the Book of Isaiah is the 
fourth and last “Servant Song,” in which God calls on a “servant” to lead the nations, only for the 
people to turn against him, and the servant bears their suffering and affliction. While the unnamed 
servant of God is grammatically framed as a singular person, and it might refer to any number of 
figures from Israel’s past, in context it most likely refers to a group, namely the Jewish people.292 
The servant “bore our illnesses, and our pains - he carried them, yet we accounted him as plagued, 
smitten by God and oppressed.”293 The undue suffering inflicted on the servant is often interpreted 
as a representation of the long history of oppression and anti-Semitism inflicted on the Jewish 
people. The prophetic book describes the servant meeting his demise “like a lamb to the slaughter,” 
and yet “he would not open his mouth.”294 The virtuous servant bears undue punishment with “no 
deceit in his mouth.”295 By the same token, the Book of Job presents the question of divine justice 
																																																						
291 Benny Lévy, “Commentaire” Cahiers d’Études levinassiennes, No. 1, 2002, 112. 
292 There is a popular Christian interpretation of the Book of Isaiah that views the servant in Chapter 53 as a prophetic 
allusion to the suffering endured by Jesus Christ. There are convincing semantic and historical reasons to doubt the 
veracity of this interpretation of the Book of Isaiah. 
293 Isa. 53:4. 
294 Isa. 53:7: ““He was oppressed, and he was afflicted, yet he would not open his mouth; like a lamb to the slaughter 
he would be brought, and like a ewe that is mute before her shearers, and he would not open his mouth.” 
295 Isa. 53:9. If the suffering servant has often been compared to the historical oppression of the Jewish people, the 




when God tests Job’s faith by forcing him to endure undeserved suffering. Job curses his birth, 
and laments God’s wrath: “what do I do to You? O watcher of man, why have You made me as a 
mark for You?”296 His suffering seems undeserved and arbitrary, and he accuses God of being 
unforgiving and angry. Turning his plaint to the injustice he observes in the world, Job questions 
why God has allowed the wicked to rule over the powerless. In both texts, the suffering of the 
innocent only discloses the inexplicability of God’s divine knowledge. This worry of suffering 
without explanation marks the peculiar affective quality of Jewish existence: 
Through this unexpected transformation of malediction into exultation, Jewish existence 
cannot take part in the play of distinctions according to which Sartre, for example, attempts 
to understand it. He may be right to contest that the Jew has a proper essence. But if Sartre 
allows [the Jew] a bare existence [existence nue] like all other mortals and the freedom to 
make his own essence – either by fleeing or assuming the situation that is made for him – 
we are right to ask if this bare existence permits any differentiation. Isn’t Jewish “facticity” 
other than [autre que] the “facticity” of a world understood on the basis of the present?297  
 
Sartre may be right that there is no “essence” to being Jewish, but if “existence precedes essence,” 
perhaps there are different ways of existing—including but not limited to the facticity of Jewish 
existence. For Levinas, the specificity of Jewish existence is its temporal disposition, turned 
towards the past and the work of creation.  
 By contrast, the temporality of Christian existence oriented in the present moment allows 
it to integrate the developments of the modern nation state and science. “Perhaps the most striking 
trait of Christianity,” Levinas writes, “is its ability to become the State religion, and to remain so 
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after the separation of Church and State.”298 Christianity maintains its influence over the state even 
when divorced from the seat of political power, and even in the face of the secularizing forces of 
modern science. This speaks to Christianity’s ability to separate a spiritual inner life, “an inner life 
that is infinitely renewed and innumerably restarted,” against the eternal flux of a profane outer 
world, which contains “a human nature that is never defined, which is classified according to stable 
types in the midst of a world with a regular rhythm, preexisting forms, and implacable laws.” 
Between secular life orientation in the present, and the affirmation of inner faith renewed in the 
present, the dialectic of Christian reality integrates the secularized state and coexist with 
developments in modern science. This flexibility is a feature and not a flaw of Christianity. 
For Levinas, Sartre’s existentialism “transform[s] supreme engagement into a supreme 
freedom” by asserting the full range of human freedom in the world, where every action is a choice. 
This obviates passivity insofar as both action and non-action constitutes a choice. Consequently, 
“activity and passivity turn from one to the other,” there is no way of avoiding one’s freedom to 
act.299 For Levinas, this is a natural starting point if one believes that the facticity of the world is 
“without origin and simply present.” Sartre describes the essence of the human being as absolutely 
determined by his or her actions and choices, where the facticity of a world without history and 
without origins allows human beings to exercise the freedom to shape themselves and the world 
they inhabit. In contrast to an connection to a past to which one can only relate passively, Levinas 
explains, “to detach the fact of one’s origin, is precisely to dwell in the modern world.” The modern 
scientific world view coincides with Sartre’s atheistic existential philosophy, but Levinas suggests 
these developments take place on the substratum of the temporal orientation of Christian existence.  
It is here that the originality – in every sense of the word – of Judaism stands out. Levinas 
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writes, “a fact can be a fact in an absolutely passive way for a creature.” Against the total freedom 
of the existentialist to shape the world through his choices, a fact can be absolutely passive for a 
creature, that is to say, a being that was created by a creator. For Levinas, the facticity of the 
world in a present without origins is incompatible with the existence of a created being: 
The imperative of creation, which is prolonged as the imperative of the commandments 
and the law, inaugurates a total passivity. To do God’s will is, in this sense, the condition 
of facticity. The fact is only possible if, beyond the power to choose oneself which annuls 
facticity, one is chosen, that is, elected. The past which creation and election introduce in 
the economy of being cannot be confused with the fatality of a history without absolute 
origin. The infinite time behind us, far from excluding the freedom of the present, rather 
makes it possible, since the instants of the series, instants without privilege which lend 
themselves to the indifference of the present, to its freedom, its youth, its ignorance of the 
past. On the contrary, the past which in the economy of being introduces creation and 
election communicates to the present the gravity of a fact, the weight of an existence and 
as a foundation.  
 
The fact of Jewish election links God’s creation of the world to the revelation of the 
commandments, anchoring the facticity of Jewish existence in the past. Even if Sartre's assessment 
of “le fait juif” as the construction of the anti-Semite proves correct, Levinas explains, “this fact 
is, in its very facticity, inconceivable without election.” The fact of Jewish election precedes 
questions regarding the specific attributes of Jewish identity, and it prefigures the conflict posed 
between Jewish self-identification and the anti-Semite’s projection. Jewish election is not the 
product of history, it is the reason that history has unfolded in such a manner. Levinas explains 
that Jewish existence “is not the way it is because it has been filled with sacred history; it relates 
to sacred history because it is a fact of the way it is.” Yet the facticity of election has an importance 
that extends beyond the Jew: for Levinas, Jewish election marks, “the very entry of the religious 
event in the world,” and the continued existence of the Jew symbolizes “the impossibility of world 
without religion.” The facticity of Jewish existence attests to the impossibility of a world without 




The fact of Jewish election contains an immanent contradiction: the Jew is both “a simple 
part of reality,” but it is also “equipped with an exceptional privilege of totality,” straddling 
particularity and universality, such that the self “is equivalent to all being, of which he only 
represents a part.”300 Levinas argues that the apparent contradiction between the particular and 
universal is overcome in election. He offers the example of a father’s love for his children to 
explain the non-exclusivity of Jewish election: the meaning of election “implies the relation of a 
father to his children, where each child is everything for the father, without excluding the others 
from the same privilege.”301 A father can love all his children greatly, without choosing one over 
another. In this sense, Jewish chosenness is one covenant between God and a particular group, it 
does not entail exclusivity. “Jewish election is thus not initially experienced as an arrogance or a 
particularism,” Levinas writes, “it is the very mystery of personality.” The fact of election is felt 
as an affect or emotion that bears out this mysterious affiliation, and Levinas suggests that it is the 
originn of freedom in Jewish existence. Indeed, freedom stems from the pure passivity of a created 
being: “to be created and to be a son is to be free.” A created being is not dispossessed of agency 
under the weight of responsibility, rather it means that he or she depends on others. To be a creature 
is “to refer to the facticity of someone who carries existence for you, who brings sin, who can 
forgive.” The fact of election evokes Job and the “suffering servant” who bear the suffering of 
others upon themselves. The responsibility borne of election gives rise to a form of ethical 
subjectivity born of the revelation of the infinity of the Other. The conflict between Judaism and 
philosophy in Levinas’ thought, shifting and evolving over the course of his long career, offers a 
productive tension which gives rise to his notion of ethical subjectivity.302  
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In one of the boldest claims in the essay, Levinas writes “Jewish existence is thus the 
accomplishment of the human condition as fact, personality, and freedom.” 303 Against the rootless 
existence in the present, the great originality of Judaism “consists in breaking from a world which 
is without origin and simply present.” The reverence for creation and the commandments which 
anchors Jewish election to the past allows the Jew to stand as a symbol for the human condition—
this, Levinas writes, “Sartre cannot grasp.” There is a “metaphysical sentiment” of attachment, 
even for the least outwardly “Jewish” Jew: 
The rag-dealer who believes he is “freed,” the intellectual who believes he is an atheist but 
still breathes the mystery of creation and election. The only mystery which remains in a 
world where everything has become matter, transparent like science. An attachment to 
Judaism which remains when no particular idea justifies it. 
  
This “metaphysical sentiment” is the symptom of election. Even in the absence of all outward and 
even inward signs of Jewish affiliation, Levinas insists that this metaphysical sentiment endures, 
as the minimal trace of Jewish existence. While refusing to describe an “essence” of Jewish 
identity, this mysterious, indescribable, perhaps ineffable sense of election serves as the 
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fundamental basis for Levinas’ conception of “being Jewish.” Conversely, anti-Semitism stems 
from a distortion of this metaphysical sentiment: “what one calls with hatred Jewish arrogance or 
Jewish impudence or Jewish pretention is the result of an interpretation which malice or cowardice 
gives to this metaphysical sentiment.”304 From the very source that gives rise to this “metaphysical 
sentiment” of Jewish affiliation, springs the irrational passion of the anti-Semite.  
In “Sans nom, honneur sans drapeau,” originally published in 1966 in Les Nouveaux 
Cahiers, a journal of Jewish thought in France published by the Alliance Israelite Universelle, 
Levinas further explicates the affective condition of Jewish existence. The extreme forms of 
violence unleashed during the Second World War had not abated in the subsequent two decades 
but “violence no longer dares speak its name. What was unique between 1940 and 1945 was the 
abandonment.”305 What Levinas had witnessed during the débâcle of 1940 was the utter 
breakdown in order, in which the objectivity of the world collapsed. “Interregnum or end of the 
Institutions, or as if being itself had been suspended,” Levinas writes, “Nothing was official 
anymore.”306 Against this breakdown of the world and the disappearance of order which he 
describes as the “il y a,” the obligation to maintain the ethical values of peacetime becomes starkly 
clear. Invoking Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor, Levinas describes, “the highest duty, when ‘all is 
permitted,’ consists in feeling oneself responsible with regard to these values of peace.” 307 Yet, 
the urgency of this obligation recedes during peacetime, when it seems that the institutions and 
values maintaining the moral universe are operative. “When the temples are standing, the flags 
flying atop the palaces and the magistrates donning their sashes,” he writes, “the tempests raging 
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in individual heads do not pose the threat of shipwreck.”308 The facticity of Jewish existence is a 
permanent awareness of the possibility that the world once more comes undone, institutions fail to 
withstand the oncoming storm, and Jews once more find themselves threatened: “Judaism is 
humanity on the brink of morality without institutions.” Being Jewish involves an ethical 
obligation challenged by the crumbling of institutions and the recourse to violence. The “strange 
election” of being Jewish is the standing possibility of finding oneself, “overnight and without 
forewarning, in the wretchedness of its exile, its desert, ghetto or concentration camp—all the 
splendors of life swept away like tinsel, the Temple in flames, the prophets without vision, reduced 
to an inner morality that is belied by the universe.”309 The facticity of Jewish existence suggests a 
heightened awareness of this risk that institutions crumble and violence resumes in the devastation 
of the “il y a.”310 Stemming from the fact of election, Jewish existence includes the permanent 
anxiety that the disorder that Levinas encountered in the débâcle of 1940 might return. 
After the opposition of philosophy and Judaism in his early work, and the middle period in 
which he suggests that Judaism represents a certain form of universalism, in Levinas’ late work 
supposes a productive distinction between Judaism and philosophy. In a 1984 interview, Levinas 
offered this most evocative descriptions of being Jewish: 
To be Jewish is not a particularity; it is a modality. Everyone is a little Jewish, and if there 
are men on Mars, one would find some Jews there. Moreover, Jews are people who doubt 
themselves, who in a certain sense, belong to a religion of unbelievers. God says to Joshua, 
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The description of being Jewish as a modality rather than a particularity suggests that it is not a 
substantive form of identity based on a set of genetic traits, observed dogmas, or even belief. 
Rather, as a “religion of unbelievers,” Judaism is a specific disposition issuing from the 
irremissible fact of election. Levinas’ remark that that there would be Jews on Mars indicates, pace 
Sartre, that the Jew is a figure of the Other whose enmity does not stem from a particular quality, 
but as an eternal scapegoat projected by the anti-Semite. Where there are people, they will 
construct some guise of the Jew as Other. In this sense, it is not that Sartre’s etiology of anti-
Semitism is wrong, so much as it is incomplete: for Levinas, it is only beginning from the facticity 
of Jewish election that we can begin to understand the construction of the Jew as Other. 
 
 
V. Derrida, Levinas, and the Colloque des intellectuels juifs de langue française 
 
Despite Sartre’s calls to uproot anti-Semitism in the aftermath of the Nazi occupation, much of the 
French collaboration with the Nazis was swept under the rug, the myth of the French resistance – 
Pétain the “shield” and de Gaulle the “sword” – still held sway, and the Shoah was viewed as too 
taboo for polite conversation. The lack of recognition and accountability for the traumas that 
French Jews had undergone during the war was shocking. Perrine Simon-Nahum explains, “the 
non-dits and the silence that surrounded the return of those who had been deported demanded Jews 
recognize the rupture which had intervened, and renegotiate their return to a national community 
from which they had been violently, and against all expectations, excluded.”312 For Jews who had 
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survived the war and remained in France despite its recent treachery, there was a sense of 
obligation to reconstruct new institutions and a new body of thought dedicated to Jewish cultural 
life in France. To this end, the École Gilbert-Bloch d'Orsay was created by Robert Gamzon and 
Léon Ashkenazi in 1946, named after the Jewish résistant killed by the Nazis during the liberation, 
and the town near Paris where the organization met. The École d’Orsay was dedicated towards the 
articulation of Jewish identity in the aftermath of the war, and it continued its activities until the 
organization moved to Israel in 1969.313 A decade after the foundation of the École d’Orsay, the 
Colloque des intellectuels juifs de langue française was established by Léon Algazi and Edmond 
Fleg in 1957, as a branch of the Jewish World Congress. The Colloque was founded as a semi-
annual meeting of francophone intellectuals dedicated to memorializing the Nazi destruction of 
French Jews, combatting the continued presence of anti-Semitism in France, and building a new 
forum for Jewish cultural reflection in France.  
The Colloque sought to bring together intellectuals to reflect on Jewish life in France after 
the war without regards to religious orthodoxy. At its first meeting on May 24, 1957, André Neher 
declared, “the organizing idea of these conferences was to try to bring together a meeting of 
reflection and communion around the Judaism of detached Jews, of dejudaized Jews [Juifs 
déjudaïsés].”314 Appealing to the need to reconstruct Jewish thought in the aftermath of the war, 
Levinas affirmed the Colloque was “an irreplaceable institution in the Jewish intellectual life of 
France.”315 Indeed, his Talmudic readings were a fixture at the Colloque from its first meetings 
until his death, and he became a central figure in the group in subsequent decades. Many of the 
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thinkers involved in the École d’Orsay also participated in the Colloque, including André Neher 
and Léon Ashkenazi, and they emphasized placing the Bible at the center of the group’s reflections. 
Other participants in the Colloque represented a more secularized approach to studying Jewish 
thought in France. Regardless, it always remained attuned to the pressing issues facing French 
Jews. Simon-Nahum argues, “the first years of the Colloque greatly contributed to fashioning the 
contemporary representations of French Judaism.”316 The Colloque – which remains active today 
– has played a crucial role in the reconstruction of post-war Jewish intellectual life in France. 
The first meetings of the Colloque were focused on combatting anti-Semitism and 
negationism in France, but this proved inseparable from the crucial question of Jewish identity, 
which Néher called “la question préjudicielle.”317 The tropes based in the political culture of 19th 
century France were no longer appropriate to describe French Jewry, and the possibility of defining 
Jewish identity after the Shoah became the salient question for participants of the Colloque. Simon-
Nahum writes, “after 1945, the questioning of the framework that defined French Jews, the 
diversification of the modalities of inscription in Judaism had as its corollary the shattering of 
identity claims.”318 In his reflections on the “internal problem” of the Jew, Vladimir Jankélévitch 
identified the “je-ne-sais-quoi” of being Jewish which “increases the difficulty of being.”319 A 
more precise definition of Jewish identity ran up against the same dilemma that historically 
problematized this affiliation. Edmond Fleg remarked, “We have the joy of having Jews assembled 
here as Jews, but who don’t know quite so well why they are Jewish.”320 While the Shoah further 
complicated the question of Jewish identity in many respects, in one sense it yielded a rather 
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discrete question: Simon-Nahum explains, “from one speaker to the next, the same question 
returned: how can one be Jewish after the Shoah? What content can one give Jewish identity after 
the destruction of an entire people? The Jewish condition is characterized precisely by the fact that 
it escapes all definition.”321 This was the prevailing topic for the Colloque until the late 1960s, 
when questions of French politics and above all conflicts in the Middle East came to the fore. 
 Jacques Derrida was not a frequent participant in the Colloque. He bristled at all 
suggestions of orthodoxy and group identity, and he rejected every attempt to pigeonhole him as 
representative or symptomatic of any kind of Jewish thinking or philosophy. Derrida’s refusal to 
identify as a “Jewish” thinker has a certain Marxian sensibility: in one sense, he takes seriously 
Groucho Marx’s expression, “I don’t want to belong to any club that would accept me as one of 
its members.” In fact, until he spoke publicly about his family in Algiers in the 1980s, little was 
known about Derrida’s Jewish roots; fairly or unfairly, he had cultivated a reputation as an 
iconoclast or critic of religion, rather than as a Jewish thinker. In her 1994 biography Emmanuel 
Levinas, Marie-Anne Lescourret asserted that Derrida had excluded himself from this community 
of French Jewish intellectuals involved in the Colloque. “But of the French philosophers of Jewish 
origin,” Lescourret writes, “we will never see Jacques Derrida there.”322 Thus, when Derrida began 
his address at the Colloque in 1998, he surely relished the chance to repeat Lescourret’s claim. The 
topic for the semi-annual colloquium was “Vivre ensemble,” and Derrida titled his contribution, 
“Avowing—The Impossible: ‘Returns,’ Repentance, and Reconciliation.” To avow his identity as 
a Jewish intellectual is for Derrida a kind of impossible request, for the topic “living together” 
already implies a set of problematic conditions for inclusion and exclusion. With whom must Jews 
live together? Who, after all, is Jewish? The subtitle hearkens the Hebrew term Teshuva, which 
																																																						
321 Perrine Simon-Nahum, “Penser Le Judaïsme,” 83. 




literally means return (Maimonides described Teshuva as the end of exile) but which is also the 
word for repentance. Derrida is engaged in both. Lescourret’s claim that he would never attend the 
Colloque is framed in the future tense, and yet Derrida recalls that even before his participation in 
1998, he had in fact taken part in the event decades earlier in the 1960s, at the invitation of Levinas 
himself. In this sense, his participation in 1998 was a return, and his impossible avowal is a form 
of repentance. Despite Derrida’s hesitance to identify as a Jew, he was not so alienated as to never 
participate in the annual colloquium of Jewish intellectuals. 
Derrida’s attendance at the Colloque in 1965 invalidates Lescourret’s assertion that he 
would never attend the event. Further, he reads himself into its early history, when he attended as 
a guest of Levinas himself. The text he presented in 1998 is framed by a joke that Levinas told him 
during his first appearance at the Colloque. Derrida recalls sitting next to Levinas during the 
address by André Neher, when Levinas leaned in and whispered to him, “You see, he is the 
Protestant—me, I’m the Catholic.”323 This short quip stayed with Derrida for many years, 
demanding of him “an infinite commentary.” Perhaps Levinas was referencing the fact that Neher 
wrote almost exclusively on the Bible and had Zionist beliefs (Neher moved to Israel after the Six 
Day War), whereas Levinas remained in France and focused on the study of Talmud, the Jewish 
literature of exile.324 Perhaps Levinas’ joke was a nod to something else. Regardless, Levinas’ 
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description of two Jewish intellectuals through a Christian typology suggests that even he, the 
“Catholic,” could traipse in the lightly profane territory of the joke. The comment further suggests 
the “Jewish people” is not a transparent expression even for those within its fold, since it can be 
further parsed according to such sectarian distinctions. If the topic of the 1998 Colloque was 
“living together,” implying Jews coexisting with non-Jews, Levinas’ joke suggests that living 
together is also a question posed within Judaism, of Jewish people living with one another. If 
Levinas is the “Catholic” and Neher the “Protestant,” Derrida wonders what sort of Jew he is: 
What must a Jewish thinker be in order to use this language, with the depth of seriousness 
and the lightness of irony that we hear in it? How can a so-called Catholic Jew (outside of 
any conversion, any canonization, and outside of any great ecclesial scene of repentance 
of which we will speak again) “live together” with a supposed Protestant Jew, while 
remaining a Jew together with himself, and while opening himself to another Jew, probable 
or improbable, in this case me, who has never felt very Catholic, and above all not 
Protestant? A Jew who, coming from another shore of Judaism than Neher and Levinas, a 
Mediterranean shore, immediately remarks in the abyss of these doubles or of this 
Abrahamic, Judeo-Catholico-Protestant, triangle, the absence of the Islamo-Abrahamic?325 
 
The crucial question of Derrida’s identification as a Jewish thinker is contained in his first 
question: what permits a Jewish thinker to speak with such irony about Judaism? To speak of 
Judaism with the authority to make such a joke requires an identification that also allows him to 
speak, in a sense, on behalf of Judaism, as its representative. However, if he is neither Catholic nor 
Protestant, Derrida asks where he fits in Levinas’ typology. He is the third party, neither Levinas’ 
“Catholic” Jew, nor Neher’s “Protestant” Jew, but something else – perhaps the “Islamo-
Ibrahimique” Jew, the Marrano, or perhaps some other amalgam of identifying affiliations. He 
suggests that “being-Jewish” is subject to further distinctions and differentiations which make it 
irreducible to a singular existential condition. The question of “vivre ensemble” is as much about 
how Jews relate to one another as it is about their relation to non-Jews. Levinas’ joke reveals that 
																																																						




Jewish identity is irreducible to a single essence, or even to the narrow modes suggested by his 
“Catholic” and Neher’s “Protestant” Jewishness.  
If Derrida balks at the notion of Jewish “identity,” he nonetheless refuses to entirely break 
off the link to his ancestral religion. Contra Lescourret and those ready to cast him off as an 
apostate, Derrida judges that it would be “irresponsible to efface, in simple politeness, my 
signature, that of a Jewish intellectual.” In this rare moment, Derrida affirms his affiliation as a 
Jewish intellectual, a rupture of the impossible avowal. The question of “vivre ensemble” with the 
non-Jewish world is no less pertinent or important that the question of how to negotiate the internal 
divisions of Jewish communities in the world. Indeed, Derrida remarks that for him the question 
of “vivre ensemble” concerned, “"first of all, for my generation, the Algerian community, the 
Algerian communities—the Arab, Berber, French of Algeria, French of France, communities—
Israeli community, Israeli communities, and beyond.” The contingencies of inclusion and 
exclusion were never reducible to Jews harmoniously living with non-Jews; the question of Jewish 
“vivre ensemble” is embedded in the intersectional demands of nationality, politics, and language. 
For Derrida, the impossible avowal always concerns the rifts and divides policing the limits of 
inclusion, both from its outside – who counts as a Jew? – as well as distinctions drawn from its 
inside – what kind of Jew is it? A Catholic or a Protestant? Levinas draws a distinction between 
two kinds of Jews, only to reveal the aporia of Jewish identification, and the difficulty for an event 
like the Colloque to discuss such questions without falling prey to a reductive imagination of what 
constitutes a Jew. Levinas’ joke reveals the chasms and ruptures contained in Jewish affiliation 






VI. Exile, Rupture, and Hyperbolic Jewishness  
 
Jabès did not participate in the Colloque des intellectuels juifs de langue française: its emphasis 
on the human sciences was not the right forum for his literary writing, but he also lived his 
Jewishness as an experience of exclusion and marginalization. In a riveting passage in the first 
volume of Le Livre des Questions, Jabès imagines a scene in which the declaration, “Je suis juif” 
is challenged from within, by other Jews who contest the narrator’s claim of belonging. The 
narrator is excluded by other Jews who do not consider him sufficiently Jewish to claim belonging 
to their religion. Jabès asks, “mes livres ont-ils accentué le malentendu entre mes frères et moi?”326 
The narrator’s interlocutors test the limits of fraternity from within, inverting the anti-Semite’s 
traditional accusation in their refusal, “Tu n’est pas juif”: 
I have been around.  
I have circled around myself without finding rest.  
 
My brothers turned to me and said:  
"You are not Jewish. You do not go to the synagogue."  
 
I turned to my brothers and answered: 
"I carry the synagogue within me."  
 
My brothers turned to me and said:  
"You are not Jewish. You do not pray."  
 
I turned to my brothers and answered:  
"Prayer is the is my backbone and my blood."  
 
My brothers turned to me and said:  
"The rabbis you quote are charlatans. Did they even exist?  
And you feed on their ungodly words." 
 
I turned to my brothers and answered:  
"The rabbi is a quote are beacons of my memory. One can only remember oneself. And 
you know that the soul has words as petals."  
																																																						





The oldest of my brothers turned to me and said:  
"Our Purim is no longer the feast of your carnival and your joy. Passover no longer the 
anniversary of your halt in the desert, your passage through the sea. Yom Kippur no 
longer your day of fasting. 
"These dates marked in our calendar: what do they mean to you now?  
"Rejected by your people, robbed of your heritage: who are you?  
"For the others, you are a Jew, but hardly for us."  
 
I turn to the oldest of my brothers and answered:  
"I have the wound of the Jew. I was circumcised, as you were, on the eighth day after my 
birth. I am a Jew, as you are, in in each of my wounds.  
“But is one man not as good as another?”  
 
The most thoughtful of my brothers turned to me and said:  
“If you make no difference between a Jew and a non-Jew, are you, in fact, still a Jew?” 
 
My brothers turned to me and continued:  
"brotherhood does not mean putting yourself in your neighbor’s place. It means you take 
into account what he is, but you want him to be as he should be, as the holy texts require 
he be, even at the risk of hurting him.  
“It is the goal that counts. The most imaginative are the most brotherly.  
“The believer’s intransigence is like a razor blade: it cuts.” 
 
And they added:  
“Brotherhood means giving, giving, giving. And you can only give what you are.”  
 
I beat my breast with my fist and thought:  
“I am nothing.  
“My head is cut off.  
“But is one man not as good as another?  
“Beheaded as good as the believer?” 
 
[J’ai fait le tour. 
J’ai tourné sur moi-même sans trouver le repos 
 
S’adressant à moi, mes frères de race ont dit: 
“Tu n’es pas Juif. Tu ne fréquentes pas la synagogue.” 
 
M’addressant à mes frères de race, j’ai répondu: 
“Je porte la synagogue dans mon sein.” 
 
S’adressant à moi, mes frères de race ont dit: 
“Tu n’es pas Juif. Tu ne pries plus.” 
 




“La prière est ma colonne vertébrale et mon sang.” 
 
S’adressant à moi, mes frères de race ont dit: 
“Les rabbins dont tu cites les paroles sont des charlatans. Ont-ils jamais existé? Et tu 
t’es nourri de leur paroles impies.” 
 
M’addressant à mes frères de race, j’ai répondu: 
“Les rabbins dont je cite les paroles sont les phares de ma mémoire. – On ne se souvient 
que de soi. – Et vous savez que l’âme a, pour pétale, une parole.” 
 
S’adressant à moi, le plus ancient de mes frères de race m’a dit: 
“Nos fêtes de Pourim ne sont pas les fêtes de ton carnival et de tes douceurs. Pâque n’est 
plus l’anniversaire de ta halte dans le desert et de ton passage dans la mer. Yom Kippour 
n’est plus la journée de ton jeûne.  
Et quelles significations ont, maintenant, pour toi, ces dates cochées dans notre 
calendrier? Renié des tiens, volé de ton heritage, qui-es tu? 
Tu es juif pour les autres et si peu pour nous.” 
 
M’addressant au plus ancient de mes frères de race, j’ai répondu: 
“J’ai, du Juif, la blessure. J’ai été, comme toi, circoncis le huitième jour de ma naissance. 
Je suis Juif, comme toi, par chacune de mes blessures. 
Mais un homme ne vaut-il pas un homme? 
 
S’adressant à moi, le plus pondéré de mes frères de race m’a dit: 
“Ne faire aucune difference entre un Juif et celui qui ne l’est pas, n’est-ce pas déjà ne plus 
être Juif?” 
 
S’adressant à moi, mes frères de race ont poursuivi: 
“La fraternité ne consiste pas à se mettre dans la peau de son voisin; mais, à partir de ce 
qu’il est, le vouloir tel qu’il devrait être, tel que les textes saints exigent qu’il soit, même 
au risqué de lui nuire. 
Le critère est le but. Les plus imaginatifs sont les plus fraternels. 
L’intransigence du croyant est pareille à une lame de rasoir dont le souci est d’être 
tranchante.” 
 
Et ils ont ajouté: 
“La fraternité, c’est donner, donner, donner et tu ne pourras jamais donner que ce que tu 
es.” 
Me frappant la poitrine avec mon poing, j’ai pensé: 
“Je ne suis rien. 
J’ai la tête tranchée. 
Mais un homme ne vaut-il pas un homme? 
Et le décapité, le croyant?”]327 
 
																																																						




Jabès’ dialogue illustrates how the claim “Je suis juif,” is also policed from within, when Jews 
exclude others they deem insufficiently Jewish. Jabès’ dialogue essentially stages a reductio 
argument: what is the minimal trace of being Jewish that would satisfy the conditions for the 
narrator’s “frères de race”? What is the essential mark of fraternity? Jabès is never quite Jewish 
enough for his imaginary interlocutors: he does not attend synagogue often enough, he does not 
observe enough rituals, he does not pray enough, his books are too heretical. These anonymous 
gatekeepers of the Jewish community tell Jabès, “For the others, you are a Jew, but hardly for us.” 
His Jewishness is not enough for those for whom stringently differentiating authentic, observant 
Jews from non-Jews is necessary for their continuation: “If you make no difference between a Jew 
and a non-Jew, are you, in fact, still a Jew?” For his “frères de race,” only inflexible adherence 
that constitutes belonging. “The believer’s intransigence is like a razor blade: it cuts,” they tell the 
narrator. The believer’s observance is like the razor’s need to be sharp: nothing is ever sharp 
enough, it can always be sharper. Here we cannot but recall Derrida’s explanation in Circonfession 
of the double-cut of circumcision, as both a cut of inclusion and a cut of exclusion: “Circumcision, 
that's all I've ever talked about, consider the discourse on the limit, margins, marks, marches, etc., 
the closure, the ring (alliance and gift), the sacrifice, the writing of the body, the pharmakos 
excluded or cut off, the cutting/sewing of Glas.”328 Like Derrida, Jabès confronts the question of 
belonging according to the same hyperbolic logic, where the claim, “je suis Juif” function both to 
exclude and include, as if on a knife’s edge. 
The difficulty in the simple identification, “I am Jewish,” reveals the double-edged cut of 
exclusion. Too Jewish for the Gentiles, not Jewish enough for the Jews: this is the paradigm of 
Derrida and Jabès’ hyperbolic Judaism. In his 1964 essay, “Edmond Jabès and the Question of the 
																																																						




Book,” Derrida interprets the earlier cited longer passage from Le Livre des Questions as a dialogue 
playing out between different characters in Jabès’ fractured consciousness: 
Jabes is not a defendant in this dialogue, for he carries both it and the charges within him. 
In this noncoincidence of the self and the self, he is more and less Jewish than the Jew. But 
the Jew's identification with himself does not exist. The Jew is split, and split first of all 
between the two dimensions of the letter: allegory and literality. His history would be but 
one empirical history among others if he established or nationalized himself within 
difference and literality.329  
 
The fractured consciousness of the Jew is in constant dialogue with itself, it is an irreconcilable 
contest of interpretations: the irreducible difference between the voice of the rabbi and the poet. 
The rift in the Jew originates in two irreducible modes of reading: allegory and literality. 
Derrida and Jabès’ experiences of exile are inseparable from questions of Jewish identity, 
yet both refused to be labeled as “Jewish thinkers.” Born in North-Africa with European passports 
and Jewish families, Jabès and Derrida represent a fraught intersectional perspective. Although 
they resisted reductionist identifications with a language, nation, or religion, these identities were 
thrust upon them like accusations. They endured exclusion and exile from the countries of their 
birth because of their families’ Jewish heritage, but they also felt the force of exclusion from within 
the Jewish community, for whom they were not Jewish enough. Neither Jabès nor Derrida had 
received a formal Jewish education, they only loosely adhered to traditional Jewish practices and 
traditions, and until they experienced anti-Semitism neither had considered himself particularly 
“Jewish.” They were the product of Jewish diaspora as much as European colonialism, yet they 
were often considered too Jewish (or even too African) for the Europeans, too European for the 
North-Africans, and not Jewish enough for many Jews. This double-edged exclusion attests to the 
difficulty of identity claims, and the impossibility of escaping them. From “the wound that will 
not heal [la blessure non cicatrisable], that anti-Semitism has left in me,” Derrida describes, “I felt 
																																																						




already, and that I still feel, at once, at the same time, as less jewish and more jewish than the Jew, 
as scarcely Jewish and as superlatively Jewish as possible, more than Jew [plus que Juif], exem- 
plarily Jew, but also hyperbolically Jew.”330 Identity claims are irreducible to a binary choice 
between two essentially and substantially distinct identities, rather they reflect a parasitic, 
differential relation between exclusionary forces that pull on identity claims from within as well 
as from without. Problematizing any easy identification with Judaism, Derrida’s “hyperbolic 
Judaism” follows the paradoxical logic of “not enough,” but also “too much.” Jabès and Derrida 
place themselves at the limits of Judaism, with one foot in the tradition and one foot outside of it, 
identifying rupture itself as the very center of Jewish identity.  
In his 1991 Circonfessions, a text written in the mode of stream of consciousness and 
placed entirely in the margins of Geoff Bennington’s book Derridabase, Derrida evokes his 
sympathy with the figure of the marrano, converts who hid their secret Judaism in the centuries 
following the 15th century expulsion from the Iberian Peninsula. He describes himself as “one of 
those marranes who no longer say they are Jews even in the secret of their own hearts,” calling 
himself the “last [and least] of the Jews,” standing at the fold between the last and no-longer 
Jewish.331 The marrano’s hidden, secret Judaism represents the figure of this fatalistic last Jew, at 
the closing limit of tradition. Derrida’s family was in fact the product of the 15th century expulsion 
of the Jews from Spanish, which ultimately led them to Algeria. He told Hélène Cixous in 2004:  
I am the inheritor, the depository of a very grave secret to which I do not myself have 
access. The word or the writing that I send into the world transports a secret that remains 
inaccessible to me but that leaves its traces in all my texts, in what I do or live. I have often 
presented myself, barely playing, like a marrano, one of those Jews converted by force, in 
Spain and Portugal, who cultivated their Judaism in secret, at times to the extent of not 
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knowing what it consisted in.332  
 
The irremediable secret at the heart of identity – this quality of the marrano – presents the 
impossibility of an identity entirely known to itself. It highlights the insufficiency of every claim 
to identity, which cannot be claimed any more than it can be escaped. “More than or less than, not 
enough or too much, ungraspable, the Judaism of the last of the Jews is impossible,” Gérard 
Bensussan explains, “there is therefore no possible Jew, for ‘Jew’ designates what is always more, 
and other, than the set of its conditions of possibility. One might say an event and, of course, a 
language event, in language, a name.”333 Derrida’s hyperbolic Judaism is an identification that is 
both “too much” and “not enough,” which reveals “the impossibility of being oneself.” Jewish 
identity is never captured by the parameters of its name, it always exceeds and undermines its 
idealized register; it is an affiliation that paradoxically can neither be affirmed nor cast off.  
The Jewish tradition confronts this impossible of identity through election and the 
prophetic notion of the “remnant.” In the Book of Isaiah, following the Assyrian invasion of Judea, 
the prophet declares a remnant of Israel will survive to see the restauration of David’s throne: “A 
remnant will return, the remnant of Jacob, to the mighty God. For though your people Israel were 
like the sand of the sea, only a remnant of them will return.” 334 Isaiah’s messianic pronouncement 
is a promise of future return and redemption, but only for a remnant, the part of Israel which 
survives: “from Jerusalem a remnant shall go out, and from Mount Zion a band of survivors.”335 
Giorgio Agamben explains the “remnant” of Israel is not a numerical figure, rather, “the remnant 
is closer to being a consistency or figure that Israel assumes in relation to election or to the 
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messianic event. It is therefore neither the all, nor a part of the all, but the impossibility for the part 
and the all to coincide with themselves or with each other. At a decisive instant, the elected people, 
every people, will necessarily situate itself as a remnant, as not-all.336 In the Star of Redemption, 
Rosenzweig describes the Jewish people as the “people of the remnant”: 
Judaism and nothing else in the world preserves itself by subtraction, by a narrowing, by 
formation of new remnants always. This holds fully true quite externally just in the face of 
the constant external apostasy. But it also holds true within Judaism itself. It separates from 
itself that which is non-Jewish again and again in order to put forth new remnants again 
and again of what is originally Jewish. It continuously assimilates itself outwardly in order 
again and again to set itself apart inwardly. There is no group, no orientation, indeed 
scarcely an individual in Judaism who would not regard his way of giving up a secondary 
matter in order to keep to the remnant as only true one and hence himself as the true 
“remnant of Israel.” And he is so. The man in Judaism is always somehow remnant.337  
 
Judaism is the religion of the “remnant”: externally, the Jews are the remainder of those who have 
not accepted the word of the Christian Gospel, but also internally, from within Judaism, they are 
the remainder who have not been peeled off by assimilation and integration. The “remnant” 
becomes the operating logic squeezing Jewish identification on both sides, such that its members 
are always-already remaining members, the remnants of a shrinking whole. Derrida extends a foot 
forward, beyond Rosenzweig’s remnant, at the threshold of the “last” and the “no longer” Jewish.  
In his contribution to the 1972-1973 issue of Les Nouveaux Cahiers dedicated to Jabès’ 
work, Derrida rejected the simple identification of Jabès as a “Jewish” writer: “Jabès, as we all 
know, isn’t Jewish.”338 This response may seem puzzling given the substantial investment in 
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Jewish themes and the endless stream of rabbinic proverbs populating the pages of Le Livre des 
Questions, but this would misunderstand Jabès’ investment in the question of Jewish identity. 
Derrida explains, “the Jewish identity sufficiently assured of itself to submit a text to questioning, 
to ask of it to respond and define itself with respect to the ‘Jewish condition,’ such an identity does 
not occur in Jabès’ writing.” The condition of Jabès’ writing is its unceasing questioning, which 
proscribes any discrete form of identity – even if it is this very questioning which is its Jewish 
quality. When asked about Derrida’s comments, Jabès explained, “I understood it very well when 
he wrote it, because I don’t really know what it is to be Jewish. Judaism for me is a certain lived 
experience that I rediscovered through the book.”339 In a 1987 text entitled “My Itinerary,” Jabès 
proffers that the Jewish themes and references in his writing does not make it symptomatic of 
“Jewish” writing: “the word ‘Jew,’ the word ‘God’ are metaphors for me: ‘God,’ the metaphor for 
the void, ‘Jew,’ for the torment of God, of the void.”340 To simply affirm one’s identification with 
Judaism, “is already a regression, a stop, a way of falling asleep in this condition,” by 
substantializing some idealized version of Jewish identity. Rather, Jabès explains, “Judaism 
resides precisely in this challenge. At the bottom of the quest for identity, which Jewish 
questioning is, there must be doubt and devouring uncertainty.”341 The notion of Judaism as an 
unending interrogation of Judaism undermines the presumptive claim, “I am Jewish,” but it also 
places Jabès’ writing firmly within the perspective of the literature of Jewish diaspora. As he 
remarked to Marcel Cohen, “isn’t the Talmud above all the book of exile, being only questions?”342 
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Derrida and Jabès express a hyperbolic Judaism that resists its reduction to a discrete identity, but 
rather insists on interrogating the limits of identity, both within and outside the Jewish tradition.343 
The treacherous question of “belonging” discloses the central role of interrogation in the 
Jewish tradition. There is a strong desire to aggregate and solidify a concrete notion of Jewish 
identity which would codify the requirements for staking a claim to belonging to the tradition. 
Jabès writes, “it would have wonderfully simplified things to be Jewish without making it a 
problem,” but this is not the case.344 “The Jewish tradition has always questioned the texts,” but 
the question of belonging also “underlies all traditional Jewish questioning without having been 
tackled openly. As if tackling it could void the questioning.” The interrogation of belonging, the 
disruption of any static notion of Jewish identity as based on a specific set of beliefs or traits, is 
central to the Jewish tradition—even when it disrupts long held notions of what it means to be 
Jewish. The interrogation of Jewish identity is “a perilous path, certainly subversive, but vital to 
explore.” The Jewish question of belonging is the gateway to an endless interrogation of the self 
and other that never foreclosed as a static and final determination. “Since he can hardly stop being 
Jewish,” Jabès writes, “he is forced to ask the question of his identity. Hence, he must immediately 
face the discourse of the other, and often his own life depends on it. Perhaps this is what is 
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specifically Jewish.” 345 Jabès’ fictional rabbis relentlessly interrogate the tradition, and The Book 
of Questions never cedes to the Book of Books, guarding against the reduction of Judaism to a 
static identity. Derrida’s denial that Jabès is a “Jewish” writer issues from a poorly formed 
expression, as if the identifier “Jewish writer” carried some objective character, when in fact it 
refers to a phantasm. Structuralist philosopher and novelist Lucette Finas, friend and interlocutor 
to both Jabès and Derrida, develops a similar objection to the characterization of Jabès’ work as 
“Jewish” in her contribution to Les Nouveaux Cahiers. She writes, “every Jew is a false Jew, not 
false as the opposite of true, but as the imaginary underside of a non-existent location.”346 The 
impossibility of offering a definition for a substantialized identity of a “Jew,” or the “Jewish” 
character of writing, stems from a certain idealism whose terrible consequences surfaced in the 
Shoah. Finas continues, “through a surfeit of horror, what Auschwitz maintained in consuming the 
Jew, was also a semantic illusion. Such a deduction can protect us from a certain idealism: this 
semantic illusion has a history.” This semantic illusion is the fantasy there is a substance or identity 
that exhibits some essentially Jewish quality, whether it is found in a certain style of writing, or in 
blood. “We all suffer from a lack of identity which we desperately try to fill in,”347 Jabès reflects. 
The desire to isolate the essence of Jewish identity, like any identity, can hold the promise of 
reassurance. Finas explains that Jabès reverses the symptomatic notion of Jewish identity: “Jabès’ 
force is to apply to the Jewish Question the correction of the text, to wrest the Jew from the 
Scriptures to restore him to writing, such that we cannot know if we are dealing with a Jewish 
writer, rather, on the contrary, he or she is Jewish who writes [est juif qui écrit].” 348 For Jabès, the 
notion of a “Jewish writer” is either meaningless, or a redundancy.  
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Jewish affiliation is a dynamic that excludes from within and without, it is an identification 
which is just as untenable as it is unavoidable. For Derrida and Jabès, Judaism is marked by 
rupture: rupture in the paradox of identity, rupture in exile, and rupture as ceaseless questioning. 
In this sense, Derrida and Jabès extend the role of Lazare’s conscious pariah, as thinkers who 
embrace their accused status as a pariah against established beliefs and practices. Too Jewish for 
some and not Jewish enough for others, their criticism represents a hyperbolic element at the limits 
of the Jewish tradition, as voices of Jewish questioning rather than Jewish identity.  
 
 
VII. “Another Abraham,” Literature, and the Comme Si 
 
The difficulty of Jewish affiliation begins as a problem of language, in language. A colloquium 
held in December 2000 at the Centre Communautaire de Paris, organized by Joseph Cohen and 
Raphael Zagury-Orly, proposed the title Judéités: Questions for Jacques Derrida. In his address 
“Abraham, the Other” Derrida expressed his apprehension in light of the topic of the colloquium: 
“Longtemps et de bonne heure, I have trembled, I still tremble, before the title of this conference 
(questions addressed to me! and concerning judeities!).”349 Derrida evokes Proust’s opening words 
in À la recherche du temps perdu, and Kierkegaard’s account of the binding of Isaac in Fear and 
Trembling: the question of Judéité, Jewishness, calls upon the Proustian activities of memory, and 
the angst of Kierkegaard’s Knight of Faith. The question of Jewishness is exemplary in its 
difficulty, and Judaism is itself a question of a certain exemplarity. Derrida refuses to speak on 
behalf of Judaism, as exemplary of Jewishnesss, or even to claim “Je suis juif” without addressing 
																																																						




the injurious connotations of this utterance. Can one speak of Judéité without passively assuming 
the place of exemplarity? Derrida cautions, “to say ‘I am jew,’ as I do, while knowing and meaning 
what one says, is very difficult and vertiginous.”350 It is a performative utterance that hangs 
between declaration and accusation, substantive and adjective, and common and proper noun.  
 The conjugation of Jewish identity takes place in the grammar of affiliation. Derrida 
identifies three modes of predication of Jewish identity: first, there is the descriptive grammar of 
affiliation, “I am Jewish,” “you are Jewish,” and so on; second, recalling Sartre’s study on anti-
Semitism, there is the dissociation between the “authentic” and “inauthentic” Jew, demanding the 
authentic Jew to look, speak, and act in certain ways and not others; third, Derrida highlights the 
distinction between Judéité, Jewishness, and Judaism. Where Judaism refers to a religion as a 
singular bloc, Jewishness refers to the diverse cultural practices of a people. For Derrida, these 
contingent registers are unsustainable, inevitably slipping between proclamation and accusation, 
identification and association, inclusion and exclusion. This is particularly evident in the French 
word juif, both noun and adjective, and its accompanying declaration “je suis juif,” which 
expresses both the substantive “I am a Jew” and the adjectival “I am Jewish.” The language of 
Jewish affiliation is exemplary, and its declensions magnify the immanent difficulty contained in 
all identity claims. Derrida recalls from his childhood in Algeria the “epiphany of the word jew”: 
There are two appellations about which I have never managed to know, to know anything 
at all, and most of all to know how they came to me or whether they constituted names, 
common nouns or proper names. […] these two words that are neither common nor proper, 
are not “Daddy” and “Mommy,” but God—and Jew.351 
 
A common noun names a kind or class of things according to their essential qualities; a proper 
name demarcates a specific individual with a unique name. The monotheistic “God” names a 
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necessary being that, by its very nature, leaves no room for other beings of its kind. But the word 
“God” is no more a name for this Being than “Dieu,” “Dios,” or “Gott.” In Jewish texts, God 
reveals himself in the Bible through a panoply of metaphors and aliases, but his true name is 
shrouded in mystery. When God reveals himself to Moses as the Burning Bush, he calls himself 
Ehyeh asher ehyeh, “I am what I am” — an enigmatic ontological tautology presented as a name.352 
In the Kabbalah, the true name of God contains all knowledge of creation. Even the 
Tetragrammaton – the unpronounceable written name of God as YHVH – reveals just a deeper 
level of mystery. “God” is neither a common noun nor a proper name. 
The word juif similarly inhabits the liminal space between common and proper noun, 
exhibiting elements of both depending on the context of the address. Derrida recalls that the first 
time he heard the word as a child was not in his home, but at school, as an insult, a performative 
address meant to injure. “Juif” was addressed as an injuria, “both an insult, a wound, and an 
injustice, a denial of right rather than the right to belong to a legitimate group,” which he received 
“like a blow, a denunciation, a de-legitimation,” and which beckoned a response.353 The word juif 
stands at a strange crossroads between memory and anxiety, affiliation and injury. This is what 
Derrida had described in Circonfessions as the double-cut of circumcision: the cut that binds and 
connects, but also the cut that divides and separates. Similarly, in “Abraham, the Other” Derrida 
describes the double-sided cut of the word “juif,” which signifies an affiliation that is paradoxically 
more than and less than Jewish. He is “plus que juif”: both “more than” and “no longer” Jewish, 
that is, hyperbolically Jewish. For Derrida, the word is torn between accusation – “Sale juif,” “Mort 
aux juifs,” “Jews Go Home” – and the expressions of Judéité which fill the memories of his 
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childhood. “Je suis juif” contains an affirmation and a disjunction: it is an expression that always 
exceeds its semantic register, even as it never says quite enough. 
 The title of the colloquium beckons Derrida to respond to the charge of Judéité, and he 
therefore turns to the origin of the divine call to Abraham, the original interpolation of the Jew as 
a Jew. In the episode known as the Akedah or the Binding of Isaac, God commands Abraham to 
sacrifice his son Isaac on Mount Moriah. The patriarch comes to the cusp of killing his only son 
when an angel intervenes at the last moment. The angel initially calls out twice, “Abraham! 
Abraham!” to which he responds, “Here I am,” hineini, relenting the very instant before sacrificing 
his son.354 The angel’s call to Abraham is in a sense the original interpolation of the patriarch of 
the Jewish people as Jewish. Abraham is only called Abraham because of the covenant with God, 
which brought him a son at ninety-nine years old, and an “h” at the center of “Abram.” The angel 
calls out “Abraham” once more, announcing, “your children shall be blessed all the nations of the 
world, because you hearkened to My voice.”355 The angel initially calls Abraham’s name twice, 
and then once more – as if the first interpolation was not sufficient, or Abraham did not recognize 
the calling, or perhaps he hesitated to respond. In the momentary hiatus between the angel’s 
repeated calls “Abraham!” lies the difficulty of identification, the ambivalence between Abram 
and Abraham, the moment before he decides to put down his knife and allow his son Isaac to live, 
and the moment when God blesses Abraham’s descendants. While the biblical Abraham responds 
to the call, by returning to the hiatus between the angel’s repeated calls “Abraham!” we can see 
the potential for something – or someone – else to emerge from this episode. 
 In “Abraham, the Other,” Derrida revisits this crucial hiatus between the repeated calls to 
Abraham in the Akedah once more, through the perspective of Kafka’s parable, “Abraham.” In 
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fact, his title “Abraham, the Other” is a quote from Kafka’s parable, which is, of course, already 
another version of the biblical Abraham. The paradox of Kafka’s short parable is contained in its 
first line: “I could conceive of another Abraham” [Ich könnte mir einen anderen Abraham denken]: 
I could conceive of another Abraham—to be sure, he would never get to be a patriarch or 
even an old-clothes dealer—, an Abraham who would be prepared to satisfy the demand 
for a sacrifice immediately, with the promptness of a waiter, but would be unable to bring 
it off because he cannot get away, being indispensable; the household needs him, there is 
always something or other to take care of, the house is never ready; but without having his 
house ready, without having something to fall back on, he cannot leave—this the Bible 
also realized, for it says: ‘He set his house in order.'356  
 
There is a necessary quality to the narrative of the biblical Abraham: if and only if Abram accepts 
God’s covenant does he becomes Abraham; if and only if Abraham welcomes the strangers into 
his shelter, does God promise his wife Sarah a son, Isaac; if and only if Abraham follows God’s 
commandment to sacrifice Isaac, does he uphold the covenant, and so on. Precisely because 
Abraham could not have acted otherwise in these critical moments of the biblical narrative without 
ceasing to be Abraham, it should be impossible to conceive of “another Abraham.” Kafka’s 
Abraham would sacrifice his son without hesitating, and thus without the hiatus in which the angel 
repeats his call– except that he is busy, “the household needs him,” and he does not have the time 
to take Isaac to Mount Moriah. Kafka’s Abraham is not the same as the anguished biblical patriarch 
who answers hineini to the angel’s repeated calls, but he nonetheless claims the name Abraham.  
In “Franz Kafka on the 10th Anniversary of his Death,” Walter Benjamin identifies the 
force of Kafka’s parable lies in the “gesture”: his Abraham is ready to sacrifice his son “'with the 
promptness of a waiter.” Benjamin writes, “Kafka could understand things only in the form of a 
gestus, and this gestus which he did not understand constitutes the cloudy part of the parables. 
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Kafka’s writings emanate from it.”357 This “cloudy part” of the parable constitutes its essential 
paradox. Kafka’s Abraham is precisely another Abraham because he would not hesitate to 
sacrifice his son: he is not his biblical analogue, and yet he is nonetheless inseparable from him. 
The essential difference is the biblical Abraham’s overwhelming anxiety before the sacrifice of 
his son, compared to the promptness with which Kafka’s Abraham is ready to enact the deed. 
Benjamin writes of Kafka’s Abraham, “No other writer has obeyed the commandment ‘Thou shalt 
not make unto thee a graven image’ so faithfully.” For Benjamin, even as his parable is a kind of 
blaspheme against the biblical patriarch, Kafka demonstrates a hypervigilance for the Second 
Commandment in his refusal to make an idol of the biblical patriarch, through the same hyperbolic 
logic that Derrida describes with the ambivalent expression, “plus que juif,” both more than 
Jewish, and no longer Jewish: 
There would be perhaps yet another Abraham, not only he who received another name in 
his old age and, at ninety-nine, at the time of his circumcision, felt, by the blow of a letter, 
the letter H right in the middle of his name; not only he who, later, on Mount Moriah, was 
called twice by the angel, first ‘‘Abraham, Abraham,’’ then, a second time still, from the 
height of the heavens, as Scripture tells us. There would be perhaps not only Abram, then 
Abraham, Abraham, twice. That there should be yet another Abraham: here, then, is the 
most threatened jewish thought [la penseée juive la plus menacée], but also the most 
vertiginously, the most intimately jewish one that I know to this day. For you have 
understood me well: when I say “the most jewish [la plus juive],” I also mean “more than 
jewish [plus que juive].” Others would perhaps say “otherwise jewish [autrement juive],” 
even “other than jewish [autre que juive].”358 
 
Kafka’s Abraham offers a powerful symbol for the logic of hyperbolic Judaism. The alternative 
vision of Abraham offered in Kafka’s parable is a microcosm of the question of Jewish affiliation: 
how far can one diverge from Jewish identity and remain a Jew? In the binary terms of identity 
claims, Kafka’s Abraham is neither Jewish, nor non-Jewish; he is, however, both more than and 
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less than Jewish. The other possible Abrahams – after the biblical Abraham, there is Kierkegaard’s 
Abraham, Kafka’s Abraham, Benjamin’s Abraham, Derrida’s Abraham, and so on – cannot shirk 
their connection to Jewishness any more than they can fulfil it. Derrida’s hyperbolic Judaism 
refracts the original Abraham – and, by the same token, the essence of Jewish identity – into the 
endless possibilities of “another Abraham.” 
 Beyond the interlocutors with whom Derrida is explicitly in conversation in “Abraham, the 
Other,” perhaps the most crucial name is largely absent. Sarah Hammerschlag observes, “though 
[Derrida] says hardly a word about him, Lévinas is nonetheless invoked on almost every page.”359 
Levinas treats Abraham as the crucial figure of Jewish monotheism, who stands in contrast to the 
Greek hero Odysseus. For Levinas, Abraham is the model of human transcendence, and the 
prototypical figure of ethical subjectivity. By contrast, Kierkegaard’s Abraham Fear and 
Trembling is characterized by the singular episode of the Akedah, where Abraham embodies the 
Knight of Faith. Derrida had explored Kierkegaard’s interpretation in The Gift of Death, where he 
suggests the possibility of ethics lies in a gift without reciprocity and beyond exchange. In his 1963 
text “Kierkegaard Existence et Ethique,” he reproaches Kierkegaard’s singular focus on this 
episode, and he suggests that there is much more to Abraham’s story than the Binding of Isaac: 
Kierkegaard has a predilection for the biblical story of the sacrificing of Isaac. Thus, he 
describes the encounter with God as a subjectivity rising to the religious level: God above 
the ethical order! His interpretation of this story can doubtless be given a different 
orientation. Perhaps Abraham's ear for hearing the voice that brought him back to the 
ethical order was the highest moment in this drama. And Kierkegaard never speaks of the 
situation in which Abraham enters into dialogue- with God to intercede in favor of Sodom 
and Gomorrah, in the name of the just who may be present there? In that passage, Abraham 
is fully aware of his nothingness and mortality. "I am but dust and ashes" practically opens 
the dialogue, and the annihilating flame of divine ire burns before Abraham's eyes each 
time he intervenes.360  
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Kierkegaard’s focus on the Akedah obscures other aspects of Abraham’s story, such as his pleading 
with God to spare the people of Sodom and Gommorah. In his 1966 text “A propos de ‘Kierkegaard 
Vivant,’” Levinas invokes this crucial episode as the root of Abraham’s ethical subjectivity:  
Here, in Abraham, the precondition of any possible triumph of life over death is formulated. 
Death is powerless over the finite life that receives a meaning from an infinite 
responsibility for the other, from a diacony constituting the subjectivity of the subject, 
which is totally a tension toward the other. It is here, in ethics, that there is an appeal to the 
uniqueness of the subject, and a bestowal of meaning to life, despite death.361 
 
For Levinas, Abraham is the symbol of election and the original figure of ethical subjectivity. 
Avowing his mortal finitude, Abraham’s plea with God to spare the people of Sodom and 
Gomorrah illustrates the infinite ethical obligation to the Other, borne of his election and mortality. 
Election constitutes the fact of Jewish existence which gives rise to the infinite ethical obligation 
to the Other, and Abraham represents the figure of ethical subjectivity. As he describes in Totality 
and Infinity, “the I is a privilege and an election.”362  
 Responding to Levinas’ Abraham via Kafka’s parable, Derrida’s “Abraham, the Other” 
questions the fact of election. “By way of Kafka's parable,” Hammerschlag explains, “Derrida 
introduces a glitch into this dynamic by asking, how does Abraham know it was he who was 
called? Does the claiming of the call not involve an element of presumption?”363 The hiatus 
between the angel’s first and repeated calls “Abraham!” contains the question of election: how 
does Abraham know that he is being called? How does a Jew recognize he or she is a Jew? This 
hiatus injects doubt into the calling, tempering the self-assured calls of zealots and extremists:  
Whoever is certain—as was not, precisely, the other, the second other Abraham of Kafka—
whoever believes he detains the certainty of having been, he and he alone, he first, called 
as the best of the class, trans- forms and corrupts the terrible and indecisive experience of 
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responsibility and of election into a dogmatic caricature, with the most fearsome 
consequences that can be imagined in this century, political consequences in particular.364  
 
The paradox is that one must answer the call, but one cannot know how to differentiate the 
authentic call to Abrahamic election from the dangerous call of the zealot. This is the risk of 
election contained in the claim of exemplarity, and it provokes the need for the “leap of faith.” In 
his rereading of Kafka’s parable, Derrida seeds doubt into the fact of Jewish election, uprooting 
the facticity of Levinas’ conception of “being Jewish.”  
In a 1989 interview, Christoph von Wolzogen recalls Levinas’ distinction between 
Odysseus’s homecoming and Abraham’s departure, and suggests that Kafka’s writing expresses 
an unfulfilled desire for homecoming. In response, Levinas opposes Odysseus’ nostalgia to the 
loss of place in Kafka’s writing: “in Kafka there is no returning; there is a search for a place, un 
lieu somewhere. It is a movement to the past. With Kafka, there is, in general, no place.”365 This 
loss of place renders Kafka’s characters constantly at odds with the world, strangers to themselves, 
accused of crimes of which they are not aware, where time and place sink into the quicksand of a 
world without explanation or cause. Levinas draws a parallel between the loss of place in Kafka’s 
writing and the biblical imperative to honor the stranger in Psalm 119, “I am a stranger on the 
earth: hide not thy commandment from me.”366 In this verse connecting the imperative to welcome 
the stranger with the appeal for God’s law, Levinas notes, “The same word that always appears in 
the Bible: one must attend to the cares of the ‘stranger.’”367 Connecting the loss of place in Kafka’s 
writing to the commandment to welcome the stranger – that is, the foreigner, the refugee, the sans-
papiers – Levinas suggests an alliance between Abraham’s going forth and Kafka’s loss of place, 
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against Odysseus’ nostalgic for return. Unfortunately, he does not close this analogical loop by 
explicitly invoking Kafka’s “Abraham.” For Levinas, the loss of place in Kafka’s writing does not 
undercut the facticity of election—rather, for Gregor Samsa or Josef K., it is precisely the fact of 
being chosen for an ordeal without explanation which provokes the loss of place. 
If Levinas views election as the fact of Jewish existence, we might describe Derrida’s 
hyperbolic Judaism as counter-factual: he frequently invokes the expression, s’il y en a, prying 
opening contingency and possibility from the trap of necessity. Hammerschlag notes, “what 
differentiates Derrida’s position from Levinas's is his use of the comme si.”368 The as if introduces 
the possibility of a different adventure, a different interpretation of the facts of the biblical 
narrative.369 Derrida’s comme si enables an infinity of literary counter-interpretations: 
I believe that a certain perhaps of the comme si, as if, the poetical or the literary, in sum, 
lies at the heart of what I want to entrust to you—as if the one who disavowed the most, 
and who appeared to betray the dogmas of be- longing, be it a belonging to the community, 
the religion, even to the people, the nation and the state, and so on—as if this individual 
alone represented the last demand, the hyperbolic request of the very thing he appears to 
betray by perjuring himself. Hence this law that comes upon me, a law that, appearing 
antinomian, dictated to me, in a precocious and obscure fashion, in a kind of light whose 
rays are unbending, the hyper-formalized formula of a destiny devoted to the secret—and 
that is why I play seriously, more and more, with the figure of the marrano: the less you 
show yourself as jewish, the more and better jew you will be.370  
 
The comme si introduces literature by introducing a disjunction between language and meaning 
which is not bound to the absolutism of the philosophical concept, enabling a Jewishness that 
“betray by perjuring,” which honors the tradition by falsifying it. Hammerschlag explains, “for 
																																																						
368 Sarah Hammerschlag, “Another, Other Abraham,” 95. 
369 There is a long history of the philosophical motif of the as if. For Kant, the regulative idea of God as supreme being 
is not effective if it is true, rather only if we act als ob it is true. Similarly, in the domain of ethics, the categorical 
imperative demands that one act “as if” the maxim of their actions becomes a universal law for humanity. Hans 
Vaihinger’s 1911 Philosophy of the As If (New York: Routledge, 2021) argues that humanity clings to certain useful 
fictions based on false assumptions but which we treat as if they were true. Kwame Anthony Appiah’s 2017 As If 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017) extends Vaihinger’s claim to study the place of idealization in human 
thought. By contrast, Derrida’s use of the comme si follows Kafka in proposing a counterfactual situation, not simply 
a useful fiction, but as a rethinking and an overturning of historical contingency.  




Derrida this perjury would in fact be the sign of fidelity to the antinomy that is at the heart of 
‘being-Jewish.’”371 This deceit connects the comme si to the marrano, whose Jewishness lies 
precisely in hiding the outward signs of Jewishness. This hyperbolic Judaism is always too much 
and never enough for a sufficient concept of identity: “The more radically you break with a certain 
dogmatism of the place or of the bond (communal, national, religious, of the state),” Derrida once 
told Levinas, “the more you will be faithful to the hyperbolic, excessive [démesurée] demand, to 
the hubris, perhaps, of a universal and disproportionate responsibility toward the singularity of 
every other.”372 Derrida’s hyperbolic Judaism refuses any final interpretation of identity, and 
embraces the endless possibilities of Judéité to question and re-imagine. 
Like Kafka’s re-imagination of Abraham, Jabès’ The Book of Questions challenges the 
Book of Books, it questions the tradition as a liminal expression of the tradition. Jabès imagines a 
legion of rabbis and sages whose invented proverbs and apocryphal Talmudic lessons present a 
different Judaism. Jabès’ relation to “Jewish” writing takes place in the imaginary because 
“Jewish” identity is already a phantasm. He inverts the question of “Jewish” writing, rendering 
writing an expression of Jewishness. Consequently, Jabès’ Judaism rewrites tradition as fiction, 
testing the limits of interpretation. Lucette Finas describes his writing as “otherwise Jewish, where 
Jewish is other than Jewish.”373 Jabès’ rabbis argue over apocryphal scripture and aberrant 
proverbs, his “Jewish” writing invents and fictionalizes as a condition of its exile. For Derrida, 
Jabès reveals the impossibility for the Jew to reconcile the literal and the allegorical: 
The imaginary, this milieu where Jabès allows his rabbis to chat, throws their sentences off 
course, expropriates their names, such that we also read an uprooting [déracinemment], a 
derivation or dispersion of which the diaspora […] is perhaps the initial and most gentle 
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suture. The Jew dresses, bandages, covers, and circumscribes this wound. Jabès re-opens 
it and makes it bleed.374 
 
The rupture of identity inspires Jabès’ use of citations and fictional characters, which both Derrida 
and Finas connect to diaspora. In lieu of a home, the exiled Jewish writer finds solace in the space 
of the imagination. Finas explains, “the character of citation, or expropriation, in the text, of Jewish 
reference. New diaspora, with a lower-case d (dispersion, dissipation, [d’écriture], displacing, 
disarticulating the Diaspora).”375 Jabès’ expropriation of the Jewish tradition in imaginary citations 
is a kind of rupture with the canonical texts of Judaism, and its re-articulation in a foreign land. 
His citations, like Derrida’s comme si, thus enable a form of literary or virtual Judaism. The split 
between allegory and literality in Jabès’ writing parallels the biblical Abraham and Kafka’s 
Abraham: the comme si enables a reading of the tradition against itself, without foreclosing the 
contingent possibilities of what could have been otherwise. 
In their initial exchanges, Levinas maintained a certain restraint and distance with regards 
to Jabès’ poetry and his “contingent” expression of Judaism. His quixotic tales of fictional rabbis 
and sages stretch the limits of what Levinas can tolerate as an expression of Judaism. Nonetheless, 
Levinas seemed to warm to Jabès’ poetic style by the third volume Le Retour au Livre – no doubt 
due to the influence of Blanchot. “You are a great poet,” he wrote Jabès in 1965 after the 
publication of Le Retour au Livre, “however I would be very embarrassed if I had to re-say in non-
poetic language what these propositions say – or, unsay. These lucky propositions contain this 
small earthquake by which one is expulsed from the trajectory of language where your thought are 
nonetheless placed.”376 Levinas identifies in Jabès’ poetry the discontinuity of language and 
meaning enabled by the imagination: 
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I see […] in reading you what Blanchot suggests in l’Attente l’Oubli about the essence of 
poetry: discontinuity to escape with the lessons that the conditions of language make of 
language, obeying the escapes it carves out, which encroach on speech to say what it wants 
to say. Is that the problem of the book which obsesses you? The book offers the unique 
possibility of transcendence. And these names of rabbis, which have shocked me until now, 
fantastic, but pronounceable names? Is it here that the desire to unveil the meaning of words 
is satisfied, to discover their freedom as sound? 
 
While he remains sceptical of Jabès’ imaginary rabbis, Levinas conceives of the “problem of the 
book,” as a question of the book as the site of transcendence – a theme he shares with the Egyptian 
poet.377 He develops these reflections in his contribution to the 1972-1973 issue of Les Nouveaux 
Cahiers on Jabès’ work, where he describes his poetry’s “exposure, without defense, to an 
attention the hyperbole of which is exigency.”378 Within the transcendence of the book, Jabès’ 
poetry is the abyssal place at the opening of language, which “makes the word God suddenly 
appear,” where Dieu emerges from d’yeux.379 The vigilance to hyperbole is the law of Jabès’ 
writing, and the Jewish condition of his work. Levinas remarks, “is that not what the ‘sleepless’ 
attention of the ‘guardian of Israel’ is?” It is the steadfast commitment to hyperbole that Levinas 
calls “the Jewish moment of Jabès’ work; I mean its human moment.” Levinas invokes a dual 
register in the ambivalence between the Jewish and human aspect of his writing.  
The “Jewish” quality of Jabès’ writing is not expressed by particular themes of exile or 
exclusion, rather Levinas explains that these themes “are still turning in the vertigo that comes 
from what he calls ‘the vertiginous place of the book.’”380 It is Jabès’ transcendence in the book 
even as he deconstructs it, which Derrida calls to “betray by perjuring,” that illustrates the 
hyperbolic Jewish character of Jabès’ writing. Levinas’ sympathetic interpretation of the Jewish 
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character of Jabès’ commitment to hyperbole suggests a reconciliation with Derrida’s comme si. 
Like the two faces sharing Adam’s head – perhaps suggesting the split for the Jew between allegory 
and literality – Jabès’ language is “without any possible rupture with this God,” his language is 
tied to the other, who is the other contained in the self. In his interpretation of Jabès’ hyperbolic 
Judaism, Levinas comes closest to intersecting the logic of Derrida’s comme si. The triangulation 
of Derrida, Levinas, and Jabès’ responses to the question of “Jewish” writing reveals a chiasmus 
between the demands of a universal ethical subjectivity, and the singularity of a narrative adventure 
which can always be imagined otherwise.  
 
 
VIII.  Conclusion 
 
In a 2004 dialogue with Jacqueline Rose and Hélène Cixous for London’s Jewish Book Week, 
Derrida told this variation of a classic Jewish joke: 
There are three people on an island: a German citizen, a French citizen, and a Jew […] 
They don’t know when they will leave the island and it is boring. One of them says, “Well, 
we should do something. […] Why don’t we write something on the elephants?” There 
were a number of elephants on the island. “Everyone should write something on the 
elephants and then we could compare the styles and the national idioms,’ and so on and so 
forth. So the week after, the French one came, with a short, brilliant, witty essay on the 
sexual drive, or the sexual appetite of the elephants […] Three months, or three years after 
that, the German came back with […] a very positive scientific book on the elephants and 
the ecology of the elephants on the island. And the two of them asked the Jew, “Well, when 
will you give us your book?” “Wait, it’s a very serious question. I need more time. I need 
more time.” And they came again every year asking him for his book. Finally, after ten 
years, he came back with a book called, “The Elephant and the Jewish Question.”381 
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Where Levinas asserts there will be Jews on Mars, Derrida’s corollary is that there will be anti-
Semitic elephants on the desert island. Sartre describes how the Jew is constructed by the anti-
Semite to fulfills the need for a scapegoat and enemy; conversely, Levinas identifies in the fact of 
Jewish election the origin of the anti-Semite’s antipathy. There is nowhere the Jew can go where 
he or she will not also encounter the anti-Semite. From the “Jewish Question” to the reflections on 
Jewish identity in the aftermath of the Shoah, the fraught definition of Jewish identity remains, 
paradoxically, the most uncanny and most exemplary affiliation, which magnifies the aporia at the 
heart of identification and belonging itself. Where Bernard Lazare turns the figure of the Jewish 
pariah against itself to discover its potential for revolutionary critique, he discovers an essential 
tactic to respond to the double-edged exclusionary forces that police the limits of Jewish identity 
and belonging. For Derrida – named for Jackie Coogan, the actor for the silver screen’s iconic 
conscious pariah in Chaplin’s The Kid – the joke highlights his parallels with Lazare’s figure. 
Trafficking in the terms of national identity, only to satirize or undermine the legitimacy of these 
distinctions from within, Derrida cannot escape Jewish identity any more than he can embrace it.  
“Je suis juif” is a performative utterance which contains an affiliation and an accusation. 
Derrida and Jabès position themselves at the critical margins of the Jewish tradition, and they 
refuse the identification as “Jewish” writers, even as they engage the questioning and exploration 
of Judéité. The grammar of Jewish identification is structured by the exclusionary group dynamics 
that have accompanied the history of anti-Semitism, and yet the recognition exemplified by the 
biblical call to Abraham is inexorable. By contrast, for Levinas, even if the essential features of 
Jewish identity are disputed, the “metaphysical sentiment” of election gives rise to the ethical 
subjectivity. Derrida rather describes himself as irreducible to any discrete form of identity, but 




enough” and “too much”: there is no necessary and sufficient concept of identity, it is a phantasm 
captured by the double-sided language of identification. By the same token, Jabès refuses to 
identify as a “Jewish writer,” and yet in his literary universe, writing is itself the expression of 
Judaism. This reversal eschews claims to identity that have marked centuries of debates concerning 
“Jewish” writing, and yet Jabès’ writing imagines an entirely fictional Jewish tradition. Derrida 
and Jabès explore the possibility of a differential Judaism, which reimagines the tradition through 
the literary mode of the comme si. Like Kafka’s Abraham, this hyperbolic Judaism betrays the 
Bible by reimagining it. When Levinas describes the Jewish condition of Jabès’ writing as his strict 
vigilance to hyperbole, where “hyperbole is exigence,” it suggests the possibility for a 
reconciliation. Levinas’ “irremissible” fact of Jewish election and Derrida’s unavoidable question 












This chapter explores the “absolute book” and its demise. I retrace the absolute book in Hegel’s 
philosophy, specifically the interpretation presented in Kojève’s influential course on the 
Phenomenology, culminating in the figure of the “sage.” Derrida’s Of Grammatology and Levinas’ 
Totality and Infinity oppose the idealism of the absolute book, but their opposition leads in different 
directions. Levinas views the Hegelian absolute book as endemic of the philosophical drive for 
totality, which obscures the idea of infinity. Drawing from Rosenzweig’s critique of totality, 
Totality and Infinity articulates a two-sided critique of totality which “does not envisage the end 
of history within being understood as a totality, but institutes a relation with the infinity of being 
which exceeds the totality.”382 Working through the system of being, the individual discovers what 
Levinas calls the “ex-ceedance” of totality by the infinite, “the overflowing of thought by its 
content.”383 By contrast, Derrida announces in Of Grammatology the “death” of the absolute book, 
and the “birth” of an understanding of language based on the “arche-trace,” the irreducible play of 
linguistic meaning that refuses the metaphysics of presence. Derrida’s critique of the absolute book 
leads to a new notion of textuality based on the “outre-livre,” which refuses the closed unity of 
Hegel’s absolute book. The difference hinges on Derrida and Levinas’ notions of the “trace.” 
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II. The Heritage of the Absolute Book  
 
Philosophers have long dreamed of an absolute book whose pages contained the totality of 
knowledge. The absolute book would be a sublime, transformative object, a kind of philosopher’s 
bible. The knowledge contained in its pages would transcend human finitude and survive the end 
of history, and it would offer an understanding of the absolute previously reserved for God. 
Modern philosophy is ostensibly inaugurated by the quest to discover the “book of nature,” to 
understand its secrets, and inscribe them in a book of human knowledge to rival God’s. In the 
Discourse on Method, Descartes resolves, “to pursue only that knowledge which I might find in 
myself or in the great book of the world [le grand livre du monde].”384 The book of nature, the 
book of the world, or the absolute book are variants of the metaphor describing the ensemble of 
worldly knowledge encompassed in the pages of a book. This ambition morphs into the project of 
philosophical encyclopedia, where the philosopher attempts to construct the system which can 
articulate and explain every domain of human experience.385 The pursuit of the absolute book 
became an obsession in 19th century Romanticism. Alexandre Kojève explains, “the summum of 
Romantic expression is the novel of the novel, the book of the book.”386 Hegel’s systematic 
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philosophy is the hallmark of this thinking. The culmination of the Phenomenology of Spirit – the 
revelation of Spirit to itself at the end of history as absolute knowledge –takes the form of an 
absolute book of knowledge. By the same token, Novalis declares in his Romantic Encylcopaedia, 
“My book shall be a scientific Bible—a real, and ideal model—and the seed of all books […] All 
the sciences amount to one book.”387 The dream of the absolute book as the organon of human 
knowledge motivated philosophers and poets alike. Mallarmé, whose life was consumed by the 
project of drafting the absolute book of poetry, declared in the Revue Blanche in 1897: “Tout, au 
monde, existe pour aboutir à un livre.”388 
The enthusiasm animating the Romantic quest for the absolute book burst in the 20th 
century. The unprecedented death and destruction of the world wars, capped by the Shoah and the 
nuclear attacks on Japan, shook faith in humanity’s inevitable progress. Stunning mathematical 
and scientific discoveries including Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, Einstein’s theory of 
relativity, and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle undercut the supposed objectivity of the physical 
world, and enabled extraordinary technological innovations that obviated the dream of an absolute 
book of philosophy. The monolithic rationalism undergirding the absolute book no longer seemed 
viable or even desirable. These developments accompanied tectonic shifts in philosophy. Both 
Wittgenstein’s 1921 Tractatus Logicus-Philosophicus as well as Heidegger’s 1927 Sein und Zeit 
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stake claims as books espousing new programmatic approaches to understanding the world. 
However, these patriarchs of 20th century “Continental” and “Analytic” philosophy would come 
to renounce the systems proposed by their respective books.  
Heidegger’s Being and Time sets out to ask the question of the meaning of Being, which 
philosophy had previously taken as “the most universal and the emptiest of questions.”389 He sets 
out to discover “the basic concept of Being” through a preliminary study of the concrete existence 
of the special entity called Dasein. The first part of Being and Time proposes an explanation of 
Dasein, for whom temporality is the “transcendental horizon for the question of Being”; its second 
part was to sketch the “features of a phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology.” 
However, after publishing the first two divisions of the first part, Heidegger came to see the futility 
of completing the project as he had originally intended. After his 1935 Introduction to 
Metaphysics, he renounced the word ontology, and the project of destroying the history of ontology 
which he had proposed for the second part of Being and Time. Being, he discovered, can only be 
revealed in dissimulation. Derrida explains in his 1967 Of Grammatology that the language of 
fundamental ontology is always-already inscribed in the metaphysics that it seeks to escape: 
The necessary, originary, and irreducible dissimulation of the meaning of being, its 
occultation within the very blossoming forth of presence, that retreat without which there 
would be no history of being which was completely history and history of being, 
Heidegger's insistence on noting that being is produced as history only through the logos, 
and is nothing outside of it, the difference between being and the entity—all this clearly 
indicates that fundamentally nothing escapes the movement of the signifier and that, in the 
last instance, the difference between signified and signifier is nothing. This proposition of 
transgression, not yet integrated into a careful discourse, runs the risk of formulating 
regression itself. One must therefore go by way of the question of being as it is directed by 
Heidegger and by him alone, at and beyond onto-theology, in order to reach the rigorous 
thought of that strange nondifference in order to determine it correctly.390 
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Fundamental ontology cannot outrun the coattails of its own historical discourse: the meaning of 
Being is bound to the metaphysical language that it seeks to escape. For Derrida, this leads to a 
regression to the dominance of the signifier, where one must analyze the meaning of Being because 
it has structured the meaning of Being. The inevitable dissimulation of Being would provoke 
Heidegger’s so-called Kehre, away from the programmatic destruction of the history of onto-
theology. In the 1946 “Letter on Humanism,” he admitted that Being and Time had led to a “blind 
alley,” from which he could not progress any further. But if the program of Heidegger’s initial 
project had to be abandoned, this does not imply that it engenders a defunct mode of thought: “to 
‘philosophize’ about being shattered is separated by a chasm from a thinking that is shattered.”391 
Heidegger no longer believed it possible to complete his proposed Destruktion of the history of 
onto-theology, and he abandoned the pretention of a systematic treatise of Being. Rather, 
“shattered” philosophical thought advances by posing critical questions and following them down 
their paths, which is incommensurate with the absolute book’s assertion of systematic totality. 
“Wege - nicht Werke,” is the motto printed at the beginning of Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe.392 He 
had come to believe that philosophy should be understood as pathways of thought, rather than a 
compendium of exhaustive treatises. Of course, the critical inheritance of Heidegger’s philosophy 
has an unparalleled importance for Levinas and Derrida. Levinas’ concept of infinity emerges in 
direct reaction to the closed totality demarcated by Heidegger’s concept of Being, and his 
Destruktion of metaphysics paves the way for Derrida’s critique of “logocentrism.” 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy follows an altogether different trajectory than Heidegger’s, but 
his turn away from the programmatic thinking of the book is similarly initiated by the impossibility 
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of reigning in language to suit his book’s systematic objective. In the preface to the Tractatus he 
summarizes, “the whole sense of the book might be summed up in the following words: what can 
be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence.”393 
To that end, the Tractatus describes the necessary and sufficient rules guiding logical language in 
its description of the world. But Wittgenstein viewed even his own book as a transitory stage: once 
it has been properly understood, the reader will have understood its propositions as “nonsensical, 
when he has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away 
the ladder after he has climbed up it.).”394 Wittgenstein’s book functions as a kind of propaedeutic 
ladder out of our non-sense so that we can “see the world aright,” only to kick away the ladder we 
have ascended. The final proposition of the Tractatus asserts, “What we cannot speak about we 
must pass over in silence,” thereby limiting what can be spoken to the bound of sense.395 We may 
wonder what becomes of the language that is excluded.396 Blumenberg writes of the Tractatus’ 
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demand to remain silent, “what this mean more specifically is simply that what we cannot speak 
of in a certain way, we must speak of it in another way.”397 Despite the Tractatus’ concluding 
imperative, there is no way to avoid speaking. Blanchot writes, “to be silent is still to speak. Silence 
is impossible.”398 In “How to Avoid Speaking: Denials,” Derrida similarly suggests that language 
is always-already underway before we enter the conversation, and there is therefore no way to 
avoid speaking: “the moment that the question ‘How to avoid speaking?’ arises, it is already too 
late. It was no longer a question of not speaking. Language has begun without us, in us, before 
us.”399 In The Postcard: From Freud to Socrates and Beyond, he critically reframes the seventh 
proposition of the Tractatus as a question of spoken and written language: “What cannot be said 
above all must not be silenced, but written. Myself, I am a man of speech, I have never had anything 
to write. When I have something to say I say it or say it to myself, basta.”400 The final proposition 
in the Tractatus circumscribes language to the language of sense, but in light of his critique of 
“logocentrism,” Derrida suggests that what cannot be said can always be written: the difference 
inscribed in his coinage “différance,” for example, can be read and written, but not heard. Derrida’s 
comment is imbued with a degree of irony if not sarcasm, but it illustrates his predilection for 
liminal discourse, which exposes the non-identity of written and spoken language. Whereas 
Wittgenstein writes, “The limits of my language mean the limits of my world,”401 Derrida instead 
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claims, “I try to keep myself at the limit of philosophical discourse.”402 Constantly seeking out the 
limits of discourse, tarrying at the margins of language, Derrida attempts to uproot and subvert the 
closure of linguistic meaning as the “transcendental signifier” or the “unity of the book.” 
Wittgenstein later rejected the logical language of the Tractatus in favor of the picture 
theory of language, whose focus on ordinary use is incompatible with the absolute book. He had 
come to regard the division of sense and non-sense as irreducible, offering the false assurance of 
a purely logical language which does not obtain. “The ideal, as we conceive of it, is unshakable. 
You can’t step out-side it,” he writes in Philosophical Investigations, “The idea is like a pair of 
glasses on our nose through which we see whatever we look at. It never occurs to us to take them 
off.”403 The language of sense functions like a pair of glasses which bring images into a certain 
focus. Taking off these proverbial glasses, Wittgenstein’s later philosophy disabuses language of 
its supposed grounding in the logical description of the objective facts of the world. In 
Philosophical Investigations, he turns to the ordinary use of language and context-driven language 
games which establish linguistic meaning. He writes, “A picture held us captive. And we couldn’t 
get outside it, for it lay in our language, and language seemed only to repeat it to us inexorably.”404 
The picture of the world determined by logical language filters the world in a manner that passes 
as objective, but it leaves a lot out of frame: ethics, religion, and the social practices that shape and 
are shaped by the ordinary, often non-sensical ways we employ language. In the “Lecture on 
Ethics,” Wittgenstein recognizes, “these nonsensical expressions were not nonsensical because I 
had not yet found the correct expressions, but that their nonsensicality was their very essence.”405 
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This tendency for particularly ethical language “to run against the boundaries of language” 
discloses the insufficiency of the logical language of the absolute book. The turn away from the 
Tractatus is a rejection of the absolute book in favor of an approach to language understood in the 
context of the ordinary usages that compose our “forms of life.” 
 
 
III. Hegel, Kojève, and the Absolute Book 
 
The notion of the absolute book reached its apex and demise in critical readings of Hegel in 20th 
century France. In the 1960 edition of Reason and Revolution, Herbert Marcuse asserted the "only 
major recent development in the interpretation of Hegel's philosophy" is the "postwar revival of 
Hegel studies in France," which identifies "the inner connection between the idealistic and 
materialistic dialectic."406 This revival can be attributed in no small measure to Alexandre Kojève’s 
seminar on Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, held between 1933 and 1939 at the École Pratique 
des Hautes Études in Paris. Kojève’s seminar was a major philosophical “event,” which introduced 
an entire generation of French philosophers to Hegel’s philosophy: its participants included 
Raymond Aron, Georges Bataille, Raymond Queneau, Jacques Lacan, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
Robert Marjolin, and Emmanuel Levinas. The importance of the seminar lies both in his novel 
interpretation of Hegel, and its tremendous influence on this budding generation of 
philosophers.407 The seminar tempted students to break from the orthodoxy of the French 
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philosophical establishment: “I don't know how many times Queneau and I stumbled out of that 
little room gasping for air-suffocated, beaten,” Bataille recounted, “Kojève's course left me broken, 
crushed, killed ten times.”408 Aron recounted that Kojève’s seminar “captivated an audience of 
superintellectuals who were inclined toward doubt or criticism,” in no small part due to the 
magnetism that “stemmed from his subject and his person.”409 Ethan Kleinberg describes the 
formative role of the seminar for “the generation of 1933,” who rose to prominence after the war 
bearing the influences of phenomenology, Marxism, and existential philosophy which Kojève 
helped bring across the Rhine.410 Levinas had previously met fellow Russian émigré Kojève 
through Alexandre Koyré, and he was one of the only participants in the seminar with direct 
knowledge of Husserl and Heidegger’s philosophies. Following Levinas’ 1930 The Theory of 
Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology, Kojève’s seminar was one of the first expositions of 
Heidegger’s philosophy in France. Derrida was still a child in Algiers during the seminar, but he 
eagerly read the published seminar in the 1950s. Both Derrida and Levinas found in Kojève a 
springboard for critical reflection on idealism, history, and philosophy’s relation to the book. 
Kojève’s idiosyncratic reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology has pronounced Marxist and 
Heideggerian perspectives. After reading Being and Time, Kojève deploys several of Heidegger’s 
key existential concepts to respond to shortcomings he identifies in Hegel’s text. Kleinberg 
remarks, “Kojève uses Hegel to read Heidegger as much as he uses Heidegger to read Hegel,” 
even if, ultimately, he “firmly believed that Hegel had gotten philosophy right.”411 Further, his 
interpretation of the Phenomenology has a Marxist gloss particularly on crucial questions of 
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history, the master-slave dialectic, and the role of work. As Kojève’s former student Allan Bloom 
wrote in the introduction to the 1969 English edition, “anyone who wishes to understand the sense 
of that mixture of Marxism and Existentialism which characterizes contemporary radicalism must 
turn to Kojève.”412 Kojève’s speculative reading of Hegel’s text struck a chord. For its participants 
and readers, the seminar was a thrilling journey through an entire century of German philosophy, 
which presented a totally new approach to philosophy.  
A central thesis of Kojève’s seminar concerns the “end of history.” Despite the fits and 
starts of the dialectical movement of history, Hegel believes that history is teleologically guided 
towards the realization of reason and freedom. Kojève sympathetically describes a two-sided 
notion of history, which is at once an unyielding story of violence, war, and revolution, as well as 
the story of humanity’s progress towards greater freedom and reason. This picture of humanity’s 
progress against the backdrop of a bloody struggle for recognition, as Kleinberg describes, 
reflected “qualities that spoke to the generation of 1933.”413 It bears reminding that until the 
outbreak of the Second World War, the notion of the “end of history” signified an optimistic hope 
for a future that would deliver humanity from its various toils.414 Kojève conceives of history as a 
struggle for recognition, which ultimately reaches its completion with the satisfaction of 
Enlightenment; indeed, he believed that the end of history had been reached with Napoleon’s 
victory at Jena in 1806. Nonetheless, as Jeff Love writes in The Black Circle: A Life of Alexandre 
Kojève, “the end of history describes an outstanding project, not a fait accompli dating back some 
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two hundred years.”415 Indeed, once the dust has settled on the major battles of world history, there 
still remain struggles to unfold history’s teleological direction. Stanley Rosen explains that after 
the end of history, “subsequent history is to be understood not as genuine history or innovation but 
as the struggle of various sub-Hegelian sects to revolt against historical necessity.”416 Kojève 
believed the struggle to determine the future of humanity had been essentially settled, and the 
remaining conflicts were the aftershocks of this epochal completion.  
The absolute book is the focal point of the final year of Kojève’s seminar in 1938-1939, 
where he interprets the final chapter of Hegel’s Phenomenology. In this enigmatic chapter, Hegel 
describes the triumphal moment that marks the end of history, where the dialectic opposition of 
subject and object is overcome, and absolute knowledge is revealed as "Spirit that knows itself as 
Spirit."417 Hegel describes this eschatological moment as “kenosis,” where “the negative is the 
negative of itself,” and through a process of “inwardizing” Spirit is “starts afresh” on a “higher 
level.” This culminates in a consciousness that achieves a kind of God-like knowledge of “the 
absolute notion” without mediation. This can only occur for a consciousness that has accrued total 
knowledge of both self and world. To guide us through the mysterious final chapter of the 
Phenomenology, Kojève introduces the figure of the sage, the consciousness of absolute 
knowledge. Like many terms in the seminar, one would be hard pressed to find “the sage” in 
Hegel’s text; this speculative reading interrogates the consequences or unturned stones of the 
Phenomenology, critically examining the text through his interpretation. The sage is “completely 
and perfectly self-conscious,”418 he can answer any question that could be posed of him, and he 
has knowledge of the totality of the world. The very purpose of the sage’s existence is “to realize 
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the Encyclopedia of all possible knowledge,” “the Sage reveals the totality of Being with all of his 
thought.”419 The sage achieves the omniscience of a finite deity: bound by the finitude of human 
existence, the sage acquires total knowledge of the world at the apotheosis of history.420 
Hegel describes consciousness as a spiraling movement between subject and object. In the 
Introduction to the Phenomenology, he identifies the paradox that one cannot judge the knowledge 
of the absolute unless one has already presupposed a criterion for what absolute knowledge would 
be. Breaking from Descartes’ foundationalist account of knowledge based on the rational 
deductions of the cogito, and Kant’s idealist distinction of a priori and a posteriori forms of 
knowledge, Hegel’s epistemology identifies the contingency of individual knowledge claims upon 
the logic of the whole in which they participate, revealing the fundamentally circular character of 
knowledge. Consciousness in fact has two objects of knowledge, which Hegel describes in terms 
of the in-itself and for-itself. There is the direct intuitive apprehension of an object of knowledge, 
and then there is the reflected notion of that object in terms of its relation to the whole. Unlike the 
Kantian notion of consciousness where subject and object are separated by a chasm bridged only 
by sensible intuition, Hegel describes the circular dependence of the subject on the circumstances 
in which he or she encounters the object: as he writes in the Introduction to the Phenomenology, 
“‘Notion’ and ‘object,’ ‘being-for-another’ and ‘being-in-itself,’ both fall within that knowledge 
which we are investigating.”421 The reciprocity of thought and objectivity, the contingency of the 
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individual subject upon the logic of the whole, becomes the principle for Hegel’s anti-
foundationalism. Likewise, Hegel defines experience, Erfahrung, as the “dialectical movement 
which consciousness exercises on itself and which affects both its knowledge and its object,”422 
that is, as the circular movement between the subject, its object, and back again. Absolute 
knowledge would involve the reconciliation of the for-itself and the in-itself such that 
“consciousness will arrive at a point at which it gets rid of its semblance of being burdened with 
something alien.”423 When consciousness achieves knowledge of itself and the world, when the 
subject overcomes the otherness of objects, as Hegel concludes the Introduction, “when 
consciousness itself grasps this its own essence, it will signify the nature of absolute knowledge 
itself.” From subject to object and back again, the movement of knowledge is circular; hence, “the 
‘circular’ existence of the Sage”:  
For the absolute Knowledge of the Sage, every question is its own answer; but this is only 
because it passes through the totality of questions and answers that form the whole of the 
System. Likewise, in his existence, the Sage remains identical with himself, he is closed 
off in himself; but he remains identical with himself because he passes through the totality 
of others, and he is closed off in himself because the totality of others is closed off in him.424  
 
The encyclopedic knowledge of the sage signifies the consciousness in which the opposition of 
the for-itself and the in-itself is finally reconciled, revealing the essence of the world in its totality. 
In this sense, the consciousness of the sage is a mimesis of the object of the totality of knowledge.  
But the crowning of absolute knowledge is not something that occurs for a person, rather 
it is an event that takes place in the pages of a book. Kojève writes, “if the Sage is a person of flesh 
and bones, Science is a discourse (Logos) that is effectively spoken or it is a book (“Bible”).”425 If 
the sage possesses an encyclopedic knowledge of the world, his book would mimetically contain 
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this same knowledge as an external object: “this Book is produced by the Sage,” and reciprocally, 
“the contents of this object is the Sage himself.” Absolute knowledge becomes science by 
transcending subjectivity and becoming a book, an object whose existence is assured beyond the 
finite limits of human subjectivity. Jeff Love remarks, “being a sage is evidently not quite enough” 
because “there is no sage without the Book.”426 To transcend the finitude of subjectivity, the sage’s 
knowledge must become the book. Kojève writes, “the Dasein of Science is not Man, it is the 
Book. Not man, not the flesh and bones of the Sage, it is the Book which is the appearance 
(Erscheinung) of Science in the world, this appearance being absolute Knowledge.”427 The sage’s 
book is a kind of philosopher’s stone, its reading is a transformative experience leading through 
the stages of knowledge to its absolute form. Jeff Love writes, “the Book is the wisdom of the 
sage, a philosophical bible.”428 Absolute knowledge “detaches itself from Man and passes into the 
Book,” as the realization of the philosopher’s long sought dream to script the book of nature.429 
The absolute book steps beyond the flux of temporality, it “eliminates the exteriority of Time for 
Man,” and transcends the finitude of human existence.430 As a finite being, the Sage exists in the 
circular biological time of birth, death, and reproduction, but the sage only exists for a brief period 
in the linear, teleological movement of historical time. Kojève explains, “The Time in which Man-
reader-of-the-Book endures [dure] is thus the cyclical (or biological) Time of Aristotle, but not 
linear, historical, Hegelian Time.” A human participates in circular biological time, but the linear 
time of history is beyond the purview of a finite being. The Sage’s knowledge is only complete in 
the pages of a book, where it can escape finitude. For Kojève, the sage’s book supplants the Book 
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of Books: “the reality of the eternal Spirit is not a transcendent God living in the heavens, but a 
book written by a living person in the natural World.”431 Hegel’s system reaches its completion in 
the philosophical facsimile of the Book of Books as the book of absolute knowledge. 
 The sage’s book is a Faustian bargain: the sage achieves absolute knowledge at the cost of 
death. Jeff Love explains, “the Book not only has the role of evidencing the sage’s wisdom; it also 
evidences the finite character of the sage’s wisdom, since the sage is not enough.” 432 The finite 
subjectivity of the sage is insufficient, and only by becoming the Book can he attain the absolute. 
“Even if Man completely disappears from the surface of the earth,” Kojève writes, “the Book will 
remain.”433 The triumph of the book marks humanity’s crowning moment at the end of history, but 
“the end of History is the death of Man.”434 Only when history is done and dusted can the book be 
completed. If the sage is indeed fated to lead humanity off the precipice for the sake of the book, 
Kojève offers a bleak outlook for humanity: “Hegel’s dialectical or anthropological philosophy is 
ultimately a philosophy of death.”435 What becomes of humanity at the culmination of a philosophy 
of death? Jeff Love reflects, “the vaunted irony of Kojève takes on a monstrous quality here when 
the final end of history, the true point of final emancipation for the toiling, oppressed human being, 
seems to be indistinguishable from suicide.”436 His notion of freedom involves humanity 
overcoming and discovering freedom from animal nature, and fully inhabiting the artifice of 
human society and culture. The sage’s book is the culmination of freedom and humanity meets its 
mortal end so its ultimate expression can endure. The sublation of humanity as the absolute book 
completely extirpates its animal nature. Georges Bataille observes the quest for absolute 
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knowledge can be achieved “only if the Sage raises himself […] to the height of death, at whatever 
anguish to him.”437 The sage is symptomatic of this sacrificial drive in human life:  
Concerning sacrifice, I can essentially say that, on the level of Hegel’s philosophy, Man 
has, in a sense, revealed and founded human truth by sacrificing; in sacrifice he destroyed 
the animal in himself, allowing himself and the animal to survive only as that 
noncorporeal truth which Hegel describes and which makes of man-in Heidegger’s words-
a being unto death (Sein zum Tode), or – in the words of Kojève himself – “death which 
lives a human life.”438  
 
Confronted with Being-towards-death, the sage’s self-annihilation represents an overcoming of 
human finitude and animal being. “Kojève’s seemingly outlandish radicality,” Love explains, “is 
in fact a challenging affront to the conception of man as ‘free, historical individual.”439 Rather than 
the idealist vision of humanity’s eternal continuation, Kojève’s utopia is articulated through the 
lens of human finitude. It is an anti-utopian utopia that marks both the demise of humanity and the 
ascendance of human freedom beyond its animal nature in the sublime object of the sage’s Book. 
 Kojève’s seminar on Hegel concluded in 1939 with Europe on the precipice of war. For 
many of its participants, this meant mobilization in the army, or life under occupation; for others, 
it would mean exile, imprisonment, or deportation. Kojève spoke of progress and the end of 
history, but these concepts seemed fantastic or hollow in the new reality hastened by World War 
II. The war had undercut belief in an unshakable philosophical system that could united ethical, 
political, and metaphysical questions in absolute knowledge. Kleinberg writes, “by the end of 
World War II, the concepts of progress and history, shored up by the turn to Hegel after World 
War I, seemed essentially bankrupt. What do ‘history’ and ‘progress’ mean in a world where the 
atom bomb has been unleashed and the Shoah has occurred?”440 Belief in the inevitable march of 
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history towards truth and justice appeared a sham, and the Hegelian dream of the absolute book 
no longer seemed a tenable or even desirable goal. Though drained of its idealistic enthusiasm, 
Kojève’s seminar nonetheless offered a fruitful source for critical reflection when it was published 
in 1947. Hammerschlag notes that Kojève’s seminar “inspired a myriad of 
philosophical/antiphilosophical approaches, which took combating the Hegelian system as their 
starting point.” For Levinas and Derrida, “Hegel’s name became synonymous with philosophy and 
his teleological view of history, the ultimate idol to be deposed.”441  
 
 
IV. Levinas and the Critique of Totality 
 
Levinas’ critique of the philosophy of totality is a rejection of the unifying impulse which reaches 
its apogee in the Hegelian absolute book. Totality and Infinity responds to “the ancient privilege 
of unity which is affirmed from Parmenides to Spinoza and Hegel,” which has long sought to bring 
together the disparate elements of existence under the regime of a single system of total 
understanding.442 For Levinas, “metaphysics would endeavor to suppress separation, to unite,” and 
the trajectory of philosophical idealism inexorably leads to Hegel’s systematic philosophy, which 
“absorb[s] the being of the metaphysician” in its drive for unity. Against the synthesis of the self 
and world as absolute spirit, Levinas insists on the idea of infinity which exceeds any unity that 
would overcome the separation of self and other in an all-encompassing system of knowledge. He 
writes, “the idea of Infinity is transcendence itself, the overflowing of an adequate idea. If totality 
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can be constituted it is because Infinity does not permit itself to be integrated. It is not the 
insufficiency of the I that prevents totalization, but the Infinity of the Other.”443 Predicated on the 
separation of self and other, the infinitely Other exceeds every systemic unity, piercing the limits 
of totality. Levinas casts the history of metaphysics as a quest to overcome separation in unity: 
Metaphysics would endeavor to suppress separation, to unite; the metaphysical being 
should absorb the being of the metaphysician. The de facto separation with which 
metaphysics begins would result from an illusion or a fault. As a stage the separated being 
traverses on the way of its return to its metaphysical source, a moment of a history that will 
be concluded by union, metaphysics would be an Odyssey, and its disquietude nostalgia. 
But the philosophy of unity has never been able to say whence came this accidental illusion 
and fall, inconceivable in the Infinite, the Absolute, and the Perfect. 444  
 
Levinas equates metaphysics’ quest for unity with Odysseus’ nostos: the pyrrhic quest to discover 
unified knowledge is akin to the adventure to return home, a return to the domain of the known, 
the finite, and ipseity. By contrast, his preferred figure of ethical subjectivity Abraham separates 
himself from his homeland, he goes forth into unknown lands in response to an infinite call.  
 Levinas describes a double-sided relation to the systematic totality subsumed in the 
absolute book. The exceedance of totality by infinity does not definitively overcome the 
systematicity of philosophy—one cannot simply step beyond totality once and for all. “This 
‘beyond’ the totality and objective experience,” he writes in the preface to Totality and Infinity, 
“is reflected within the totality and history, within experience.”445 The idea of infinity can only 
emerge by working through the system of totality. Just as Levinas rejects the idealist thinking of 
totality which sacrifices the individual for the sake of unity, he also criticizes the subjectivist 
critique of totality which he associates with Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. The eschatological 
relation to what lies beyond being is not a rejection of totality in the name of a subjectivist 
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transvaluation of values, or belief in values that lies beyond Being. Levinas describes the 
subjective resistance to totality as futile: 
The eschatological vision does not oppose to the experience of totality the protestation of 
a person in the name of his personal egoism or even of his salvation. Such a proclamation 
of morality based on the pure subjectivism of the I is refuted by war, the totality it reveals, 
and the objective necessities. We oppose to the objectivism of war a subjectivity born from 
the eschatological vision. The idea of infinity delivers the subjectivity from the judgment 
of history to declare it ready for judgment at every moment and, we shall show, called to 
participate in this judgment, impossible without it. The harsh law of war breaks up not 
against an impotent subjectivism cut off from being, but against the infinite, more objective 
than objectivity.446  
 
The thinking of totality which he associates with war cannot be escaped in ontology, or by turning 
inward to subjective experience. Rather, Levinas’ phenomenology works through the imminent 
content of totality from which springs its exceedance by infinity. This double-sided thinking of 
totality is therefore “a defense of subjectivity,” but one which is “not at the level of its purely egoist 
protestation against totality, nor in its anguish before death, but as founded in the idea of infinity.” 
He refuses the warlike thinking of totality as unified objectivity just as he rejects the subjectivist 
revolt against totality: it is in Being that one discovers that which exceeds Being,  
The idea of infinity can only emerge out of the “separation” of self and other. The encounter 
with the wholly Other exceeds totality in a presence which cannot be assimilated into the domain 
of the self. Levinas writes, “the way in which the other presents himself, exceeding the idea of the 
other in me, we here name face.”447 This exceedance of totality is only possible through the 
separation of self and other, which makes possible the idea of infinity. Levinas writes, “thesis and 
antithesis, in repelling one another, call for one another. They appear in opposition to a synoptic 
gaze that encompasses them.”448 There is no final reconciliation of self and other which accedes 
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to absolute identity or sameness; separation undercuts any systematic totality that purports to 
subsume alterity. The face to face encounter with the wholly Other is only possible because of 
separation, which enables the ethical exceedance of totality. Levinas writes, “an absolute 
transcendence has to be produced as non-integrateable.” The refusal to integrate the individual in 
the mechanics of systematicity is essential for freedom. Separation cordons off an interiority for 
the individual to exist outside of the grips of history. “Infinity is produced by withstanding the 
invasion of a totality,” he explains, “in a contraction that leaves a place for the separated being.”449 
If philosoophy is bound to the quest for totality and unity, the infinite arises from the domain of 
religion. “Totality and the embrace of being, or ontology, do not contain the final secret of being,” 
Levinas writes, “religion, where relationship subsists between the same and the other despite the 
impossibility of the Whole – the idea of Infinity – is the ultimate structure.” The idea of infinity 
reveals the insufficiency of philosophy’s conceptual nostos as the Hegelian book. 
 Levinas’ critique of totality is deeply indebted to Rosenzweig’s The Star of Redemption. 
His opposition to the philosophical drive for unity “from Parmenides to Spinoza and Hegel”450 
hearkens the opening pages of The Star, where Rosenzweig “throws the gauntlet to the whole 
venerable brotherhood of philosophers from Ionia to Jena,” and the identity of being and thought 
which was first posited in Parmenides’ poem and culminates in Hegel’s system.451 Levinas 
discovered Rosenzweig’s philosophy during the same period in the 1930s when he also attended 
Kojève’s seminar, but it was the former’s interpretation of Hegel which proved decisive. Myriam 
Bienenstock observes, “of Hegel and on Hegel, Levinas first knew – he tells us this himself – what 
																																																						
449 Ibid, 104. 
450 Ibid, 102. 





Rosenzweig said.”452 Levinas wrote two key essays on Rosenzweig’s work: “Between Two 
Worlds,” which he presented at the Colloque des Intellectuels Juifs de Langue Française in 1959 
and which was subsequently included in Difficult Freedom, and his introduction to Stéphane 
Mosès’ 1982 guide to The Star, Système et Révélation. In light of these commentaries, we can 
better appreciate Levinas’ declaration in the preface to Totality and Infinity that Rosenzweig is 
“too often present in this book to be cited.”453 Beyond the importance of The Star as a critique of 
philosophical idealism, Levinas emphasized “this book of general philosophy is a Jewish book, 
which founds Judaism in a new way.”454 Rather than offering a programmatic set of rules or 
doctrines pertaining to Judaism, The Star illustrates that “Jewish existence (and I write existence 
as one word) itself is an essential event of being; Jewish existence is a category of being.” The 
articulation of a properly Jewish reality was instructive for Levinas in Totality and Infinity. 
 Rosenzweig’s doctoral dissertation “Hegel and the State,” completed in 1912 under the 
direction of Friedrich Meinecke, offered a novel interpretation of Hegel’s political philosophy. 
Meinecke had posited in Cosmopolitanism and the National State that the history of political 
ideology can be understood through the creative developments of its writers and artists, and 
Rosenzweig following this approach in his study of Hegel’s political thought. Rosenzweig found 
in Hegel’s early political writings a struggle to reconcile the demands of radical subjectivity with 
the objectivity of the world, which was rooted in a rigid concept of the individual at the unyielding 
mercy of the state. Nahum Glatzer explains, “Hegel’s original conception of the military state [is] 
rooted in a dim, obscure, rigid, superhuman fate which set itself against the individual.”455 For 
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Rosenzweig, Hegel’s conception of the state valorizes the sacrifice of the individual in the name 
of the totality. This was illustrated in the founding of the Bismarckian Reich, and its consequences 
were revealed in the Great War, in which Rosenzweig served as a member of the Red Cross in 
Belgium, and later as a solider on the Balkan Front. He told Rudolf Hallo in 1923, “even when I 
started writing my Hegel book I considered Hegel’s philosophy dangerous,” and the Great War 
had only borne out these suspicions.456 The horrors he witnessed in the trenches belied Hegel’s 
belief in progress, which left the suffering individual powerless against the forward march of 
history. Bienenstock explains that Rosenzweig “assimilates what Hegel names ‘power’ (Macht) 
and, more specifically, the ‘power’ of the State to ‘violence’: he makes of the Hegelian state a 
State-power (Machtstaat) – and he rejects the ‘totalitarianism’ of Hegelian reason.”457 He 
associated the thinking of totality with the statecraft which led to the Great War.  
Rosenzweig wrote the first sketches for The Star of Redemption on postcards he sent home 
from the Macedonian front, in war hospitals, and during the German army’s retreat. When he 
returned to Germany, he renounced his university career, and founded the Freies Jüdisches 
Lehrhaus in Frankfurt. Hegel and the State was published in 1920, and Rosenzweig turned the 
page on this period of his philosophical thought. He told Meinecke, “The man who wrote the Star 
of Redemption […] is of a very different caliber from the author of Hegel and the State.”458 
Rosenzweig wrote The Star in six months of what Levinas called “a feverous ecstasy of genius,” 
and it was published in 1921.459 Shortly afterwards, he was diagnosed with Amyotrophic Lateral 
Sclerosis, causing him to suffer paralysis and aphasia until his death in 1929. Levinas describes 
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The Star as “the work of his life,” which “heralds a new way of thinking.”460 Rosenzweig’s life 
followed a perfectly tragic arc: he “paid off, at the age of thirty-two a lifetime’s debt that Goethe 
had not managed to pay off before the age of eighty-two, when he finally finished Faust.”461 More 
than just his most important book, The Star also marks “an essential moment in his relations with 
life,” as “a book that opened up the gates of life.” Whereas Kojève’s sage sacrifices himself for 
the sake of the absolute book, Rosenzweig’s book is a transitory stage in life which, Levinas 
explains, “extends beyond the book, but assumes a passage through it.”  
The Star begins with a stunning critique of the philosophy of totality. The Great War had 
disclosed that the obsession with total domination demands the sacrifice of the individual for the 
sake of history or national glory. Rosenzweig’s opening lines describe the absurdity of the 
philosophical quest for the absolute for the soldier struggling to stay alive in the trenches: 
That man may crawl like a worm into the folds of the naked earth before the whizzing 
projectiles of blind, pitiless death, or that there he may feel as violently inevitable that 
which he never feels otherwise […] upon all this misery, philosophy smiles its empty smile 
and, with its outstretched index finger, shows the creature, whose limbs are trembling in 
fear for its life in this world, a world beyond, of which it wants to know nothing at all.462 
 
For Rosenzweig, the war obliterated the systematic basis for Hegel’s philosophy. If The Star is a 
war book, Glatzer writes, “the enemy it attacks is the philosophy of German idealism, the home it 
defends is the individual, the suffering, erring, loving, doubting, despairing, and hoping human 
being whom the philosophy of the classical systems has so badly neglected, letting him vanish in 
the ‘whole.’”463 The same quest for totality drove millions to die fighting in the trenches for the 
Nation in pursuit of power and domination. Philosophical idealism treats the individual as an 
abstraction, casting aside his or her individual existence, suffering, and death. “Philosophy refutes 
																																																						
460 Emmanuel Levinas, “Between Two Worlds,” Difficult Freedom, 183. 
461 Ibid, 184 
462 Franz Rosenzweig, Star, 9. 




these earthly fears,” he writes, “that the fear of death knows nothing of such a separation in body 
and soul, that it yells I, I, I and wants to hear nothing about a deflection of the fear onto a mere 
‘body’—matters little to philosophy.”464 The war revealed thinking amounted to an inexhaustible 
teleological justification for sacrificing the individual in the name of a collective end. Glatzer 
writes, “‘only’ the individual dies, nothing can ever die in the ‘whole,’ says the philosopher.”465 
The totalizing vision of philosophy subsumes the individual in the name of collective ideals.  
The first movement in the Star is therefore the shattering of totality, namely the 
Parmenidean identity of being and the thinking of being, which undergirds philosophical idealism. 
Stéphane Mosès explains that Rosenzweig “breaks with the central project of Occidental 
philosophy which is to think Being,” and instead proposes “restarting philosophy from the only 
possible evidence that cannot be reduced: the personal existence of the person who 
philosophizes.”466 Levinas highlights that for Rosenzweig “everything is not assimilable,” and 
instead “the bursting of the totality affirmed against Hegel […] puts into question the most 
spontaneous, most natural movement of philosophy: encompassing, embracing the thinkable.”467 
The understanding of being as the totality of the thinkable connects Parmenides’ poem to the 
Hegelian absolute book. By refusing to subsume the individual to the fate of the whole, 
Rosenzweig begins the Star with the existence of the suffering individual, viscerally revealed in 
the trenches: anxiety of death is the starting point for the individual philosopher. The opening 
words of the Star declare, “from death, it is from the fear of death that all cognition of the All 
begins.”468 Philosophy begins from the fear of death, which fractures the dream of the absolute. 
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Mosès writes, “death destroys the philosophical illusion that everything can be thought.”469 
Philosophical idealism has embraced the reduction of the Multiple to the One, so that the entirety 
of the universe can be grasped by the Concept. For Rosenzweig, this dream of unified totality is a 
pernicious illusion: “the All, which would be both everything and whole, can neither be known 
honestly nor experienced clearly; only the dishonest cognition of idealism, only the obscure 
experience of the mystic can make itself believe it has grasped it.”470 Shattering this illusion 
engendered by totality, and reframing philosophy starting from the suffering individual, “the All 
of thinking and being [is] unexpectedly shattered before our eyes,” revealing its composite 
elements: humanity, world, and God.471From the fracturing of totality, Rosenzweig brings a close 
to the philosophical idealism which wills unity at all costs, but as Levinas notes, “'the individual 
quand même,’ cannot escape purely and simply from philosophy.”472 There is no final overcoming 
of philosophy and its legacy of war, surely not in the subjectivist revolt against the system. For 
Rosenzweig, Levinas explains, “the anarchy of the individual protestations of subjective thinkers, 
as he calls them, such as Kierkegaard or Nietzsche, threatens us with every kind of Schwarmerei 
and every kind of cruelty in the world.” The futility of the individualist revolt against totality 
presents its own illusion of separation and isolation, which is belied by the reality of war. For the 
Jewish people, independence from the universal presents a dangerous illusion of security: 
The particularity of a people is identical to its finitude. It is Hegelian logic that presides 
over this announcement of disappearance. The particularity of a thing has significance in 
fact only in relation to a whole; and from that point on, in the name of Hegelian logic, the 
necessary disappearance of a people is announced, for everything that is finished must 
finish. The famous independence of the Jews in the face of history is equally presented as 
a subjective illusion.473  
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Jewish particularity is not assailable to the demands of the universal, but it cannot exist without 
relation to the universal. This is an important feature of The Star of Redemption: in its three parts, 
Creation, Revelation, and Redemption, Rosenzweig traces the web of entanglements structuring 
the relation between self, world, and God. The Star is a path that begins “From death,” and 
ultimately concludes “ins Leben.”474 Across its winding path, Glatzer remarks, “The distant vision 
of truth does not lead into the beyond, but ‘into life’ – which are, not accidentally, the concluding 
words of the book.”475 Stepping out of the book and into the world, Rosenzweig offers a new 
perspective on the transitory relationship of the philosopher to the book. “The meaning of 
Rosenzweig's contribution,” Levinas writes, is the “fracturing of the totality through which his 
work began - the substitution of legislation for the totalizing thought of philosophers and industrial 
society, for attitudes to life that are a series of structures of the absolute.”476 
Rosenzweig’s 1925 essay “The New Thinking” situates The Star as a transitory book which 
offers a path out of idealist book to the immediacy of lived experience:  
Here the book concludes. For what now still comes is already beyond the book, a ‘gate’ 
from it out into the No-longer-book [Nicht-mehr-Buch]. No-longer-book is the enraptured-
startled knowledge that in this beholding the ‘world-likeness in the countenance of God’ 
in this seizing of all being in the immediacy of a moment [eines Augenblicks] and blink of 
an eye [Augen-blicks], the limit of humanity is entered. No-longer-book is also becoming 
aware that this step of the book towards the limit can only be atoned for by—ending the 
book. An ending which is also a beginning and a midpoint: stepping into the midst of the 
everyday of life.477 
 
The book of philosophy is not a materialization of absolute knowledge or an echo of the Book of 
Books, but rather it constitutes a passage, a transformation, or a metamorphosis for its reader. 
“Everyone should philosophize once,” Rosenzweig reflects in “The New Thinking,” “Everyone 
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should look all around once from his own standpoint and life perspective. But this view is not an 
end in itself. The book is no attained goal, not even a preliminary one.”478 The book represents a 
stage in the becoming of the author and reader before the philosopher can enter “the everyday of 
life.” Levinas focuses on these remarks in his essay “Between Two Worlds.” The conclusion of 
the Star leads “Ins Leben,” but Rosenzweig emphasizes that his book is something that must be 
“overcome” by means of a passage through the book. Levinas remarks, “real life involves precisely 
no longer being a book. Nicht-mehr-Buck seinl But it is for that very reason a reference to the 
book.”479 For Rosenzweig, the book is only valuable to the extent that it leads its reader to take 
responsibility in ordinary life: “This responsibility occurs in the everyday of life. Except that to 
know and live it as everyday, the day of the life of the All has to be traversed.”480 The Star 
concludes with a leap beyond the book of philosophy, and a renewed engagement with lived 
experience, but it is not a regression to a pre-philosophical natural attitude. If the book of 
philosophy is something to be overcome, Levinas explains, “the end of philosophy is not the return 
to the age in which it has not begun,” but rather “the beginning of an age in which everything is 
philosophy, because philosophy is not revealed through philosophers.”481 Rosenzweig’s step 
beyond the book brings philosophy to reality, exposing philosophy to the concrete reality of lived 
experience.482 Unlike Kojève’s sage who sacrifices himself for the absolute book, Rosenzweig’s 
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book is a passage from death to life. We may recall Kierkegaard’s words in the Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript, “to write a book and to revoke it is not the same as refraining from writing 
it.”483 Rosenzweig’s book plots a path beyond philosophy, by only by passing through it.  
 Levinas elaborates Rosenzweig’s critique of Allheit in his analysis of the philosophical will 
to subsume alterity within the bounds of totality. In “The Trace of the Other,” Levinas diagnoses 
philosophy’s “allergy” to what is foreign, and its need to domesticate the Other into something 
that is known. Like Odysseus who dreams of returning home, the philosophical tradition 
inaugurated by Plato responds to the challenge of otherness by returning it to known territory, by 
domesticating the Other as an expression of ipseity, or sameness: 
Western philosophy coincides with the disclosure of the other where the other, in 
manifesting itself as a being, loses its alterity. From its infancy philosophy has been struck 
with a horror of the other that remains other – with an insurmountable allergy. It is for this 
reason that it is essentially a philosophy of being, that the comprehension of being is its 
last word, and the fundamental structure of man. It is for this reason that it becomes 
philosophy of immanence and of autonomy, or atheism. The Gods of the philosophers, 
from Aristotle to Leibniz, by way of the God of the scholastics, is a god adequate to reason, 
a comprehended god who could not trouble the autonomy of consciousness, which finds 
itself again in all its adventures, returning home to itself like Ulysses, who through all his 
peregrinations is only on the way to his native island.484 
 
The quest for a unity that overcomes the alterity of the Other is in some sense woven in the genetics 
of Western philosophy, from Plontius’ principle of the One to Heidegger’s philosophy of Being. 
This “horror” and “insurmountable allergy” of alterity is for Levinas an essential feature of 
Western philosophical thought that transcends oppositions of theism and atheism, or idealism and 
empiricism. The otherness of the Other represents a challenge to the fundamental disposition of 
philosophical inquiry to seek unity, from the adequate idea to the rational God of the philosophers. 
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If this tendency is endemic to the philosophical tradition, it reaches its apex in Hegel’s systematic 
philosophy, where the dialectical movement of Spirit towards the integration of difference 
constitutes the ultimate expression of the philosophical impetus to conquer alterity. Levinas writes, 
“Hegel’s philosophy represents the logical outcome of this underlying allergy of philosophy.”485 
The absolute book is the ultimate objectification of this allergy: Hegel’s system would unify the 
totality of knowledge in one encyclopedic book, for which nothing could be external or other.  
 In his rather polemical 1971 text “Hegel and the Jews,” Levinas explicates the implications 
of Hegel’s concept of totality. He describes Hegel’s systematic philosophy as the culmination of 
reason, which must overcome all particulars—including the “separation” of the Jews: 
The Hegelian system represents the fulfilment of the West’s thought and history, 
understood as the turning back of a destiny into freedom, Reason penetrating all reality or 
appearing in it. An unforgettable enterprise! Universal thought must no longer be 
separated, in the heads of some intellectuals, from the individual whom it renders 
intelligible. A separate universal is no longer universal but has once again become 
something particular. It must be separated from its separation; the universal, identified from 
the different, must remain in the different from which it had been taken, whether it be, 
according to the famous formulae, identity of identity and of non-identity or concrete 
universal or Spirit.486  
 
The movement of the Hegelian system towards Absolute Spirit is all-encompassing, it does not 
tolerate holdouts: the absolute cannot accept the possibility of a “separate universal” that co-exists 
alongside it. The power of reason integrates all particulars into the systematic construction of the 
universal, steamrolling opposition and incorporating it into the whole: to raise objection to the 
logic of Hegel’s system is tantamount to contesting the universal movement of reason itself. The 
drive for unity and mistrust of the particular in Hegel’s systematic philosophy is also “the argument 
that, up to the present day, has nurtured anti-Semitism.”487 The Jewish people, as a “separate 
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universal” from Christian Europe, has been viewed with suspicion for its particularity, and Hegel’s 
philosophy elevates this perspective to a systematic philosophy. With more than a hint of sarcasm, 
Levinas comments, “Anti-Semitism is based within the System, which amounts to saying within 
the absolute. What a godsend!” Once Hegel’s argument is stripped of its rhetorical flourish, it 
discloses the basic structure of anti-Semitism: the Jewish people’s separation from the universal is 
an affront to reason itself. Levinas writes, “the separation of the universal and the particular in 
which Judaism would be maintained would signify domination.” If this is the logic organizing the 
anti-Semite’s hatred, it risks appearing self-evident in Hegel’s systematic thinking.488  
The solution is not as simple as calling Hegel’s thinking as fatally anti-Semitic. The 
brilliance of the Hegelian system is that it undercuts any straightforward criticisms through the 
logic of the dialectic. Levinas writes, “when faced with the Hegelian saying [le dire] one cannot 
easily raise one’s voice – not only because thought becomes timid, but because language seems 
lacking.”489 If we cannot find words adequate to call into question the workings of the Hegelian 
system, it is because our language is ill equipped to confront Hegel’s thinking without becoming 
entwined in its logic. “We speak a poor language! It has no beginning. No word is first,” Levinas 
writes, “we express ourselves in a language that has not established its grounding.” Just as Hegel’s 
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system can integrate any particular objection into its dialectical movement, our ordinary language 
lacks the grounding to mount a true objection to its logic. Hegel’s thinking is the culmination of 
the rationalist tradition which seeks to overcome alterity in unified totality: “A great philosophy is 
perhaps only a language that miraculously found in Greece – or somehow gave itself – a justified 
point of departure,” this logic of universality has been programmed into our thinking. The error is 
believing the Greek origin is the exclusive or privileged origin of philosophy. Levinas cautions, 
“this is the West’s miracle – or mirage.” If Hegel’s system is culmination of the rationalism 
inaugurated by the Greeks, and if the logic of anti-Semitism flows from this same thinking, Levinas 
seeks the Archimedean point from which to oppose the logic of the Hegelian universal. 
If there is an alternative destiny for the rationalist tradition, it has its provenance in a 
different book. Levinas suggests we exit Hegel’s system “through the very door by which Hegel 
thinks we enter it,” by turning towards self-alienation, by refusing to integrate the particular in the 
universal, and insisting on the separation of self and other. This reversal of Hegel’s dialectics, for 
Levinas, suggests a turn to the Biblical tradition, whose prophetic language permits another kind 
of thinking foreclosed by Greek rationalism: 
We ask ourselves whether language does not hold another secret to the one brought to it by 
the Greek tradition, and another source of meaning; whether the apparent and so-called 
‘non-thought’ ‘representations’ of the Bible do not hold more possibilities than the 
philosophy that ‘rationalizes’ them, but cannot let them go free; whether the meaning does 
not stem from the Scriptures that renew it; whether absolute thought is capable of 
encompassing Moses and the prophets – that is to say, whether we should not leave the 
System, even if we do so by moving backwards, through the very door by which Hegel 
thinks we enter it.  
 
Levinas proposes exiting the Hegelian system through alienation, by turning back the dialectical 
progress of Spirit, and instead embracing the separation of self and other – both in the otherness 
contained within the self, and the self’s encounter with the infinitely other. As he memorably 




– that man is not alienated.”490 Backing out of the privilege of the Greek logos which has yielded 
Hegel’s absolute book, and returning to the alienation of the self from itself, Levinas suggests that 
the Biblical tradition offers a different locus of meaning wherein the ethical is first philosophy. As 
Hammerschlag writes, “it is the call of the Other that initiates subjectivity in the accusative form, 
as an act of uprooting that would constitute the subject first and primarily as a stranger”491 Against 
Odysseus’ nostalgia for a return home which he equates with the philosophy of totality, Levinas 
highlights the possibility of another book and its ethical calling. 
 Levinas evokes a different relation to the book based on prophetic language. In a series of 
texts from 1982, he reflects more explicitly on the existential relationship between human beings 
and the book. In his dialogue with Philippe Nemo, Levinas calls the relation to the book as “a 
modality of our being.”492 Or, in a 1982 discourse entitled “Philosophy, Justice and Love,” he 
memorably describes the existential relation to the book as zum-Buch-Sein:  
The human being is not only in the world, not only an in-der-Welt-Sein, but also zum-Buch-
Sein [being-toward-the-book] in relationship to the inspired Word, an ambiance as 
important for our existence as streets, houses, and clothing. The book is wrongly 
interpreted as pure Zuhandenes, as what is at hand, a manual. My relation to the book is 
definitely not pure use; it doesn’t have the same meaning as the one I have with the hammer 
or the telephone.493  
 
This ontological relation to the book is present in all forms of literature: both the Bible and national 
literatures reveal the trace of the infinite. Bienenstock writes, “because and to the extent that an 
‘other’ voice is heard in the book, the book is ‘holy’; the Bible is a Book, Holy Writing par 
excellence, to the extent that it is, it is a radically other voice which makes itself heard.”494 The 
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alterity of the voice that speaks in the book, like the transcendence of the encounter with the Other, 
reveals a trace of the infinite in its inspired language, as an exemplar of human expression. The 
ethical calling is discovered through the book, connecting the ethical and textual. For Levinas, 
Bienenstock writes, “the response to moral interpellation is found in the Book – in Books.” 
In Beyond the Verse, Levinas describes the trace of the infinite in literature stems from its 
relation to the inspired language of the Bible, whose meaning exceeds the literal text. The book 
represents “a contraction of the Infinite in Scripture,” and its language contains the trace of “the 
prophetic dignity of language, capable of always signifying more than it says.” 495 This potential 
is found in literature, but for Levinas its inspired language derives from its biblical source: 
“Scripture would begin with the line which is outlined in some way, and thickens or emerges as a 
verse in the flowing of language – no doubt of every language – in order to become text, as proverb, 
or fable, or poem, or legend, before the stylet or quill imprints it as letters on tablets, parchment or 
paper. A literature before the letter!” Levinas argues that the “thickening” of the language in the 
Bible through interpretation and exegesis gives rise to literature, whose potential always-already 
exists in the reading of the biblical text. The prophetic language of the Bible, which always 
signifies more than it says, reveals “a religious essence of language, a place where prophecy will 
conjure up the Holy Scriptures, but which all literature awaits or commemorates, whether 
celebrating or profaning it.” Both biblical texts and national literatures disclose this trace of the 
infinite: “signifying beyond their plain meaning, they invite the exegesis – be it straightforward or 
tortuous, but by no means frivolous – that is spiritual life.” Literature reveal the trace of the inspired 
language from the Bible, and the privilege of the book as a site for the encounter with the infinitely 
other. “My condition – or my un-condition – is my relation to books,” Levinas declares, “it is the 
																																																						




very movement-towards-God [l’à-Dieu]. Is this an abstract expression? Language and the book 
that arises and is already read in language is phenomenology, the ‘staging’ in which the abstract is 
made concrete.”496 Jean Greisch explains the book is always connected to prophetic language: 
Two points are important here: the relation to the book has an ontological significance, and 
this relation is always more or less a religious relation. […] this hermeneutics refuses to 
trace a neat border between the “holy” text and “profane texts.” The religious relation to 
the book is found both in the relation to the Book of Books, in other words the Bible, as 
well as in certain privileged texts, for example, in national literatures.497 
 
This religious relation to the book, which Levinas discovers in biblical and literary texts, reveals 
the book’s transcendence as a modality of human existence. One discovers the ethical imperative 
in the book, whether it is Abraham’s ethical calling or the parable of the Grand Inquisitor. The 
“thickening” of language through the inexhaustibility of commentary and interpretation is the 
vitality of the book, both for the Bible and literary texts. Levinas explains in a 1984 dialogue: 
Commentary is the life of the text. If a text is alive today, it is because we comment on it. 
The meanings are not exhausted in interpretation. This is true of the Talmud, but also for 
Plato or Goethe. When we read Goethe, we also read the commentaries on Faust, wherein 
the innumerable lives of the text are found. Proust realizes this in regard to his past, and 
we ourselves realize this in regard to Proust. Further, think of Kafka. He describes 
culpability without crime, a world in which man never gets to know the accusations 
charged against him. We see there the genesis of the problem of meaning. Is it not only the 
question ‘is my life righteous?’ but rather, ‘is it righteous to be?’ this is very important for 
we always measure out the good on the basis of the being that is.498 
 
Questioning the meaning of the text through commentary is the vitality of the book, from the 
practices of interpretation in the Talmud to Kafka’s texts which problematize the meaning of being 
itself. Even the prophetic language of the Bible never accedes to a book whose unity or identity 
stands beyond interpretation. Relinquishing the quest for unity motivating the Hegelian absolute 
book, Levinas embraces the book as the site of the “à-Dieu,” an encounter with the transcendence 
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of the Other, where one’s very existence is put into question, accused, and threatened without 
cause—posing “not only the question ‘is my life righteous?’ but rather, ‘is it righteous to be?’” 
 
 
V. Derrida, Logocentrism, and the Autodidact  
 
The dissolution of the absolute book is a crucial focus of Derrida’s writing in the 1960s. While too 
young to count amongst the “generation of 1933,” he eagerly read Kojève’s published seminar on 
Hegel’s Phenomenology in the 1950s in Paris. Jean Hyppolite, Derrida’s teacher at the Ecole 
Normale Supérieure, had attended the seminar and published the first complete French translation 
of the Phenomenology of Spirit in 1939 and an extensive commentary in 1946.499 For Derrida, 
Hegel’s absolute book is the symbol for an entire metaphysics of language, the philosophical 
tradition he calls “logocentrism.” This question is a central concern in his 1965 text “Writing 
Before the Letter,” which focused on Saussure and Rousseau. After Michel Deguy praised the 
essay, and at the insistence of editor Jean Piel who hailed Derrida’s “extremely dense, rich, and 
novel study,”500 it was published in two parts in the December 1965 and January 1966 issues of 
Critique.501 This text formed the germ for his 1967 book Of Grammatology. 
Of Grammatology is a historical and systematic study of the science of writing, in which 
Derrida describes a “historico-metaphysical epoch” which has reached its “closure.”502 
Traditionally, writing has been considered “meaningful for us only in terms of an origin and within 
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a world to which a certain concept of the sign […] and a certain concept of the relationship between 
speech and writing, have already been assigned.” The “closure” of this historical epoch and even 
the “death” of the book implies a new conception of “arche-writing” based on the “text” and the 
“arche-trace.” Since Socrates privileged the spoken word over the written sign, philosophical 
logocentrism has demands a language grounded in metaphysical presence, with a discrete origin 
and fixed meaning. Writing is presented as a momentary development in history, “parousia 
misleading us […] in the course of an adventure” into thinking the priority of the spoken word 
over the written sign is natural or necessary.503 However, this adventure of logocentrism – “all in 
all a short enough adventure” – has reached its closure, its point of “essoufflement,” “exhaustion.” 
“Arche-writing” is without origin or living presence, but a “trace” marked by “différance.” 
Hegel’s “closure” of the book is apparent in his reflections on the question of the preface. 
The unity of Hegel’s system in the Phenomenology means no preface could meaningfully add to 
the conceptual elaboration in the body of the text. If the development of the book is a closed 
system, then a preface can only distract or dissimulate. Hyppolite explained at the 1966 
“Structuralist Controversy” event at Johns Hopkins University – with Derrida in attendance – that 
Hegel struggled to write the preface for the Phenomenology: 
When Hegel had finished the Phenomenology, therefore, he reflected retrospectively on 
his philosophic enterprise and wrote the “Preface,” different from the original introduction. 
It is here that he tells what he conceives a philosophic discourse to be. However, it is a 
strange demonstration, for he says above all, “Don’t take me seriously in a preface. The 
real philosophical work is what I have just written, the Phenomenology of Sprit. And if I 
speak to you outside of what I have written, these marginal comments cannot have the 
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If Hegel’s system sketches the self-moving activity of Spirit through the immanent logic of its 
conceptual determinations, then there is nothing that prefatory remarks can add to the book other 
than abstract generalities, which contribute nothing to the treatise. Hegel condemns the preface as 
at best an unnecessary supplement, and at worst a misleading abstraction of the systematic analysis 
in the Phenomenology of Spirit. The tone of his preface implies, as Hyppolite puts it, “Don’t take 
me seriously in a preface.” Where Hegel criticizes the preface as an excess or supplement to the 
systematic elaboration in the body of the text, by contrast, Levinas suggests the need for a preface 
reveals the insufficiency or incompletion of the book or system, and the impossibility of a self-
sufficient totality without remainder, without an Other: 
The word by way of preface which seeks to break through the screen stretched between the 
author and the reader by the book itself does not give itself out as a word of honor. But it 
belongs to the very essence of language, which consists in continually undoing its phrase 
by the foreword or the exegesis, in unsaying the said, in attempting to restate without 
ceremonies what has already been ill understood in the inevitable ceremonial in which the 
said delights.505  
 This disagreement concerning the preface illustrates the contrast between Hegel’s closed system 
and Levinas’ “exceedance” of totality. There can be no totality without alterity, and no book can 
sketch the closed unity of a philosophical system without exceeding its own limits. 
Hegel’s condemnation of the preface discloses the teleology of the philosophical book as 
a closed system. Gayatri Spivak explains in her translation of Grammatology that Hegel’s question 
of the preface reflects “humankind’s common desire is for a stable center, and for the assurance of 
mastery—through knowing or possessing. And a book, with its ponderable shape and its 
beginning, middle, and end, stands to satisfy that desire. But what sovereign subject is the origin 
of the book?”506 The book can be conceptualized in terms of a closed totality, which originates in 
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the mind of its author, and whose content is contained between its two covers – but what role does 
that leave for the preface? Despite his own condemnation, Hegel’s preface is significant. Written 
after the body of the Phenomenology and before drafting the Science of Logic, Hegel’s preface 
explores how these projects relate. Hyppolite observes, “what interests us more today is to know 
what Hegel considered the style and structure of a philosophic work to be.”507 In fact, Hegel’s 
exclusion of the preface from the systematic elaboration of the concepts in the body of the text 
reveals deeper commitments regarding the metaphysics of language and writing.  
This is the logic of “logocentrism,” which Derrida calls a kind of ethnocentrism that from 
Plato to Hegel has organized the place of writing and the book according to the demands of logos. 
Derrida argues in Of Grammatology that the self-same identity of the book is a kind of fiction or 
myth, based on a conception of language where the linguistic sign is absolutely linked to its 
signified meaning. From the “play” of the signifier to the work of interpretation, the book is an 
unstable determination that is always in flux. “What, then, is the book’s identity?” Spivak writes,  
Saussure had remarked that the “same” phoneme pronounced twice or by two different 
people is not identical with itself. Its only identity is in its difference from all other 
phonemes. So do the two readings of the ‘same’ book show an identity that can only be 
defined as a difference. The book is not repeatable in its “identity”: each reading of the 
book produces a simulacrum of an “original.”508 
 
The stable identity of the book – like the stable presence of the linguistic signs that fill its pages – 
is based on a fiction. Following Saussure’s observation that phonemes are defined not by their 
identity but through their difference from other signs, Derrida suggests the book is marked by the 
indelible difference between every reading and every reader: every iteration of the book is, in a 
sense, new. Spivak writes, “there is, in fact, no ‘book’ other than these ever-different repetitions: 
the ‘book’ in other words, is always already a ‘text,’ constituted by the play of identity and 
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difference.”509 By contrast to Hegel’s systematic enterprise, Derrida’ has no pretention of 
exhaustiveness or completeness in Of Grammatology. He privileges Saussure’s Course in General 
Linguistics and Rousseau’s Essay On the Origin of Languages as emblematic of a certain 
metaphysical tendency, but Derrida admits that the undertaking is “incomplete,” and has “no 
ambition to illustrate a new method.”510 For Derrida, Spivak writes, “the structure preface-text 
becomes open at both ends. The text has no stable identity, no stable origin, no stable end. Each 
act of reading the ‘text’ is a preface to the next.”511 Where Hegel sought to explicate the systematic 
workings of a closed totality in his book, Derrida’s notion of “arche-writing” cannot be contained 
to the space bounded by the covers of the book.  
In 1967, Derrida published three major books: Of Grammatology, Writing and Difference, 
and Voice and Phenomenon. Despite their simultaneity, he strenuously denied that the three books 
should be considered unified treatises in a traditional philosophical architectonic system. Derrida 
told Henri Ronse in a 1967 interview in Les Lettres françaises, “in what you call my books, what 
is first of all put in question is the unity of the book and the unity ‘book’ considered as a perfect 
totality, with all the implications of such a concept.”512 Describing the relation between these three 
texts, Derrida sketches a structure reminiscent of Escher’s stairs: “One can take Of Grammatology 
as a long essay articulated in two parts (whose juncture is not empirical, but theoretical, systematic) 
into the middle of which one could staple Writing and Difference,” or, “inversely, one could insert 
Of Grammatology into the middle of Writing and Difference.”513 The “juncture,” “soudure” that 
Derrida speak of at the center of Grammatology suggests, as Ian Machlachlan writes, “the 
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soldering (etymologically, a strengthening) of a joint, which we might read in relation to the 
‘hinge’ (brisure) that both separates and joins, given as the title of the third section of Chapter 3 
of Grammatology.”514 As for Speech and Phenomenon, Derrida tells Ronse it “could have bound 
it as a long note to one or the other of the other two works. [. . .] But in a classical philosophical 
architecture, Speech ... would come first.”515 The variability of the possible relations between these 
texts reflects the contingency of their philosophical questions, which always-already exceeds the 
limits of its enclosure as a system. The junctures form a network that cannot be organized 
according to the logic of the concept, but according to “metaphoricity itself.”516 Machlachlan 
describes this metapahoricity as “the possibility of carrying over – from article to book, within or 
across volumes, or more generally from one place to another, whether that place is literal or 
metaphorical, by means of joints, hinges or bindings that might be theoretical, empirical, or on the 
way from one to the other.517 These junctures reveal a system that is irreducible to a fixed identity. 
The first chapter of Grammatology, “The End of the Book and the Beginning of Writing,” 
begins with Nietzsche’s remark, “Socrates, he who does not write.”518 The peripatetic philosopher 
engaged his interlocutors in spoken dialogue, which he refrained from recording as written 
treatises. Socrates is not a thinker of the book: in the Phaedrus and the Republic, he describes 
writing as a nefarious practice that masquerades as an aid to reason, but which in fact ruins the 
faculty of memory. Of course, ironically, these arguments against writing have only been 
memorialized because his disciple Plato wrote the dialogues. Socrates’ privileging of the spoken 
word over the written sign is perhaps the clearest example of the “phonocentrism” of the 
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philosophical tradition. A subspecies of logocentrism, phonocentrism describes the hierarchizing 
the spoken word over the written word, which has been tacitly assumed if not explicitly endorsed 
through much of the Western philosophical tradition. Derrida writes, “within this logos, the 
original and essential link to the phone has never been broken.” 519 Following Aristotle, for whom 
“the voice, producer of the first symbols, has a relationship of essential and immediate proximity 
with the mind,” the spoken word is treated as the most immediate, original expression of logos; 
writing is thus its subordinate, as if the written gramme only exists to support the spoken phone:  
In every case, the voice is closest to the signified, whether it is determined strictly as sense 
(thought or lived) or more loosely as thing. All signifiers, and first and foremost the written 
signifier, are derivative with regard to what would wed the voice indissolubly to the mind 
or to the thought of the signified sense, indeed to the thing itself (whether it is done in the 
Aristotelian manner that we have just indicated or in the manner of medieval theology, 
determining the res as a thing created from its eidos, from its sense thought in the logos or 
in the infinite understanding of God). The written signifier is always technical and 
representative. It has no constitutive meaning. This derivation is the very origin of the 
notion of the “signifier.” 
 
The historical contingency of the written sign on the spoken word reveals the preference for the 
human voice, which is endowed with a vitality and presence that is lacking from the “dead letter” 
of the written sign. The derivative status of the written sign gives rise to the “signifier” as distinct 
from the “signified,” which for Saussure are like the two sides of a leaf composing the linguistic 
sign. Writing is “confined within secondariness,” it is considered a parousia to the spoken word, 
a surplus that is exterior, derivative, and ultimately subordinate to the faculty of voice.520 For 
Derrida, there is a second meaning of parousia as well: the parousia is also necessary to maintain 
the closure of the system against which it is contrasted. 
 Derrida describes a further distinction between two notions of writing. First, there is a 
notion of “universal” or “natural” writing, which is a broad notion of language that is expressed in 
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the signs and patterns in the organization of nature, and which is often expressed in metaphoric 
terms to describe God’s creation; second, there is “artificial” writing, produced by human beings 
using available technologies, that is, writing in its ordinary sense. In the Phaedrus, Socrates 
opposes the metaphorical writing of the truth of the soul with the ordinary sense of writing as the 
activity of externalizing logos as written signs. Similarly, in the Essay on the Origin of Languages, 
Rousseau contrasts the writing of the soul to the artifice of representational writing. Whereas the 
writing of the soul exhibits “self-presence in the senses, in the sensible cogito, which 
simultaneously carries in itself the inscription of divine law,” representative writing weakens the 
faculty of speech: “to ‘judge genius’ from books is like ‘painting a man’s portrait from his 
corpse.””521 For the philosophical tradition, the artifice of human writing is “the dead letter, it is 
the carrier of death,” because it reproduces the living voice in the dead letter of written language, 
which “exhausts [essouffle] life.” On the other hand, “writing in the metaphoric sense, natural, 
divine, and living writing, is venerated,” it is considered as “equal in dignity to the origin of value, 
to the voice of conscience as divine law, to the heart, to sentiment, and so forth.” Natural writing 
is “immediately united to the voice and to breath,” it is “not grammatological but 
pneumatological.” Natural writing is the presence of the living voice as an inner monologue for 
the soul, it is “hieratic,” akin to the “interior holy voice,” expressing the “full and truthful presence 
of the divine voice to our inner sense.” From Plato to Rousseau, the metaphor of natural writing 
has been privileged over the representational, artificial writing of the human hand.  
Despite the privilege it is accorded over representational writing by the philosophical 
tradition, natural writing can only be understood by recourse to metaphor. Yet paradoxically, the 
metaphor of natural writing relies on a literal understanding of writing as a referent—it is a circle 
																																																						




where the basis for the concept of writing is already a metaphor for writing. For Derrida, this 
bespeaks the intrinsic metaphoricity of writing, long repressed by the logocentric tradition: 
The paradox to which attention must be paid is this: natural and universal writing, 
intelligible and nontemporal writing, is thus named by metaphor. A writing that is sensible, 
finite, and so on, is designated as writing in the literal sense; it is thus thought on the side 
of culture, technique, and artifice; a human procedure, the ruse of a being accidentally 
incarnated or of a finite creature. Of course, this metaphor remains enigmatic and refers to 
a “literal” meaning of writing as the first metaphor. This “literal” meaning is yet unthought 
by the adherents of this discourse. It is not, therefore, a matter of inverting the literal 
meaning and the figurative meaning but of determining the “literal” meaning of writing as 
metaphoricity itself.522 
 
While the logocentric concept of writing originates in the divine scripting of the book of nature, 
writing can only be articulated by the marginalized category of artificial, human writing. What is 
at stake in Derrida’s critique of phonocentrism and logocentrism is not the eradication or reversal 
of the divisions of natural and human writing and their respective metaphors, but an understanding 
of metaphoricity itself. He insists on the need to retrace the history of the metaphors of writing, 
which have opposed natural or divine writing with the finitude and artificiality of human writing. 
In one of the most striking pages in Of Grammatology, Derrida quotes a series of passages that 
describe the world in terms of liber mundi, the book of the world: 
Rabbi Eliezer said: “If all the seas were of ink, and all ponds planted with reeds, if the sky 
and the earth were parchments and if all human beings practiced the art of writing—they 
would not exhaust the Torah I have learned, just as the Torah itself’ would not be 
diminished any more than is the sea by the water removed by a paint brush dipped in it.” 
 
Galileo: “It [the book of Nature] is written in a mathematical language.” 
 
Descartes: “ . . . to read in the great book of Nature . . . ”  
 
Demea, in the name of natural religion, in the Dialogues, . . .of Hume: “And this volume 








Bonnet: “It would seem more philosophical to me to presume that our earth is a book that 
God has given to intelligences far superior to ours to read, and where they study in depth 
the infinitely multiplied and varied characters of His adorable wisdom.” 
 
G. H. von Schubert: “This language made of images and hieroglyphs, which supreme 
Wisdom uses in all its revelations to humanity—which is found in the inferior [nieder] 
language of poetry—and which, in the most inferior and imperfect way [auf der 
allerniedrigsten und unvollkommensten], is more like the metaphorical expression of the 
dream than the prose of wakefulness, . . . we may wonder if this language is not the true 
and wakeful language of the superior regions. If, when we consider ourselves awakened, 
we are not plunged in a millennial slumber, or at least in the echo of its dreams, where we 
only perceive a few isolated and obscure words of God’s language, as a sleeper perceives 
the conversation of the people around him.” 
 
Jaspers: “The world is the manuscript of an other, inaccessible to a universal reading, which 
only existence deciphers.”523 
 
The preference of natural writing over artificial writing is structured into the very foundations of 
the modern world, from the Cartesian foundations of modern philosophy and the Galilean 
discovery of a natural world ascertained through observation and reason. The metaphor of the book 
retraces the line between natural and human writing by privileging the metaphors of liber mundi 
as the site of the philosopher’s quest for absolute knowledge. Derrida’s selection of quotations also 
offer insight into the far-ranging use of the metaphor of liber mundi in the structuring of the modern 
world. The first quotation from Rabbi Eliezer illustrates the inexhaustibility of the Torah’s 
knowledge through the analogy of the oceans to ink and the sky for parchment. This passage is 
found in the Talmud, but Derrida’s footnote indicates its proximal source is Levinas’ “The Pharisee 
is Absent,” included in Difficult Freedom.524 Vividly describing nature in terms of the articles of 
writing – pen, parchment, ink – Rabbi Eliezer suggests not just the inexhaustibility of the Torah’s 
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knowledge, but his own limitless knowledge of the Torah. Following this Talmudic passage, 
Derrida identifies the metaphor of Liber mundi in key passages from Descartes, Galileo, and 
Hume, G.H Schubert that orient the foundations of modern philosophy, mathematics, and the 
natural sciences. Finally, Karl Jaspers’ comparison of the unknowability of the Other to a book 
extends the metaphor of liber mundi to the phenomenological tradition. While we should not 
ignore the subtle differences marking these different invocations of liber mundi, they share “the 
most decisive separation [which] appears at the moment when, at the same time as the science of 
nature, the determination of absolute presence is constituted as self-presence, as subjectivity.”525 
These metaphors mark the very grounding of the modern philosophical-scientific worldview, 
delineating subjective experience from the working of the objective world, and illustrating the 
penetration of logocentrism in the arrangement of self and world. Derrida does take human beings 
out of the book, but rather liberates writing from the book. 
The predominance of liber mundi produces a distinction between what Derrida terms 
“good” and “bad” writing. “Good” writing is the divine inscription in nature and the human soul; 
“bad” writing is the technology of artificial, human writing, from cave paintings and the cuneiform 
to the modern technologies of writing from the pen to the keyboard. For Derrida, “good” writing 
finds refuge in the book, where it can be seized as a closed totality:  
The good writing has therefore always been comprehended. […] within a nature or a 
natural law, created or not, but first thought within an eternal presence. Comprehended, 
therefore, within a totality, and enveloped in a volume or a book. The idea of the book is 
the idea of a totality, finite or infinite, of the signifier; this totality of the signifier cannot 
be a totality, unless a totality constituted by the signified preexists it, supervises its 
inscriptions and its signs, and is independent of it in its ideality. The idea of the book, 
which always refers to a natural totality, is profoundly alien to the sense of writing. It is 
the encyclopedic protection of theology and of logocentrism against the disruption of 
writing, against its aphoristic energy, and, as I shall specify later, against difference in 
general. If I distinguish the text from the book, I shall say that the destruction of the book, 
																																																						




as it is now under way in all domains, denudes the surface of the text. That necessary 
violence responds to a violence that was no less necessary.526 
 
“Good” writing is amenable to the absolute book. It implies knowledge is a closed totality which 
culminates with the book of nature. We may recall Kojève sage, willing to sacrifice himself for 
the sake of the absolute book, who ultimately represents the paragon of “good” writing. Shattering 
the book and its “good” writing in favor of the expansive and open-ended notion of text, Derrida 
turns towards the metaphoricity that undergirds the logocentric metaphysics of the absolute book. 
 Against the metaphysics of presence that culminates in the absolute book, Derrida 
introduces the notion of “différance,” which is “an economic concept designating the production 
of differing/deferring.”527 Philosophers have long sought to understand the world on the basis of a 
kind of “Urwort,” which orients conceptual thinking: Plato’s thinking is bound to the ideal form, 
just as Hegel’s philosophy is inseparable from Spirit, and Heidegger’s investigation of Being. For 
Derrida, “différance by itself would be more ‘originary,’ but one would no longer be able to call 
it ‘origin’ or ‘ground,’ those notions belonging essentially to the history of onto-theology, to the 
system functioning as the effacing of difference.” Working through concepts while refusing 
assertions of origins or grounding, Derrida uproots the metaphysics of presence that yields the 
absolute book by inhabiting its concepts to reveal their own contradictions and inadequacies, and 
turning these limitations against concepts from within. “The movements of deconstruction do not 
destroy structures from the outside,” rather it involves working through concepts from within, 
“inhabiting them in a certain way,” articulating one’s own investment in the very concepts that 
one deconstructs, “because one always inhabits, and all the more when one does not suspect it.”528 
Derrida’s close reading always carries the risk of falling prey to the discourse he is criticizing: 
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“Operating necessarily from the inside, borrowing all the strategic and economic resources of 
subversion from the old structure, […] the enterprise of deconstruction always in a certain way 
falls prey to its own work.” Deconstruction inhabits the book as a means of dissembling it, 
parasitically turning the text against itself. “It is within structures that it shakes up and deconstructs 
from inside, a certain inside, which nevertheless opens to some outside,” Peggy Kamuf explains, 
“deconstruction is a way of inhabiting structures that turns them inside out or upside down, like an 
uncanny guest who displaces all the host’s property.”529 Derrida frames deconstruction in the 
domestic terms of habitation: by inhabiting the text and familiarizing oneself with its operating 
logic, the meaning of the text can be contested, rearranged, and displaced. 
 If deconstruction involves “inhabiting” the immanent logic of the text to displace or disrupt 
its dominant interpretation, “Hegel was already caught up in this game.”530 Derrida identifies in 
Hegel a two-sided relation to writing, as both the culmination of the “logocentrism” which 
subordinates writing to spoken language, but also as a thinker of writing, perhaps malgré soi. On 
the one hand, Hegel “summed up the entire philosophy of the logos. He determined ontology as 
absolute logic; he assembled all the delimitations of philosophy as presence; he assigned to 
presence the eschatology of parousia, of the self-proximity of infinite subjectivity. And for the 
same reason he had to debase or subordinate writing.” If the movement of Aufhebung is a conscious 
process of interiorizing knowledge, kenosis, then writing represents a countervailing movement as 
an externalized form of Spirit, a mere representation of thought. Derrida identifies the same gesture 
in Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind, the third part of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, 
where he criticizes writing by “denouncing the being-outside-of-itself of the logos in the sensible 
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or the intellectual abstraction. Writing is that forgetting of the self, that exteriorization, the contrary 
of the interiorizing memory, of the Erinnerung that opens the history of the spirit.” The kenotic 
movement of Spirit runs in the opposite direction of writing, which proceeds by externalization. 
Hegel’s subordination of writing is ultimately based on the same argument Socrates puts forth in 
the Phedrus: writing is an external appendage to the mind which enervates the power of memory.  
Despite outwardly relegating writing to a secondary position with regards to the spoken 
word, Derrida argues that the movement of Hegel’s thought can also be understood as a meditation 
on writing itself. Hegel’s criticism of writing ends at the level of the phonetic alphabet, where 
written signs are transparent with regards to the sounds they signify. Leibniz had sought to create 
a universal symbolic language that could employ symbols or even hieroglyphics to rationally 
describe concepts in science, mathematics, and philosophy. In §459 of his Philosophy of Mind, 
Hegel disputes Leibniz’s linguistic formalism and his praise of hieroglyphic writing: “hieroglyphic 
script designates representations with spatial figures, whereas alphabetic script designates sounds 
which are themselves already signs.”531 Unlike Leibniz’s symbolic hieroglyphics, which depend 
on the spatial representation of words and concepts, alphabetic signs are a direct representation of 
the sounds upon which they are contingent. Hegel writes, “Alphabetical writing thus consists of 
signs of signs, and in such a way that it analyses the concrete signs of spoken language, words, 
into their simple elements and designates these elements.” The signs composing the alphabet are 
the units of writing that come closest to transparently standing in for spoken words; alphabetic 
signs are “sounds which are themselves signs,” and therefore the “signs of signs.” As the written 
sign that most closely represents the spoken word, alphabetic writing is the purest possible second 
order sign for an object. Hegel writes, “alphabetic writing is in and for itself the more intelligent 
																																																						





form; in it is the word, the worthiest mode, peculiar to the intelligence, of expressing its 
representations, is brought to consciousness and made an object of reflexion.” If the phonetic 
alphabet serves as the basic unit for representing thought as written sign, it is indicative of both 
“good” and “bad” writing. “As phonetic writing, the alphabet is at the same time more servile, 
more contemptible, more secondary,” Derrida explains, “but it is also the best writing, the mind's 
writing.”532 Hegel’s ambivalence with regards to phonetic writing marks an inflection point. 
Alphabetic signs combine letters into the units of words and sentences through a process 
of Aufhebung. Hegel describes the underappreciated educational value of reading and writing the 
phonetic alphabet because “it diverts the mind's attention from the sensorily concrete to the more 
formal aspect, the spoken word and its abstract elements, and makes an essential contribution to 
laying and clearing the ground for the subject's inwardness.”533 As the individual phonemes are 
passed over in the immediate synthetic apprehension of complete words through the “signs of 
signs,” the subject initially connects the written sign to its spoken referent. Through habituation 
and repetition, the subject apprehends words synthetically rather than as a composition of 
individual phonetic units, as if the word were its own symbolic unity. In this case, written words 
are no longer mediated by their phonetic units, rather “habit makes it a hieroglyphic script for us.” 
Yet, this is precisely the synthesis of written signs as words and concepts which Hegel had 
criticized in Leibniz’s universal symbolic language. Derrida writes, “it is the Aufhebung of other 
writings, particularly of hieroglyphic script and of the Leibnizian characteristic that had been 
criticized previously through one and the same gesture.”534 If the phonetic language of alphabetic 
signs involve a process of synthetic combinations of phonetic units as complete words and phrases, 
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it resorts to the non-phonetic language in the immediate apprehension of abstract linguistic unities.  
 The capacity for abstraction in written language leads Hegel to offer guarded praise for 
Leibniz’s non-phonetic writing for, amongst others, deaf mutes. Nonetheless, the written sign 
remains relegated to the inferior category of the dead letter. Non-phonetic writing, Derrida 
explains, “betrays […] life. It menaces at once the breath, the spirit, and history as the spirit's 
relationship with itself. It is their end, their finitude, their paralysis.” The non-phonetic moment of 
language threatens to undermine the written sign as the mimetic representation of the human voice, 
it undercuts “substantiality, that other metaphysical name of presence and of ousia.”535 This 
momentary consideration of non-phonetic writing in Hegel’s account of writing reveals the other 
side of his argument. His relation to language is therefore double: while he is the thinker for whom 
“the horizon of absolute knowledge is the effacement of writing in the logos, the retrieval of the 
trace in parousia, the reappropriation of difference,” Hegel’s project can also be “reread as a 
meditation on writing.” Constructing the absolute book while simultaneously seeding its demise, 
Derrida concludes the first chapter of Grammatology by casting Hegel as “the last philosopher of 
the book and the first thinker of writing.”  
By deconstructing the philosophical privilege of the spoken word over the written sign, 
Derrida pushes philosophy into foreign territory. Gérard Granel frames Derrida’s question of 
writing as a kind of exile, a denial of origins, where language is without recourse to its source and 
must confront the alterity of writing. Derrida’s reflections on logocentrism and the repression of 
writing attempt to “circumscribe the fire that burns at the heart of the Occident,” which “has always 
encompassed and possessed in itself metaphysics.”536 The insistence on difference before identity 
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is always an act of estrangement, both in the confrontation with the Other and in the writing of the 
book. The question of writing displaces philosophy onto foreign territory. Granel writes: 
Another “space,” rather another geo-graphy, in the country of the non-origin [pays de l’In-
origine] in which we can see that Origin and Presence are only aspects (or versions) 
(presently on fire), and which for that matter is not the super-country of the origin, the 
nation of the origin of the origin, but wholly other and wholly otherwise: the country of 
Writing [le pays de l’Écriture]. 
 
In this “other geo-graphy” of the “country of writing,” Granel describes Derrida’s “arche-writing,” 
as the language the precedes the division of speech and writing, and which exists without origin 
or absolute presence. Arche-writing remains connected to the ordinary concept of writing, but this 
relation is placed under erasure, it is “that very thing which cannot let itself be reduced to the form 
of presence.”537 Granel describes arche-writing as the “movement of différance, irreducible arche-
synthesis, opening in one and the same possibility, temporalization as well as relationship with the 
other and language.”538 Arche-writing critically inhabits the words and concepts of the 
metaphysical tradition because “the transcendental arche must make its necessity felt before letting 
itself be erased.”539 The erasure of the transcendental meaning of language leaves what Derrida 
calls a “trace,” or the “arche-trace,” a written mark that is neither present nor absence, but the 
product of arche-writing, opposing the logic of identity by exposing difference: 
The concept of arche-trace must comply with both that necessity and that erasure. It is in 
fact contradictory and not acceptable within the logic of identity. The trace is not only the 
disappearance of origin-within the discourse that we sustain and according to the path that 
we follow it means that the origin did not even disappear, that it was never constituted 
except reciprocally by a non-origin, the trace, which thus becomes the origin of the origin. 
From then on, to wrench the concept of the trace from the classical scheme, which would 
derive it from a presence or from an originary nontrace and which would make of it an 
empirical mark, one must indeed speak of an originary trace or arche-trace. Yet we know 
that that concept destroys its name and that, if all begins with the trace, there is above all 
no originary trace.  
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Derrida’s disavowal of the absolute book and its understanding of the written sign as 
transcendental signifier leads him towards a notion of language as arche-trace, without an origin, 
and always-already different from itself. The double move in Derrida’s “arche-trace” consists of 
inhabiting the transcendental concepts inherited from the metaphysical tradition, but then placing 
these concepts under erasure, exposing them to the movement of différance. 
 Derrida further reflects on the “closure” of the book in “Culture and Writing: the 
Proliferation of Books and the End of the Book,” a little-known, untranslated text published in 
1968 in the journal Noroit.540 The essay extends Derrida’s critique of “logocentrism” introduced 
in Of Grammatology to the objects of the book, the library, and questions posed by advances in 
computing technology, which are “haunted by the project of a single universal science, of an 
encyclopedia.”541 The “closure” of the book does not suggest a book burning, or a regression to a 
world without books; on the contrary, it disseminates writing beyond the limits of any supposed 
absolute book, beyond the book as a closed unity, and indeed beyond the page itself. For Derrida, 
“la mort du livre” indicates the end of the Hegelian absolute book, and a new conception of writing 
that is “outre-livre,” [beyond-the-book] where the world itself becomes an experience of textuality.  
In “Culture and Writing” Derrida interprets the “Autodidact,” the memorable character 
from Sartre’s 1938 novel Nausea, as the exaggerated depiction of the encyclopedic spirit, whose 
quixotic drive for absolute knowledge can only lead to disappointment. Nausea presents the 
journalistic reflections of Antoine Roquentin, who has settled in the fictional town of Bouville to 
complete a history thesis about fictional 18th century adventurer M. de Rollebon. Roquentin 
frequents the public library, where he encounters an eccentric man known as the Autodidact, a 
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self-described humanist who has tasked himself with reading the library’s entire contents. 
Roquentin observes that the Autodidact follows a simple principle in his monumental task of 
reading all the volumes in the library: he proceeds in alphabetical order.542 For Derrida, this parodic 
character represents “the phantom that haunts every general library,” he is the caricature of the 
encyclopedic quest for absolute knowledge. His approach to reading the volumes in the library 
alphabetically reflects a neurotic obsession for completeness or exhaustiveness which is no short 
of ridiculous. What Derrida calls the “parable of the Autodidact” reveals the extent to which the 
content of the library had become the Autodidact’s world: 
He scanned the innumerable books which lined the walls and he must have said, something 
like Rastignac, “Science! It is up to us.” Then he went and took the first book from the first 
shelf on the far right; he opened to the first page, with a feeling of respect and fear mixed 
with an unshakable decision. Today he has reached “L”—“K” after “J,” “L” after “K.” He 
has passed brutally from the study of coleopterae to the quantum theory, from a work on 
Tamerlaine to a Catholic pamphlet against Darwinism, he has never been disconcerted for 
an instant. He has read everything; he has stored up in his head most of what anyone knows 
about parthenogenesis, and half the arguments against vivisection. There is a universe 
behind and before him. And the day is approaching when closing the last book on the last 
shelf on the far left: he will say to himself, “Now what?”543  
 
As the Autodidact carries on from volumes beginning with the letter L to K, as he nears the middle 
of the alphabet, accumulating a seemingly endless knowledge of the faits divers of the universe, 
Sartre notes, “There is a universe behind and before him.” The totality of his universe is contained 
in the library, Derrida comments “the library as the universe, the universal library is the 
microcosmic reflection of the universe itself, of the macro-cosmos, of the ordered universe. The 
universe is the absolute unity of all possible pluralities.” The Autodidact’s gesturing from left to 
right suggests “the representation of the path of Absolute Knowledge.”544 The mere thought of 
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reaching his goal - the apotheosis of knowledge - introduces a terrifying possibility for the 
Autodidact: “Now what?” With dread, the Autodidact considers the possibility of a world beyond 
the walls of the library, and confront the world he has so meticulously avoided. At the end of the 
novel, Roquentin imagines that the Autodidact lives on after completing his task, wandering the 
streets of Bouville, anonymous, unremarkable, and without purpose.  
The Autodidact’s self-assigned task represents the exhaustion of the encyclopedic zeal in 
philosophy that hastened “the closure of the book.” The Autodidact renders the quest for absolute 
knowledge a farce. For Derrida, he is a caricaturized image of a more general symptom of 
“logocentrism.” Two inverse dynamics that signal the end of the traditional concept of the book: 
first, the slow disappearance of the book in national, international, and popular cultures, and 
second, the acceleration of specialized books particularly in academic and scientific research. 
Highlighting the proliferation of cottage industries surrounding every well-known philosopher, 
“such as the Marx library, which collects all the marxistes, marxiennes or marxologiques studies.” 
Derrida notes that the multiplication of texts will soon require that libraries will need texts to be 
stored as microfilm and other technologies to reduce the massive accumulation of text into a 
manageable size. A tiny microfilm containing an entire library, Derrida writes, “classified in a 
niche like a small urn in a columbarium.” If technological innovations permit the storage of more 
and more text in less and less space – a trend that has obviously continued well past Derrida’s 
comments in 1968 – the publication of scientific research has accelerated as never before. The 
absolute book from Hegel’s Phenomenology must contain more and more information in a smaller 
and smaller object, ad infinitum, to the point of its explosion. For Derrida, the absolute book has 
always been foreign to the real activities of science. “There has never been a book of science,” he 




has always been in some way contested, more or less secretly and today in a new manner which is 
declared.” A direct affront to Hegel’s absolute book, Derrida diagnoses the “death of the book,” 
and sketches the possibilities for what follows it. 
What defines the ordinary concept of the book? Derrida sketches seven characteristics: a 
book is (1) “a kind of micro-cosm of a totality containing a beginning and end”; (2) it must have 
an author; (3) it must express a specific parole, a particular voice; (4) it must be linear; (5) in the 
book, we search for “the living presence of speech and the person who stands behind it”; (6) a 
book is a kind of expression or exteriorization of reality, it is “the image of a reality which is first 
perceived or projected: image, that is, imitation”; finally, (7) “the real and absolute Model of the 
book” is ultimately “God’s book is being as divine writing, as spelling that conforms to thought, 
to the understanding of divine logos.” The first six characteristics are formal aspects of the book, 
each of which is accompanied by a body of literary criticism; the seventh characteristic pertains to 
the ontology of the book. Books are “opuscules modelled off the great divine opus,” they are like 
“small mirrors,” “finite speculations,” in relation to the divine book: the trace of liber mundi, as 
an afterglow of the Book of Books, is ingrained in the ordinary concept of the book: 
This is why the ideal form of the human book which most closely resembles God’s book 
is the book of total science, a book covering the cycle of knowledge but also, since truth is 
already constituted as a relation of the absolute to the self, as a relation of God to the self, 
it will be a cyclical book which will only only teach the knowledge of truth. This cyclical 
book will be pedagogical. It will be a book of the encyclopedic sort. All other books must 
be summarized, collected, identified, and ordered by it. 
 
Derrida’s description of the ideal book recalls Kojève’s absolute book, which replicates “the 
‘circular’ existence of the Sage.”545 Hegel’s possibility of a circular knowledge, with no beginning 
or end, would constitute this long vaunted ideal object of knowledge to rival God’s Book of Books. 
If the philosopher’s book supplants, or at least supplements, the Bible as the beacon of absolute 
																																																						




knowledge in modernity, the theological structure of the book as the source of truth remains intact. 
Derrida describes Hegel’s Encyclopedia as the achievement of a certain philosophical totality, 
which marks the end of a certain kind of philosophy: 
That Hegel, whose philosophy is summarized and completed precisely by the concept of 
absolute knowledge, also wrote an Encyclopedia in which all the parts of knowledge, that 
is to say of philosophy (logic, physics, anthropology, phenomenology, psychology, etc.) 
are coordinated, this is quite symptomatic. The end of philosophy, its completion, is also 
that of the Encyclopedia.546 
 
Echoing his diagnosis in Grammatology of Hegel as the last thinker of the book and the first thinker 
of writing, in “Culture and Writing” Derrida describes Hegel’s Encyclopedia as the last 
philosophical project that sought to grasp the absolute book. Once the encyclopedic task of 
absolute knowledge is complete, we may pose the Autodidact’s question to Hegel: “Now what?” 
 The seven characteristics frame “the closure of the book,” in terms of a series of oppositions 
that “demarcate the book from the exterior.” These characteristics outline the common notion of 
the book, but they also leave in relief a negative image of what Derrida calls the “outre-livre,” 
what lies outside of the book. He asks, “how is our epoch marked by the opening of this outre-
livre?” The concept of the book, the “unity analogical for Man and God,” is threatened by the 
proliferation of non-phonetic writing. Derrida presciently foresees the non-phonetic language of 
mathematics and computing that has evidently played a decisive role in the organization of 
contemporary society. Referring to MacLuhan’s study of mass-media, he suggests our “civilization 
of the image” cannot be contained to the classic notion of the book and increasingly relates to the 
world in the non-phonetic language of images. Derrida writes, “non-phonetic writing is 
programming and computing in all its forms,” whether it is computer or genetic code. The 
predominance of phonetic language that accompanied Hegel’s quest for the absolute book has been 
																																																						




supplanted by a new order of language unbound by linearity or phonetic writing: it is outside of 
the book, disseminated into the world as a general practice of arche-writing.  
Derrida finds in Mallarmé’s poetry the germ for the “outre-livre.” The poet’s later life was 
consumed by the pyrrhic quest to write the absolute book of poetry. “Tout, au monde, existe pour 
aboutir à un livre,” he writes in the studies for the Book of poetry, “Un livre ne commence ni ne 
finit, tout au plus fait-il semblant.”547 Mallarmé dreamed of drafting a book of poetry to rival the 
Book of Books. In a letter to Verlaine, he expresed his desire to write a book worthy of its name: 
Quoi ? C’est difficile à dire : un livre tout bonnement, en maints tomes, un livre qui soit un 
livre, architectural et prémédité, et non un recueil des inspirations de hasard fussent-elles 
merveilleuses… j’irai plus loin, je dirai : le Livre, persuadé au fond qu’il n’y en a qu’un, 
tenté à son insu par quiconque a écrit, même les Génies. L’explication orphique de la Terre, 
qui est le seul devoir du poête et le jeu littéraire par excellence : car le rythme même du 
livre, alors impersonnel et vivant jusque dans sa pagination, se juxtapose aux équations de 
ce rêve, ou Ode.548 
 
Mallarmé’s dream to write “un livre qui soit un livre” sheds light on a future of writing after the 
book. For Derrida, while Mallarmé’s Book “seems to desperately summarize and bring together 
the metaphysics or theology of the Book,” it also opens to a horizon “towards the future of 
literature without the book.” Mallarmé’s physical poetry is irreducible to phonetic reading and 
insists above all on the visual engagement of the reader; the non-linear language in his physical 
poetry points towards the “outre-livre.” Derrida explains, “Mallarmé tried to restore in some sense 
the spatiality, the spacing, the theatricality of the letter in his ‘total expansion,’ that is, to break the 
linearity of writing.” Mallarmé’s writing not only breaks from poetry’s formal constraints, it 
disrupts the predominance of voice. Derrida writes, “as soon as there is non-phonetic writing, the 
entire system of values associated with the predominance of voice are displaced.”549 The written 
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gramme that is irreducible to the phonetic language of the voice challenges the preeminence of 
which Derrida calls “phonocentrism.” Mallarmé relates the book to an immersive theatrical 
representation, which in modernity has become the site of religious observance in the disenchanted 
modern world.550 In this theater of the book, Derrida relates the “outre-livre” to Artaud’s theater 
of cruelty, which is “a new writing, without the book, of a non-phonetic writing of gestures, of 
volumes of ‘sacred hieroglyphs,’ whose depth only accords words and phonetic writing a 
subordinate role.” The theater of cruelty refuses the representational limits imposed by the division 
of the stage and audience, it engages through shock and excess, refusing to abide by the separation 
of the theater as a representation of the world. Likewise, non-phonetic writing cannot be contained 
to the book, it spills onto the stage of a theater without limits. In contrast to the Autodidact, anxious 
about the day he completes his encyclopedic task, Derrida heralds the “outre-livre” as a liberation 
of writing confined to the long shadow of the absolute book. 
 “Culture and Writing” is the published version of a text which Derrida had presented on 
several other occasions, including lectures at Brown University in 1968 and at the Institut Français 
of Great Britain in 1970. However, Derrida’s notes disclose that at these events he presented the 
same text under the alternative title, “La Bibliothèque en jeu.”551 This alternative title, which is in 
a sense remains sous rature in Derrida’s text, strongly evokes René Char’s 1956 poem “La 
Bibliothèque est en feu,” “The Library is on Fire.” Char’s poem appears as the first of four poems 
in a collection by the same name published in 1956. He emphasizes the poet’s role as a guiding 
light for others, and the need – indeed, the moral obligation – for poetry to supplant philosophy. 
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Virginia A. de la Charité explains, “the poet's work, ‘la bibliothèque,’ is written for and accessible 
to the public. His work is ‘en feu’ because it is discovered in an intense moment of contact between 
disparate elements.”552 The book, the symbol of the poet’s creative production, is a beacon for 
humanity, holding the torch of poetic creation for all to see. Fire is the expression of passion and 
creativity, it is “an image for the terrestrial and celestial sources of energy,” bridging the physical 
world and the heavens; fire is also destructive, it consumes and destroys everything that it meets, 
giving way for something new to rise from its ashes. De la Charité remarks, “poetic combustion, 
not philosophy, enlightens man.” “La Bibliothèque est en feu” expresses the creative and 
destructive forces of poetic expression. Char writes, "Desire, desire which knows, we draw no 
advantage from our shadows except from some veritable sovereignties accompanied by invisible 
flames, invisible chains, which, coming to light, step after step, cause us to shine” [Désir, désir 
qui sait, nous ne tirons avantage de nos ténèbres qu’à partir de quelques souverainetés véritables 
assorties d’invisible flames, d’invisibles chaînes, qui, se révélant, pas après pas, nous font 
briller].”553 “La Bibliothèque est en feu” evokes the fires of passion and excitement, but also the 
creative potential of language. Char describes poetry in a symbolic register which connects the 
earthy with the celestial, it is the fiery moment of creation itself. “Why poème pulverisé?” Char 
asks, “Because at the end of its voyage towards the Country, after the pre-birth darkness and the 
earthly harshness, the finitude of the poem is light, a bringing of being to life [Parce qu’au terme 
de son voyage vers le Pays, après l’obscurité pré-natale et la dureté terrestre, la finitude du poème 
est lumière, apport de l’être à la vie].”554 Poetry illuminates what philosophy has relegated to the 
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shadows: the fiery, destructive, and indeed creative force of language. Char’s “poème pulverisé” 
suggests his predilection for physical descriptions of language, as if the words of a sentence were 
the bricks of a building. He pulverizes these bricks, leaving behind an archipelagic, fragmented 
physical language. Paulène Aspel writes, “the nature of Charian poems, which indeed bear traces 
of this pulverization, somehow become fragments scattered over the world, but paradoxically 
remain solid, resistant entities. These fragments are island-poems, made of small blocks, prose 
paragraphs, boldly emerging from silence.”555 Char’s pulverization of language shatters the book, 
and unleashes the creative fire of poetic language. The vestigial title of Derrida’s “Culture et 
écriture: la prolifération des livres et la fin du livre” carries the trace of Char’s library on fire, the 
image of language’s power of creation.  
 
 
VI. Conclusion: The Trace 
 
The philosopher’s quest for the absolute book is driven by the will to capture the totality of 
knowledge in one sublime object. The absolute book has the allure of a philosophical bible, a 
secular analogue to the Book of Books, and a rival to God’s liber mundi. Hegel’s systematic 
philosophy represents the culmination of this dream to capture the unity of knowledge in the pages 
of a book, crystalized in Kojève’s influential seminar which emphasized the sage’s sacrifice to 
realize the absolute book of knowledge at the end of history. As we have seen, if Hegel’s 
philosophy represents the ultimate attempt to realize the absolute book, it also sowed the seeds for 
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its demise. It is the pretension of closure, unity, and totality that sparks Levinas and Derrida’s 
criticisms of the Hegelian absolute book, leading them to reevaluate the relationship between the 
book, writing, and being, as well as the model of knowledge as a closed totality. Where Hegel’s 
Phenomenology charts the incorporation of alterity in the dialectical movement of Spirit, Levinas 
reverses this movement to reveal the notion of infinity in the encounter of the self with the alterity 
of the Other. Derrida diagnoses Hegel as the last thinker of the book and the first thinker of writing 
in his critique of non-phonetic language. For both, what remains after the destruction of Hegel’s 
absolute book is a certain kind of trace. What each means by this term, however, is something 
different, highlighting their respective turns away from the idealism of the absolute book. Whereas 
Levinas’ trace calls upon the transcendence of the encounter with the Other, Derrida’s trace 
highlights the interminable play of “différance” in writing. 
In “The Trace of the Other,” Levinas describes the trace as a mode of signifying meaning 
beyond being, which occurs in the encounter with the infinitely Other. The unity of the “I” is 
constituted by its ipseity, its inalienable ontological identification of itself as itself, which discloses 
its horizon of being, and concomitantly the limits of its knowledge and world. The encounter with 
the Other interrupts ipseity, it presents someone who is wholly other. Specifically, the face of the 
Other is a remarkable, even halting presence, which breaks the enclosure of the self in the horizon 
of being. Levinas writes, “the epiphany of the absolutely other is a face in which the other calls to 
me and signifies an order to me by its nudity, its denuding. Its presence is a summation to 
respond.”556 The face of the Other is not a mere object, it is an “epiphany” which demands a 
response. “A face is abstract,” Levinas writes, “it is an incision made in time that does not 
bleed.”557 The nudity of the face appears is a presence that rattles the order of being disclosed by 
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ipseity; the face “is not a form of concealing, but thereby indicating, a ground, a phenomenon that 
hides, but thereby betrays a thing itself.” The presence of the face may be obscured or shrouded 
by a mask of sorts, nonetheless, “a mask presupposes a face.”558 While the face is a presence, the 
otherness of the Other is an absence for the ontological horizon of the “I.” “The other proceeds 
from the absolutely absent,” Levinas writes “yet the absent has a meaning in a face.” The trace of 
the Other discloses a transcendence within the immanence of consciousness, which originates in 
an immemorial past, beyond the horizon of ipseity, and whose meaning signifies beyond the 
bounds of the totality of being: 
Within being, a transcendence revealed is inverted into immanence, the extra-ordinary is 
inserted into an order, the other is absorbed into the same. In the presence of the other do 
we not respond to an “order” in which signifyingness remains an irremissible disturbance, 
an utterly bygone past? Such is the signifyingness of a trace. The beyond from which a 
face comes signifies as a trace. A face is in the trace of the utterly bygone, utterly passed 
absent, withdrawn into what Paul Valéry calls “the deep yore, never long ago enough,” 
[“profond jadis, jadis jamais assez”] which cannot be discovered in the self by an 
introspection.  
 
The “epiphany” of the face introduces a kind of transcendence, which appears as a phenomenon 
within the domain of immanence. The trace of the Other extends beyond being, it points to the 
presence of alterity which predates any specific meeting with another person, and refers to an 
origin in an immemorial past, the “profond jadis.” This original trace of alterity discloses the 
infinite ethical obligation to the Other, which is actualized in the face.  
The meaning of the trace consequently exceeds the modes of signification available to the 
linguistic sign. Whereas the correlation between an ordinary sign and its signification is 
determined by the horizon of being which Levinas calls “rightness,” [rectitude] for the trace, the 
relationship of the sign and its signification is one of “unrightness [irrectitude],” which discloses 
a “lateral relationship, unconvertible into rightness (something inconceivable in the order of 
																																																						




disclosure and being), answering to an irreversible past.” The unrightness of the meaning of the 
trace “ signifies beyond being,”559 and it cannot be righted, so to speak, to fit the ontological 
horizon of meaning. “Beyond being is a third person,” irreducible to ipseity, who defies the 
“bipolar play of immanence and transcendence” at work in the signification of ordinary objects. 
The origin of the trace in an absolute past condenses into the form of the third person, a “he,” an 
il, from which Levinas derives his concept of “illéité”: 
Through a trace the irreversible past takes on the profile of a “He.” The beyond from which 
a face comes is in the third person. The pronoun He expresses exactly its inexpressible 
irreversibility, already escaping every relation as well as every dissimulation, and in this 
sense absolute unencompassable or absolute, a transcendence in an ab-solute past. The 
illeity of the third person is the condition for the irreversibility. 
 
The trace of the Other takes the embodied form of a “he,” an “il,” which beckons a response. The 
trace is “not a sign like any other.” ” The “unrightness” of the trace does not follow the correlation 
of sign and signification that is disclosed by being, it refuses categorization as a phenomenon that 
occurs within the world; the trace, rather, interrupts the world. The trace is not a representation or 
facsimile, it exceeds the register of correlation. “When in transactions one ‘pays by check’ so that 
there will be a trace of the payment, the trace is inscribed in the very order of the world,” Levinas 
elaborates, “but a trace in the strict sense disturbs the order of the world. It occurs by 
overprinting.”560 This surplus of meaning in the trace punctures the horizon of being with an 
alterity whose appearance cannot be understood in the register of signification.  
To the extent that the “unrightness” of Levinas’ trace overwhelms the limits of ontology 
by indicating a transcendence beyond the categories of presence and absence, it dovetails with 
Derrida’s critique of the logocentrism which has determined language as speech and relegated 
																																																						
559 Ibid, 356. 




writing to a secondary position. He explicitly credits the term “trace” to Levinas in Of 
Grammatology, while making crucial modifications in his use of the term: 
I relate this concept of trace to what is at the center of the latest work of Emmanuel Levinas 
and his critique of ontology: relationship to the illeity as to the alterity of a past that never 
was and can never be lived in the originary or modified' form of presence. Reconciled here 
to a Heideggerian intention,- as it is not in Levinas’s thought - this notion signifies, 
sometimes beyond Heideggerian discourse, the undermining of an ontology which, in its 
innermost course, has determined the meaning of being as presence and the meaning of 
language as the full continuity of speech.561  
 
For Derrida and Levinas, the trace troubles this view of knowledge as a closed totality, and 
suggests linguistic meaning is irreducible to absence or presence, but exceeds these categories. 
Levinas’ trace discloses the illéité that is never experienced as presence, which gestures towards 
the infinite Other; Derrida’s trace disturbs the presence of the sign in the play of différance.  
“Why traces?” Derrida asks in a 1968 interview with Julia Kristeva, “It is a question, rather, 
of producing a new concept of writing. This concept can be called gram or différance.”562 Against 
the logocentrism of the philosophical tradition, Derrida’s trace implies language is not “present,” 
either as the spoken word of a living voice, and the meaning of language is not “present,” but rather 
supposes “the play of differences” in the sign, whose “syntheses and referrals […] forbid at any 
moment, or in any sense, that a simple element be present.” Here, the trace begins from the 
contingency of the sign: the meaning of a linguistic sign does not stand autonomously from the 
system in which it operates, rather “no element can function as a sign without referring to another 
element which itself is not simply present.” The text is produced by the “interweaving” of 
differences, and the meaning of the linguistic sign is never defined by its absolute presence, rather 
its meaning derives from the web of signs produces the play of difference. “Nothing, neither among 
the elements nor within the system, is anywhere ever simply present or absent,” Derrida writes, 
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“there are only, everywhere, differences and traces of traces.” Writing as trace suggests language 
is never fully present, but always the result of the play of difference, and the sign is always-already 
a trace which is woven in a network of signs and texts: 
In the extent to which what is called "meaning" (to be "expressed") is already, and 
thoroughly, constituted by a tissue of differences, in the extent to which there is already a 
text, a network of textual referrals to other texts, a textual transformation in which each 
allegedly "simple term" is marked by the trace of another term, the presumed interiority of 
meaning is already worked upon by its own exteriority. It is always already carried outside 
itself. It already differs (from it-self) before any act of expression. And only on this 
condition can it constitute a syntagm or text. Only on this condition can it "signify."563  
 
Whereas the Hegelian book promises to bring together the totality of knowledge between its 
covers, Derrida rejects this closed unity and reveals the play of difference in the arche-trace. 
 The model of philosophy as a quest for knowledge of the world entails the book as the site 
of humanity’s triumph over nature. The absolute book would be a a secular alternative to the Book 
of Books. This dream, which Levinas and Derrida both retrace from its roots in the Greek 
rationalist tradition to its apex in Hegel’s system, crumbled in the 20th century. The death and 
destruction brought about by world wars, the brutal struggles against colonialism and imperialism, 
and the massive acceleration of technological innovation were only some of the developments that 
brought about the demise of the absolute book. But, as we have seen, the shattering of the Hegelian 
absolute book leads Derrida and Levinas in difference directions. Whereas Levinas’ trace points 
to the illéité of the ethical obligation to the Other, Derrida’s trace uncovers the endless play of 














If the dissolution of Hegel’s absolute book marks the demise of a certain philosophical idealism, 
the fragmented book has a memorable biblical antecedent: in the Book of Exodus, Moses shatters 
the Tablets of the Law at the foot of Mount Sinai when he discovers his people worshipping a 
golden calf. After punishing the idolaters, God asks Moses to carve a new set of tablets for the 
commandments, which are transcribed by the prophet and finally revealed to the Hebrew people. 
The dramatic episode highlights God’s retribution against those who break the covenant, but 
Moses’ audacity to shatter the tablets inscribed with God’s commandment is also remarkable. 
Talmudic and philosophical debates highlight the complexity of ascribing a motivation that 
justifies Moses’ act of destruction. The Tablets of the Law are a kind of Ur-book, the precursor to 
the Torah, and all the books that follow. Moses’ shattered tablets become a crucial symbol for the 
theological-political question of the book’s relation to God, and the writer’s freedom to follow or 
rebel against authority, law, and tradition. In the exchanges between Edmond Jabès and Jacques 
Derrida, the shattered tablets represent the ambivalence between the obedience to law and the 
freedom from law: the force of tradition binding them to Judaism, as well as the desire to rebel 
against law to seek out creative freedom. Moses’ gesture represents an act of creative destruction 
– he shatters God’s law and rewrites it with a human hand. In Jabès’ 1963 The Book of Questions 
and Derrida’s 1964 essay “Edmond Jabès and the Question of the Book,” the broken tablets emerge 




is akin to breaking the tablets, undermining the presumptive authority of the law. In other words, 
The Book of Questions is a challenge and a response to the Book of Books, it shatters the original 
biblical text and rewrites it in fiction with the human hand. 
In this chapter, I argue that Derrida and Jabès’ reflections on the shattered tablets illustrate 
what Walter Benjamin calls a “dialectical image” of the tension between the freedom and law of 
writing. Benjamin describes in the Arcades Project an image that exceeds its historical moment: 
“it’s not that what is past casts its light on what is present, or what is present its light on the past; 
rather, image is that wherein what has been comes together in a flash with the now to form a 
constellation. In other words, image is dialectics at a standstill.”564 The dialectical image captures 
historical dynamics in a single frame, it presents “the constellation of a single moment,” whose 
meaning stretches beyond a given historical moment, in which “the past becomes part of 
humanity's involuntary memory.”565 Highlighting the ambivalence of adherence to the law, the 
broken tablets present an image that extends beyond its specific historical moment and sinks its 
roots into the profound seedbed of humanity. “The dialectical image,” Benjamin continues, “can 
be defined as the involuntary memory of redeemed humanity.” The dialectical image of the 
shattered tablets of the law dramatizes the rupture from Judaism, history, and tradition, even as 
Moses’ gesture is ultimately folded into the biblical narrative of the revelation of the law with the 
replacement tablets. Jabès and Derrida express this tension between law and freedom in their 
reflections on the connection of the Jew and writing. Benjamin writes, "the dialectical image is an 
image that flashes up,” transcending its historical moment and imprinting itself in humanity’s 
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memory, it is “the image of what has been […] flashing up in the now of its recognizability.”566 
The broken tablets are a potent symbol for the writer’s freedom for creation against the force of 
tradition, and the ambivalence of the rupture with Jewish tradition, law, and homeland. 
 
 
II. Max Jacob and the Torn Manuscript 
 
It was an unforgettable encounter in 1935 with his mentor Max Jacob that left Edmond Jabès with 
an image for the dissolution of the book: challenging the young Egyptian to discover his own 
poetic voice against his literary influences, Jacob tore up Jabès’ manuscript before his eyes. This 
jarring experience was formative for Jabès. In The Book of Questions, the book becomes the site 
of the contestation between law and freedom: between the holy words of the Bible and the revolt 
against them, or equally between the writer’s literary influences and his or her unique poetic voice. 
The torn manuscript is the template for Jabès’ reflections on the freedom of literary expression. 
Max Jacob is a somewhat overshadowed figure of early 20th century French literature 
whose writing exhibits a unique and iconoclastic style of post-symbolist poetic expression.567 
Jacob was born in 1876 to a Jewish family in the city of Quimper in Brittany, but converted to 
Catholicism in 1915 after he claimed to receive a vision of Christ. He was homosexual, though he 
did not avow it outside the confessional booth. As a child, Jacob was also treated by Jean-Martin 
Charcot for his chronic migraines. His poetry bridged symbolism and surrealism in volumes such 
as his 1917 Le Cornet à dès and experimental novels including the 1922 Le Laboratoire central, 
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though he always maintained critical distance from any specific literary school or movement.568 
Jacob also played a particularly crucial role as a bridge in the network of artists and writers in Paris 
at the turn of the century. In 1901, he befriended Pablo Picasso, who he introduced to his friend, 
Guillaume Apollinaire, who in turn connected Picasso with his cubist collaborator, Georges 
Braque; Jacob was also friends with Jean Cocteau and Amadeo Modigliani, who painted his 
portrait in 1916. Jacob became friends with Jean Moulin when the latter was named sous-préfet in 
Jacob’s native Finistère region; Moulin went on to lead the French Resistance to the Nazi 
occupation, during which he used the nom de guerre “Max,” after his old friend. Despite his 
proximity to many of its major themes and figures, as Jabès notes, “the surrealists were repulsed 
by Jabès” due to his conversion to Catholicism, and his tepid embrace of iconic forerunners to 
surrealism, the poètes maudits Rimbaud and Lautréamont.569 Perhaps Jacob’ iconoclasm 
contributed to his occlusion from literary movements of the early 20th century. Jabès later reflected 
that many “were quite unjust with his work. They have gone as far as to deny his influence, which 
is nonetheless undeniable.”570 Jacob’s iconoclasm appealed to Jabès, and his mentorship was 
formative for the young Egyptian poet. Jabès reported, “he was an excellent advisor for all.” 
Jabès discovered Max Jacob’s poetry around 1930 when he eighteen years old in Cairo, by 
way of Jean Cocteau’s collection Le rappel à l’ordre. In 1933, Jabès gave a public lecture on 
Jacob’s poetry in Cairo, but he found that the audience was unreceptive to “the gravity and 
profundity” of Jacob’s writing, which “hides and reveals its anxiety in multiple forms of playing 
with words.”571 Jabès was captivated by the freedom of Jacob’s writing in texts such as Le Cornet 
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à dès, and the same year he began a correspondence with Jacob. “You have a lot of thoughts, of 
interior life,” Jacob wrote Jabès in December 1933, “I am fully persuaded that you will go a long 
way on the path of art.”572 Their correspondence continued for over a decade. Jacob offered crucial 
advice to his young Egyptian interlocutor, in whom he recognized “the promise of a great future 
production.”573 In his letters, Jacob urged Jabès to explore the medium of poetry, not to get caught 
up in questions of representation, but to instead seek out his poetic voice in the immediacy of 
language. They ultimately met in Paris in the summer of 1935, while Jabès was celebrating his 
honeymoon with Arlette. Jabès considered Jacob “his first guide, his spiritual father,”574 whom he 
credited for the discovery of his own literary voice, he recalled that it was Jacob who “taught me 
to be myself, that is, different,”575 echoing Rimbaud’s 1871 pronouncement to Paul Demeny, “Je 
est un Autre.” The uncanny co-occurrence of ipseity and alterity, the inmixing of a selfsame 
authorial voice with the polyphonous if not cacophonous voices of others, and the face of alterity 
encountered in the pages of the book are important themes in Jabès’ writing. Jabès praised Jacob 
for challenging him to identify his own literary sensibility, wrested from those inherited from his 
influences. He later reflected, “with his friend Guillaume Apollinaire who admired and loved his 
entire life, [Jacob] belongs amongst the first order in the golden book of modern poets.”576 
The extraordinary episode of the torn manuscript occurred during their 1935 meeting in 
Paris. When they first met in Jacob’s apartment on the rue Saint-Romain in the 6th 
Arrondissement, Jabès brought a manuscript of unpublished new material to solicit Jacob’s 
opinion. When they met again the following day, Jacob reported that he had indeed read the 
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manuscript, but he added, “and, if you’ll permit me, I am now going to tear it up so we can speak 
more freely.”577 At issue was not the quality of Jabès’ writing, but the autonomy of his poetic 
voice. “It is excellent,” Jacob told him, “but it isn’t you. You imitate me, but I’ve done my time.” 
To Jabès’ astonishment, Jacob tore up the manuscript and threw it in the trash. This shocking 
episode left an indelible mark on Jabès, who systematically retold this story to young writers who 
came to meet him. “For an hour and a half,” Jabès recounts, “he gave me the most extraordinary 
lesson in poetry.” Jacob gave Jabès “to courage to be myself,” and to “destroy the idols” of his 
literary imagination.578 This scene of destruction was also a scene of creation: Jacob tore Jabès’ 
manuscript as an all too literal expression of freeing his writing from the grip of tradition.  
In letters that perambulate between prose and verse, often with small drawings animating 
the margins, Jacob insisted that Jabès explore the creative limits of language in search of his unique 
poetic voice. He wrote to Jabès in September 1935, “a poem is an experience: passion is not the 
goal, it is the means! The more it is contained the more animate it is. A dog who scratches the 
doormat doesn’t make a painting from the dust he lifts! Disorder doesn’t mean to dissolve it.”579 
Jacob advised Jabès to look at Apollinaire and Éluard to see how they push the creative potential 
of language by exploiting the sonorous as well as semantic dimensions of poetry; at the same time, 
he guards against the parasitic urge to imitate or replicate these literary forbearers. “Look at 
Apollinaire, our only great poet, on the subject of vowels, consonances, diphthongs,” Jacob advises 
Jabès, “If you shoot at random and approach the target afterwards to see if you’ve hit it, you run 
the risk that you’ll never hit it.” Jacob called for Jabès to use his poetic voice to push the limits of 
representational language, but he insists that the poet sow disorder with acute intentionality: “be 
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profound, not strange. Look at Éluard.” Jacob urged Jabès not to get caught up in the anxiety of 
influence. Ultimately, Jacob wrote to Jabès in October 1935, it is a question of exploiting one’s 
singular voice and aesthetic: “Advice is useless. I have my aesthetic, you have yours. A question 
of one’s own skin. No one is wrong if he is profoundly himself, and if he is bold.”580 This journey 
lasted several decades, but Jabès’ mature work is undeniably his own voice. 
Max Jacob was arrested in Paris by the Gestapo in January of 1944 due to his Jewish roots, 
and he died of bronchial pneumonia at the Drancy camp in March before his deportation to 
Auschwitz. Jabès learned of Jacob’s death in heartbreaking fashion, when a message that he had 
sent Jacob in France was returned to him in Egypt, marked “Décédé.”581 In May 1945, Jabès 
presented his “Hommage à Max Jacob” at a meeting of the Groupement des Amitiés Françaises in 
Egypt. Jabès concludes his text in verse: “The heavens have taken back Max Jacob / The earth 
retains his work [Le ciel a repris Max Jacob. / La terre conserve son oeuvre].”582 The details of 
Jacob’s arrest and death at Drancy would only later become known to Jabès. The memory of Max 
Jacob would remain with Jabès throughout his life, weaving into his writing. Jabès’ dedicated his 
collection I Build My House to Jacob, and in The Book of Questions, a facsimile of Jacob appears 
as a character: “Reb Jacob, who was my first teacher, believed in the virtue of the lie because, so 
he said, there is no writing without lie. And writing is the way of God. [Reb Jacob, qui fut mon 
premier maître, croyait à la vertu du mensonge parce que – disait-il – il n’y a pas d’écriture sans 
mensonge et que l’écriture est le chemin de Dieu].”583 Transformed into one of the fictional rabbis 
populating the pages of the Book of Questions, “Reb Jacob” teaches Jabès “the virtue of the lie”: 
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that there is “no writing without lie,” even as “writing is the path of God.” Jabès transforms Jacob 
into a holy lie, as the fictional rabbi “Reb Jacob.” The contingency of reality and fiction, person 
and character, is the legacy of the virtuous lie in Jabès’ writing.  
The indelible memory of the 1935 episode of Max Jacob and the torn manuscript served as 
a kind of primal scene for Jabès. The episode inevitably hearkens the theatrical scene from the 
Book of Exodus in which Moses shatters the tablets on the ground. In The Book of Questions, 
writing takes place in the wake of the broken tablets. As Jabès writes in the final volume El ou le 
dernier livre, “by turning their backs to the Tables, the chosen people gave Moses a master-lesson 
in reading [Le peuple élu, en se détournant des Tables, donnait à Moïse une magistrale leçon de 
lecture].”584 Breaking the tablets was necessary so that the commandments could be rewritten by 
human hand, making possible the creative freedom of writing. Jabès writes in Le Livre des 
Ressemblances, the book “is always the breaking of the imitated, inimitable book [est toujours 
brisure du livre imité, inimitable].”585 The book always contains the trace of an inimitable original, 
in the interim between the shattered tablets and their replacements. 
 
 
III. The Biblical and Philosophical Legacy of the Broken Tablets  
 
For “the people of the book,” the relationship with God is mediated by a series of books. Indeed, 
the Jewish people’s bond with God through text is a central thematic in the Tanakh. Moshe 
Halbertal explains the broad meaning of “the book,” sefer, in the Hebrew Bible:  
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The plurality of the functions of texts is strikingly visible in the biblical use of the term 
"book" (sefer). In the Bible "book" covers a wide range of meanings-in fact, the range 
covered by our use of the broader term "text." A book in the Bible can be a document. In 
Deut. 24:1-3, a bill of divorce is called a book of divorce (sefer kritut). A book can be a 
contract; Jeremiah calls a contract of purchase "the book of purchase" (sefer ha-mikna, Jer. 
32:11-16). A letter is also called a book, such as the one David sent to Yoav-a letter with 
instructions (2 Sam. 11:14, 2 Kings 5:5, Esther 3:13).586 
 
The different books in the Bible illustrate the overarching importance of text in the Jewish 
tradition, serving a wide array of purposes. The book as a form of nourishment is particularly 
emphatic in the prophetic books. In the Book of Ezekiel, God calls upon Ezekiel to spread his 
prophesy of the imminent destruction of the temple to the people of Israel. God tells him, "Son of 
man, that which you find, eat; eat this scroll and go, speak to the house of Israel."587 Literally 
consuming the book, Ezekiel notes the scroll “was as sweet as honey.” By ingesting God’s words 
which are physically inscribed on the scroll, Ezekiel incorporates the divine word into his being, 
and he is literally able to “speak to them with My [God’s] words.” Ezekiel is not merely a 
messenger carrying God’s word, he is quite literally the embodiment or incarnation of the message 
itself, as God’s word incorporated into the body of the prophet. A prophetic analogy is perhaps 
found in the Book of Jeremiah, where God literally places his word in Jeremiah’s mouth.588 
Levinas further elaborates in Beyond the Verse on the connection of the Jewish people to the book: 
As the 'people of the Book' through its land which extends the volume of in-folios and 
scrolls, Israel is also the people of the Book in another sense: it has fed itself, almost in the 
physical sense of the term, on books, like the prophet who swallows a scroll in Ezekiel 
Chapter 3. The remarkable digestion of celestial food!589  
 
The book is the “celestial food” that nourishes the “people of the book,” it represents the bonds 
connecting Jews dispersed around the world, which articulates their history, laws, and precepts.  
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 Perhaps the most memorable book in the Jewish tradition is the “book of the covenant,” 
sefer ha-brit, in the Book of Exodus. After leading the Israelites out of Egypt, escaping the 
Pharaoh’s army by miraculously crossing the Red Sea, God first speaks his commandments to the 
Jewish people at the foot of Mount Sinai, which Moses subsequently records as a book. Following 
legal conventions, in chapters 20-24 of Exodus, the covenant is spoken aloud for all to hear, before 
it is inscribed as written text: “Moses wrote all the words of the Lord …And he took the book of 
the covenant, and read in the hearing of the people; and they said: 'All that the Lord hath spoken 
will we do, and obey.'590 Hearing and then writing God’s covenant as a text, the Jewish people 
bind themselves to the contract. Halbertal explains that sefer ha-brit is “a legal document, a 
contract, to remind a party of the obligation he has taken upon himself. Moses gives to the people 
the laws he heard from God, the people accept them, and he subsequently writes them in a book 
which is called ‘the book of the covenant.’"591 The reading, writing, and spilling of sacrificial 
blood on both parties seals the covenant. In this context, “writing is a sign of commitment; texts 
are a physical embodiment of will, objects of consent. They also serve to remind people of their 
promise.” God then commands Moses to ascend Mount Sinai, where he promises to give the 
prophet “the tablets of stone, with the law and the commandment, which I have written for their 
instruction.”592 Few biblical episodes match the drama and intensity of the ensuing series of events. 
As the people anxiously await his return, Moses finally descends the mountain carrying lukhot ha-
brit, the Tablets of the Law, but finds his people worshipping the idol of a golden calf. The 
revelation of the tablets to the people is preempted by the frenzied scene of idolatry, in violation 
of the newly sealed covenant. The Book of Exodus recounts that Moses’ “anger was kindled” by 
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his people’s transgression, and he “flung the tablets from his hands, shattering them at the foot of 
the mountain,” interrupting the revelation of the commandments.593 In the context of the book of 
the covenant, Halbertal explains, “writing is a sign of commitment; texts are a physical 
embodiment of will, objects of consent.”594 Moses’ shattered tablets are literally a broken contract. 
After the idolaters are punished, Moses returns to Mount Sinai for forty days and forty nights, 
where God commands him to carve a new set of replacement tablets, duplicating the words of the 
originals but written by human hand. When Moses descends with new tablets, “his face was 
radiant because he had spoken with the Lord,” and he reveals the commandments on new tablets.595 
The awesome revelation of the commandments, despite this hiatus, ultimately occurs in chapter 
35. Strikingly, the revelation of the law on the second set of tablets is unaffected by the previous 
incident, as if the shattered tablets were a forgotten interlude and the episode resumed as intended. 
The scene of Moses breaking the tablets is one of the most over-determined images in the 
Western cultural imagination, arousing endless reflection by artists and writers inspired by its 
intense psychological complexity and theological terror. Michelangelo’s 1515 statue of the horned 
Moses depicts the prophet sitting as he awkwardly holds the tablets under his arm, perhaps holding 
back his anger at his people’s idolatrous transgressions. The seriousness and tension contained in 
his face belies his awkward hold on the tablets, which look as if they might slip from his grasp. 
Rembrandt’s 1659 painting Moses illustrates the prophet holding the intact tablets above his head, 
but the image leaves ambiguous whether they are the original tablets or the replacements, turning 
the focus instead to Moses’ inscrutable expression. Chagall’s numerous depictions of the 
Revelation at Sinai insert the scene in the historical arc of the Jewish people in the millennia that 
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follow the Exodus through the catastrophes of the 20th century. These representations of Moses 
illustrate the unparalleled psychological drama of this episode, at the crucial moment of the 
revelation of God’s commandments to the Jewish people. The interval between the shattering of 
the original tablets and their replacements is a fascinating scene of anxiety and dread. That God 
would instruct Moses to carve new tablets is far from obvious; after the betrayal of the golden calf, 
God could have forsaken the chosen people for their idolatry. Moses’ anger bespeaks a human 
character flaw, but it also reveals his anguish that their treachery might provoke divine wrath. 
This iconic passage of the Book of Exodus is laced with textual ambiguities which enable 
an array of interpretative possibilities. Once the new tablets are carved, there is no further mention 
of the shattered originals, as if the broken tablets were a detour that no longer bore mentioning, 
and the new tablets were simply a repetition without a difference. The biblical text contradictory 
explanations for Moses’ shattering the tablets, the authorship of the second set of tablets, and the 
fate of the shattered originals. These questions have given rise to lively debates concerning Moses’ 
gesture and its consequences for the Jewish people. The broken tablets are a crucial image for the 
theological and philosophical stakes of commandment and human freedom at stake both in the 
Bible as well as the secular books that disseminate from it. 
While one of the most visually striking scenes in the Bible, a close reading of the episode 
of the broken tablets reveals important textual lacunae. Chapters 32-34 of Exodus depict the 
episode of the golden calf and the revelation of the commandments. Moses has climbed Mount 
Sinai to receive God’s commandments, but his people grow impatient as they await his return. 
They convince Moses’ brother Aaron to fashion an idol of a golden calf from their jewelry, and 
they declare, "These are your gods, O Israel, who have brought you up from the land of Egypt!"596 
																																																						




God is angered by their transgression, and sends Moses down the mountain with the tablets of the 
law. These tablets were “God's work,” and on them, “the inscription was God's inscription.”597 In 
one of the most dramatic scenes in the Torah, when Moses descends from the mountain to see the 
people of Israel worshipping the idol of a golden calf, his “anger was kindled,” and he “flung the 
tablets from his hands, shattering them at the foot of the mountain.”598 After Moses pleads with 
God to pardon the chosen people for their blasphemy, through the form of a pillar of clouds God 
tells Moses, "Hew for yourself two stone tablets like the first ones. And I will inscribe upon the 
tablets the words that were on the first tablets, which you broke.”599 God commands Moses to 
return to the mountaintop, where he stays for forty days and nights while he receives God’s 
commandment, and returns to the people of Israel bearing the tablets of the law. Moses’ actions 
are described as praiseworthy throughout the narrative in Exodus, even after he had shattered the 
original tablets out of anger. While the prophet demonstrates his short temper on several occasions 
in the Bible, it is surprising that he is not reprimanded for destroying God’s commandments, or 
that he is afforded a second set of tablets without complaint. These questions expose ambiguities 
related to Moses’ motivations when shattering the original tablets, which are further explored later 
in the Torah, and in subsequent Talmudic interpretations of the passage. 
The narrative of the broken tablets is retold in chapter 9 of the Book of Deuteronomy with 
several key differences. Whereas in Exodus, Moses shatters the tablets out of anger at the foot of 
the mountain, in Deuteronomy, Moses addresses his people directly, and he acts not out of angry, 
but deliberately: “I saw and behold you had sinned against your God,” and then “I grabbed hold 
of the two tablets and flung them from my two hands and shattered them before your eyes.”600 
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Rather than the impulsive gesture described in Exodus, the text of Deuteronomy shies away from 
Moses’ flawed emotional reaction and suggests he intentionally breaks the tablets as a message for 
all of Israel to see. Yet this re-articulation introduces new questions because it implies that Moses 
deliberately shatters tablets inscribed with God’s word. The biblical text leaves unresolved whether 
Moses acted out of anger or deliberately, and how his actions are justified, posing serious 
interpretive questions. What is the logic governing the change in Moses’ motivation for dropping 
the tablets from Exodus to Deuteronomy? How do we explain or resolve the apparent internal 
contradiction in the multiple biblical retellings of this episode? Further, we might interrogate 
God’s inaction in response to Moses’ gesture, an act of destruction which seemingly contravenes 
God’s wishes that Moses present the commandments to the people. Does Moses bear any 
consequences for breaking the tablets? Does God gratuitously offer the second set of tablets, as a 
repetition without difference, or do they come at some cost ? 
A variety of interpretative strategies have been used to explicate Moses’ decision to shatter 
the tablets. According to an interpretation found in the first century text of unknown authorship 
called Pseudo-Philo, when Moses descends from Sinai to discover the people worshiping the 
golden calf, the inscribed letters flew off the tablets, and in a moment of panic Moses drops them: 
“He looked at the tablets and saw that they were not written upon and, agitated, he smashed 
them.”601 This interpretation rationalizes both Moses’ emotional reaction and obviates his intention 
to destroy God’s word. A similar interpretation in Midrash Tanhuma suggests the tablets were only 
light enough to carry when inscribed with God’s commandments; once the text flies off the tablets, 
they became heavy, and Moses dropped them. According to this interpretation, Moses is not even 
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responsible for dropping the tablets, since it is ostensibly God’s decision to lift the words from the 
stones and making them heavy, though it does not account for Moses’ apparent anger.602 Other 
interpretations accept that Moses acted out of anger. A 9th century midrash in Deuteronomy 
Rabbah offers a sharp rebuke of Moses’ impetuous action.603 The midrash recalls Ecclesiastes 7:9, 
“Do not be fast to anger for anger resides in the bosom of fools,” to suggest that Moses should 
have reflected before breaking the tablets, since being fast to anger is foolish, and unbecoming of 
the prophet.604 According to the midrash, God questions Moses, “you are calming your anger by 
[destroying] the Tablets of the Covenant? Do you want me to calm my anger [by destroying 
things]? Do you not see that the world would not last even one hour [were I to do so]?” If God 
were as quick to anger as Moses, he would’ve destroyed the world many times over. When Moses 
asks how he might atone, returning to the text of Deuteronomy, God tells him to “sculpt two stone 
tablets.”605 Following this interpretation, Moses’ punishment for destroying the tablets is to fashion 
the second set–in which case, the replacement tablets inscribed with God’s commandments are, in 
fact, made by Moses’ hand. This midrash presents the prophet as acting hastily and without 
reflection – that is, he is an all too human prophet who acts imperfectly – and he must take 
responsibility and atone. Recasting God’s request that Moses to carve the new tablets as a 
punishment renders the symbolic origin of human writing both a donation and a burden. 
The debates in the Talmud offer different perspectives on Moses shattering the tablets. In 
a homily in Tractate Shabbat, it is argued that shattering the tablets is one of Moses’ three actions 
that God justifies ex post facto.606 The reasoning is that if God forbids “aliens” or “apostates” from 
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taking part in the pascal sacrifice, then this interdiction applies to their participation in the 
revelation of the Decalogue. According to this interpretation, when Moses sees the Israelites 
worshipping the golden calf, at that moment they became apostates who are no longer permitted 
to share in the revelation of God’s commandment, and therefore Moses is justified in destroying 
the tablets. Rashi endorses this reasoning, just as Resh Lakish writes of Moses, “More power to 
you that you shattered them.”607 But this reasoning by homology is criticized in the medieval 
Tractate Tosafot, which suggests that Moses should have taught the idolaters repentance, rather 
than simply depriving them of the original tablets.608 These opposing interpretations emphasize 
the worthiness of the people of Israel to receive the commandments, rather than focusing on 
Moses’ impetuous decision to break a sacred object. This suggests the stone tablets themselves are 
incidental, the question is whether the people deserve to receive their message. 
Before he descends Mount Sinai with the original tablets, God instructs Moses to place 
them in an ark built to precise specifications. While the second set of tablets are explicitly placed 
in the ark, the text does not elaborate on what becomes of the broken shards of the original tablets. 
After the original tablets are broken, they disappear from the text as if they no longer exist. By 
contrast, the narrative in Exodus is quite clear about what happened to the golden calf: it was 
ground into a powder and mixed with water, which the Israelites were forced to drink to atone.609 
Despite the text’s silence, its seem that the fate of the broken tablets would be of great significance, 
especially when compared to the handling of the golden calf. According to Jewish oral tradition, 
damaged sacred books are supposed to be buried in veneration, like dead bodies; if the broken 
tablets had been buried, it might explain why their fragments subsequently disappear from the 
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biblical narrative. However, the Talmud suggests a different interpretation.610 When God instructs 
Moses to carve a second set of tablets after he shatters the originals, in the Book of Deuteronomy 
he tells the prophet, “you will place them in the Ark,” which Rabbi Yosef interprets to mean that 
both the new tablets and the shattered original tablets are held in the arc of the covenant.611 The 
ambiguous pronoun “them” immediately follows the clause, “the first tablets that you broke,” 
which implies that when God asks Moses to place “them” in the ark, he is referring to both the old 
and the new tablets. This interpretation relies on an awkward grammatical claim, but it does resolve 
the fate of the broken tablets, and it is significant that the broken tablets would be preserved in the 
ark along with the replacements. Rabbi Yosef suggests the broken tablets are preserved with the 
new in the ark of the covenant because they are holy, which teaches that we should respect the old 
and sick who have forgotten their former learning, like the still holy shards of the tablets. This 
lesson implies deference before the broken tablets, as one should respect the elderly.  
In the Theological-Political Treatise, Spinoza takes note of a related textual lacuna in the 
Bible concerning the fate of the ark housing the tablets. “I find it strange that Scripture tells us 
nothing of what became of the Ark of the Covenant,” he writes in Chapter 18, “in spite of the fact 
that the Hebrews regarded nothing as more sacred or more worthy of reverence.”612 While he 
believes the ark was destroyed along with Solomon’s Temple, Spinoza considers this absence from 
the biblical text to be a noteworthy commentary on the sacredness of biblical scripture. He argues 
that scripture is sacred “as long as it moves men to devotion towards God”; if it ceases to inspire 
the love of God, “if it is utterly disregarded by them, as it was once by the Jews, it is nothing more 
than paper and ink, and their neglect renders it completely profane.” Words can be corrupted, 
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misinterpreted, and twisted to suit particular ends; once the words of scripture fall into disrepute, 
they are no longer sacred, and the words of sacred texts are reduced to ordinary inscriptions on 
mere material. Spinoza crucially draws an analogy between the absence of the destruction of the 
ark and Moses’ shattering the original tablets in Exodus. He writes, “when Moses broke the first 
tablets, he certainly did not in his anger cast from his hands and shatter the Word of God – this 
would be inconceivable of Moses and of the Word of God – but merely stones.” Spinoza argues 
the original tablets were profaned by the transgression of the golden calf, rendering them mere 
stones, echoing Rashi’s position in the Tractate Shabbat. Consequently, the tablets “were now 
without any sanctity whatever, the Jews having nullified that Covenant by worshipping the calf. 
And for the same reason the second tablets could not avoid destruction along with the Ark.” He 
suggests there is nothing inherently holy about the material on which scripture is written. 
Spinoza further questions whether there is anything particularly holy in the words of 
scripture. His deflationary account attempts to separate the narrative or storytelling function of 
scripture from any essentially rational argument underlying the biblical text. Spinoza insists on 
separating the letter from the spirit of God because nothing essential to God can be recovered from 
scriptures. “It is therefore not surprising that the original of Moses' writing, too, is no longer 
extant,” he explains, “even the true original of God's Covenant, the most sacred of all things, could 
have completely perished.”613 Spinoza notes that the logical extension of this separation between 
the letter and spirit of God emerges in the Pauline epistles, citing 2. Corinthians, where the apostle 
describes faith as “written not with ink but with the Spirit of God, not on tablets of stone but on 
the fleshly tablets of the heart.”614 The absence of the ark’s destruction, like the shattered tablets, 
reveal that the words of scripture are perfidious and inessential, subject to misinterpretation and 
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corruption. The essential belief, “love God above all, and one’s neighbor as oneself,” outlasts the 
written word, which is subject to profanation and bound to its eventual material destruction.615 By 
taking the narrative of the Bible as mere rhetorical flourish, Spinoza’s rationalist interpretation is 
an affront to the hermeneutic tradition that views the Bible as an insuperably meaningful text. In 
the Theological-Political Treatise, Spinoza describes the Bible as a mere medium – and a highly 
problematic one at that – for its essential message concerning the love of God. 
In the biblical commentary, whether Moses is justified in shattering the tablets depends if 
the holiness of the engraved commandments can be abrogated. However, to borrow Kafka’s 
formulation, “Ich könnte mir einen anderen Mose denken”: a wholly different Moses shatters the 
tablets as an intentional act of revolt against God’s law. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche 
emphasizes the rupture with the law, framing the broken tablets as a symbol for humanity’s 
overcoming of slave morality. As a foil to the traditional image of Moses the Legislator, 
Zarathustra casts aside the broken tablets of the old, slavish morality, and seeks to write a new set 
of laws based on higher values. In the third part of the book, Zarathustra returns to his cave upon 
the mountain after failing to impart to mankind his knowledge of the self-overcoming of man, 
determining that mankind is not yet ready for his message. The chapter “On Old and New Tablets” 
begins with Zarathustra’s lament for humanity’s lack of receptivity to his teachings: “Here I sit 
and wait, old broken tablets around me and also new tablets only partially written upon. When will 
my hour come? - the hour of my going down, going under [Die Stunde meines Niederganges, 
Unterganges]: for I want to return to mankind once more.”616 Between freedom and 
commandment, the broken tablets symbolize the rupture with tradition, law, and the attempt to 
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begin anew, but also the freedom inaugurated by the second set of tablets, written by human hands. 
While Zarathustra is frequently depicted as a foil for Jesus, in this case Nietzsche’s anti-hero 
invokes the symbolism of Moses the Legislator. Nietzsche’s character restages Moses’ descent 
from Sinai to deliver a message to the people, and like the biblical prophet, Zarathustra has broken 
the original tablets and returns to the mountain to hew a new set. In contrast to Moses’ transcription 
of the new tablets, Zarathustra invert the ethical message of the original tablets of the law: 
Look here, here is a new tablet, but where are my brothers to help me carry it to the valley 
and into hearts of flesh?  
This is what my great love of the farthest demands: do not spare your neighbor! Human 
being is something that must be overcome.  
There are manifold ways and means of overcoming: you see to it! But only a jester thinks: 
"human being can also be leaped over."  
Overcome yourself even in your neighbor; and you should not let anyone give you a right 
that you can rob for yourself! 617 
 
Nietzsche’s hero excoriates the old law of humanity as “an old delusion called good and evil,” 
which preached a “sermon of death that pronounced holy what contradicted and contravened all 
life.” In the most explicit sense, Zarathustra’s new tablets invert the moral laws of the Decalogue: 
“This new tablet, my brothers, I place above you: become hard!”618 “do not spare your 
neighbor,”619 “Break, break me the good and the just.”620 Nietzsche’s trans-valuation of values is 
perfectly expressed by Moses’ gesture of shattering the tablets. Even when new tablets are written, 
in another turn in the eternal recurrence, Zarathustra preaches, “Break, my brothers, break me this 
new tablet too!”621 The shattered Tablets of the Law illustrate the self-overcoming of man. 
Certainly, Nietzsche’s moral and hermeneutic register for Zarathustra’s broken tablets diverge 
greatly from the interpretive techniques in the Talmud, but he views the tablets’ destruction as 
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freeing humanity to write thee new laws of the Overman. While Nietzsche has no interest in 
conserving the divine authority of God’s commandments, Zarathustra’s destruction of the tablets 
liberates humanity from the old laws of divine authority, and enables their self-overcoming. 
 The shattered tablets first appear in Derrida’s work in reference to Zarathustra in the final 
passages of his 1963 essay “Force et Signification.” He interprets Zarathustra’s new tablets as 
fundamentally a question of alterity. Sitting alone in his cave on the mountain with partially written 
tablets, Zarathustra must go down, go under, and find companions with whom he can write new 
laws. Derrida explains in the closing pages of “Force and Signification”:  
It will be necessary to descend, to work, to bend in order to engrave and carry the new 
Tables to the valleys, in order to read them and have them read. Writing is the outlet as the 
descent of meaning outside itself within itself: metaphor- for-others-aimed-at-others-here-
and-now, metaphor as the possibility of others here-and-now, metaphor as metaphysics in 
which Being must hide itself if the other is to appear. Excavation within the other toward 
the other in which the same seeks its vein and the true gold of its phenomenon. Submission 
in which the same can always lose (itself). Niedergang, Untergang.622  
 
Derrida frames Zarathustra’s going down into the valley to find companions as the question of 
writing confronted by the crucible of alterity: “Writing is the moment of this original Valley of the 
other within Being. The moment of depth as decay. Incidence and insistence of inscription.” 
Writing is the descent from the mountain into the valley, where one steps beyond the self and 
encounters others. Zarathustra poses the crucial question of the new and broken tablets when he 
asks, “where are my brothers to help me carry it to the valley and into hearts of flesh?” Derrida 
cites these words to close his essay. Hammerschlag explains that in Derrida’s interpretation, “what 
is emphasized thus in Zarathustra’s legacy is not the overcoming of Christianity, the announcement 
of the overman, but rather Nietzsche’s use of equivocity, his emphasis on it as a means of pointing 
to the metaphoricity of the discourse.”623 Derrida notes the duplicity in the use of descent in 
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Zarathustra’s Niederganges, Unterganges as akin to the duplicity of reading and interpreting. 
Zarathustra’s iconoclasm in his cave is therefore belied by his need to “go down,” “go under,” and 
submit himself to “the work and the peril of inter-rogation.”624 In a strikingly similar formulation, 
Jabès writes in the second volume of Le Livre des Question, “My questions are the mountain tops 
of the book. At night, I must climb down to the valley [Mes interrogations sont les cimes du livre. 
Il me faut descender, le soir, dans la vallée].”625 The encounter with others is like the practices of 
reading and interpreting: it is not bound by the absolute rules inscribed on the tablets of the law, 
rather as Derrida explains it remains the moment of “depth as decay.” Writing occurs in the interim 
between the old and the new tablets, between the shattered originals and their re-inscription. 
Emmanuel Levinas’ Difficile Liberté opens with an epigraph from the Talmudic debates 
over the two sets of tablets. Levinas cites the Talmudic Tractate of Principles which proclaims, 
“Freedom on tablets of stone.”626 The citation refers to a Talmudic commentary on Exodus 32.16 
which describes the original tablets: “And the tables were the work of God, and the writing was 
the writing of God, graven upon the tables.” “Why does it say ‘engraved’?” Rabbi Eliezer explains, 
“had the first tablets, the subject of this verse, not been broken, the Torah would never have been 
forgotten from the Jewish people, as the Torah would have been engraved upon their hearts.” 
However, as Rav Aha bar Ya’akov argues, “Had the tablets not been broken, no nation or tongue 
would ever have ruled over them, as it is stated: ‘Engraved,’ do not read it engraved [harut] but 
rather freedom [heirut].”627 Playing off the proximity of harut and heirut, Levinas hearkens the 
rabbinic principle that there is freedom to be found in adherence to the law, just as for Levinas the 
responsibility for the other is binding, but it is also what give rise to my own freedom. The tablets 
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are a dialectical image of commandment and freedom, whether like Zarathustra we insist on the 
inherent contradiction between commandment and freedom, or like Rav Aha bar Ya’akov that 
there is a contingency of commandment and freedom which are mutually enabling. This is the 
essential question played out by Jabès and Derrida concerning the Jew’s relation to writing.  
 
 
IV. The Book of Questions and the Writing of Absence 
 
“You are the one who writes and the one who is written [Tu es celui qui écrit et qui est écrit],”628 
announces the opening page of The Book of Questions. For Jabès, the writer is the subject of the 
book, and reflexively the book is the subject of the writer, both creator and creation. “To be in the 
book [Être dans le livre]” is to declare “The book is my world, my country, my room, and my 
riddle. [Le livre est mon univers, mon pays, mon toit et mon énigme].” 629 For Jabès, literary 
creation does not stand apart from the world to offer a mere representation of lived experience, 
rather lived experience is itself part of a textual world: the book is of the world, and reciprocally 
the world is of the book. Inverting the “realist” book, in which the book offers a representation of 
the real world, Jabès begins from the premise that the very existence of the world and even God is 
contingent on the book: “If God is, it is because He is in the book [Si Dieu est, c’est parce qu’Il 
est dans le livre],” and further “the world exists because the book does [Le monde existe parce que 
le livre existe].” Jabès’ world is an endless unveiling of books, books inside of books, texts about 
texts, and the endless proliferation of writing. Jabès writes in the third volume Return to the Book, 
“the book is a labyrinth. You think you are leaving and only get in deeper. You have no chance of 
																																																						
628 Edmond Jabès, The Book of Questions, Tome 1, 11 [12]. 




running off [Le livre est le labyrinthe. Tu crois en sortir, tu t’y enfonces].”630 For Jabès there is no 
stepping out of the world of books, his literary universe is an infinite series of books within 
books—the inversion of the metaphor of liber mundi. For Jabès, the world exists because it is in a 
book: “A book without room for the world would be no book. It would lack the most beautiful 
pages, those on the left, in which even the smallest pebble is reflected [Un livre dans lequel 
l’univers n’aurait pas sa place n’en serait pas un; car il serait un livre auquel il manquerait les plus 
belles pages, celles de gauche dans lesquelles se mire jusqu’au plus obscure caillou].”631 Writing 
is the process by which the reflexive relationship between the poet and the book is articulated, and 
the book is the expression of the unfolding tussle between writer and book.  
In a rare moment of synopsis early in The Book of Questions, Jabès offers this explanation 
of his puzzling book: “the story of Sarah and Yukel is the account, through various dialogues and 
meditations attributed to imaginary rabbis, of a love destroyed by men and by words. It has the 
dimensions of the book and the bitter stubbornness of a wandering question [Le roman de Sarah 
et de Yukel, à travers divers dialogues et méditations attribués à des rabbins imaginaires, est le 
récit d’un amour détruit par les hommes et par les mots. Il a la dimension du livre et l’amère 
obstination d’une question errante].”632 This is perhaps the most cogent declaration of the plot of 
The Book of Questions, whose exposition is fragmented and sometimes indecipherable, and whose 
narrative often unfolds in the margins of expression, in the words that are left unsaid, in forays 
into the language of the unspeakable. Jabès recounts a story that cannot be contained to the 
confines of ordinary language or simple expository narrative. The Book of Questions is about its 
characters Yukel Serafi and Sarah Schwall as much as it is a book about books themselves, their 
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creation, their inspiration, and their destruction. These two dimensions course through Jabès’ text 
as its double metaphorical register. Dider Cahen writes, “with the book, with and against its 
tradition, with words, with and against the silences they contain, with our culture, with and against 
the use that we can make of it, Jabès intends to differentiate the reactive attitude which consists in 
bearing in mind, and the questioning, liberating, and mobilizing conduct which consists in 
memory.”633 Abandoning traditional narrative form, Jabès’ writing is a polyphonic assemblage of 
stories, written in a singular fragmented style that shift from dialogue between named or unnamed 
characters, to pages of invented rabbinic proverbs and midrash, as well as prose, letters, as well as 
free poetic verse. Paul Auster elaborates, “Neither novel nor poem, neither essay nor play, The 
Book of Questions is a combination of all these forms, a mosaic of fragments, aphorisms, 
dialogues, songs, and commentaries that endlessly move around the central question of the book: 
how to speak what cannot be spoken.”634 The long arc of the seven volumes of Jabès’ cycle passes 
from the tragic love story of Sarah and Yukel amidst the catastrophe of the Shoah, to Yukel’s 
suicide and Sarah’s madness, to the eponymous Yaël who is possibly murdered by her husband, 
to her stillborn child Elya, to Aely, all of whom are different tessellations of God, El in Hebrew, 
who meets a cataclysmic end in the final volume El, or the Last Book. But, in a sense, a plot 
synopsis of The Book of Questions is beside the point: the dizzying style of Jabès’ writing is itself 
implicated in the story. “Fragments from Yukel and Sarah’s journals, parts of dialogues, snippets 
of dreams and tales, songs, poems, etc,” Cahen writes, “just as words are meaningful through the 
silences they uncover, it is trained silences that allow the reader to compose the story!”635 The 
force of Jabès’ writing lies both with the words on the page and those left absent, and its plot is 
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constructed not merely from the divagations of its characters, but through the expression of its 
fractured language itself. The Book of Questions is sustained by the negativity of what it does not 
– or cannot – say. Auster continues, “Because the story of Sarah and Yukel is not fully told, 
because, as Jabès implies, it cannot be told, the commentaries are in some sense an investigation 
of a text that has not been written. Like the hidden God of classic Jewish theology, the text exists 
only by virtue of its absence.”636 In Jabès’ writing, the play of absence and presence in the language 
of the book intersects with the presence and absence of God. 
The seven volumes of the cycle of The Book of Questions symbolically correspond to the 
seven days of God’s creation, but Jabès’ books are also a tale of destruction and death. As Jabès 
writes in the sixth volume entitled Aely, “Death is an accomplice of creation. Death is the absent 
place where the book waits for its fulfillment [La mort est complice de la création. La mort est le 
lieu absent où se tient, pour son accomplissement, le livre].”637 The dual aspects of creation and 
destruction, life and death, are simultaneously present in Jabès’ tragic characters. “I have erased, 
in my books, the borderline of life and death [J’ai aboli, dans mes livres, les frontiers de la vie et 
de la mort],”638 he writes in the first volume. In a broken dialectic of creation and destruction, 
Jabès’ characters exist in the indeterminate space between reality and fiction, life and death. Jabès 
writes in the seventh volume, El, or the Last Book on the relation of death and the word, “Deprived 
of the air of its r, la mort death, dies asphyxiation in the word, le mot [privé d’R, la mort meurt 
d’asphyxie dans le mot].”639 Jabès connects the order of words to that of life—almost like the 
golem of Ashkenazic folklore, a figure of inert matter which is brought to life with the inscription 
on its forehead of the Hebrew word emet, truth, and which is returned to clay by effacing its first 
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letter to reveal met, death. Further, when God creates the first human being in the Book of Genesis, 
he brings Adam to life from the earth, adama. In the Talmud, the first hour of Adam’s existence is 
his shaping out of inert matter, but “in the second [hour], he became a Golem,” before he is given 
a soul, nefesh.640 Jabès’ writing explores this same imbrication of embodiment, life, and text. 
Jabès’ characters are connected by name, but also in language; they all exist in the 
indeterminacy between life and death, as much as reality and fiction. His fiction weaves between 
the fictional characters of The Book of Questions and the reflections of his memory and experience. 
Jabès told Marcel Cohen, perhaps to the surprise of new readers of his vertiginous writing, “there 
is always a direct relationship between my life and my writing. I can say, today, that all my books 
are autobiographical.”641 But Jabès’ characters are not mere representations or facsimiles of 
himself and Arlette, they are no more real than the imaginary rabbis whose sage words he “quotes.” 
Didier Cahen recalls that Jabès loved to repeat the slogan, “only the reader is real.”642 Personal, 
historical, and biblical narratives are woven together in Jabès’ captivating and singular style, and 
shattered in the fragmented narrative that grasps at the fleeting memory of love and loss in a time 
of catastrophe. The Book of Questions abolishes the line between the presumed reality of the world 
and the fiction of the book, and its characters are neither real nor fictional. Jabès writes in the 
fourth volume Yaël, “Thus the book is first read outside its limits [Ainsi le livre se lit d’abord hors 
de ses limites].”643 His book “infinitely reflects itself,” articulating the limits of the creative 
possibility of writing, it is “a painful questioning of its own possibility” as a book, but Jabès’ book 
is also a cipher for another question: “the generation of God himself.”644 The Book of Questions is 
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the negative image of the Book of Books, it is the fracturing of the Book of Books as broken 
tablets, as the torn manuscript, or as the shattered trace of the Hegelian absolute book.  
The first volume of The Book of Questions was published by Gallimard in February 1963. 
It first received media attention in April when Jabès was featured in an interview in L’Express 
with Madeleine Chapsal.645 Derrida recalled first encountering Jabès’ book in a suburban 
newsstand in the spring of 1963; drawn to the book, he purchased it with no knowledge of its 
author or content. He was immediately enraptured by its scintillating prose, and by the fall he was 
submitting his essay on The Book of Questions for publication. “Edmond Jabès and the Question 
of the Book,” was ultimately published in January 1964 by the journal Critique, one of the first 
contributions to the critical and philosophical reception of Jabès’ work. Derrida’s article on The 
Book of Questions was followed by Maurice Blanchot’s “Interruption,” published in the Nouvelle 
Revue Française in May 1964, and Gabriel Bounoure’s essays “Edmond Jabès, the Home and the 
Book” in the Mercure de France in January 1965 and “Edmond Jabès or Healing by the Book” in 
Les Lettres nouvelles in July 1966.646 The second and third volumes of Jabès’ Book of Questions, 
The Book of Yukel and The Return to the Book, followed in 1964 and 1965. While Jabès’ writing 
remained firmly ensconced in the avant-garde intelligentsia of the Parisian Left Bank, his work 
also drew the interest of some popular outlets. In features on Jabès in Le Figaro in November 1965 
and January 1966 following publication of the first three volumes of The Book of Questions, 
Claude Mauriac hailed the “discovery of an œuvre.”647  
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Jabès wrote to Derrida on October 4, 1963, after hearing of the young philosopher’s 
impending essay. His letter mentions that he enjoyed Derrida’s essay “Force and Signification,” 
and requests to read what he had written on The Book of Questions. In response, Derrida expresses 
the difficulty of writing a commentary he deemed worthy of Jabès’ book: 
Any critical commentary can, already, only show itself infinitely unequal to your book. 
What to say about the ten or so pages in which I had to reintroduce this essay, and where 
all its limits, which aren’t only material, attest even more to this necessary inequality? To 
seek forgiveness, I can only invoke my admiration, my immense admiration for The Book 
of Questions, and a certain duty I feel to say it. Even poorly and briefly.648 
 
Despite his humility, his essay demonstrates tremendous insight into Jabès’ writing. “C’est de 
l’excellent,” Jabès wrote Derrida after reading the essay. Lauding his almost premonitory 
understanding of The Book of Questions, Jabès reported, “you open paths which I have not visited, 
where I do not know in advance where they might lead me. In reading you, I find these paths traced 
so well that it is as though I have always known your book.”649 They met in person several times 
during the fall of 1963, immediately sparking a dialogue that would continue in friendship for three 
decades. On only their second meeting, Jabès showed Derrida his letters from Max Jacob. In a 
December 1963 letter, Derrida wrote he was “touched by what you allowed me to see from your 
past, with the ‘traces of ink’ that you showed me.”650 He describes Jacob’s letters as “beautiful and 
strange,” “profound, worrying,” while he also reflects on “his itinerary at once cowardly, 
disordered, undone, and courageous, determined, heroic everywhere.” Derrida’s appreciation for 
these “traces of ink” echoes Jabès’ own formative encounters with Max Jacob.  
 “Edmond Jabès and the Question of the Book” is unlike any other text by Derrida. Rather 
than reading the central problematic of the text against the grain to displace its presumed meaning, 
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as he had done in his early texts on Rousset, Husserl, and Levi-Strauss, Derrida’s essay on Le Livre 
des Questions wrestles with Jabès’ words as if they in dialogue. He generously quotes Jabès text 
as he teases out an interpretation of its imaginary rabbis and fictional authors. Just as the title of 
Derrida’s essay, “Edmond Jabès and the Question of the Book,” is in a sense the mirror image of 
The Book of Questions by Edmond Jabès, it is often difficult to distinguish the line between Jabès’ 
original words and Derrida’s interpretation—an ambiguity that Derrida exaggerated by leaving out 
citations for the many quotes from Jabès’ text. Benoit Peeters describes, “quoting Jabès at length, 
slipping in between his sentences so as to draw them out, the text rests on a form of empathy.”651 
Derrida’s commentary draws from the book’s narrative development, working through its crucial 
metaphors, but he never strays from the vertiginous logic of Jabès’ text. Derrida offers a reading 
of Jabès’ book that resembles a melitzah, a medieval form of Jewish poetry in which fragments of 
biblical and Talmudic quotations are reassembled in a new context as in collage or mosaic to create 
a new meaning. Of course, he is not citing actual verse nor real rabbinic interpretation, but Jabès’ 
text and his universe of imaginary rabbis. Derrida’s text resembles a Talmudic commentary, 
including dissonant voices and unresolved questions in its construction. He wrestles with Jabès’ 
book, challenging and questioning its logic; at times, his efforts to manipulate the text are rebuffed, 
overtaken by Jabès’ writing. After reading his article in Critique, Jabès wrote Derrida to laud his 
empathetic reading of The Book of Questions. “You are constantly at the sources of this book and 
its interrogations,” Jabès wrote Derrida in February 1964, “What lucidity throughout. A great joy 
for me which I owe to you. From now on, those who have read you will know how to read me in 
depth.”652 Derrida’s essay demonstrated almost uncanny insight into Jabès’ labyrinthine text.  
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V. Writing and the Broken Tablets 
 
 “Edmond Jabès and the Question of the Book” identifies the crucial connection in The Book of 
Questions between writing and the Jewish people, which Jabès calls the “race born of the book 
[race issue du livre].”653 For Derrida, Jabès’ book pertains to “a certain Judaism as the birth and 
passion of writing.”654 The metaphors of writing and the figure of the Jew are so thoroughly 
enmeshed in Le Livre des Questions that one cannot discern whether its subject is “the Jew or the 
Letter itself.” These metaphors take on an outsized role in Jabès’ text, where writing and the Jew 
are intimately related. Jabès describes the “difficulty of of being Jewish, which is the same as the 
difficulty of writing. For Judaism and writing are but the same waiting, the same hope, the same 
wearing out [difficulté d’être Juif, qui se confound avec la difficulté d’écrire; car le judaïsme et 
l’écriture ne sont qu’une même attente, un même espoir, une même usure].”655 The parallel 
between the Jew and the poet becomes the central question in the essay. Born of the book, the 
Jewish people stands in a peculiar relation to history. The people of the book are attached not only 
to history, but also to its inscription and memorialization in the book. “The only thing that begins 
by reflecting itself is history,” Derrida writes, “And this fold, this furrow, is the Jew.” 656 The Jew 
is grafted onto history itself according to the logic of supplementarity. The book is external to the 
movement of history, but the memorialization of history is contingent to the book; born of the 
book, the Jew is the “fold” of history which is bound to the letter. 
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Blanchot emphasizes the rupture between the Jew and history in his essay on The Book of 
Questions. The book’s “very title speaks of its insecurity, its painful force,” both in its poetic 
fragmentation, but also in the rupture of history embodied by the Jew: 
A rupture suffered in history, where catastrophe still speaks, and where the infinite violence 
of pain is always near : the rupture of the violent power that has tried to make and mark an 
entire era. Then, the other, the original rupture, which is anterior to history, and which is 
not suffered but required, and which, expressing distance in regard to every power, delimits 
the interval where Judaism introduces its own affirmation.657 
 
The Jew is born from the rupture of history, and The Book of Questions is therefore always written 
twice: both as history and as the writing of history. Blanchot describes, “the book that interrogates 
the movement of the rupture,” as well as “the book in which ‘the virile word of the renewed history 
of a people folded on itself’ is designated.” In his writing, Jabès sustains this double movement, 
“supports without unifying it, or even being able to reconcile it.”658 The rupture at the heart of The 
Book of Questions is embodied by the Jew.  
The rupture in Jabès’ text poses the question of the relation between the poet and the Jew. 
The Book of Questions advances by means of its endless folds, its repeated prefaces and avant-
propos in chapters entitled “Dedication,” “At the threshold of the Book,” “And You Shall Be in 
the Book,” which are further divided by many numbered sections. The constant folding and 
unfolding in Jabès’ book echoes the fractured subjectivity of the Jew and the poet, whose existence 
Derrida characterizes as the fold of history. The writer creates the book just as the book creates the 
writer. Derrida writes, “This movement through which the book, articulated by the voice of the 
poet, is folded and bound to itself, the movement through which the book becomes a subject in 
itself and for itself, is not critical or speculative reflection, but is, first of all, poetry and history.”659 
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The Jew and the poet represent the fractured subject of history, where “the subject is shattered and 
opened,” folded upon itself, where “writing is itself written, but also ruined, made into an abyss, 
in its own representation.” The dual aspect of writing as both creation and destruction reflects the 
writer, the Jew or the poet, whose fractured subjectivity is expressed in the fragmentation of the 
book. Didier Cahen writes “Jew and Poet, carrying in his flesh the tear of man [la déchirure de 
l’homme], EJ [Edmond Jabès] is an other – an other JE, without being. [EJ est un autre – un autre 
JE sans l’être].”660 The alterity contained within this fractured identity, both self and other, is 
expressed in the book as the site of creation and destruction. The broken tablets are the crucial 
motif for this ambivalence in The Book of Questions. 
For Jabès, the broken tablets unmistakably hearken Max Jacob and the torn manuscript. 
The writer is torn between creation and destruction, but also between adherence to law and 
freedom. Derrida writes, “The wisdom of the poet thus culminates its freedom in the passion of 
translating obedience to the law of the word into autonomy [traduire en autonomie l’obéissance à 
la loi du mot].”661 The irreducible tension for the writer between adherence and revolt is, in a sense, 
a question of theodicy: can the Jew follow the law, but out of freedom? Reframed in different 
terms we might ask, can the Book of Books coexist with The Book of Questions? The subjectivity 
of the Jew is split between freedom and the adherence to law. In the chapter entitled “The Book of 
the Absent,” Jabès sketches an invented debate between fictional rabbis, who debate whether 
freedom is found in its rootedness, enracinement, or its uprootedness, déracinement in the law: 
(“If freedom has wings," taught Rab Idrash, "it also has eyes, a forehead, genitals. Each 
time it takes wing, a transfigures a bit of both the world and man in the excitement of its 
flowering."  
And Reb Lima: "In the beginning, freedom was ten times engraved on the tables of the law. 
But we so little deserved it that the prophet broke them in his anger.”  
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“Any coercion is a ferment of freedom,” Reb Idrash taught further. “How can you hope to 
be free if you are not bound with all your blood to your God and to man?”  
And Reb Lima: “Freedom awakens gradually as we become conscious of our ties, like the 
sleeper of his senses. Then, finally, our actions have a name.”  
A teacher which Reb Zalé translated into this image: “you think it is the bird which is free. 
Wrong: it is the flower.”  
And Reb Elata into this motto: “Love your ties to their last splendor, and you will be free.”) 
 
(« Si la liberté a des ailes, enseignait Reb Idrash, elle a, aussi, des yeux, un front et un sexe. 
Ainsi, à chaque envol, c’est une parcelle partagée du monde et de l’homme qu’elle 
transfigure dans l’ivresse de son épanouissement » 
Et Reb Lima : « La liberté fut, à l’origine, gravée dix fois dans les tables de la Loi, mais 
nous la méritons si peu que le Prophète les brisa dans sa colère » 
« Toute contrainte est un ferment de liberté, enseignait encore Reb Idrash. Comment peux-
tu espérer être libre si tu n’es pas lié de ton sang à ton Dieu et à l’homme ? 
Et Reb Lima: « La liberté s’éveille petit à petit, à mesure que nous prenons conscience de 
nos liens comme le dormeur de ses sens ; alors nos actes ont enfin un nom. » 
Enseignement que Reb Zalé traduisit par cette image: « Tu crois que c’est l’oiseau qui est 
libre. Tu te tromps; c’est la fleur» 
Et Reb Elat par ce blazon: « Aime ton lien jusqu’à son extreme lueur et tu seras libre. »)662 
 
Derrida reconstructs Jabès’ invented debate by identifying two crucial themes for the Jew and the 
Poet. First, the rabbis debate the place, lieu, of freedom, where the Jew and the Poet are alike. The 
teachings of Reb Lima and Reb Zalé suggest, Derrida writes, “freedom must belong to the earth, 
or it is merely wind.”663 The rootedness, enracinement, of freedom in the world is an essential 
question for writing. If according to Reb Zalé freedom is rooted like a flower rather than winged 
like a bird, how can the Jewish people be free in exile without a “place” of their own? For “cette 
race issue du livre,” the “place” of writing is not in fact a geographical location:  
When a Jew or a poet proclaims the Site, he is not declaring war. For this site, this land, 
calling to us from beyond memory, is always elsewhere. The site is not the empirical and 
national Here of a territory. It is immemorial, and thus also a future. Better: it is tradition 
as adventure. [la tradition comme aventure]. 
 
The place of writing for the Jew is not rooted “here,” “ici,” in the “Blut und Boden” that ties a 
nation of people to the earth of a sacred homeland. Rather, the Jew is always “there,” “là-bas,” in 
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a condition of exile from its geographical place, but historically rooted by tradition to a world to 
come. Without a national home, Jewish existence in diaspora finds its roots in “tradition as 
adventure.” “The Poet and the Jew are not born here but elsewhere. They wander, separated from 
their true birth,” Derrida writes, “’Race born of the book’ because sons of the Land to come.”664 
The Jew, like the poet, does not find a place for writing in the world of “here and now,” except in 
the flux of time, in exile, in the book. “The Jews fatherland is a sacred text amid the commentaries 
it has given rise to [La patrie des Juifs est un texte sacré au milieu des commentaires qu’il a 
suscités],” writes Jabès, “Hence, every Jew is in the Law. Hence, every Jew makes the Law. Hence, 
the Law is Jewish [Ainsi chaque Juif est dans la Loi. Ainsi chaque Juif fait la Loi. Ainsi la Loi est 
juive].”665 The fractured tablets represent the rupture with a homeland: the Jew takes refuge in the 
book, a home in the adventure of history, rather than a geographical location. Blanchot reads Jabès’ 
line concerning the importance of commentary in terms of “the dignity and importance of exegesis 
in the rabbinic tradition” where “the written law, the unoriginal text of the origin, must always be 
taken on by the commenting voice—reaffirmed by the oral commentary, which does not come 
after it, but is contemporary to it—taken on, but unjoined, in this dis-junction that is the measure 
of its infinity.”666 Referencing the distinction between the Oral Torah, Torah shebe’al-peh, and the 
Written Torah, Torah she-bi-khtav, whose disagreements and disputes nourish textual debate, 
Blanchot cites Levinas from Difficult Freedom: “The oral law is eternally contemporaneous to the 
written. Between them there exists a relationship whose intellection is the very atmosphere of 
Judaism. The one neither maintains nor destroys the other—but makes it practical and readable.”667 
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The linkage of exile and commentary makes questioning an expression of dis-placement and dis-
propriation. Blanchot explains the rupture of the Jew contests and interrupts the book: 
By the arduous and scathing experience that Judaism carries with it—a shattering that 
continually rises, not only up to the Tables of the Law but on this side of creation (the 
breaking of the Vessels) and up to loftiness itself; by a tradition of exegesis that does not 
worship signs but that sets itself up in the gaps they indicate—the man of words, the poet, 
feels involved, confirmed, but also contested, and in his turn, contesting. We can do nothing 
concerning his inter-ruption.668 
 
Blanchot connects the rupture of the Jew to the shattered tablets and practices of commentary and 
interpretation. The interruption of language reveals up gaps, ruptures, and breaks in its fabric. 
The broken tablets illustrate the poet’s freedom to create. In response to Jabès’ invented 
debate, Derrida writes, “Poetic autonomy, comparable to none other, presupposes broken Tables 
[L’autonomie poétique, à nulle autre semblable, suppose les Tables brises].”669 He cites Jabès’ 
fictional Reb Lima, who writes, “Freedom, at first, was engraved ten times in the Tables of the 
Law, but we deserve it so little that the Prophet broke them in his anger [La liberté fut, à l’origine, 
gravée dix fois dans les tables de la Loi, mais nous la méritons si peu que le Prophète les brisa 
dans sa colère].”670 The broken tablets represent the irreducibility of commentary and 
interpretation, which is shared by the poet and the Jew: 
Between the fragments of the broken Tables the poem grows and the right to speech takes 
root. Once more begins the adventure of the text as weed, as outlaw [Recommence 
l’aventure du texte comme mauvaise herbe, hors la Loi] far from "the fatherland of the 
Jews," which is a "sacred text surrounded by commentaries." The necessity of commentary, 
like poetic necessity, is the very form of exiled speech. In the beginning is hermeneutics.671  
 
For both the Jew and the poet, the need for commentary is the expression of exiled language. 
Nonetheless, despite their shared condition of exile, the modes of writing proper to the Jew and 
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the poet ultimately cannot be assimilated. The limit separating the poet from the Jew stems from 
the source of their poetic visions: the poet can only aspire to create a facsimile or representation 
of the Jew’s divine source of inspiration. The poet and the Jew are “forever unable to reunite with 
each other, yet so close to each other,” they are ultimately irreconcilable in their relation to the 
trace of divine authority of the text. “There will always be rabbis and poets,” Derrida writes, “And 
two interpretations of interpretation.”672 The two interpretations of interpretation for the Jew and 
the poet are both irreconcilable and irreducible. The broken tablets of the law become the site for 
the contest of interpretations and commentaries, where the book of humanity transforms into a 
book of questions. This pregnant image contains both the fragments of God’s commandment, but 
also the violence of its overthrow and destruction. “The breaking of the Tables articulates, first of 
all, a rupture within God as the origin of history,” Derrida writes. The symbolic importance of this 
episode gives birth to autochthonous human history free from God’s interventions: the shattered 
tablets represent human freedom to question even God. Jabès’ Reb Armel writes, “Do not ever 
forget that you are the kernel of a severance [N’oublie pas que tu es le noyau d’une rupture].”673 
The broken tablets illustrates the Jew’s fractured subjectivity, bound between the fragments of the 
law and the freedom to rebel against them. 
 Following these initial meetings in the fall of 1963, Derrida and Jabès and their wives 
became acquainted as friends. Edmond and Arlette would host Jacques and Marguerite for lunches 
and dinners at their apartment on the rue de l’Epée-du-bois, and they continued to discuss their 
latest texts in letters, postcards phone calls, and impromptu meetings in Paris. They exchanged 
letters of condolence after the death of Jabès’ mother in 1965 and Derrida’s father in 1970, and 
their correspondences share details of their families and mutual friends. Derrida later recalled, “we 
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were neighbors, between the rue de l'Épée-de-bois and the rue d'Ulm,”674 and Jabès would host 
him and other colleagues for aperitifs after work in his Latin Quarter apartment, mere steps from 
the Ecole Normale Supéreriure. It was through these informal meetings in Jabès’ apartment that 
Derrida crossed paths with other intellectuals, “on one occasion with Celan, on another with 
Gabriel Bounoure (a great friendship for which I have Edmond Jabès to thank).” Indeed, Bounoure 
was a pivotal figure in 20th century French literary production, even if his behind-the-scene role is 
largely forgotten today, and his exchanges with Jabès and Derrida were crucial early in their 
development as writers. Gabriel Bounoure was born in Brittany in 1886; normalien and résistant, 
he was the chief poetry critic for the Nouvelle Revue Française [N.R.F], and he played a decisive 
role in elevating French writers including Max Jacob, Pierre Jean Jouve, Henri Michaux, and Pierre 
Reverdy. He taught in universities in Rabat and Cairo, and he was an important voice in dialogues 
between writers of the Arab and Western worlds. Through his involvement with francophone 
writers around the Mediterranean, Bounoure played a crucial part in popularizing Lebanese writer 
and playwright Georges Schehadé as well as Edmond Jabès. He published one book in his lifetime, 
the experimental novel Marcelles sur le parvis, Hopscotch on the Square, though his numerous 
essays and reviews of contemporary French literature and poetry made him, according to Peeters, 
“the most influential poetry critic of his time.”675 Bounoure befriended Jabès in Egypt, and wrote 
the preface for Je bâtis ma demeure, a book which Jabès said was written “under his gaze.”  
After Jabès sent him Derrida’s unpublished essay on the Book of Questions, Bounoure 
wrote Derrida a stunning letter in January 1964, which Derrida read with “grande joie et un grand 
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encouragement.”676 The letter highlights the importance of the theme of “la rupture juive” in the 
Book of Questions, connecting the image of the broken tablets with the theme of exile:  
This penetrating analysis shines a clear light on the confounding richness of the work – a 
richness conquered by way of destitution [dénuement] and silence. Here, there is a 
perpetual oscillation between All and Nothing which scans the movement of a 
consciousness that lives, as if for another, the ambiguities of poetry and its language. A 
quest which demands the most destitute, most excluded, most exiled man. But by his 
misfortune and his wandering, by the privilege of his disproportionate suffering, the Jew 
obtains the quality of man par excellence, the exemplary man. More than any other, this 
quality belongs to Edmond Jabès, having taken as far as possible Jewish ruptures = rupture 
with his community, rupture with the synagogue, rupture with the Hebrew language, 
rupture with the Law. Without a doubt, Edmond Jabès needed this excess of desert solitude, 
this extreme condition, for Canaan to appear on the horizon as a freedom which multiplies 
the passionate, obsidianal interrogations of God. Like the winds of sand which bring the 
negativity of the secret to the houses of Cairo.677 
 
Beyond the “confounding richness” of Jabès’ writing, swinging between existential categories of 
being and nothingness, life and death, speech and silence, Bounoure identifies the importance of 
rupture. Beginning with the broken tablets of the law, but also in the rupture or break with a 
national home, language, community, and even a break in the adherence to the law, it is the quality 
of rupture that marks the exemplarity of the Jew as a form of consciousness, and as a figure of 
writing. Jabès confirmed in a letter to Derrida, “what he said about rupture through experience is, 
for me, essential.”678 This rupture is symbolized in the broken tablets, but it is repeated in the 
ruptures of the Jewish people with a national home, language, or with adherence to the law. This 
is the double consciousness of the Jew, torn between rabbi and poet. Bounoure describes the 
freedom in Jabès’ writing to relentlessly question and interrogate, “like the sandstorms which bring 
into the houses of Cairo the negativity of the secret.” Like the sandstorm which exposes the cracks 
in the wall, Jabès’ writing tarries in a kind of negativity that reveals the glimmer of freedom 
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through the limits of the book. For Bounoure, Jabès’ incessant questioning is split between a call 
for divine justice and a poetry of negativity, which takes the form of the two faces of the book:  
A foreigner everywhere, like in the past the cynic in the cities of handsome aristocrats […] 
questions surge from two opposing sides, provoked as much by the universal demand for 
justice, as by the fate of nothingness and the pain imposed on individual existences. Before 
the God of the Covenant, the lives of Sarah and Yukel, “these two echoes of flesh” force a 
cry which accompanies questioning reason, but the cries, the fatal particularities of human 
existences thrown into suffering and ended by death, are lost in the unfathomable refusal 
of silence. Where to go? To the past of the old covenant or towards a new promise which 
would be contained in the Book to come? 679  
 
In the tragic story of Yukel and Sarah, Jabès confronts the senselessness of human suffering with 
unending interrogation. For Derrida and Jabès, the fractured subjectivity of the Jew inhabits the 
interval between the broken and replacement tablets, between what Bounoure describes as the “the 
past of the old covenant” and “a new promise that would be contained in the Book to come.” Like 
Zarathustra in his cave amidst new and old tablets, in this interregnum, Jabès’ book becomes a site 
for creation itself, revealing the possibility for novelty amidst the divine trace in the broken tablets. 
 
 
VI. Creation and the Name 
 
Following the destruction of the original Tablets of the Law, Moses inscribes the replacement set 
with God’s commandment, endowing human writing with a trace of the divine power of creation. 
For Jabès and Derrida, the interval between the broken tablets and their replacements reflects the 
writer’s ambivalence: torn between obedience to the law and the power to write its own laws, as 
beings who are auto-nomos. Between creator and creation, the dialectical image of the shattered 
																																																						




tablets discloses the writer’s power to create with words, even as the writer is also the creation of 
another Book. Jabès’ exploration of the creative potential of writing has its roots in the mystical 
theories of language he discovered in part through Walter Benjamin’s early work on language. In 
the initial sketches for The Book of Questions conserved in the archives of the Bibliothèque 
Nationale de France, Jabès transcribed on a fragment of paper two memorable quotations from 
Benjamin’s 1916 essay, “On Language as such and on the Language of Man.”680 Jabès read the 
essay in the 1959 publication of Benjamin’s Oeuvres Choisies, translated by Maurice de Gandillac, 
the first collection of his work in French. The fragment is remarkable if for no other reason because 
it is a rare instance in the draft materials for Le Livre des Questions – a book filled with hundreds 
of quotations from invented rabbis and fictional characters – where Jabès quotes a real, extant 
author. Benjamin’s essay offers insight into Jabès’ reflections on writing, creation, and the name. 
The first citation in Jabès’ notes is Benjamin’s phrase, “the name is that through which, 
and in which, language itself communicates itself absolutely.”681 This is a distillation of the essay’s 
central argument that the name is both the expression and the medium of pure language. “All 
nature, insofar as it communicates itself, communicates itself in language, and so finally in man,” 
writes Benjamin, “hence, he is the lord of nature and can give names to things.” The power to 
assign names permits human beings, in a sense, to create and order the world; without affirming 
the literal truth of the biblical account, Benjamin notes the importance of naming in the first 
chapters of the Book of Genesis. He explores the “fallenness” of language, from its prelapsarian 
creative and magic function to the communicative and instrumental role of human language. The 
power of nomination is the continuation of the divine work of creation, as Benjamin writes, “God's 
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creation is completed when things receive their names from man, from whom in name language 
alone speaks.” The power to name marks the essential overlap of human and divine language. 
The second quotation in Jabès’ notes is a well-known expression from Johann Georg 
Hamann pertaining to the relationship between language and revelation, which is cited in “On 
Language as such.” Hamann, the 19th century Lutheran minister and counter-Enlightenment 
philosopher from Königsburg known as the “Wizard from the North,” contests the rationalist claim 
of the primacy of reason over language. For Leibnitz, “language is the mirror of the intellect,” 
suggesting a close connection between the activities of thought and language, where language 
originates in reason, and it is reason that conditions the rules and structure of language. Reversing 
the primacy of reason and language, Hamann insists that it is language that is the original medium 
of both reason and revelation, as he wrote in a 1784 letter to philosopher F.H Jacobi, “language is 
the mother of reason and revelation, its alpha and omega.”682 Benjamin quotes Hamann’s words 
in the context of the relation of “linguistic being” and “mental being.” The equation of these two 
aspects of human existence come together in the question of revelation. Benjamin writes, “Within 
all linguistic formation a conflict is waged between what is expressed and expressible and what is 
inexpressible and unexpressed.”683 Yet, the highest question of religion cannot account for the 
inexpressible because “it is addressed in the name and expresses itself as revelation.” Hamann 
suggests that language is the substratum for reason and revelation, it is constitutive of them, rather 
than an external description of a phenomenon through linguistic signs. Revelation is born of 
language, and language begins with the name. Benjamin’s assertion that the name is the medium 
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and unit of linguistic meaning draws from his lengthy discussions with Gershom Scholem, who 
framed a similar point when he wrote to Franz Rosenzweig, “Sprache ist Namen.”684 
Nomination is constitutive of the act of creation. Benjamin notes that in the opening verses 
of the Book of Genesis, God’s creation of the world proceeds through a threefold act: “Let there 
be,” “He made (created),” “He named.”685 This threefold act of creation implies an absolute 
relation between name and knowledge since “God made things knowable in their names.”686 
However, the creation of human beings does not follow the same process: it is not accompanied 
by “He named.”687 Benjamin suggests a parallel between God’s absolute power of creation and the 
relative human power of nomination: “in this very parallelism the divergence is all the more 
striking.”688 In contrast to the creative possibilities of divine language, the finite power of human 
language is expressed in nomination. God pointedly does not name the first human beings, instead 
through an extraordinary donation of creative power, he offers to human the power of naming: 
God did not create man from the word, and he did not name him. He did not wish to subject 
him to language, but in man God set language, which had served him as medium of 
creation, free. God rested when he had left his creative power to itself in man. This 
creativity, relieved of its divine actuality, became knowledge. Man is the knower in the 
same language in which God is the creator. God created him in his image; he created the 
knower in the image of the creator. 
 
Unlike the rest of the named creatures and beings, the power to name affords human beings the 
possibility of creation with their words. For Benjamin, nomination marks “the frontier between 
finite and infinite language,” where “the proper name is the communion of man with the creative 
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word of God”689 This mystical connection between name and knowledge contrasts with the 
“bourgeois view of language” which insists on the wholly arbitrary connection between signs and 
their meanings. Rather, Benjamin insists, “language never gives mere signs.” 
 Benjamin illustrates his theory of language through an interpretation of the “falleness” of 
language in the Book of Genesis.690 In the Garden of Eden, God instructs Adam to name the 
animals according to their essences, demonstrating a transparency between the name and the 
essence of things. Stéphane Mosès explains that at this stage, “language represents the very essence 
of reality,” where this language of creation contains “a perfect match between words and things: 
reality is entirely transparent to language, and language adjoins the very essence of reality with 
quasi-miraculous accuracy.”691 Tempted by the nameless snake to eat of the Tree of Knowledge, 
Adam and Even are expulsed from paradise, precipitating the first “fall” of human language. Fallen 
human language loses its magical quality, and introduces the imperfect relation between names 
and things, and the question of correspondence between name and thing, sign and referent. This 
fall “marks the birth of the human word, in which name no longer lives intact and which has 
stepped out of name-language.”692 Henceforth, language takes on an instrumental quality, where 
“the word must communicate something (other than itself).” The fall from Paradise introduces 
mediation into language, splitting the thing and word, and thereby introducing the question of the 
sign and its correspondence. After the fall, “linguistic confusion could be only a step away.”693 
The episode of the Tower of Babel marks a second moment of language’s fall. When humanity 
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unites speaking “one language and uniform words” to builds a tower that would reach the heavens, 
God halts its construction by “confus[ing] their language,” and “scatter[ing] them from there upon 
the face of the entire earth.”694 With the people of Earth separated into different nations speaking 
different tongues, God names the tower Babel, in recognition of the site where God confused the 
language of humanity.695 The second fall of language inaugurates different peoples and languages, 
thereby introducing translation and misunderstanding. Henceforth, the power of the name is 
scattered and confused, but it is not entirely erased. “In our current language,” Mosès explains, “its 
instrumental function designates its profane side, whereas its magical (that is, poetic) functions 
bears witness to the survival of its paradisiacal splendor.”696 The creative power of language shines 
through in the name. Benjamin concludes:  
Man communicates himself to God through name, which he gives to nature and (in proper 
names) to his own kind; and to nature he gives names according to the communication that 
he receives from her, for the whole of nature, too, is imbued with a nameless, unspoken 
language, the residue of the creative word of God, which is preserved in man as the 
cognizing name and above man as the judgment suspended over him. The language of 
nature is comparable to a secret password that each sentry passes to the next in his own 
language, but the meaning of the password is the sentry's language itself.697  
 
For some Kabbalistic understandings of language, the true name of God’s contains the knowledge 
of the universe, and all language contains a trace of this secret divine name; Benjamin’s claim that 
human language contains “the residue of the creative word of God” comes to him via Scholem, 
but Hamann, Herder, and Jakob Böhme, who had introduced concepts from the Kabbalah into the 
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stream of German Romantic thought. Nonetheless, Benjamin’s reflections on the pure language of 
the name resonates with mystical theories of language for biblical interpretation. 
Neither of the quotations from Benjamin’s essay recorded in Jabès’ notes ultimately appear 
in the published version of The Book of Questions – there are precious few citations of existing 
authors in the series – but these pronouncements deeply inform Jabès’ reflections on the relation 
of the name and creation. Jabès’ Reb Stein describes, “When, as a child, I wrote my name for the 
first time, I knew I was beginning a book [Enfant, lorsque j’écrivis, pour la première fois, mon 
nom, j’eus conscience de commencer un livre].”698 Mosès writes that Benjamin’s theory of 
language is based on “the evocation, through a language structured by forms of negativity, of a 
universe – ours – from which God has withdrawn and which bears witness to nothingness more 
than Revelation.”699 Akin to Benjamin’s reflections on the language of naming in Genesis, Jabès 
and Derrida’s discussion of the broken tablets highlight the rupture of divine writing and the birth 
of human writing which is endowed with the power of creation, and testifies to God’s negativity 
in the book. Derrida suggests it is God’s contraction that makes possible the writer’s power of 
creation. “The breaking of the Tables” Derrida writes, is “a rupture within God as the origin of 
history.”700 This rupture carried within God and symbolized by the broken tablets is given to 
human beings in their language. Derrida calls upon the contraction or withdrawal of God from the 
world – and from writing – which frees human writing to create. The broken tablets symbolize this 
rupture in human writing: “God separated himself from himself in order to let us speak, in order 
to astonish and to interrogate us. He did so not by speaking but by keeping still, by letting silence 
interrupt his voice and his signs, by letting the Tables be broken.”701 He identifies two episodes in 
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the book of Exodus where God repents: the first occurs just before God gives Moses the original 
Tablets of the Law (Ex 32:14), and the second occurs just before the inscription of their 
replacements (Ex. 33:17), two moments “between originary speech and writing and, within 
Scripture, between the origin and repetition.” These moments of divine repentance correspond to 
the two sets of tablets. Writing always contains this interval between the original, shattered Tablets 
inscribed by God and the replacement tablets written by Moses’ hand: “This difference, this 
negativity in God is our freedom, the transcendence and the verb which can relocate the purity of 
their negative origin only in the possibility of the Question.” The broken tablets disclose God’s 
negativity, between the trace of God’s divine inscription and the autonomy of human language, 
and thus they mark the origin of human writing. 
Jabès describes God’s absence from the world which makes possible the free expression 
of human language. The co-existence of human freedom alongside an omnipotent and omniscient 
God arouses questions of theodicy: how can human beings act freely in a way uncontrolled by an 
all-knowing and all-powerful God? The solution lies in the negativity of God who retracts from 
the active workings of the world to permit human freedom, echoing the Kabbalistic notion of 
TsimTsum, which means “contraction.” This theory of creation from the Lurianic Kabbalah 
describes a process by which God, as En-Sof or absolute, contracts into the nothingness of a point 
to make room for the free existence of the world. TsimTsum effectively inverts the logic of creatio 
ex nihilo, it explains God’s retraction from the active workings of the world, which makes possible 
human freedom. Gershom Scholem explains: 
The concept of Tsimtsum, the contraction or withdrawal of God, was Luria's attempt to 
reconcile the existence of God with that of the physical world. If God is infinite, how is it 
possible for anything to exist which is not God? Given the monotheistic theologies on the 
immutability of God, Luria's answer to this dilemma was a highly unorthodox one. He 
taught that an act of creation is possible only through the "entry of God into Himself"; God 




single place. The place from which God retreats is merely "a point" in comparison with 
His infinity, but from man's perspective, it comprises all levels of existence, both spiritual 
and corporeal. This "point" is the totality of all possible worlds - primordial space. It is no 
longer God but it is not empty; some residue of divinity remains in primordial space, just 
as the taste and smell of oil linger in a bottle after the oil is poured out. And it is in these 
traces of divinity that the potential for the development of the universe is contained.702  
 
The contraction of God, his separation from himself in a point, enables the creation of a world of 
human freedom which nonetheless retains the trace of its divine source. God’s silence dissimulates 
the divine origin of human writing, and makes room for the poetic freedom made possible by the 
shattered tablets. Similarly, Jabès’ practice of writing involves the articulation of the book from 
the formless, chaotic matter of language which he calls the “absolute book,” and its contraction at 
the “threshold” of the book. In his interview with Marcel Cohen, he describes the process of 
undertaking a new book: 
I find myself, at the moment of starting a book – and surely I am not alone – literally 
submerged in its material. It is as if a multitude of possible books are waiting to see the 
light of day. This material is perhaps the “absolute book,” which merges all the books we 
are capable of writing. It is, in truth, only a vast unintelligible rumor because it can’t be 
formulated, but at least it seems it could be. I try to preserve this material as long as possible 
in its state of chaos at the threshold of the book, so that the reader can also be present at 
the birth of the work.703 
 
Jabès describes the process of writing as formulating the matter of language from out of its infinite 
potentialities contained in the “absolute book.” This unformed matter of the “absolute book” 
echoes what Benjamin calls the “pure language” of the name. From the tohu va-bohu of the 
unformed language of the “absolute book,” the writer creates a world in the book, he or she gives 
form and content to a world of characters and events, and then withdraws from the scene. Like 
God’s absence in the created world, the writer similarly creates the world of the book, and the 
author’s presence in the world he or she creates is felt as a form of negativity. Derrida connects 
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the logic of TsimTsum to the human freedom to write, enabled by the shattered tablets. “Absence 
of locality,” he writes, “Absence of the writer too. For to write is to draw back [Écrire c’est 
retirer].”704 These absences of place and writer give birth to the poetic autonomy necessary to 
create—this is the meaning of the broken Tablets. With regards to his or her work, “the writer is 
at once everything and nothing. Like God.”705 Derrida recognizes the echoes of this mystical 
understanding of language in Jabès’ writing where he writes, “Negativity in God, exile as writing, 
the life of the letter are all already in the Cabala.”706 Between God’s book of creation that speaks 
the world into existence, and the human book which creates its own world in the power to name, 
the broken tablets enable the creation of the endless nesting of books within books. 
 From Moses’ broken tablets to Jabès’ torn manuscript, the destroyed book represents the 
dialectical image of writing as rupture, a gesture that signifies both creation and destruction, 
commandment and freedom. For Jabès and Derrida, the broken tablets represents the struggle 
between the law – divine law, the law of tradition, of influence – and the creative possibilities of 
writing enabled by the revolt against the law. Where Jabès writes “God is in perpetual revolt 
against God [Dieu est en perpétuelle révolte contre Dieu]” and “God is an interrogation of God 
[Dieu est une interrogation de Dieu],”707 Derrida responds by citing Kafka’s remark, “'We are 
nihilistic thoughts that come into God's head.”708 This expression suggests that humans are 
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emanation of the divine intellect, no more than haphazard modalities of God’s thought. “If God 
opens the question in God, if he is the very opening of the Question,” Derrida writes, “God 
proceeds within the duplicity of his own questionability.”709 The question of God inaugurated by 
God implies the very articulation of the book is contingent on its questioning: The Book of 
Questions is the negative image of the Book of Books. 
 
 
VII. Circles, Signatures, and Countersignatures 
 
The practice of quotation call upon prior literary creation, transplanting words from their original 
setting to a different textual corpus, where they are revived in a new context. Ordinarily, quotations 
are treated as a kind of supplement to the main textual corpus: marked off from the body of the 
text, quotation is supposed to add justification or reinforcement for the author’s authentic voice, 
which is the presumptive structural center of the text. But, as Derrida argues in “Structure, Sign, 
and Play,” there is a double logic of supplementarity. The supplement is an addition to the center, 
but the very existence of the center is also contingent upon the projection of a supplement. He 
writes, “one cannot determine the center and exhaust totalization because the sign which replaces 
the center, which supplements it, taking the center's place in its absence – this sign is added, occurs 
as a surplus, as a ‘supplement.’"710 In other words, quotations supplement the “central” voice of 
the text, while also maintaining the illusion that such a central voice exists. The supplement “comes 
to perform a vicarious function, to supplement a lack on the part of the signified,”711 revealing the 
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absence of a center: the center only exists in relation to a margin, to a supplement that defines the 
supposed objectivity of the center. Following “the lost or impossible presence of the absent origin,” 
Derrida embraces “the Nietzschean affirmation, that is the joyous affirmation of the play of the 
world and of the innocence of becoming, the affirmation of a world of signs without fault, without 
truth, and without origin.”712 The logic of supplementarity thereby “determines the noncenter 
otherwise than as loss of the center.” Quotation supplements but also determines the central 
“voice” of the text. Jabès’ eccentric use of quotations in The Book of Questions disrupts the text’s 
presumed center and its author’s singular, identical voice, and embraces the polyphony of voices, 
names, and quotations filling its pages: “N’oublie pas que tu es le noyau d’une rupture.”713 
Walter Benjamin long dreamed of writing a book composed entirely of quotations. The 
first draft of The Origin of German Tragic Drama was entirely written in quotations. “It is the 
craziest mosaic technique one can imagine,” Benjamin wrote to Scholem in 1924 of this method 
of writing, “so odd for a work of this kind that I will probably touch up the fair copy in places.”714 
Subsequent versions of his Trauerspiel book ultimately took a more conventional approach, but 
he realized this dream in his mammoth Arcades Project, which is as much a theory of citation as 
it is a history of capitalism in 19th century Paris. Benjamin deliberately sets apart his sparse 
comments in the Arcades Project from the majority of the book composed of quotations. Eli 
Friedlander notes that even after Benjamin had worked on the project for a decade, “a special effort 
was made not to produce larger unities of writing that would rework and absorb the initial 
material.”715 By highlighting citation as the very material of his text, its building blocks, Benjamin 
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undertakes a method of creation through re-appropriation. Friedlander elaborates, “the text that 
emerges is not so much an elaboration and interpretation of the quoted material as an ordering of 
that material as a continuity of citations without quotation marks.”716 If citation is most 
fundamentally the repurposing of language in a new context, then Benjamin’s generous use of 
quotation disrupts the ordinary ways of determining its value or meaning. By cutting off writing 
from its original context and re-appropriating it in citation elsewhere, the quotation “bears no 
relation to why the words were uttered or written in the first place,” and it suggests, “there is no 
distinction between major and minor matters insofar as the material of history is concerned.” 
Benjamin’s use of quotation has a levelling effect on language: it produces a reorganization of 
historical artifacts, uprooting dominant historical perspectives, and creating a historical work of 
greater significance. “In being so dissociated,” Friedlander writes, “the citations become material 
to form a wholly different constructed unity that is essentially distinct from the reconstruction of 
the past.”717 The citation migrates from its original historical and textual location to assume a new 
place in a foreign text, and its words take root in a different context. Benjamin’s “craz[y] mosaic 
technique” transforms the very fabric of the text. Writing by quotation disrupts the unicity of the 
book which qualifies authenticity through the “aura” of originality or uniqueness, and assigns 
value based on the distinction between “real” and “fake,” original and copy.  
The Book of Questions is filled with quotations of proverbs and aphorisms from a 
cacophony of rabbis and sages. Quotations constitute the very fabric of Jabès’ text, rather than 
externally imposed references. Like Benjamin, Jabès uses quotations to reshuffle the narrative 
traces of bygone history. His qutoations transform language, evoking the names of presumably 
wise rabbis and sages to call up the material history of the past in order to give its words new life. 
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However, in contrast to Benjamin’s tome of quotations culled from the margins of historiography, 
Jabès almost exclusively quotes fictitious characters. His imagined rabbis offer salient 
philosophical perspectives, and the title “Reb,” “Rabbi,” preceding their names affords their words 
presumptive authority, but they are ultimately fictional characters: 
Why rabbis? Rabbis are, by essence, the privileged interpreters of the book. For them, 
finding God means finding him in the book, through the word which is hidden behind the 
word, as if there was always a book within the book, which was ultimately a matter of 
decrypting beyond the text, the sign itself. White writing, in sum, in writing […] My rabbis 
are fake rabbis but, for me, they are closer than any other decoder, because they are 
themselves writers; that is, they are both creators and commentators of their own works. 
Isn’t every real reader a potential writer, a “rabbi” rooted in the book? You see a 
contradiction between the terms “memory” and “imagination.” This contradiction does not 
exist in my eyes.718  
 
The rabbis in Jabès’ Book of Questions offer commentaries and interpretations of scriptures, which 
are themselves merely imaginary facsimiles of the “real” Bible and its commentary. The 
seriousness of Jabès’ proverbs, the authenticity of its quasi-Talmudic debates over questions of 
God and ethics, and the painful story of Yukel and Sarah belie their fictionality. Echoing what 
Max Jacob called “the virtue of the lie,” Jabès’ rabbis interpret a fabricated and perhaps even 
heretical Judaism with the most profound reverence. By abolishing the distinction between 
memory and imagination, Jabès insists that there is no true reality which can separate itself from 
fiction. “We are but fiction [Nous ne sommes que fiction]. We are only the idea that we make for 
ourselves,” he explains, “only fiction can transcend the unvarnished event, grasping it in the most 
intimate extensions.”719 In this sense, The Book of Questions is the fictional representation for an 
experience which has no other narrative possibility : the unspeakable, unimaginable horror of the 
Shoah. Jabès turns to fiction to speak of what cannot be spoken.720  
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The narrative entanglement of truth and fiction discloses the contingency of literature and 
religion. Jabès asks, “Isn’t the Bible itself first read as a novel?”721 The Book of Questions 
constantly slips between the domain of literature and religion, as well as between the space of the 
book and the world of lived experience. For Jabès, every rabbi is a kind of literary critic, to the 
extent that the practices of narrative and fiction are deeply woven into biblical interpretation; by 
the same token, every writer crafts a world in the book by tapping into what Benjamin articulated 
as the magic language of creation. The writer and the rabbi share a spiritual bond with the book, 
the common object of their respective practices. Jabès remarks, “everything unfolds as if the writer 
questions the rabbi, and the rabbi the writer; the two being inhabited by the same obsession with 
the book.”722 Derrida argues in his essay on The Book of Questions that the distinction between 
the writer and the rabbi is based on a false opposition of religious and literary narrative, the prophet 
and the poet, even if they ultimately draw their inspiration from irreconcilable sources. The 
continuity between practices of writing, commentary, and interpretation discloses the divine trace 
of creation in our fallen language. Jabès explains, “the Jew is fundamentally riveted to the text that 
his commentary is creation. It is this sort of relationship that the fake – real – rabbis of my books 
maintain with the text. They would only be ficticious in appearance…”723 Under the guise of their 
apparent fictionality, as “virtuous lies,” Jabès’ rabbis speak a certain kind of prophetic truth. 
 The characters populating The Book of Questions overflow the limits of fiction. If indeed 
writing, as Derrida writes, is “to confuse ontology and grammar,”724 then perhaps the author can 
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write a fictional character into existence, just as a person can discover that his or her life has slipped 
into the space of narrative fiction. Derrida’s essay concludes by citing “Reb Rida,” one of the 
rabbis who appears in the opening pages of Jabès’ book: 
Henceforth, so that God may indeed be, as Jabès says, an interrogation of God, would we 
not have to transform a final affirmation into a question? Literature would then, perhaps, 
only be the dreamlike displacement of this question [le déplacement somnambulique de 
cette question]:725  
 
“There is the Book of God, through which God questions himself. And there is the book 
of man. It is on the scale of God’s.” – Reb Rida 
[« Il y a le Livre de Dieu par lequel Dieu s’interroge et il y a le livre de l’homme qui est à 
la taille de celui de Dieu. » Reb Rida]726  
 
Reb Rida is a fictional character invented in Jabès’ imagination, but his name is also a near perfect 
anagram for Derrida—save for the missing “d,” which is mirrored as “b.” Even this small 
difference seems fitting insofar as Derrida’s essay inverts the title of Jabès’ book, as if read 
backwards – like Hebrew. The use of anagram as a literary device recalls approaches to biblical 
interpretation from the Jewish tradition. In Talmudic and Midrashic approaches to textual 
interpretation, the device of anagram, the transposition a word’s letters to create another word is 
called hipukh or “inversion.” The second century scholar Eleazar of Modi’im introduces the use 
of inversion in biblical interpretation by transposing a word’s letters; inversion gradually comes to 
include transpositions across words and phrases. Inversion as an interpretative device reaches its 
apogee with the Kabbalists, for whom inversion reveals the occult or secret meaning of words and 
names. Kabbalistic texts often describe the rules governing inversions, called temurah. 
Discovering his own name encrypted in Jabès’ text, it is as if Derrida has been drafted as a character 
in The Book of Questions. The uncanny resonance of Reb Rida and Derrida is, strictly speaking, a 
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coincidence: Jabès wrote these passages before he would have ever come across Derrida’s name. 
Yet this coincidence suggests an almost mystical connection, which did not escape Derrida’s 
attention. By concluding his essay with the “countersignature” of Reb Rida, Derrida suggests that 
Jabès’ invented rabbi is the author of his essay. At the same time, the countersignature projects 
Derrida into the text as a character in The Book of Questions – as if Jabès imagined a rabbi, who 
then wrote an essay entitled “Edmond Jabès et la Question du Livre,” who was ultimately Derrida. 
If a person can write a commentary of a book in which he or she already exists as a character, then 
perhaps Jabès is right that the world exists because the book exists.  
The interlacing of Jabès and Derrida as authors and characters continued as their dialogue 
progressed during these extremely productive years for both writers. The second volume of Jabès’ 
series, The Book of Yukel, was published in April 1964, and the third volume Return to the Book 
in 1965. During this time, Jabès’ friendship with Derrida blossomed. In their correspondences, 
Derrida shared with Jabès his texts on Foucault, Artaud, and other essays that featured in Writing 
and Difference; while Arlette Jabès was always the first reader of her husband’s writing, Derrida 
was the second to read the manuscript for Le Retour au Livre.727 In a June 1964 letter to Derrida, 
Jabès describes his worry that with each successive volume of The Book of Questions he 
confronted the same impossible question of the book. “As for me, I can no longer see the 
‘difference’ between the first and second Book of Questions,” he wrote Derrida, “I am making 
progress in the third (and final) volume and I am noticing that I am rewriting the same book for 
the third time, in search of an impossible response? Maybe these books are only good for the 
tenacity and the hope […] of dominating failure; but failure is inevitable.”728 Jabès’ worry that he 
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was repeating the same impossible task with each of his books appears in Le Retour au Livre in a 
passage entitled “The Loop,” “La Boucle,” which concludes the first part of the book: 
One of my greatest fears, said Reb Aghim, “wants to see my life round itself into a loop 
without being able to stop it.”  
Reb Ardash wrote: “To be in the truth means excepting ugliness on the same grounds as 
beauty. Religion is the religion of the soul where truth is protected from itself. God plays 
against God for a reassuring image of His power. There is no divine Truth. There is a desire, 
a foolishness of God’s which quickens in goodness where the circle is made certain.” 
“Blasphemy,” replied Reb Séri. “Gods Truth is the summer of the world, not its venom. It 
is the gold of the first morning. You only know the rue in truth. You suffer from truth-ache. 
Ah, may you get well.“  
And Reb Ardash said: “It is not always the heart which closes the loop. Sometimes it is the 
teeth. There are celestial bites which witness God’s despair.“ 
 
“L’une de mes grandes angoisses, disait Reb Aghim, fut de voir, sans que je puisse 
l’arrêter, ma vie s’arrondir pour former une boucle.” 
Reb Ardash écrivait: “Être dans la vérité, c’est appeter la laideur au même titre que la 
beauté. La religion est la région de l’âme où la vérité est protégée d’elle-même. Dieu joue 
contre Dieu pour une image rassurante de Sa puissance. Il n’y a pas de Vérité divine. Il y 
a un désir, une déraison de Dieu qui s’avivent dans le Bien, où le cercle est certifié. 
—Sacrilège, lui répondit Reb Séri. La vérité de Dieu est l’été du monde et non le venin. 
Elle est l’or du premier matin. De la vérité, tu ne connnais que le ver. Tu souffres du mal 
de la vérité. Ah! Puisses-tu en guérir.” 
Et Reb Ardash dit: “Ce n’est pas toujours le coeur qui clôt la boucle; ce sont quelquefois 
les dents. Il ya des morsures célestes qui témoignent du désespoir de Dieu.729 
 
Where Reb Aghim worries that his life has become a loop, Reb Ardash suggests that the truth of 
God is revealed in contradictions – good and evil, beauty and ugliness – hence “the circle is 
certified.” Reb Séri protests that God is only good and never evil, but Reb Ardash’s rejoinder that 
there are also “celestial bites which witness God’s despair,” echoing Kafka’s remark, referenced 
in Derrida’s essay, “'our world is only a bad mood of God.” “The Loop” echoes Jabès’ anxieties 
about the seemingly impossible task of writing the second and third volumes of The Book of 
Questions, and the Nietzschean trope of the eternal return.  
																																																						




In a lengthy letter to Jabès dated New Year’s Day 1966, Derrida offered his admiration for 
the recently published Retour au Livre, and his reflections focused on “La Boucle”: 
I have just closed the Return to the Book, a book that does not close, a book on the truth of 
the book opened on the basis of which only God and the hymn have the chance to exist, a 
book that does not close more than it closes a Loop […] or which is not centered, and 
which speaks the absence of the center, the center as the absence without ground, the well, 
the elsewhere, the threshold, mourning [le puits, l’ailleurs, le seuil, le deuil]. I want to tell 
you without qualifications – and also with the absolute sincerity which is yours […] that I 
find your poem admirable, of a power, mastery, and “disciplined chance” which were a 
profound joy for me, in this region where beauty – is not satisfied but tears, doesn’t tear 
[déchire, ne déchire pas] – because this book is serene (isn’t it? A strange serenity) but 
leaves open the tear [déchirure] by which everything acquires meaning. I will say that the 
parts of the book which touched me the most (especially beginning with “The Loop” where 
I nonetheless started to enter the text, if this word has meaning), the raw sublime [brut 
sublime], where this word which mans more than beauty, was not lacking. By designing a 
text, terrestrial humility searching for the question on which the book remains open, in its 
path and its end. The Return, here, is not the closed Loop, but the indefinite reopening of 
the origin of the book [Le Retour, ici, n’est pas la Boucle fermée, mais la réouverture 
indéfinie de l’origine du livre].730 
 
The question of “La Boucle,” the closed loop or buckle, is literally at the center of Le Retour au 
Livre, where Jabès reflects on the futility of completing his task through the cipher of his rabbis. 
Jabès’ difficulty closing the circuit inaugurated in the first volume of Le Livre des Questions attests 
to what Derrida calls “the indefinite reopening of the origin of the book.” “The Loop” testifies to 
“the absence of the center, the center as the absence without ground,” repeating Derrida’s 
reflections on the de-centering of structural myth in “Structure, Sign, and Play.” The center of the 
text is both “within the structure and outside it,” which is projected as a kind of fiction: 
By orienting and organizing the coherence of the system, the center of a structure permits 
the play of its elements inside the total form. And even today the notion of a structure 
lacking any center represents the unthinkable itself. Nevertheless, the center also closes off 
the play which it opens up and makes possible. […] The center is at the center of the 
totality, and yet, since the center does not belong to the totality (is not part of the totality), 
the totality has its center elsewhere. The center is not the center.731 
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Derrida’s remarks in “Structure, Sign, and Play” echo his comments on “La Boucle” in Jabès’ 
Retour au Livre: the impossibility of closing the loop and “finishing” book is like the impossibility 
for the center to determine the system without being conditioned by it. He reveals the imbrication 
of the interrelated circles, centers, and loops in the book, and the impossibility of their 
completeness or closure. The impossibility of closing the loop, completing the circle, or aligning 
the center demonstrates the insufficiency of any supposedly closed system, and the ubiquity of the 
trace, the supplement, or différeance. 
Soon after the 1966 Baltimore colloquium, Derrida wrote to Jabès in December 1966 that 
he was completing a text on Return to the Book, which would appear in his forthcoming Writing 
and Difference. The collection published by Editions du Seuil in 1967 ostensibly tackles each of 
Derrida’s major influences and interlocutors: he devotes an essay to Freud, Heidegger, Levinas, 
Artaud, Foucault, Lévi-Strauss, and so on. Notably, it includes two essays on Jabès: “Edmond 
Jabès and the Question of the Book,” and his essay on Return to the Book, “Ellipse.” Building on 
the discussion of “The Loop” in their correspondence, “Ellipse” appears as the final essay in the 
collection, directly after “Structure Sign and Play,” as its shortest text and the only one which did 
not independently published in a journal; therefore, it offers the semblance of a final word in 
Writing and Difference in the guise of a commentary. “Ellipse” is dedicated to Gabriel Bounoure, 
who had become an important interlocutor for Derrida, and whose acquaintance he owed to Jabès. 
Alluding to the circularity in “La Boucle,” Jabès wrote Derrida in December 1966, “I am proud 
and happy to be in the book twice – with meticulousness through the final line, which is, as we 
know, always a beginning.”732 “Ellipse” focuses on the question of circularity in “The Loop,” and 
the impossible closure of the book. Echoing the critique of “logocentrism” in the first chapter of 
																																																						




Grammatology, the essay opens by describing what are by now two familiar models of writing: 
Here or there we have discerned writing: a nonsymmetrical division designated on the one 
hand the closure of the book, and on the other the opening of the text. On the one hand the 
theological encyclopedia and, modeled upon it, the book of man. On the other a fabric of 
traces marking the disappearance of an exceeded God or of an erased man. The question 
of writing could be opened only if the book was closed. The joyous wandering of the 
graphein then became wandering without return. The opening into the text was adventure, 
expenditure without reserve [L’ouverture au texte était l’aventure, la dépense sans 
réserve].733  
 
The dissolution of the theological or encyclopedic book inaugurates the text and the question of 
arche-writing or the arche-trace. Jabès’ affirms the “joyous wandering” of the sign, which he calls 
the “adventure” of the text. Yet the closure of the book is not its end, and it is in the repetition of 
the book that the writer unleashes the play of the sign. Jabès’ Reb Jorna writes, “God follows God 
and Books follow the Book [Dieu succède à Dieu et le Livre au Livre].”734 The circular movement 
from God to God, from book to book, reiterates of the closure of the book, and the impossible task 
of completing the final, absolute book. Indeed, alluding to his own struggle to complete his trilogy 
in Le Retour au Livre, Jabès writes, “no book is complete. Is it three times I have rewritten mine? 
[aucun livre n’est achevé. Trois fois, ai-je refait le mien?]”735 For Derrida, the closure of the book 
is a “moment of errance”736 which replays the interval between these two forms of writing. Despite 
its apparent futility, it is this effort to begin again, to repeat the symbolic shattering of the tablets, 
and begin writing the book anew that constitutes its adventure.  
“Ellipse” poses the question of the eternal return of the book. In Return to the Book, Jabès 
writes, “The world is exiled in the name. Within it there is the book of the world. Writing means 
having a passion for origins. It means trying to go down to the roots. The roots are always the 
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beginning [Le monde s’exile dans le nom. A l’intérieure, il y a le livre du monde. Ecrire, c’est 
avoir la passion de l’origine ; c’est essayer d’atteindre le fond. Le fond est toujours le 
commencement].”737 Echoing Benjamin’s essay on the power of the name, Jabès’ “passion for the 
origin” suggests a circularity in the writer’s pursuits that must always begin anew. Derrida 
interprets this passion for the origin as the ceaseless displacement of the text’s center : 
It is not absence instead of presence, but a trace which replaces a presence which has never 
been present, an origin by means of which nothing has begun. Now, the book has lived on 
this lure: to have given us to believe that passion, having originally been impassioned by 
something, could in the end be appeased by the return of that something. Lure of the origin, 
the end, the line, the loop, the volume, the center [Leurre de l’origine, de la fin, de la ligne, 
de la boucle du volume, du centre].738 
 
Following the logic of supplementarity articulated in “Structure, Sign, and Play,” the passion for 
the origin in “Ellipse” reveal the absence of an origin, or rather the projection of an origin which 
is constantly displaced. The rabbis in “The Loop” ask whether it is possible to close the loop. For 
Derrida, the closure of the book is merely a projection produced by repetition: “the return to the 
book is of an elliptical essence,” where “something invisible is missing in the grammar of this 
repetition.”739 In the elliptical mouvement of the book, the repetition of the origin is always 
different, the book returns to itself as other. Just before “The Loop,” Yukel describes the elliptical 
closure the book: “the circle is known. Break the curve. The road doubles the road. The book 
consecrates the book [Et Yukel dit: ‘Le cercle est reconnu. Brisez la courbe. Le chemin double le 
chemin. Le livre consacre le livre].’”740 In the repetition of the elliptical movement of the book, its 
destruction, its closure, and its renewal, Derrida writes, “The return to the book here announces 
the form of the eternal return.”741 He suggests that the movement to return to the book is the 
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structure of writing itself. If the author is the presumed center or origin of the text, then writing 
preserves the living voice through its repetition as sign, as gramme, and henceforth the 
disappearance of its origin. Jabès writes in Le Retour au Livre: 
The center is a well.  
 
The center is a scream, an open wound, a key.  
"Do not bet on calming the waves," said Reb Fayah. "The sea holds a grudge."  
"Where is the center?" howled Reb Madiés. "The disowned water lets the falcon pursue his 
prey." 
The center is perhaps a shift in the question. 
 
 No center where no circle possible. 
[…] 
The center is threshold. 
[…] 
“Where is the center?”  
“Under the cinders.” –Reb Selah 
[…] 
The center is mourning. 
 
[Le centre est le puits.  
 
Le centre est le cri, la blessure vive, la clé.  
“Ne mise pas sur l’accoisemennt des flots, disait Reb Fayah. La mer est rancunière.” 
“Où est le centre? Hurlait Reb Madiés. L’eau répudiée permet au faucon de poursuivre 
sa proie.” 
Le centre est, peut-être le déplacement de la question. 
 
Point de centre où le cercle est impossible. 
[…] 
Le centre est le seuil 
[…] 
“Où est le centre? 
– Sous la cendre” Reb Selah 
[…] 
Le centre est le deuil].742  
 
By multiplying its meanings – the well, the cry, the wound, the margin, mourning, and so on – and 
by drawing connections between its contradictions – “the center is the margin” – Jabès affirms the 
																																																						




play of the sign over the ultimate absence of center. Derrida writes, “just as there is a negative 
theology, there is a negative atheology,” which work in tandem to project a desire for solid ground 
in “the phantom of the center.”743 Jabès’ Return to the Book highlights this projected phantom in 
the repetition of the closure of the book, and the displacement of its center. Ultimately, Derrida 
writes, “the center was the name of a hole.” The phantoms of closure, completeness, and center 
only work to cover over the abyss at the center, which is the trace of a rupture and an absence. 
 The third and final part of Return to the Book opens with the words of Reb Dérissa: 
“Tomorrow is the shadow of our hands and capacity to be reflected [Demain est l’ombre et la 
réflexibilité de nos mains].”744 Like Reb Rida before him, Reb Dérissa’s name bears an uncanny 
resemblance to Derrida – this time, the resemblance is a visual and vocal confusion of “s” and “d,” 
rather than an anagram. He noted in a letter to Jabès, “Ellipse” “closes with the signature of a 
certain Reb Dérissa.”745 Once more, Derrida is conscripted as a character in Return to the Book. 
By concluding “Ellipse” and thus Writing and Difference with the countersignature of Reb Dérissa, 
Derrida signs his own work in the rabbi’s name, inserting himself once more into the network of 
fictitious rabbis and characters in Jabès’ series. Following the publication of Writing and 
Difference, Derrida wrote Jabès in May 1967, “people often speak to me about you, about ‘Ellipse’ 
and the interlacing, the destruction, or reconstruction of our ‘noms d’auteurs,’ through these texts. 
Nothing gives me more joy. This play of names allows, as it must, the enigma in which we 
exist…”746 Unlike the uncanny appearance of Reb Rida in the first volume of The Book of 
Questions, Reb Dérissa was an intentional nod to his friend. Jabès conceded in his response to 
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Derrida: “Behind Reb Rida and Reb Dérissa, there is without a doubt the same man.” 747 Derrida’s 
countersignatures insert him in the world of Jabès’ book, where imagination and memory are 
undivided. Jabès and Derrida’s connection is expressed as a play of names, sources, and quotations 
that intertwines their writing in a space undivided between reality and fiction, writing and 
interpretation, real and fake. The intertextual network tying together Jabès and Derrida as writers, 
characters, and interpreters in and of each other’s work. Echoing Reb Dérissa, Derrida writes, “The 
beyond of the closure of the book is neither to be awaited nor to be refound. It is there, but out 
there, beyond, within repetition, but eluding us there. It is there like the shadow of the book, the 
third party between the hands holding the book [Il est là comme l’ombre du livre, le tiers entre les 
deux mains tenant le livre].”748 The shadow in the space between our hands, between the book and 
the book, is irreducible to the closed totality of the book: this is the trace of the book, writing that 





Writing after the broken tablets discloses the fragmentation of language and the contingency of 
the written sign. The creative potential of human writing, inaugurated by Moses’ shattering of the 
original tablets, explodes the absolute book containing the totality of revealed truth. Derrida and 
Jabès’ exchanges in Le Livre des Questions and Writing and Difference, and their epistolary 
dialogue on these texts, frame the question of the book – its closure, its completeness, and its 
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destruction – in terms of the trace, and the fragmentation of language after the shattered tablets. 
We have highlighted the broken tablets as a Benjaminian dialectical image: from its biblical 
interpretations to its symbolic iterations in Jabès and Derrida’s writing, this motif illustrates the 
rupture of the opposition in writing between law and freedom, tradition and rebellion. 
The legacy of the broken tablets leads Derrida and Jabès to frame their writing in opposition 
to the unicity and closure of the absolute book. In May 1967, Jabès wrote to Derrida praising the 
recent publication of Writing and Difference: “Your Book is One in its multiple paths. It is the 
daybreak that contests a thousand fires […] One needs night, the shadows which gleam, in its near 
infinity, light.”749 The texts in Derrida’s book are assembled chronologically, but they fit together 
as if by bricolage, woven by the binding that joins its pages; nonetheless, he resists framing Writing 
and Difference as the closure of a synthetic totality. The multiplicity contained within its covers 
illustrates the closure of the book, which was Derrida’s focus in “Ellipse.” Jabès’ letter highlights 
the play of light and shadows as a metaphor for presence and absence in Derrida’s book, alluding 
to Reb Dérissa’s words, “Demain est l’ombre et la réfléxibilité de nos mains.” The interlacing of 
names and characters in Jabès and Derrida’s writing obliterate the line between philosophy and 
literature, and the division of reality and fiction. Jabès writes in the closing pages of Return to the 
Book, “In the book reality learns and reveals what it is: a visible your reality which we can front 
with itself, with its base in the summoned word [Dans le livre, la réalité apprend et révèle ce 
qu’elle est; une irréalité visible que nous confrontons avec elle-même, à sa base dans le vocable 
convoqué].”750 The line separating reality from fiction is an illusion indulged by the book. By the 
same token, concluding the final essay of Writing and Difference with the countersignature of 
Jabès’ imaginary Reb Dérissa, Derrida inscribes his text in the domain of literature and fiction. 
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Writing and Difference has no introduction or conclusion. The volume opens with an 
epigraph from Mallarmé’s Un Coup de dès, “le tout sans nouveauté qu’un espacement de la 
lecture,” followed by its eleven essays. The final word in Derrida’s book is a short note in small 
type appended just after its bibliography, which pertains to the connection between the volume’s 
texts. Translator Alan Bass observes it is surely the most difficult passage to translate in the book: 
By means of the dates of these texts, we would like to indicate [marquer] that in order to 
bind them together, in rereading them, we cannot maintain an equal distance from each of 
them. What remains here the displacement of a question certainly forms a system. With 
some interpretive sewing [couture] we could have sketched this system afterward. We have 
only permitted isolated points [le pointille] of the system to appear, deploying or 
abandoning in it those blank spaces without which no text is proposed as such. If text [texte] 
means cloth [tissu], all these essays have obstinately defined sewing as basting [faufilure]. 
  
Par la date de ces textes, nous voudrions marquer qu'à l'instant, pour les relier, de les relire, 
nous ne pouvons nous tenir à égale distance de chacun d'eux. Ce qui reste ici le deplacement 
d’une question forme certes un systeme. Par quelque couture interpretative, noun aurions 
su après-coup le dessiner. Nous n'en avons rien laissé paraitre que le pointille, y menageant 
on y abandonnant ces blancs sans lesquels aucun texte jamais ne se propose comme tel. Si 
texte veut dire tissu, tous ces essais en out obstinement defini la couture comme faufilure.751  
 
Derrida highlights the hipukh connecting book binding [relier] and re-reading [relire], and weaves 
together the language of textuality and textiles. The eleven essays in Derrida’s collection are held 
together “some interpretive sewing,” which form a system through the “displacement of a 
question.” He has only allowed isolated points, “le pointille,” to appear by setting aside the blank 
space of the page, the “blank spaces [ces blancs] without which no text is proposed as such.” 
Derrida suggests that the connections between the texts does not form a closed totality that aspires 
to rival the absolute book, but rather a porous, open-ended composition shot through by negativity 
and the play of difference. The phrase from the preface to Mallarmé’s Un Coup de dès which he 
cites in the epigraph, “le tout sans nouveauté qu’un espacement de la lecture,” continues, “Les 
																																																						




‘blancs,’ en effet, assument l’importance, frappent d’abord.”752 Gesturing to Mallarmé’s words, it 
is as if Derrida has inscribed his text in the hiatus of the preface to “Un Coup de dès.” Writing and 
Difference is held together by the blank space of the page, words that cannot be said, memories 
and experiences for which there are no words. By the same token, Jabès concludes Le Retour au 
Livre, “man does not exist. God does not exist. The world alone exists through God and man in 
the open book [L’homme n’existe pas. Dieu n’existe pas. Seul existe le monde à travers Dieu et 
l’homme dans le livre ouvert].”753 The negativity of God and the human being shine in the text. 
The final sentence develops the closure of the text in terms of stitching textiles: “If text 
[texte] means cloth (tissu),” Derrida writes, “all these essays have obstinately defined sewing 
[couture] as basting [faufilure].” Alain Bass’ introduction to his English translation of Writing and 
Difference explains the etymological connection between text and textile: “the word texte, is 
derived from the Latin textus, meaning cloth (tissu), and from texere, to weave (tisser); in English 
we have text and textile.”754 But, the stitching that weaves together the texts of Writing and 
Difference is not a permanent bind, but a loose “basting” stich. Bass explains Derrida’s 
conspicuous use of faufilure: “the faux, ‘false,’ in fau-filure, or ‘false stringing,’ is actually an 
alteration of the earlier form of the word, farfiler or fourfiler, from the Latin fors, meaning outside. 
Thus basting is sewing on the outside which does not bind the textile tightly.” The texts composing 
Writing and Difference are not bound in a closed totality that separates an inside from an outside, 
but a written trace connected through the preliminary first stitch. In the aftermath of the shattered 
tablets, Jabès and Derrida’s writing bears these scars of the fragmentation, incompleteness, and 
impermanence of the trace. 
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From the shattered fragments of the absolute book, a new notion of philosophy emerges in postwar 
France which rejects the teleology of Hegelian idealism and treats philosophy as an adventure of 
thought. An adventure is a break from the ordinary, its course is unpredictable, its conclusion 
unknown, and it carries danger and risk. Rethinking philosophy as an adventure reorients its 
objectives and methods, and it fractures its principal object, the monolithic book of absolute 
knowledge. Adventure undermines the neat separation of fiction and fact, revealing the latent 
narrative structure and the textuality which cannot be separated from the world of lived experience. 
For the generation of thinkers who emerged amidst the rebellious fervor of the 1960s, criticism of 
Hegel’s teleological vision of history demanded a reconsideration of philosophy and its relation to 
reason. This reassessment of philosophy as adventure initiates a turn to literature, and as a 
reconsideration of the formal and methodological constraints of philosophical inquiry.  
The focus on adventure captures a certain air of the times: it marks a rejection of the formal 
academism and a rethinking of the relation between theory and practice during the tumultuous 
years of the 1960s. In the Adventure of French Philosophy, Alain Badiou describes his generation 
of French philosophers who emerged in the 1960s as “adventurers of the concept”:  
But the French philosophical moment was more interested in greatness than in happiness. 
We wanted something quite unusual, and admittedly problematic: our desire was to be 
adventurers of the concept. We were not seeking a clear separation between life and 
concept, nor the subordination of existence to the idea or the norm. Instead, we wanted the 
concept itself to be a journey whose destination we did not necessarily know. The epoch 
of adventure is, unfortunately, generally followed by an epoch of order. This may be 




would say. Yet 'adventurers of the concept' might be a formula that could unite us all; and 
thus I would argue that what took place in late twentieth-century France was ultimately a 
moment of philosophical adventure.755  
 
Badiou describes his generation as “adventurers of the concept,” a philosophical approach which 
overwhelms the distinctions between concept and experience, life and work, philosophy and non-
philosophy. Against the rigid determinations which divide philosophy according to its traditional 
conceptual domains – metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, logic – Badiou’s generation 
sought to reinvent philosophy in such a manner that broke down these traditional categories, 
extending the place of the philosopher beyond its traditional academic confines of metaphysics 
and epistemology, to further engage literature, politics, and ordinary experience in a new way. This 
adventure of philosophy knows no predetermined conceptual limitations, and it is not limited by 
preordained boundaries imposed by idealistic philosophy. These philosophers who emerged in the 
1960s, these “adventurers of the concept,” endorsed a notion of philosophy as a journey that 
confronts the unknown, unbound by the conventions of philosophy’s past.756  
Edmond Jabès, Emmanuel Levinas, and Jacques Derrida are three such “adventurers of the 
concept,” who reflect on the relation of textuality and lived experience in the book as a kind of 
adventure. For these writers, the book is not the site of absolute knowledge, but rather an 
articulation of the unpredictable and fractured path of philosophical thought, which is inseparable 
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from literature. Even in their divergences, Levinas, Derrida, and Jabès’ reflections on the 
“adventure” of philosophy oppose the teleology of Hegelian idealism, and embrace 
unpredictability and incalculability. The critique of philosophical idealism rejects the model of 
knowledge endowed in the absolute book, and they seek out the incalculability of adventure. In 
Totality and Infinity, Levinas reproaches philosophy’s faith in the supremacy of thought: “the 
transcendence of thought remains closed in itself despite all its adventures.”757 The philosophy of 
totality edifies the transcendence of thought, but this cuts off self-consciousness from encountering 
the thinking of otherness; Levinas suggests that philosophy must open itself up to the encounter 
with the radical alterity of the other, which he describes as a kind of adventure. Derrida describes 
in Voice and Phenomenon “the adventure of the metaphysics of presence”758 in the history of 
philosophy. If the history of metaphysics is an adventure, rather than the preordained outcome of 
the teleological movement of history, then philosophy must be understood as a story whose 
outcome remains uncertain. As he proclaims in “Structure, Sign, and Play,” “in absolute chance, 
affirmation also surrenders itself to genetic indetermination, to the seminal adventure of the 
trace.”759 The movement of the trace is the adventurous foray into the incalculability of writing. 
Jabès describes the adventure of writing in his 1975 Ça suit son cours where he writes, “the gesture 
of writing is, in the first place, a gesture of the arm, of the hand engaged in an adventure whose 
sign is thirst.”760 Between the hand holding the pen, and the blank page it confronts, writing marks 
the liminal space connecting the text and the world: “on one side the vocable, the work; on the 
other, the writer.” For Jabès, the adventure of writing consists in the immixing of text and world, 
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and the unpredictable course of narrative. This chapter reconstructs Derrida, Jabès, and Levinas’ 
dialogue on the adventure of thought in their major publications in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
Adventure reorients philosophy’s relation to the book: the book recounts the adventure of thought 
in movement in its pages, but this reformulation of philosophy is also an adventure of the book—
it is an adventure that pertains to the phenomenology of reading, as well as a rethinking of the 
relation between the fiction of the book and the world of lived experience.  
 
 
II. Reason contra Adventure  
 
To describe a philosophical approach as an “adventure” has often been used to suggest a flight of 
fancy, a departure from reason, and an invitation for speculation. For others, adventure represents 
the vitality and daring of philosophy to fearlessly ask questions. Indeed, the opposing use of 
adventure as a term of praise or derision has a distinguished philosophical history. The value of 
adventure is the subject of a notable disagreement between Kant and Goethe regarding knowledge 
of the origins of life. In the Critique of Judgment, Kant describes the attempt to understand the 
origin of life through the purposiveness of nature as “a daring adventure of reason,”761 for which 
human cognition is not equipped. For Kant, only a divine intellect capable of intuitive 
understanding could apprehend something in nature from the whole to its parts, “from the 
synthetically universal […] to the particular” to determine its origins.762 Human cognition is not 
capable of intuitive understanding, and to undertake a study of the origins of life on the basis of 
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sensible intuitions would be a misunderstanding of the limits of human cognition, and it would 
imply a fanciful misuse of reason. On this point, Goethe strongly disagrees with Kant, provoking 
him to respond in an introduction to a new, though ultimately abandoned Metamorphosis of Plants: 
Second Attempt. Goethe describes his unrelenting “pursuit of the archetypical,” for which “nothing 
could keep me from courageously plunging myself into the adventure of reason, as the sage of 
Königsberg himself has called it.”763 The value of adventure is at stake in this disagreement. Where 
for Kant adventure represents an overstretch of the limits of human reason, Goethe embraces 
adventure as the daring pursuit of the unknown. Is adventure antithetical to the sound use of reason, 
or is adventure a matter of audacity and daring? The question of adventure cleaves along similar 
lines for Edmund Husserl, who echoes Kant’s refusal to engage in adventures of reason when he 
insists in his 1931 Cartesian Meditations that “phenomenology's purely intuitive, concrete, and 
also apodictic mode of demonstration excludes all ‘metaphysical adventure,’ all speculative 
excesses.”764 The “metaphysical adventure” which Husserl decries as too speculative for 
phenomenological description suggests an irreconcilable conflict between reason and adventure. 
Challenging those who decry adventure as an invitation for speculation, there exists a 
counter-tradition that embraces philosophy’s adventurous spirit. The emblematic figure of this 
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anti-rationalist attitude is Friedrich Nietzsche, who wholeheartedly embraces philosophy as 
adventure. In Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche describes the philosopher’s need “to experience 
the most manifold and contradictory states of joy and distress in soul and body, as adventurers and 
circumnavigators of that inner world called ‘man’.”765 Likewise, as he writes in Ecce Homo, “when 
I call up the image of a perfect reader, what emerges is a monster of courage and curiosity, who is 
also supple, clever, cautious, a born adventurer and discoverer.”766 Nietzsche applauds the 
boldness of the adventurous reader, who has the courage to seek out the unknown and take risks 
beyond calculated decisions. This adventurous character has been snuffed out of human beings by 
modern society, which refuses to admit such animal instincts in civilized men. By contrast, the 
adventurer’s spirit is epitomized by his hero Zarathustra, whose own philosophical reflections 
takes the form of an adventure. In the chapter entitled “On Science” in the final part of Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, Nietzsche’s hero decries the loss of humanity’s courage for adventure. This animal 
instinct has been replaced by the herd-like power of fear: 
Fear you see – is our exception. But courage and adventure and pleasure in uncertainty, in 
what is undared – courage seems to me humanity's whole prehistory. He envied and robbed 
the wildest, most courageous animals of all their virtues: only thus did he become – 
human.767  
 
Out of fear, humanity has repressed its courage for adventure to become the docile human beings 
adapted to modern society; Nietzsche identifies the desire for adventure with the “Dionysian” 
element of human beings, along with their carnal, erotic, and animal drives, by contrast with the 
“Apollonian” drives for reason, morality, and ruling structure. Indeed, as David B. Allison 
describes the philosopher’s work in The New Nietzsche, “it is an adventure, then, with an urgency 
																																																						
765 Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, trans. by R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1986), I, ‘Preface’, 7. 
766 Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, in The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, translated by Judith Norman 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005), §3, 103. 




that is, strictly speaking, unheard of.”768 The adventurous quality that Nietzsche cheers in 
philosophy stands in contrast to Kant’s broad dismissal of metaphysical adventures. Whether 
adventure is an expression of speculative folly or the courage to confront the unknown, it embodies 
values pertaining to the purpose of philosophy itself: is philosophy defined by the cultivation of 
reason in concepts and systems, or is it rather characterized by the irrepressible curiosity to seek 
out the unknown? Whereas rationalist philosophy relegates adventure to the domain of literature, 
Nietzsche declares the philosopher an adventurer who courageously faces the unknown. 
 The exceptional and unpredictable character of adventure is emblematic of a certain 
modernism. In Georg Simmel’s 1910 essay “The Philosophy of Adventure,” the German 
sociologist and philosopher sketches the formal aspects of adventure, whose most general feature 
is its interruption of ordinary life: an adventure insists on “dropping out of the continuity of life,”769 
marking an interruption in the continuous thread of the adventurer’s life. Simmel explains, 
“adventure stands in contrast to that interlocking of life-links, to that feeling that those counter-
currents, turnings, and knots still, after all, spin forth a continuous thread.”770An adventure is a 
part of one’s life, yet it also constitutes a break from everyday experience, it is “the exclave of life, 
the 'torn-off',” “like an island in life which determines its beginning and end according to its own 
formative powers and not like the part of a continent also according to those of adjacent 
territories.”771 The logic of adventure functions apart from ordinary life, it has a coherency which 
offers its own meaning, yet it is also the adventure that gives meaning to ordinary life. Adventure 
has no necessary content, it is rather a “form of experiencing.”772 For Simmel, adventure has two 
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formal conditions. First, an adventure must have narrative coherency, with “a specific organization 
of some significant meaning with a beginning and an end.”773 Second, the adventure must express 
a kind of necessity for the adventurer. An adventure does not occur simply by chance, rather 
“transcending, by a mysterious necessity, life's more narrowly rational aspects,” the call to 
adventure takes the allure of necessity in connection with one’s life, even if the source of the 
calling is unknown. On both points, the meaning of the adventure depends on the perspective of 
the adventurer, which comprises “a particular encompassing of the accidentally external by the 
internally necessary.”774 The adventurer confronts a series of events which find coherence and 
necessity for him or her; for an external observer, the connection between the events may appear 
haphazard, even illusory. Don Quixote’s battles with windmills dramatize this all too well: 
adventure is construed subjectively, and the source of its calling, like its outcome, is unknown.  
Undertaking an adventure is akin to viewing a work of art: it is an experience that is of this 
world, yet it is also a gateway to another. Like the work of art, adventure is cut off from ordinary 
life, but it can illuminate the meaning of one’s entire life. In this sense, Simmel suggests the desire 
for adventure is illustrative of a certain modernism. The acute awareness of temporal passage, the 
intensification of the present moment, and the desire to escape the mundane experience of the 
everyday are illustrative of the modernist attention to subjective experience and temporality. 
Nonetheless, “so much of life is hostile to adventure.”775 Everyday life is organized by mundane 
decisions and predictable outcomes which lend a semblance of coherence to the logic of one’s life. 
The urge to escape the banality of the everyday, to unlock the sublime power of the present 
moment, is at the heart of the interest in adventure. One might go as far as to qualify life itself as 
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a kind of adventure. Simmel writes, “to have such a remarkable attitude toward life, one must 
sense above its totality a higher unity, a super-life.”776 Life can be understood as an adventure only 
with regards to a higher order of existence, from which the adventure of life would serve as an 
interruption: it beckons what Simmel calls “a metaphysical order,” of which “earthly, conscious 
life is only an isolated fragment as compared to the unnamable context of an existence running its 
course in it.” This belief in existence beyond life takes many forms, but it “merely expresses the 
running together, in life, of the symptoms of adventure.” Conceived as an adventure, life takes the 
form of a coherent narrative, whose twists and turns are directed towards the fulfilment of a goal 
or objective. Simmel writes, “adventure appears admixed with all practical human existence,” and 
“every single experience contains a modicum of […] adventure.”777 Unlocking the adventure of 
the everyday is the quintessential modernist experience of escape from the mundane. For Proust, 
the taste and smell of a madeleine sends his narrator on an adventure through time back to 
memories of his grandmother; Joyce’s Ulysses relives Homer’s epic adventures in one day through 
the streets of Dublin. The adventure of the everyday illustrates the heightening of time 
consciousness, the intensification of the present, and the incalculability of the future. Simmel 
continues, “the philosopher is the adventurer of the spirit,” calling upon fate and freedom to 
confront uncertain events with “the typical fatalism of the adventurer.” 
Vladimir Jankélévich expands on Simmel’s analysis in his 1963 L’aventure, l’ennnui, le 
sérieux, emphasizing the temporality of adventure as a relation to the future. Laure Barillas, Pierre-
Alban Guinfolleau, and Frédéric Worms explain, “for Jankélévitch, what anguishes the subject is 
the – often banal – coming [avènement] of what will happen to him with certainty, but he ignores 
what it will really be: he knows that something new will happen, but he doesn’t know what this 
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novelty is.”778 Viewed as a relation to an uncertain future, he operates “a conceptual displacement 
in his definition of adventure,” which is no longer a “category of action, polarized by its twists and 
turns [péripéties], but becomes a disposition towards being in time, oriented towards the future.” 
To this end, Jankélévitch distinguishes the aventurier, the adventurer, and the aventureux, the 
adventurous person. The adventurer is a “professional adventurer,” whose interest in adventure is 
a means to an end, “a bourgeois who cheats at the bourgeois game”; by contrast, the adventurous 
person typifies “a style of life” with a specific disposition towards the future.779 These two forms 
of adventure are qualitatively different, engendering different existential dispositions. 
Jankélévitch describes the minimal unit of adventure, which he calls “the infinitesimal 
adventure” or “elementary adventure,” as essentially a relation to future possibilities: adventure 
concerns the future, but what precisely the future has in store is crucially unknown. He notes “the 
amphibolic, ambiguous, equivocal character of adventure” which is crucial for its articulation. 
Echoing Goethe’s adoption of the “adventure of reason,” Jankélévitch emphasizes its 
incalculability. Kant describes amphiboly in the Critique of Pure Reason as "a confounding of an 
object of pure understanding with appearance."780 Because an adventure never divulges its 
outcome in advance, the (subjective) appearance of adventure is bound to be blurred with the 
(objective) intelligible form of adventure. The amphiboly is produced by confusing the appearance 
of an adventure with the ultimate fulfillment of the adventure, which can only be judged 
retroactively. Adventure depends on this amphiboly: it is precisely the impossibility of knowing 
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in advance whether the hero emerges victorious or if the adventure veers into tragedy which 
maintains the adventure. Jankélévitch explains, “the future is ambiguous because it is both certain 
and uncertain. What is certain is that the future will be, that a future will come [adviendra]; but 
what it will be, this is what remains enveloped in the fog of uncertainty.” Adventure depends on 
this tension: once its outcome becomes certain, it is no longer an adventure. The aventureux 
maintains the same double relation to the future as Pascal’s reflection on infinity in his Pensées: 
“We know that the infinite exists without knowing its nature.”781 Jakélévitch comments, “does not 
adventure suffer from the infinite? I know that [que], and I don’t know what [quoi]. The future is 
a je-ne-sais-quoi. Further: the infinitesimal adventure is connected to the coming of the event 
[l'avènement de l'événement].”782 Whereas the adventurer calculates future events, the adventurous 
person responds to the uncertain-certainty of “coming of the event,” with free improvisation: 
The event [evènement] is only a date on the calendar; but its coming [l'avènement] is felt 
like the “Advent” of a mystery. The event comes too late for adventure: I am face to face 
and nose to nose with it, and it is no longer the time to courageously face up to this flagrant 
present. Rather, the coming is the pending instant [l'avènement est l'instant en instance]: 
not actuality in the making, nor is it made progressively, but still on the brink of the making 
[…] adventure is connected to the extemporaneity of improvisation.  
 
Adventure is not limited to an interruptive and extraordinary form of experience, rather the 
existential disposition of the adventurous person is oriented to confront the uncertain possibilities 
of the future with freedom and improvisation at any moment. “Such is the aventure-minute,” 
Jankélévitch writes, “the minuscule adventure of the next minute, which maintains the 
unpredictable instant of the pending minute, and which makes the heart beat.” The aventureux 
responds to the incalculability of the “coming of the event” with creativity and improvisation. 
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 “The vertiginous passion of adventure” is always divided between opposing motivations: 
while the adventurous person encounters risks and dangers with “timidity at the precipice of 
novelty,” he or she is also drawn to adventure by “the crazed desire to profane a secret, to decrypt 
the mystery of the future.” For the subject of the adventure, “sometimes the heroic desire for peril, 
war, and catastrophe predominates,” and “sometimes horror blocks the desire.” Between attraction 
and horror, adventure involves an “oscillation of consciousness between play and seriousness,” 
without which “adventure ceases to be adventurous.” Without play, adventure descends into 
tragedy; without seriousness, adventure becomes trite. The tension nourishes the adventure. 
Similarly, adventure also requires an inside and an outside perspective: inside from the perspective 
of the subject of the adventure, and outside from the perspective of an audience. “The aventureux 
is inside-outside,” Jankélévitch explains, “Make of that what you can!” [Comprenne qui pourra!] 
Three species of adventure emerge from these relations. First, mortal adventure involves the threat 
of death. It is more internal than external, more serious than playful, and it is always on the cusp 
of become tragedy. “Death is the precious spice of adventure,” without some fear of death, there 
can be no risk or danger, and thus no stakes for adventure. Second, the aesthetic adventure “has 
for its center not death, but beauty, which is the object of Art.” The aesthetic adventure is more 
external than internal, it involves the predominance of play over the serious aspect of adventure, 
and rather than an experience lived in the moment, it is “an adventure contemplated after the fact 
when it is finished.” The aesthetic adventure takes shape in its retelling. Jankélévitch evokes 
Kierkegaard’s remark, “Life can only be understood backwards; but it must be lived forwards.”783 
The narrative cogency of adventure is formed retroactively in its retelling, which lends aesthetic 
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form to the inchoate flux of present experience. Third, the amorous adventure is a sublime mix of 
serious and playful, internal and external, it is “extravital, extraterritorial, extraordinary.” 
Reminiscent of Simmel’s description of adventure as “an island in life,”784 Jankélévitch’s amorous 
adventure is a “joyous island, a parenthesis that is without relation to life as a whole.”785 In all its 
forms, adventure is “always precarious,” constantly at risk of veering off course and “losing its 
adventurous character.” This precariousness sustains its risk and thrill. 
 The philosophical interest in adventure is motivated by a desire to understand our perennial 
sense that we are on the cusp of the coming, avènement, of a changed future. The religious overtone 
of Jankélévitch’s avèvement is no accident. The temporal disposition towards the “coming of the 
event” parallels the relation to revelation in the Abrahamic religions, it has the same formal 
structure as messianism: 
It sometimes seems that we are living in a period of advent [avènement]: our epoch gives 
us the impression that we are leaning into the future. “Vers le monde qui vient”… isn’t this 
the title of a book by Edmond Fleg? We often write that events happen quickly, that the 
time comes, that the time has come, that the time is close, that we are in the Advent of a 
mystical celebration where everything will be resolved. It is true that people have always 
said these things. Since we announced the premises of the coming and the approach of 
time, how is the time not yet here? The two Writings, The Old and the New, the Prophets 
and the Gospel, announce the nascent dawn and the imminence of a great event. Ἐρχόµενος 
ἥξει, veniens veniet. Ἰδού ἔρχεται, ecce venit : God is almost present, not yet, but almost! 
 
The belief in the almost or nearly is crucial in religion as in politics as the basic anticipatory 
structure of messianism, whether it is the coming revelation or revolution. It maintains the belief 
that the present is nearly the moment of rupture, where a coming event will shatter the status quo. 
That the present is always-already on the cusp of a future event – the coming of a messianic event 
that is “almost-already” here – discloses the temporality of the religious adventure of a partially 
hidden God who promises to reveal himself further in a future moment to come. This God, 
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Jankélévitch explains, is “half hidden, fere absconditus.” This adventure of revelation is shared by 
the Abrahamic traditions, but the reference to Jewish scholar Edmond Fleg is noteworthy. Fleg 
was a poet, playwright, and scholar, and he was a co-founder of the Colloque des intellectuels juifs 
de langue française, where Jankélévitch was a regular participant; his 1960 book Vers le monde 
qui vient offered a message of hope for building a bridge between Jewish and Christian 
communities – a new adventure of the Abrahamic religions – after the Shoah.786 Emphasizing the 
homologous structure of the religious adventure alongside its literary and philosophical variants, 
Jankélévitch rejects the Greek tradition’s monopoly on adventure, and suggests that any experience 
has the potential to become adventure. By introducing fantasy and uncertainty into lived 
experience, adventure forces us to consider the possibility of a changed future: 
The evasions of adventure help us discover pathos, drama, and passion in an existence that 
is over-regulated by economic and social fatalities and the compartmentalization of urban 
life. Adventure, which introduces pathetic tension and fantasy into existence, reminds us 
that social barriers are fluid: it equalizes the inferior and superior, brings together the 
unequal, erases distances, upends hierarchies, softens an overly rigid notion of justice; 
thanks to adventure, shepherds can marry ambassadors.  
 
Adventure insists on the inexorable possibility of the unexpected, it forces us to expand our 
expectations of how the world could be otherwise. The aventureux confronts the certain-
uncertainty of the future with creativity and ingenuity.  
The question of adventure enables Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir to explore the 
possibilities of truth and fiction in the philosophical novel. Certain phenomena are only accessible 
through literary exploration, as a different modality of the adventure of thought. In Beauvoir’s 
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1945 essay “Literature and Metaphysics,” she identifies the ability of the “metaphysical novel” to 
evoke certain ideas which are inaccessible to traditional philosophy. Whereas philosophical 
systems construct knowledge based on fixed concepts and axioms, literature can access a thicker 
mode of description without a preconceived conclusion. Beauvoir writes, “the novel will appear 
as an authentic adventure of the mind.”787 Systematic philosophy is incompatible with the novel 
because understands the world through preconceived concepts that telegraph the meaning of 
phenomena; the appeal of the philosophical novel stems directly from its adventure, whose 
uncertain outcome is only revealed in the telling. Beauvoir continues, “One renounces the 
philosophical novel if one defines philosophy as a fully constituted, self-sufficient system. Indeed, 
the adventure of the mind is lived out in the course of the building of the system.” The 
unpredictable fate of the adventurer contrasts with the fixed destiny of the Hegelian sage who must 
sacrifice himself for the absolute book. The philosophical novel calls upon the “adventure of the 
mind,” freeing it from the fatalism of the concept, following the adventure wherever it may lead.  
 The possibility of adventure is the central question in Sartre’s Nausea. When he initially 
submitted the novel to Gallimard, his editors considered the title inadequate, and suggested 
renaming it The Extraordinary Adventures of Antoine Roquentin, with a notice below that would 
state, in contradiction, “There are no adventures.”788 While this alternative title was ultimately 
rejected, it indicates the dual face of adventure in Sartre’s novel. Roquentin has settled in Bouville 
to write a history thesis about 18th century adventurer M. de Rollebon, only to realize that his life 
has been devoid of real adventures. For Roquentin, the difference between adventure and mere 
memories lies in the telling: “you have to choose: live or tell.”789 One can perceive the inchoate 
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events of life as part of the continuum of experience, or one can tell a story. The retelling of an 
ordinary event as if it were a story, indeed a true story, can transform anything into an adventure. 
“This is what fools people: a man is always a teller of tales,” Roquentin writes, “he tries to live his 
own life as if he were telling a story.” One can choose to remember the drab events of the past, or 
to construct the edifice of adventure. There is a teleology of storytelling: the framing of the tale 
determines its conclusion from its beginning, and from there “the story goes on in the reverse.” 
But to reconstruct the well-ordered coherency of one’s life based on events as they were 
experienced, “you might as well try and catch time by the tail.” Sartre’s protagonist realizes the 
thrill of adventure has little to do with events, but stems from an awareness of temporal passage: 
This feeling of adventure definitely does not come from events: I have proved it. It’s rather 
the way in which the moments are linked together. I think this is what happens: you 
suddenly feel that time is passing, that each instant leads to another, this one to another 
one, and so on; that each instant is annihilated, and that it isn’t worth while to hold it back, 
etc., etc. And then you attribute this property to events which appear to you in the instants; 
what belongs to the form you carry over to the content. You talk a lot about this amazing 
flow of time but you hardly see it. You see a woman, you think that one day she’ll be old, 
only you don’t see her grow old. But there are moments when you think you see her grow 
old and feel yourself growing old with her: this is the feeling of adventure. If I remember 
correctly, they call that the irreversibility of time. The feeling of adventure would simply 
be that of the irreversibility of time. 
 
Roquentin’s nausea overtakes him, awakening him to the absurdity of own existence, and the 
contingency of the objects in the world around him. This adventure is the experience of 
temporality: it is not his travels, but his nausea which awakens the sense of adventure that he had 
desperately sought. In a moment of meta-fictional admission, Roquentin writes, “the word 
absurdity is coming to life under my pen.” The adventure is his nausea, which allows him to 
articulate the absurdity of existence that evades the philosopher’s pen. James Wood explains, 




arbitrariness — of reality itself.”790 The novel ends when Roquentin abandons his thesis and 
decides to write a novel, “something that could never happen, an adventure,” which would 
“beautiful and hard as steel and make people ashamed of their existence.”791 In this sense, Nausea 
is ultimately a novel about writing a novel – this novel. The transformation of the ineffable 
philosophical notions of absurdity, contingency, and fictionality into the “adventure of the mind” 
unlocks the philosopher from the yoke of the concept, and unleashes the adventure of the book—
this is the adventure Roquentin uncovers sitting on a park bench contemplating a chestnut tree. 
 Adventure also describes the unpredictable twists and turns of the history of philosophy, 
in contrast to the teleological movement of Hegelian history. Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s 1955 book 
Adventures of the Dialectic stakes a philosophy of experience on the basis of political philosophy, 
by retracing the historical development of the concept of the dialectic through its developments in 
the previous century. Merleau-Ponty diagnoses the failure of the dialectic to reap its promised 
rewards in the concrete facts of history. “Revolutionary politics proclaimed synthesis as its 
immediate goal,” he writes, “The dialectic was going to appear in concrete facts. Revolution was 
the sublime moment in which reality and values, subject and object, judgment and discipline, 
individual and totality, present and future, instead of colliding, would little by little enter into 
complicity.”792 That moment has not come, and the hopes that dialectic will reveal itself in the 
facts of the world seems unlikely. To “bring this liquidation of the revolutionary dialectic to its 
conclusion,” Merleau-Ponty proposes “the adventures of the dialectic […] are errors through 
which it must pass.”793 The teleological movement of the dialectic is ultimately more fiction than 
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reality, a fever that will eventually pass. Post-Marxist scholars have extended the trajectory traced 
by Merleau-Ponty’s Adventure of the Dialectic, including Martin Jay’s Marxism and Totality: The 
Adventures of a Concept from Lukács to Habermas or Warren Breckman’s Adventures of the 
Symbolic.794 Similarly, in his analysis of the theological-political stakes of democratic societies 
and the “adventure of their disintrication” from religion, Claude Lefort cautions against “any new 
adventure that begins with the formulation of a new idea of the state, the people, the nation or 
humanity is that it has its roots in the past.”795 Such an adventure anchored in the past, like 
Odysseus’ nostos, can only seek to return to its origin, rather than facing the alterity of the Other. 
 
 
III. Jabès, Derrida, and “Feux des mots” 
 
 Derrida’s three major 1967 publications interrogate the adventure of philosophy. “Force 
and Signification,” the first essay in Writing and Difference, provocatively begins with an 
anticipatory post-mortem for structuralism. From the perspective of the future anterior in which 
structuralism will have already met its end, he foresees the legacy of the structuralist moment will 
have been not a discrete set of innovations or concepts, but rather an “adventure in vision”: 
If it recedes one day, leaving behind its works and signs on the shores of our civilization, 
the structuralist invasion might become a question for the historian of ideas, or perhaps 
even an object. But the historian would be deceived if he came to this pass: by the very act 
of considering the structuralist invasion as an object he would forget its meaning and would 
forget that what is at stake, first of all, is an adventure of vision, a conversion of the way 
of putting questions to any object posed before us, to historical objects—his own—in 
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particular. And, unexpectedly among these, the literary object.796  
 
It is rather daring to begin one of his first major publications by predicting the demise of 
structuralism at the height of its popularity. Imagining a future in which structuralism has met its 
end, Derrida posits that structuralism should not be understood as a historical object which yielded 
discrete inventions or events as its legacy. This would betray the true legacy of structuralism as an 
“adventure in vision.” The structuralist adventure consists in a change in perspectives, “a 
conversion of the way of putting questions,” rather than leaving as its legacy a discrete historical 
object to be discovered as a kind of material or conceptual relic. This “adventure in vision” 
reorients language and the limits of semiology. Similarly, in “Structure, Sign, and Play,” he 
describes the play of presence and absence in the text as “the seminal adventure of the trace.”797 
In this register, adventure suggest a shift in perspective to a new thinking of writing as the trace, 
embracing the uncertainty and indeterminacy of the linguistic sign and its signification. 
Derrida employs adventure in a second register to describe the enduring illusions or fictions 
in the history of philosophy. In “Cogito and the History of Madness,” published in Révue de 
métaphysique et de morale in 1964 and the second essay in Writing and Difference, he describes 
“the adventure of Western reason” and “the adventure or misadventure of classical reason” that 
has marginalized the discourse of madness.798 In Voice and Phenomenon, Derrida identifies the 
history and meaning of the classical notion of the sign which belongs to “the adventure of the 
metaphysics of presence.”799 Similarly, he writes in Of Grammatology, “the history of metaphysics 
is the history of a determination of being as presence,” and “its adventure merges with that of 
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logocentrism.”800 For Derrida, the “logocentric” domination of the spoken over the written word 
has reached its point of exhaustion and become untenable: it is an adventure that has reached its 
closure. The belief that human language is only a moment or aspect of natural writing is a fiction 
which dissimulates by “willfully misleading us, only in the course of an adventure: as that 
adventure itself. All in all a short enough adventure.”801 Reminiscent of Merleau-Ponty’s use of 
adventure as the historical or narrative trajectory of a concept, this historical adventure is a kind 
of fiction that has outlasted its usefulness. Derrida works through these philosophical adventures 
by retracing their paths, exposing their missteps, and indicating how they could have gone 
otherwise. In both registers, his notion of adventure suggests the historical arc of ideas rather than 
eternal platonic truths, the temporality of concepts under erasure.  
The second wave of publications in 1972 further develop Derrida’s adventure of 
philosophy. His essay “Différance” in Margins of Philosophy opens by recounting the adventure 
of a letter: “I will speak, therefore, of a letter. Of the first letter, if the alphabet, and most of the 
speculations which have adventured in it [qui s'y sont aventurées].”802 The adventure of 
“différance” divulges the incalculability and unpredictability of writing, beginning with the 
deconstruction of difference itself as différance. Jabès writes of Derrida’s essay, “in the word 
différance, a letter, its seventh, is exchanged against the first in the alphabet, in secret, silently. 
And that is enough for the text to be other.”803 Echoing Jankélévitch’s aventureux who is oriented 
by the “coming of the event,” Derrida writes that “in the delineation of différance everything is 
strategic and adventurous,” where one follows the uncertain and risky future of the trace: 
Strategic because no transcendent truth present outside the field of writing can govern 
theologically the totality of the field. Adventurous because this strategy is not a simple 
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strategy in the sense that strategy orients tactics according to a final goal, a telos or theme 
of domination, a mastery and ultimate reappropriation of the development of the field. 
Finally, a strategy without finality, what might be called blind tactics or empirical 
wandering if the value of empiricism did not itself acquire its entire meaning in its 
opposition to philosophical responsibility. If there is a certain wandering in the tracing of 
différance, it no more follows the lines of philosophical-legal discourse than that of its 
symmetrical and integral inverse, empirical-logical discourse. The concept of play keeps 
itself beyond this opposition, announcing, on the eve of philosophy and beyond it, the unity 
of chance and the necessity in calculation without end.804  
 
The trace of différance is adventurous because it implies the play of presence and absence without 
a predetermined ending; the incalculability of the adventure must be approached strategically.  
Jabès describes the weaving of his life and writing in terms of an adventure. He explained 
in a 1986 interview, “for me writing is the adventure to live. And I live it as writing. I myself 
become a word, a phrase, and what the phrase say, they say it to me too.”805 The adventure of 
writing is the inmixing of fiction and lived experience. In a 1985 interview, Jabès expressed his 
desire to “disappear from the world of spoken sense and all its presumptions” and “enter into the 
adventure of writing.”806 Didier Cahen explains that Jabès’ adventure responds to the shadow of 
the Shoah, as an expression of the need to speak the unspeakable: 
In the 1960s, Le Livre des questions seemed to attract the avant-garde, by privileging a 
certain air of the times. In truth, the adventure that carries him and the experience that takes 
over him have little to do with so-called experimental literature. In fact, in the broken 
narrative between two adolescents, the shadow of the Shoah hovers over all its pages; but 
with a perfectly measured distance of words which must relearn to speak, to speak 
otherwise than by speaking, since it is also a certain adventure of meaning and the letter, 
an experience of time and being which almost perished in the death camps. This is the heart 
of the adventure which requires authentic formal un-discipline; thus its fragmentary, 
polymorphous, elliptical aspect: a new life of the book beyond the worst transgressions 
[“compromissions”] of meaning and reason.807 
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More than simply following the literary trends of the avant-garde, the fracturing of experience in 
Jabès’ writing responds to the utter breakdown in reason and meaning revealed by the Shoah. The 
adventure of The Book of Questions consists of the writing of the unspeakable, it is the adventure 
of writing that responds to an experience that threatened to extinguish meaning itself.  
The adventurous quality of Jabès’ writing is a function of its uncertain narrative course. 
Where the philosopher traditionally writes a text with the aim of lassoing a predetermined concept, 
Jabès’ writing follows the opposite path, enabling the imagination to follow an uncharted path 
towards an uncertain destination: 
The philosopher, when he writes a philosophical text, tries to circle the object of his 
thought, in making a concept perhaps, and then to develop it. While for me, this job of 
development is hidden, it's done inside me, and what is said is the end of all this 
development inside me. As if each time it was the last phrase, the last thing that remains 
from a long interrogation. That's how these aphorisms are presented, as in the process of 
thought, what has been kept, cancelled, kept, cancelled, and at the end one says the thing. 
Which is why thought itself is a dialogue, and these phrases are what is at the end of the 
dialogue. The theories one draws from my books are theories based on my practice of the 
text, and not on a general practice. One can take up the steps after, but not before. Before 
is the adventure.808 
 
Rather than the philosopher whose pursuit of the concept orients the path of writing in advance of 
its destination, Jabès allows himself to be led by writing, from which the adventure unfolds. The 
adventure lies in the pre-theoretical moment of writing where the direction of the narrative remains 
uncertain. François Laruelle explains that Jabès’ conception of writing is based on the immediacy 
of the creative spark: “the writer does not first have access to the book by the mediation of themes, 
objects, signifiers, figures, or images, he is immediately affected by the force that he experiences 
without delay, without distance, without postponement, without precaution, and which, by this 
haste, will add even more postponement and delay in the efficiency of the signified and the 
																																																						




signifier.”809 Jabès discloses the gripping immediacy of writing an uncertain future, his text is 
experienced both by the writer and reader as an adventure in the unpredictable.  
Jabès positions his writing as the other of philosophy, by questioning its foundations and 
undercutting its concepts. In his published exchanges with Derrida and Levinas, he challenges the 
law of the text, by inhabiting the language of his philosophical interlocutor to fracture its 
conceptuality from within. Cahen describes Jabès’ dialogue with philosophers as “an essentially 
non-thematic relationship. More than the words in a speech, Jabès is attentive to the ways that life 
manages to be exposed to philosophy.”810 His writing displaces the conceptual foundations of his 
philosophical interlocutors, challenging them to occupy a foreign ground. Thus, Cahen continues, 
“in the texts he consecrates to Derrida or Levinas, he plays the game of the other! As he must, the 
dialogue is not an exchange of positions, but a change of places.” Jabès’ unrelenting questioning 
submits philosophy to the quixotic dislocation on display throughout his writing. He addresses 
Levinas and Derrida in published texts in the 1970s by pushing their own words to the limit, and 
inhabiting their own positions against their authors: “it is to better ensure an improbable address 
that he deconstructs the letter he sends to Derrida. It is by citing Levinas to the word that he follows 
the trace of the other!” By positioning his writing as the other to philosophical discourse, Jabès 
disrupts its conceptual borders, and forces his interlocutors into occupying unfamiliar positions. 
 Adventure is at the forefront of Derrida’s readings of Le Livre des Questions. In “Edmond 
Jabès and the Question of the Book,” he describes the Jew’s existence in exile which forces him 
to seek refuge in history, by turning towards the possibilities endowed by the future. For the Jew, 
he writes, “The site is not the empirical and national Here of a territory. It is immemorial, and thus 
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also a future. Better: it is tradition as adventure.”811 The Jew’s exile is transmuted as text, 
experienced as a as a kind of adventure, turned towards an uncertain future. Where Jabès evokes 
writing after the broken tablets of the law, Derrida comments, “once more begins the adventure of 
the text as weed, as outlaw far from ‘the fatherland of the Jews,’ which is ‘a sacred text surrounded 
by commentaries.’”812 The adventure of the text illustrates the Jew’s exile, like Jabès’ obsession 
with commentary, which is “the very form of exiled speech.” The condition of exile frames the 
history of the “people of the book” as an adventure of writing experienced in textuality. Jabès 
writes in Le Retour au Livre, “adventure is a property of words [vertu du vocable].”813 The 
adventure of the book suggests its challenges are unforeseen, and its destination unknown. Against 
the fatalism of the absolute book whose ultimate object is nothing short of the totality of 
knowledge, the adventure reflects the text’s unpredictability and uncertainty. As Mallarmé writes, 
“Un coup de dès jamais n’abolira le hasard.” Adventure is always subject to the irrepressible play 
of chance, the possibility that the text does not lead down the expected road. “The joyous 
wandering of the graphein then became wandering without return,” Derrida writes in the opening 
passage of “Ellipse,” “the opening into the text was adventure, expenditure without reserve.”814 
The adventure of the text that develops in Derrida’s essay is played out in the opening of the book, 
the eternal return of the “boucle,” and the repetition of the book’s closure.  
Following Jabès’ naturalization as a French citizen in December 1967, he and Arlette took 
advantage of their newfound security to travel, and to take a more politically engaged stance amidst 
the events of May 1968 in Paris. Their apartment on the rue l’Epée-du-bois, in heart of the Latin 
Quarter, was in the geographic center of the student uprisings that upended the city, and despite 
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Jabès’ seniority with regards to the student protesters, he took part in some of the key protests 
including the large protest on May 13 around the Sorbonne and Odéon. Cahen reports that Edmond 
and Arlette found in the protests an “undeniable echo of the aspirations for a change of era, which 
is translated by Le Livre des Questions.”815 Many of Jabès’ elliptical and paradoxical expressions 
might well have been as slogans for the student protesters: we can imagine Jabès’ formulations 
such as “Voici venu le temps de défendre notre parole” or “Nous sommes liés par l’impossible” 
alongside some of the famous protests slogans, “Soyons réalistes, demandons l’impossible” or 
“Sous les pavés la plage.”816 The students’ demands surely resonated with Jabès’ own brief and 
frustrating experience as a student at the Sorbonne, where he was put off by the institution’s stuffy 
academism and formalism. He was impressed by the vitality of the student movement which raised 
similar plaints. During his frequent travels during the late 1960s, Jabès sent Derrida postcards from 
trips to Mallorca, Jerusalem, and Tunisia. This period also involved significant travel for Derrida. 
Following his spate of publications in 1967, he quickly gained notoriety in France and particularly 
in the United States, where he was invited to lecture and teach across the elite Northeastern 
university circuit in the late 1960s. He wrote postcards to Jabès from the Swiss Alps, Berlin, 
Venice, and the United States, including a 1968 postcard of Gilman Hall at Johns Hopkins 
University, where he touted the idyllic conditions he encountered in Baltimore.817 By the early 
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1970s, Derrida’s letters address “mon cher Eddie,” and Jabès writes to “mon cher Jacques”; Arlette 
and Marguerite often added notes as well. Their friendship was profoundly connected to the written 
letter and travel, in a dialogue sustained for years in publications and correspondence. 
Jabès prolonged The Book of Questions beyond its initial trilogy, and he published the 
subsequent volumes of the seven-part series in alternating years: Yaël in 1967, Elya in 1969, Aely 
in 1971, and El, ou le dernier livre in 1973. Derrida released “another tripartite Derridean 
biblioblitz” in 1972 with the publication of Dissemination, Margins of Philosophy, and 
Positions.818 While Jabès and Derrida do not explicitly engage each other’s work in this round of 
publications, the traces of their dialogue are widespread. Derrida wrote to Jabès after reading Yaël, 
reporting “c’était magnifique!”819 He sent Jabès “The Double Session” before it appeared in Tel 
Quel in 1970, and the latter expressed his admiration for a “text which is so perfectly close to me”: 
What I find admirable in what you write is your thought, by default, seems to want to learn 
everything on its path. You know everything, but you forget everything while listening to 
the text, which raises your interrogation; interrogation which is already in any event which 
you will awaken in passing. We go along with you, behind you, from discovery to 
discovery. Writing is Eurydice – in this mourning, texts in particles – certain keys are 
hidden, which you use.820 
 
If “writing is Eurydice,” then to gaze directly upon her condemns her back to the underworld, 
rather it is the uncertainty of her presence that sustains Orpheus’ adventure to rescue her. It is by 
taking risks that writing becomes adventure. In July 1971, Derrida wrote to Jabès, “I have just 
finished, more or less, the text that will open the collection (Dissemination) which will appear, I 
hope, next winter.”821 Jabès highlighted the collection’s first essay “Hors-Livre,” which he called 
“a great text which I ‘meditated’ at length (you know how close it is to me),” and he praised 
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Derrida’s daring: “Your books trouble us and comfort us. They are now at the heart of your 
existential contemplations.”822 Derrida’s audacity is that of the aventureux, who is attracted by the 
thrill and risk of adventure even as it inspires fear and dread.  
This adventure was further developed in a series of publications in the 1970s. In his 
contribution to the winter 1972-1973 issue of Les Nouveaux Cahiers dedicated to Jabès’ work, 
Derrida recalls fortuitously coming across Le Livre des Questions, “like a vault” which revealed 
“the unanticipatable”—a kind of Pandora’s box, unleashing the adventure of writing which is “the 
most repressed, the most familiar, unbearably close and known, the most anticipated.”823 This 
sympathetic view was, of course, mutual. Jabès wrote Derrida in September 1972, “my books owe 
you so much. You protected them across this difficult mortal path.”824 For Derrida, unleashing the 
“vault” of Jabès’ writing denudes an adventure where the question of writing is “gathered, 
speculated, staked, risked in advance in every atom of the book.” Before structuralism was in 
vogue, before it had developed “its titles, its revues, its parades, its devalued currencies, its 
frustrated mimes and tics,” Jabès had already made the question of writing the beating heart of his 
work. He describes the “aphoristic ruby” of Jabès’ poetry where “the shining aphorism still hides, 
it only shines in simulacra.” In a moment of glowing praise, Derrida proffers that in contemporary 
literature “nothing has been written that does not have its precedent somewhere in Jabès’ text.”825  
Jabès wrote to express “how much your note touched me,” and he responded in the issue 
of L’Arc on Derrida’s work later that year.826 His contribution, “Lettre to Derrida on the Question 
of the Book,” explicitly recalls Derrida’s “Edmond Jabès and the Question of the Book,” placing 
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the letter in the context of the dialogue inaugurated a decade earlier, and extending their private 
correspondence into publication.827 Jabès previewed that he had tried “to share the path, to affirm 
the infinite question and the infinite putting into question, the explosion of the book in the book.”828 
The published letter opens with an epigraph from a 1971 interview in which Derrida tells Jean-
Louis Houdebine and Guy Scarpetta, “I have also regularly tried to put philosophy back on stage, 
on a stage that it does not govern.”829 That philosophy must relinquish its claim to mastery and 
embrace the unpredictable hearkens Mallarmé’s declaration, “un coup de dès jamais n’abolira le 
hasard.” Jabès explains that he has decided to address Derrida in the form of a letter because “we 
can only speak to the other – or about the other – in the voice of an intimate dialogue.”830 He 
prefers to speak directly to his interlocutor rather than erecting a false veneer of distance. Didier 
Cahen explains, “the letter testifies to the most lively attention to the worry and the anxiety of the 
other as the ferment of questions and the resilience of the exchange.” 831 They share the audacity 
to plunge into the adventure of philosophy, a scene that it does not govern: “it is this radicality 
which unites the two friends so strongly.” Jabès’ letter resembles a prose poem, prolonging his 
epistolary dialogue with Derrida, which weaves between letters and publications.  
 The adventure of writing begins with the writer confronting the blank page. Jabès writes, 
“the blank page is not a grid that one must accommodate. It becomes this surely, but at what 
cost?”832 The possibility for writing to breach the infinity of the blank page in an act of creation is 
not bound by any a priori boundaries or strictures—this is the unbounded possibility for adventure: 
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Everything seems to happen as in a game of chess; but what strategy does one employ 
when, as in the case of Mallarmé, for example, the chessboard is all white? What game is 
conceivable when one removes from the players all possibility of playing? It is here that 
the adventure begins.833 
 
Jabès’ letter highlights the adventure of writing that begins with the gesture of the hand and follows 
an uncertain course. He describes his process of writing in the material terms of the contact of the 
ink of the pen on the page, connecting the vitality of his hand to the blank page: 
The gesture of writing is, in the first place, a gesture of the arm, of the hand engaged in an 
adventure whose sign is thirst; but the throat is dry and the body and thought are attentive. 
It is only later that one perceives that the forearm on the page marks the border between 
what is written and oneself. On one side, the vocable, the work; on the other, the writer. 
They will try to correspond but to no avail. The page remains the witness of two 
interminable monologues, and when voice is silenced, on both sides, it is the abyss.834 
 
The adventure is the spark of creation that emerges from the confrontation of the writer and the 
page, in the magical space between the blank page and the forearm. Echoing the crucial passage 
“La Boucle” from Le Retour au Livre, Jabès emphasizes the circularity of the book, as a 
confrontation of opposing forces which is always-already repeating its closure and 
recommencement: “We always depart from the written text to return to the text to be written, from 
the sea to the sea, from page to page [Nous partons toujours du texte écrit pour revenir au texte à 
écrire, de la mer à la mer, du feuillet au feuillet].”835 Jabès emphasizes that the end of the book is 
only the beginning of the next. Notably, he conserves Mallarmé’s notion of Le Livre Absolu: “In 
and above all imaginary closure, writing begins and finishes in its perpetual beginning; begins and 
finishes our passionate interrogation of an absolute – the Book – which is, definitively, outside-of-
time [outre-temps], only the white background where, in the day, the shadows of our counted 
vocables dance [dansent les ombres de nos vocables dénombrés].836 The irrevocable fracturing of 
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the absolute book – the symbolic fragments of the broken tablets – disseminates writing beyond 
the binding of the book and into the far reaches of the world because “it is in fragmentation that 
the immeasurable totality is given to read.”837 The repetition of the book and its fragmentation is 
the Sisyphean task of the writer: “Everything is put in movement – in question – by writing.”838  
The operative tool for Derrida in this fragmentation of the absolute book is différance, 
which Jabès describes as a “synonym for mine,” in its fourfold French meaning as the nib of a 
pencil, a person’s facial appearance, an underground deposit of minerals, and an explosive 
device.839 Indeed, the non-concept of différance is a technique of writing, as well as a relation to 
the Other, which in a certain sense extracts its material from deposits hidden deep within the 
grounds of history and metaphysics. Jabès emphasizes the explosive power of différance, a kind 
of landmine that obliterates the ground beneath our feet. Indeed, as he wrote in a letter to Derrida, 
différance is “the explosion of the book in the book.”840 
 Jabès highlights elemental metaphors of water and fire to illustrate the contradictory if 
essential question of writing and the book. He compares the role of the writer to the keeper of the 
lighthouse, who forgets that the lighthouse, “its stone tower and its lantern,” exists to guide ships 
to safe harbor in the dark ocean night. By the same token, the writer illuminates the path of writing 
amidst the uncertainty of the blank pages of the book. “The movement of the book is like that of 
aggressive, amorous waves,” Jabès writes, “the plume, like a beam of fire, illuminates the hope 
where writing blossoms, and where the lighthouse keeper and the writer record their sighs, their 
growls, their cries, their grumbles at a distance.”841 Like the ocean’s waves, writing proceeds along 
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a path through crests and troughs, always in alternation. Against the image of the writer as the 
lighthouse keeper steering the narrative to safe port, Jabès reframes the question of writing through 
its negative image—as fire: Jabès juxtaposes the images of the lighthouse keeper and the fire-
fighter at the top of his ladder: “one tries to put out the fire, the other tries to illuminate the sea. 
Both show death.” The chiasmus of the lighthouse illuminates the water, and the water that flows 
from the firehose to extinguish the fire. The dialectical opposition of water and fire leads Jabès to 
pose Derrida “the burning question,” which forms the vital heartbeat of their extended dialogue:  
What is the book ? For the most pertinent, most pressing interrogations, I offer this response 
proposed by a Kabbalist rabbi – who knows, I assure you, more than we imagined on what 
we today call writing, or who perhaps knows nothing, preoccupied by symbolism, but so 
what ? – and which I literally submit for your reflection : the Book is what “is engraved 
with the black of fire on the white of fire.” Black fire on white fire. Consumption without 
end of the holy parchment, of the profane page devoted to signs, as if what is consigned – 
cosigned – written, was only the play perpetrated by flames, “feux des mots,” as you said 
in a recent interview. 842  
 
The paradoxical metaphor of writing as fire recalls the hermeneutic tradition of interpreting God’s 
word. Jabès references the understanding of the Torah as fire in the Book of Deuteronomy, where 
God gives the Israelites “a fire of Law.”843 Rashi comments on this passage that the Torah is written 
in “black fire on white fire,”844 and this becomes a key expression in the Zohar.845 In The Burnt 
Book, Marc-Alain Ouaknin brilliantly examines the Talmudic debate concerning the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for a written trace to qualify as a “book” based on the case of a book damaged 
in a fire.846 We might also hear the echoes of 19th century Hasidic rabbi Nachman of Breslov’s 
lengendary burnt books.847 Finally, we might also hear in “feux des mots” Kafka’s testamentary 
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letter to his friend Max Brod ordering him to burn his unpublished writing upon his death.848 The 
paradoxical image of the burned book as a source of creation and destruction ultimately expresses 
the precariousness of the adventure and the dangers it incurs. 
In an interview with Lucette Finas which appeared in Le Quinzaine littéraire in November 
1972, Derrida portrays his writing as “feux de mots,” which “consume signs until they are cinders, 
but first and most violently, by the irritated flair, to dislocate verbal unity, the integrity of the 
frayed or frightened voice […] the calm surface of ‘words’ by submitting their body to a gymnastic 
ceremony.”849 He makes words dance, like the licking flames of a fire. Jabès wrote him, “Your 
‘deconstruction’ is nothing but the propagation of innumerable fiery hearths”: 
Your “Margins” are without reassuring edges; your “Positions,” “Disseminate.” To hope 
for appeasement from your is to turn away from you. You burn what is positioned at the 
edge of flames. Rare, very rare are those who live writing with such intensity. “An entire 
life,” in fact, cannot suffice to calm the fire.850 
 
The metaphorical connection between fire and text, a burning question indeed, is a central theme 
in the eponymous essay in Derrida’s 1972 Dissemination. Where Philippe Sollers remarks in 
Nombres, “3.43 / The path of the black fire where I burned myself on the white fire…”851 Derrida 
comments, “the fire, indeed, is nothing apart from this ‘transference’ from one text to another.”852 
The flames spread across the page consuming its words as pure energy. “Consumption,” he writes, 
“is, like dissemination, textual through and through.” The metaphor of language as fire connects 
the fiery creation of the book to its destruction, linking its energetic and vital force to its 
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consumption and negation as ashes. Jabès concludes his lettter by returning to the sympathy for 
his addressee and interlocutor, who he confronts face to face, metaphorically, in “feux des mots”:  
The gaze divides. On one side, fire; on the other, fire. The “black of fire” is the fire of night, 
against the white fire of the morning. Between these two fires – the space of a fraction of 
a second, the time of the nuptials of fire – the irruption of a familiar face. The noise made 
by words in the book are only noises emitted by the fire, gestures which have become 
voices mixed with flames.853 
 
Jabès describes his encounter with Derrida’s words as a face to face encounter through the fire of 
the text. His letter in L’Arc challenges Derrida on the territory of philosophy, provoking an 
inversion between the writer and philosopher. “Jabès bends to the law of the other,” Cahen 
explains, “it is ‘as a philosopher’ that Jabès addresses the writer Derrida! Jabès deconstructs his 
own reading of Derrida to put into question the responses which could have fraudulently slipped 
in to offer the counterfeit assurance of the ground, where only adventure reigns without an end in 
sight.”854 By forcing Derrida to occupy the place of the poet against the philosopher’s analytic eye, 
Jabès’ text operates a kind of chiasmus which challenges Derrida to respond to his own writing as 
literature in response to Jabès’ philosophical analysis. In this written exchange, “Jabès passes for 
Derrida, and Derrida for Jabès.” This displacement of the philosopher and the poet plays out the 
very dislocation and exile that marks the adventure of writing.  
 Reflecting on their friendship, Jabès wrote Derrida in March 1973, “what remains is our 
proximity! It is profound, intimate.”855 Derrida wrote to thank Jabès for his contribution in L’Arc. 
Addressing “cher Eddie,” he evokes this proximity: 
After rereading your letter in L’Arc: it generously carries to the furthest, most risky […] 
abyss, to the most profound mine in which, despite the night, the invisibility, and the 
separation, I hear you nearby writing, hollowing out, breathing, engraving, rummaging, 
stacking, “striking down”—your generosity helps me to live and to continue.856 
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This generous praise is telling of his high regard for Jabès. In response, Jabès wrote, “I obviously 
had so many things to write about you, about your books…but I preferred to speak to you in a low 
voice, as if all that remained were words for us.”857 Derrida and Jabès’ dialogue is an adventure of 
letters, both as the written sign and as the epistolary envoi, in the blurred space between private 
correspondence and published texts, philosophy and literature, fact and fiction. Their dialogue 
reflects the rapprochement of philosophy and literature, from Derrida’s adventure of the letter “a” 
in différance to Jabès’ “adventure of the vocable” which leads in unexpected paths. It is this sense 
of literature that Derrida alludes to in an interview with Richard Kearney when he describes his 
interest in literature, “not with a capital L,” but rather as “certain movements which have worked 
around the limits of our logical concepts, certain texts which make the limits of our language 
tremble, exposing them as divisible and questionable.”858 Between Writing and Difference and The 
Book of Questions, the signatures and countersignatures that intertwine Derrida and Jabès’ writing 
are the heart of a shared adventure of writing, literature, and “feux des mots.” 
 
 
IV. Levinas, Derrida, and the Adventure of the Other 
 
Jankélévitch questions whether Odysseus is truly an adventurer. Whereas the aventureux 
is ready to confront the “coming of the event,” Odysseus constantly shirks the allure of the 
unknown in favor of his persistent, nostalgic desire to return home. “Surely,” Jankélévitch writes, 
“Calypso, Circe, the Sirens, and the Lotus-eaters represent for Odysseus as much promise of a 
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new, unusual life.”859 However, he never strays from his desire for return, and the characters he 
encounters are mere obstacles to overcome in his nostos tale. Ultimately, Jankélévitch explains, 
“Odysseus only desires one thing: to return home, to find his loyal wife, his Penelope, and his 
house in Ithaca, and the smoke of his village. He does not seek out adventures.” He is not curious 
about the uncertain possibilities of the future, he is an “aventurier by force,” whose “peregrinations 
[…] are bourgeois adventures.” Odysseus remains closed off from the possibility of true adventure. 
“The nostalgia of this nostos,” Jankélévitch adds, “is the contrary of adventurous curiosity.” 
Unlike the hero of Homer’s epic, “modern adventure is departure without return.”  
 This notion of adventure as departure without return echoes Levinas’ Abraham in contrast 
to Odysseus. For Levinas, adventure is the preeminent metaphor for the experience of subjectivity 
in its encounters, and the possibility of this departure without return is the crucial question in his 
dialogue with Derrida. Adventure, then, has two potential valences: like Odysseus, the adventure 
of the self can remain closed off, dominated by the thinking of ipseity and the unending desire for 
nostos; or, the adventure can go forth and engage the uncertain future with no return, by 
confronting the stranger and the infinity of the face of the Other. Levinas frames the stakes of the 
adventure of philosophy his 1963 essay “The Trace of the Other”: 
Western philosophy coincides with the disclosure of the other where the other, in 
manifesting itself as a being, loses its alterity. From its infancy philosophy has been struck 
with a horror of the other that remains other – with an insurmountable allergy. It is for this 
reason that it is essentially a philosophy of being, that the comprehension of being is its 
last word, and the fundamental structure of man. It is for this reason that it becomes 
philosophy of immanence and of autonomy, or atheism. The Gods of the philosophers, 
from Aristotle to Leibniz, by way of the God of the scholastics, is a god adequate to reason, 
a comprehended god who could not trouble the autonomy of consciousness, which finds 
itself again in all its adventures, returning home to itself like Ulysses, who through all his 
peregrinations is only on the way to his native island.860 
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The hero of Homer’s epic is the standard bearer for the adventure of the self, which for Levinas 
has become the modus operandi of Western philosophy: Odysseus unwavering desire to return 
home to Ithaca reflects a thinking of totality defined by the home, the familiar, and sameness. For 
Levinas, this is the same thinking that from Aristotle to Heidegger has framed philosophy as a 
search for mastery over totality, and the domestication of otherness. The purported self-sufficiency 
of consciousness, reason, and knowledge are always structured in terms of a return to sameness. 
By contrast, the second kind of adventure is embodied by the biblical patriarch Abraham, who is 
commanded to go forth into unknown lands.861 The two paths for the adventurer oppose the 
philosophical thinking of totality with the religious thinking of infinity, Odysseus and Abraham. 
 Levinas describes the transformations of individual self-consciousness as an adventure that 
leads in two possible directions: either the adventure of self-consciousness returns to itself, its 
essence, or its ipseity, or the adventure leads to the encounter with the stranger, and the unknown 
territory of alterity. The first possibility of adventure is engendered by the philosophical tradition 
which embraces the thinking of totality, by treating thought as co-extensive with being. The 
transcendence of thought is ultimately the non-transferable condition of subjectivity, which seals 
off the self from the world, as the object for its reflection and mastery. In the preface to Totality 
and Infinity, Levinas writes, “the transcendence of thought remains closed in itself despite all its 
adventures – which in the last analysis are purely imaginary, or are adventures traversed as by 
Ulysses: on the way home.”862 He draws a parallel between the transcendence of thought and the 
Homeric hero’s journey home from Troy. The adventures of self-consciousness also return to its 
origin, engendering a kind of solipsism where the thinking of totality always returns to the identity 
of being and thought. Levinas’ comparison recalls Rosenzweig’s discussion in the Star of 
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Redemption of the hero of antiquity, who is the symbol of the “meta-ethical Self.”863 The defining 
feature of the ancient hero is muteness, which is an expression of isolation from others: 
By being silent, the hero dismantles the bridges that link him to God and the world, and 
he tears himself away from the landscapes of personality, which, through the spoken word, 
marks out its limits and individualizes itself in the face of others in order to climb into the 
icy solitude of the Self. For the Self knows nothing outside itself; it is quite simply 
solitary.864  
 
Levinas’ adventure of the transcendence of thought, closed off from the world and others, extends 
Rosenzweig’s analysis of the solitary hero of antiquity. Like the philosopher whose attention 
remains fixed on existence and who is unaffected by the presence of others, Odysseus’ singular 
focus through is his return, and he is undeterred by the people and places he encounters on the 
journey. As Rosenzweig writes, the hero embodies “the tragedy of absolute man in his relationship 
to the absolute object.”865 The apotheosis of this closed thinking of totality is disclosed by 
Heidegger’s philosophy of being which is an adventure turned inward on the domain of ontology, 
sealed off from the possibility of an intervention that exceeds this order. For Levinas, it is “a 
process of being, an event of being, an adventure of being. A remarkable adventure!”866 This 
adventure of being marks the culmination of the idealist tradition’s focus on the solipsistic 
activities of self-consciousness. Levinas writes in his 1947 Time and the Other, “solipsism is 
neither an aberration nor a sophism; it is the very structure of reason.”867 In a 1951 essay “Is 
Ontology Fundamental?” he criticizes the solipsism of the philosophy of existence, comparing the 
philosophy championed by Heidegger to a solitary adventure: “philosophical research cannot be 
content with reflection on itself or on existence. Reflections gives us only the narrative of a 
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personal adventure, a private soul, incessantly returning to itself, even when it seems to flee 
itself.”868 The circuity of the “adventure of being” leaves the individual cut off from alterity.869 
The second kind of adventure involves the encounter with the Other. Levinas begins 
Totality and Infinity by describing the uncanny fact that subjectivity can have an idea of infinity, 
a thought overwhelms the totality of thought: “Subjectivity realizes these impossible exigencies – 
the astonishing feat of containing more than it is possible to contain.”870 This idea of infinity is 
able “to shatter at every moment the framework of a content that is thought, to cross the barriers 
of immanence,” but without a “descent into being,” a return to the thinking of totality. What allows 
thought to overcome the thinking of totality is the violence of the idea of infinity which exceeds 
the limits of thought. Following Rosenzweig’s shattering of the All, this thought ruptures the limits 
of finitude. Levinas explains, “what, in action, breaks forth as essential violence is the surplus of 
being over the thought that claims to contain it, the marvel of the idea of infinity.” Whereas the 
transcendence of thought is an adventure that proves solipsistic or even imaginary because it 
inevitably leads back to itself, the thinking of infinity leads the adventurer to the unknown domain 
of otherness. Levinas explains in Difficult Freedom, “The solipsistic anxiety of consciousness, 
seeing itself in all its adventures as captivated by itself, ends here. The privilege of the Other in 
relation to the I - or moral consciousness - is the very opening to exteriority, which is also an 
opening to Highness.”871 The adventure of the other reveals an infinite ethical obligation. 
																																																						
868 Emmanuel Levinas, “Is Ontology Fundamental?” Entre Nous: Thinking-of-the-Other, 11. 
869 Emmanuel Levinas, “Dying for…” Entre Nous: Thinking-of-the-Other, 207. Levinas often describes Heidegger’s 
philosophy as an “adventure or advent of being that is concerned with being—or being in which being is at stake.” 
(212) However, he is skeptical that this is truly the only calling for human beings: “Did this meditation on Sein – the 
adventure of being – this questioning of being and its meaning, this meditation on being in the guise of the human 
being-there, […] leaves us without ambiguities? Is the adventure of being, as being-there, as Da-sein, an inalienable 
belonging to self, a being proper – Eigentlichkeit […]?” (207). 
870 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 27. 




	 Levinas evokes another adventure in the chapter of Totality and Infinity entitled “The 
Ambiguity of Love,” where he argues “the transcendence of discourse is bound to love.”872 There 
are two possibilities for the adventure of love. In the first case, love is conceived as a purely 
immanent relation of the self to the beloved Other that reflects a kind of destiny, where “the 
supreme adventure is also a predestination, a choice of what had not been chosen.” In this case, 
love reflects the revelation of a preordained sameness. Levinas recalls, “the myth Aristophanes 
tells in Plato's Symposium, in which love reunites the two halves of one sole being, interprets the 
adventure as a return to self.” This adventure suggests a thinking of identity that is closed off from 
a true experience of alterity: even where it engages the other, it is under the guise of sameness and 
identity, and this adventure ultimately returns to the self.  
The second possibility of love is the notion of Eros, and it initiates an adventure that turns 
to the infinitely other. “Eros does not only extend the thoughts of a subject beyond 'Objects and 
faces,” Levinas writes, “it goes toward a future which is not yet and which I will not merely grasp, 
but I will be – it no longer has the structure of the subject which from every adventure returns to 
its island, like Ulysses.”873 Eros suggests the radical openness of the future, an experience of 
subjectivity that confronts the radical unpredictability of the future. Levinas’ notion of fecundity 
offers an adventure that turns away from the self and towards “my future, which is not a future of 
the same,” but which is “my adventure still, and consequently my future in a very new sense, 
despite the discontinuity.” Fecundity makes possible a notion of temporality experienced as 
adventure. The radical openness of the future is an adventure that engages what Levinas calls “true 
temporality,” where “the definitive is not definitive,” and there is always the possibility of the 
																																																						
872Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 254. 
873 Ibid, 271. Perhaps in recognition of Odysseus’ seafaring voyage, that the metaphor of the island appears in Simmel, 




unanticipated. For Levinas, fecundity discloses an uncertain future by “escaping the crushing 
responsibility of existence that veers into fate,” and “resuming the adventure of existence so as to 
be to the infinite.” This adventure does not conclude with the safe arrival home, but rather insists 
on the birth of something new. Levinas writes, “without multiplicity and discontinuity – without 
fecundity – the I would remain a subject in which every adventure would revert into the adventure 
of a fate.”874 Rather, he explains, “without multiplicity and discontinuity – without fecundity – the 
I would remain a subject in which every adventure would revert into the adventure of a fate. A 
being capable of another fate than its own is a fecund being.” Ultimately, the transcendence of the 
I in the encounter with the face of the other is the discovery of “an absolute adventure.”875 This 
second kind of adventure discloses an unwritten future in the encounter with the Other.  
  If Odysseus’ adventure exemplifies the historical arc of philosophy’s quest for mastery of 
totality, then the encounter with alterity suggests a departure from philosophy and a turn to 
religion, or at the very least, recourse to a notion of infinity that exceeds philosophy’s rationalist 
purview. For Levinas, the idea of infinity is philosophy’s other, which exceeds, disrupts, and 
challenges the supremacy of thought as a closed totality. The possibility of an adventure of non-
philosophy is at stake in Derrida’s monumental essay on Levinas “Violence and Metaphysics,” 
which questions the viability of the adventure of alterity. “Violence and Metaphysics” was 
published in the Revue de métaphysique et morale in 1964, and it reappears as the fourth essay in 
Writing and Difference. The essay’s title, and the title of the collection, can be understood as a 
gloss and a response to Levinas’ Totality and Infinity. The “et,” “and,” that ties Totality to Infinity 
presents two disjunctive concepts, where Levinas challenges the supremacy of totality through the 
idea of infinity. By contrast, Derrida’s “Violence and Metaphysics” plays on the homophones “et” 
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and “est,” “and” and “is,” suggesting these concepts are indissociable: there is no escape from 
violence in metaphysics because they hold a shared fate. Sarah Hammerschlag explains,  
If Levinas paired totality and infinity together to suggest the latter as the break with the 
former, Derrida paired violence and metaphysics together to suggest that the break from 
both was impossible. In Writing and Difference we have the first steps on an alternative 
route, one that claims to overcome totality not through the recourse to infinity but merely 
by exploiting the play of difference already present within the conceptual and linguistic 
framework of the metaphysical tradition.876 
In agreement with Levinas, Derrida’s title suggests totality is a kind of violence, and infinity does 
imply the restitution of a kind of metaphysics; however, against Levinas’ central claim, Derrida 
argues these concepts are ultimately inseparable, there is no escape from the violence of totality in 
the metaphysics of infinity. The title’s double meaning illustrates his ambivalent relation to 
Levinas, marked by extreme proximity and great distance.  
Derrida also opens “Violence and Metaphysics” with a post-mortem for philosophy: 
That philosophy died yesterday, since Hegel or Marx, Nietzsche, or Heidegger—and 
philosophy should still wander toward the meaning of its death—or that it has always lived 
knowing itself to be dying (as is silently confessed in the shadow of the very discourse 
which declared philosophia perennis); that philosophy died one day, within history, or that 
it has always fed on its own agony, on the violent way it opens history by opposing itself 
to nonphilosophy, which is its past and its concern, its death and wellspring; that beyond 
the death, or dying nature, of philosophy, perhaps even because of it, thought still has a 
future, or even, as is said today, is still entirely to come because of what philosophy has 
held in store; or, more strangely still, that the future itself has a future— all these are 
unanswerable questions.877 
 
He poses the question of an “outside” of philosophy, whether there can be a non-philosophy which 
takes philosophy as its object of study. Whether philosophy has reached its terminus is a question 
that philosophy cannot answer for itself, insofar as questioning “the possibility of philosophy, 
philosophy's life and death,” is already caught up in philosophy, the question is “already engaged 
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in, already overtaken by the dialogue of the question about itself and with itself.”878 Philosophy’s 
questioning of itself by itself is a part of its process of shedding its historical skin, overcoming 
itself, and transformation through criticism; philosophy’s capacity “to speculate, to reflect, and to 
question about itself within itself” is what allows it to engage in the secondary operations of 
interpretation and reflection on specific problems posed within the domain of philosophical 
analysis. There is no outside of philosophy that would not already be engaged in the enterprise 
from which it seeks distance. The correspondence between the question of philosophy’s demise 
and the determination of its own content inaugurates “the combat” between the question of 
philosophy as such and philosophy as a “as a determined finite and mortal-moment or mode of the 
question.” For Derrida, this represents “the difference between philosophy as a power and 
adventure of the question itself and philosophy as a determined event or turning point within this 
adventure.” These two relations to philosophy can be framed by Jankélévitch’s distinction between 
the aventurier, who treats the question of philosophy as a hurdle to overcome, and the aventureux, 
who takes the question of philosophy as part of its immanent questioning of itself. 
 “Close to us and since Hegel, in his mighty shadow,”879 Derrida argues that, despite their 
manifold differences, the major philosophical innovations brought about by Husserl’s 
phenomenology and Heidegger’s ontology insist on several shared principles: first, they identify 
the fundamentally Greek origin of philosophy; second, they seek “a subordination or transgression, 
in any event a reduction of metaphysics,” to seek a more immediate form of experience; third, they 
consider ethics must be separate from metaphysics, “coordinated with something other than itself, 
a previous and more radical function,” otherwise it loses its specificity and is subject to corruption. 
For Derrida, Husserl and Heidegger both frame philosophy in terms of its Greek origin: 
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At the moment when the fundamental conceptual system produced by the Greco-European 
adventure is in the process of taking over all of humanity, these three motifs would 
predetermine the totality of the logos and of the worldwide historico-philosophical 
situation. No philosophy could possibly dislodge them without first succumbing to them, 
or without finally destroying itself as a philosophical language.880  
To excise the Greek heritage from philosophy would leave its conceptual language to crumble like 
a house of cards. Husserl and Heidegger can only articulate their philosophical languages on the 
basis of this presumed Greek origin of their thinking, and they cannot conceive of a philosophical 
language that would originate from a different beginning and remain philosophy.  
“It is at this level that the thought of Emmanuel Levinas can make us tremble,” Derrida 
writes, “at the heart of the desert, in the growing wasteland, this thought which fundamentally no 
longer seeks to be a thought of Being and phenomenality, makes us dream of an inconceivable 
process of dismantling and dispossession.” To dispossess the adventure of philosophy from this 
constrained conception of its possibilities, Levinas asks us first of all “to depart from the Greek 
site and perhaps from every site in general, and to move toward what is no longer a source or a 
site (too welcoming to the gods), but toward an exhalation [respiration],” a thinking which is “the 
other of the Greek.”881 Uprooting the presumed Greek foundation of philosophy would imply not 
“a thought for which the entirety of the Greek logos has already erupted, and is now a quiet topsoil 
deposited not over bedrock, but around a more ancient volcano.” Second, this thinking rehabilitates 
a notion of metaphysics that Levinas will “raise up from its subordinate position,” and “restore in 
opposition to the entire tradition derived from Aristotle.” Third, Levinas’ concept of ethics is based 
on “a non-violent relationship to the infinite as infinitely other, to the Other” who is uniquely 
capable of “opening the space of transcendence.” Against the phenomenological tradition which 
demands ethics be derived from a non-metaphysical origin, lest ethics be infected with the same 
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problem of onto-theology that has plagued metaphysics, he reasserts the primacy of the ethical and 
metaphysics against the adventure of being. That ethics is salvageable from the wreckage of 
metaphysics is the heart of his rebuttal to Heidegger in Totality and Infinity, and his reorientation 
of philosophy based on the idea of infinity. Stéphane Mosès writes, “this subversion of an idea that 
is so profoundly anchored in the unconscious logic that structures our thought – that of a reciprocity 
between the I and the other – still remains difficult for philosophers to admit today.”882 Levinas’ 
concept of infinity is a remarkable affront to the philosophical tradition anchored in Greek logos. 
 Infinity arises from the finitude of lived experience. Derrida describes that Levinas seeks 
out “experience itself and that which is most irreducible within experience: the passage and 
departure toward the other; the other itself as what is most irreducibly other within it: Others.”883 
Levinas proposes a kind of empiricism that seeks to overcome empiricism by discovering the 
immanent transcendence confronted in the otherness of the other. It is a philosophy of immanence 
that reveals the alterity of the Other which exceeds immanence. In this sense, Derrida identifies in 
Levinas’ philosophy as a kind of eschatology, “a question of designating a space or a hollow within 
naked experience where this eschatology can be understood and where it must resonate,” where 
“the possibility of the impossible system will be on the horizon to protect us from empiricism.”884 
By describing his philosophy as an empiricism, Mosès explains, “Derrida reveals in Levinas a 
form of empiricism to which, in effect, Rosenzweig had laid claim.”885 In “The New Thinking,” 
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Rosenzweig describes his project as an “absolute empiricism,”886 by which he means to suggest, 
as Michael Morgan and Paul Franks explain, “a philosophy that bases knowledge on experience 
but does not limit the objects of experience to the relative or conditioned objects of the senses, 
leaving room for the possibility of experience of the absolute, unconditioned, supersensible, or 
divine.”887 This is precisely the movement which Derrida identifies as Levinas’ empiricism, which 
begins with lived experience but is confronted by a kind of transcendence. Where Husserl had 
sought to root out “metaphysical adventures” from phenomenological description, Levinas 
proposes that the immanence of lived experience reveals a transcendence that exceeds those 
bounds. In the Republic, Plato characterizes the good as epekeina tès ousias, beyond being.888 
Levinas describes his phenomenology in these terms in Existence and Existents, where he 
articulates a "departure from being and from the categories which describe it: an ex-cendance."889 
As Derrida explains, “this ethical excendence designates the site – rather the nonsite – of 
metaphysics as metatheology, metaontology, metaphenomenology.”890 For Levinas, the “ex-
cendance” of empiricism in the transcendence of the Other is disclosed in the encounter with the 
face, the most originary encounter with alterity which precedes any encounter with others through 
the prism of being and ontology. Derrida explains the encounter with the face is more immediate 
than immediacy, disclosing a phenomenon which cannot be spoken in the language of logos: 
Beneath solidarity, beneath companionship, before Mitsein, which would be only a 
derivative and modified form of the originary relation with the other, Levinas already aims 
for the face-to-face, the encounter with the face. "Face to face without intermediary" and 
without "communion." Without intermediary and without communion, neither mediate nor 
immediate, such is the truth of our relation to the other, the truth to which the traditional 
logos is forever inhospitable. This unthinkable truth of living experience, to which Levinas 
																																																						
886 Franz Rosenzweig, “The New Thinking,” Philosophical and Theological Writings, Ed. Paul Franks and Michael 
Morgan, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000), 138: “The catchword [Schlagwort] I would soonest tolerate would have been 
that of absolute empiricism.” 
887 Michael Morgan and Paul Franks, Ibid, 138n48. 
888 Plato, Republic 509b9. 
889 Emmanuel Levinas, Existence and Existents, 15.  




returns ceaselessly, cannot possibly be encompassed by philosophical speech without 
immediately revealing, by philosophy's own light, that philosophy's surface is severely 
cracked, and that what was taken for its solidity is its rigidity. It could doubtless be shown 
that it is in the nature of Levinas's writing, at its decisive moments, to move along these 
cracks, masterfully progressing by negations, and by negation against negation. Its proper 
route is not that of an "either this ... or that," but of a "neither this ... nor that." The poetic 
force of metaphor is often the trace of this rejected alternative, this wounding of language. 
Through it, in its opening, experience itself is silently revealed.891  
 
If Levinas takes recourse in metaphor to describe the encounter with the face of Other, it reflects 
the remnants of a philosophical language gone asunder. The transcendence of the face cannot be 
bound to the language of the concept. Derrida writes, “truthfully, one does not have to wonder 
what this encounter is. It is the encounter, the only way out, the only adventuring outside oneself 
toward the unforeseeably-other. Without hope of return."892 The encounter with alterity, like God’s 
directive to Abraham lech lecha, is an adventure without return, out of philosophy’s stranglehold 
on thinking, without Odysseus’ nostos or the sufficiency of the concept. For Levinas, there is no 
concept of the Other that can respect her otherness; the wholly other is beyond conceptualization. 
To respect the alterity of the other, Derrida explains, “there is no concept of the Other.”893 The 
transcendence of the face is matched by the absence of language that can encompass it.  
“The other proceeds from the absolutely absent,” Levinas writes in “The Trace of the 
Other,” “yet the absent has a meaning in a face.”894 The transcendence of the face is therefore a 
phenomenon that breaks from the immanence of lived experience, and its meaning is expressed 
other than as concept or language; rather, Levinas writes, “the beyond from which a face comes 
signifies as a trace.” For Levinas, the face of the Other discloses a kind of transcendence, indeed 
“the Other […] resembles God”.895 This marks a chiasmus between their notions of the trace. 
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Whereas Derrida’s represents the play of absence and presence in the sign, Levinas’ trace is a 
presence beyond presence which stems from lived experience but exceeds it. Derrida writes, “it is 
a question of knowing whether the trace permits us to think presence in its system, or whether the 
reverse order is the true one.”896 Between the trace of God in the face of the Other and the absence 
of the Other in concepts and language, Derrida writes, “The face of God which commands while 
hiding itself is at once more and less a face than all faces.” 897 This crucial ambiguity between the 
face of the Other and the face of God, or equally between the description of lived experience and 
metaphor, commits Levinas to a form of empiricism while striving for the ethical transcendence 
of a religious order. At this crucial juncture in his interpretation of Levinas’ philosophy concerning 
the trace of God in the face of the Other, Derrida invokes a verse from Jabès’ Book of Questions: 
Would Levinas subscribe to this infinitely ambiguous sentence from the Book of Questions 
by Edmond Jabès: "All faces are His; this is why HE has no face" [Tous les visages sont le 
Sien; c'est pourquoi IL n'a pas de visage]? The face is neither the face of God nor the figure 
of man: it is their resemblance. A resemblance which, however, we must think before, or 
without, the assistance of the Same. 
These elliptical words – “All faces are His; this is why HE has no face” – reflect Derrida’s 
interruption of Levinas’ ethical philosophy, while nonetheless remaining closely proximate to it. 
Jabès illustrate a paradox between the universality of God and the singularity of the individual, 
between the face of the One and the Many. The solipsism of the adventure of Being meets the 
transcendence of the Other who cannot be understood as presence.  
If Levinas proposes a departure from philosophy without return, an interruption of totality 
through the infinity of the encounter with the Other, Derrida’s deep ambivalence in “Violence and 
Metaphysics,” suggests the impossibility of this dream. Mosès remarks, “Derrida is taken by the 
thought of Levinas, a little as if he were to say with respect to the priority of ethics over knowledge: 
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it is too good to be true.”898 The ambiguity between the empirical and the metaphorical in Totality 
and Infinity reveals an immanent contradiction in Levinas’ critique of philosophy: “by making the 
origin of language, meaning, and difference the relation to the infinitely other, he is resigned to 
betraying his own intentions in his philosophical discourse. The latter is understood, and instructs, 
only by first permitting the same and Being to circulate within it.”899 Ostensibly, Derrida argues, 
the adventure of the Other is indissociable from the adventure of being: the transcendence of the 
Other in Levinas’ philosophy ultimately takes recourse in the being from which it seeks separation: 
By radicalizing the theme of the infinite exteriority of the other, Levinas thereby assumes 
the aim which has more or less secretly animated all the philosophical gestures which have 
been called empiricisms in the history of philosophy. He does so with an audacity, a 
profundity, and a resoluteness never before attained. By taking this project to its end, he 
totally renews empiricism, and inverses it by revealing it to itself as metaphysics. 900 
 
Levinas’ adventure of the Other ultimately must return to the empiricism from which it takes leave. 
The transcendence of the Other is a phenomenon of a different order than philosophy, which 
confronts the individual with something on the order of a religious phenomenon. “If one calls this 
experience of the infinitely other Judaism,” Derrida writes, “one must reflect upon the necessity 
in which this experience finds itself, the injunction by which it is ordered to occur as logos, and to 
reawaken the Greek in the autistic syntax of his own dream.” This assertion finds fertile ground in 
Levinas’ crucial distinction between Odysseus and Abraham’s respective forms of adventure.  
Derrida’s conclusion returns to the possibility for an adventure that departs from 
philosophy without return, a non-philosophy which diagnoses philosophy’s demise, as its other. 
Levinas’ interruption of the solipsistic adventure of the self through the encounter with the infinity 
of the Other makes philosophy tremble to its foundations. Nonetheless, it remains entwined in the 
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philosophical tradition it rebukes. Derrida places himself in the space between philosophy and its 
other: “Are we Jews? Are we Greeks? We live in the difference between the Jew and the Greek, 
which is perhaps the unity of what is called history.”901 Between these two orders, Derrida 
provocatively invokes Joyce’s Ulysses, the modern iteration of the classic adventurer: "Jewgreek 
is greekjew. Extremes meet"902 This expression, Derrida notes in the accompanying footnote, is a 
“neutral proposition,” even if he recognizes that “Levinas does not care for Ulysses, nor for the 
ruses of this excessively Hegelian hero, this man of nostos and the closed circle, whose adventure 
is always summarized in its totality.”903 Levinas frames Abraham’s adventure in contrast to 
Odysseus’, but perhaps there is more contamination between these categories than he 
acknowledges. Derrida asks, “is the theme of the return as unhebraic as all that?” Injecting 
ambivalence into the distinction between Abraham and Odysseus, between departure and return, 
Derrida’s conclusion suggests the impossibility of a departure without any semblance return. 
 
 
V. Levinas and Derrida: Chiasmus and Sériature 
 
The subsequent exchanges between Derrida and Levinas heightened the intensity of their 
disagreements. Levinas’ contribution to the 1973 edition of l’Arc entitled “Jacques Derrida, Tout 
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Autrement” [“Wholly Otherwise”] presents an astonishing rebuttal to the author of “Violence and 
Metaphysics.” Responding most directly to the reading of Husserl’s notion of the sign in Voice 
and Phenomenon, Levinas describes Derrida’s philosophy in the rhetoric of battle, where “we 
tread a no-mans land, an in-between that is uncertain even of the uncertainties that flicker 
everywhere. Suspension of truths! Unusual times!”904 The deconstruction of the metaphysics of 
presence that is central to Derrida’s approach displays “philosophy as defeat, desertion of an 
impossible presence,”905 as if deconstruction were a philosophy of retreat. Levinas highlights 
Derrida’s deconstruction of presence as “an inversion of the limiting concept into precondition, of 
defect into source, of abyss into condition,” provoking the slipping of the very ground beneath our 
feet, obliterating the foundations through the deconstruction of the concept, “stripped of their ontic 
resonance, freed from the alternative of true or false.” Levinas calls this destruction of foundations, 
“a purely literary effect, a new frisson, Derrida's poetry.” In a damning comparison, he likens 
Derrida’s philosophy to his experience of the débâcle of 1940: 
In reading him, I always see the 1940 exodus again. The retreating military unit reaches an 
area that still doesn't know what is happening. The cafes are open, the ladies are at the 
"Ladies' Latest" stores, barbers are cutting hair, bakers are baking, viscounts meeting and 
telling one another viscount stories. An hour later, everything is torn down [deconstruit] 
and left desolate: the houses closed up, or abandoned with their doors open, are emptied of 
their inhabitants, who are caught up in a stream of cars and pedestrians through the streets, 
which have reverted to their "deep past" [''profond jadis”] of routes, traced out in an 
immemorial past by the great migrations. In those days of a time between times, there 
occurred the following symbolic episode. Somewhere between Paris and Alençon, a half-
drunk barber invited the soldiers who were passing by on the road (the "boys," [les ''petits 
gars"] as he called them, in a patriotic language gliding above the waters, or keeping afloat 
in the chaos) to come into his little shop for a free shave. He, along with his two co-workers, 
shaved them for free and suddenly it was today. The essential procrastination – the future 
différence – was reabsorbed into the present. 
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In his Notebooks, Levinas describes the débâcle as “the human nudity of the absence of authority,” 
where order breaks down and the edifices of human society are stripped to its mere shell.906 It 
testifies to the “il y a,” the faceless, anonymous field of being: it is a feeling of rootlessness, akin 
to the nightmare of endlessly falling. Levinas recalls an episode he observed in 1940, where 
“somewhere between Paris and Alençon,” a barber, drunk on the side of the road amidst the 
debacle, offered to cut the hair of passing soldiers for free. Contrary to the French adage, “demain, 
on rase gratis” - “tomorrow, we’ll cut hair for free,” equivalent to the English expression “when 
pigs fly” - this barber “shaved them for free, and suddenly it was today.” Amiddst the débâcle, 
even this sort of “essential procrastination – the future différence – was reabsorbed in the present.” 
The barber demonstrates the deformation of time during the debacle: time is warped and temporal 
passage is annulled. The comparison alone is a stinging rebuke to Derrida. 
 However, Levinas also indicates a rapprochement in what he calls the “chiasmus.” By 
“free[ing] time from its subordination to the present,” Derrida extends the Bergsonian criticism of 
being and the Kantian critique of metaphysics to their logical end, undercutting the presence that 
grounds the Cartesian cogito and its ensuing determinations. His critique of the metaphysics of 
presence has permitted us, Levinas writes, “to conceive of the being of the creature without 
resorting to the ontic narrative of a divine operation – without treating the ‘being’ [‘être’] of the 
creature as a being [un étant] from the outset, without bringing to bear negative and empirical 
concepts, such as contingency or ‘generation and corruption’ – concepts as ontic as the 
incorruptibility of the Whole.”907 By undercutting the presence of being, Derrida emphasizes “the 
‘less being,’ which is that of the creature, is shown in its verbality of verb,” it discloses the étant, 
the creature, in critical relation to the horizon of ontology. If Derrida razes the foundations for 
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thinking of being as presence, he reveals “the sign, like the Saying, is the extra-ordinary event 
(running counter to presence) of exposure to others, of subjection to others; i.e. the event of 
subjectivity. It is the one-for-the-other.” 908 The undercutting of presence opens the space for the 
distinction between the Dire and the Dit. Ultimately, Levinas expresses his sympathy for “the 
primordial importance of the questions raised by Derrida,” and “the pleasure of a contact at the 
heart of a chiasmus.”909 Despite his injurious reproach to Derrida’s anti-foundationalism, Levinas 
nonetheless affirms their proximity, connected and separated by an adventure. 
In his 1978 Otherwise than Being, Levinas develops new perspectives on adventure as a 
question of language. He depicts the history of philosophy in terms of “the accomplishment of the 
adventure of essence” which allows the construction of a notion of the self by “persisting in essence 
and unfolding immanence, in remaining in an ego, in identity.”910 Significantly altering the 
approach developed in Totality and Infinity, Otherwise than Being sketches the structures of 
responsibility which emerge from the experience of subjectivity, above and against the limiting 
conditions of ontology. The resulting notion of ethical responsibility is the “other” of Being, it is 
the negative image of fundamental ontology. Levinas introduces the distinction between the Dire 
and the Dit, the Saying and the Said, to explain the language of the other of ontology. Contra 
Heidegger’s claim that being resonates in the poetic language of the verb “to be,” the Saying is the 
pre-original language that issues an ethical injunction before the constitution of the totality of 
being, it is “below” being, seizing on the adverbial quality of language, its force of action. By 
contrast to the ethical injunction of the Saying, Levinas writes, “The birthplace of ontology is in 
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the said [le Dit].”911 The Said is the language of ontology, which discloses the being of the world.912 
Levinas describes the slippage by which the pre-original language of the Saying is reduced to the 
Said, where the ethical force of language is reduced to the domain of ontological description: 
“philosophy makes this astonishing adventure - showing and recounting as an essence - 
intelligible, by loosening this grip of being.”913 This is the language of “the Saying,” le Dire, which 
is “is both an affirmation and a retraction of le Dit.” The Saying is the language of ethics: 
“Responsibility for the others or communication is the adventure that bears all the discourse of 
science and philosophy.” 914 The Saying is an adventure which carries beyond being. 
The core argument of Otherwise than Being is its fourth chapter, “Substitution.” Levinas 
opens with a verse from Paul Celan’s “Lob der Ferne”: “Ich bin du, wenn ich ich bin.” The 
understanding of self and other in terms of their co-constitutive articulation and reversibility is 
central to the notion of substitution, which occupies the place held by responsibility in Levinas’ 
earlier work. Substitution describes the choice to give oneself for the sake of the Other, which is 
the realization of the ethical responsibility that stands above and against the domain of being. He 
describes the advent of consciousness as an “ontological event” which extends the philosophical 
tradition’s elaboration in terms of its arche, in the Parmenidean identity of being and the thought 
of being. Levinas questions whether the search for origins is truly an adventure at all: 
Subjectivity qua consciousness can thus be interpreted as the articulation of an ontological 
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event, as one of the mysterious ways in which its "act of being" is deployed. Being a theme, 
being intelligible or open, possessing oneself, the moment of having in being - all that is 
articulated in the movement of essence, losing itself and finding itself out of an ideal 
principle, an ἀρχή [arche], in its thematic exposition, being thus carries on its affair of 
being. The detour of ideality leads to coinciding with oneself, that is, to certainty, which 
remains the guide and guarantee of the whole spiritual adventure of being. But this is why 
this adventure is no adventure. It is never dangerous; it is self-possession, sovereignty, 
ἀρχή. Anything unknown that can occur to it is in advance disclosed, open, manifest, is 
cast in the mould of the known, and cannot be a complete surprise.915  
 
The philosophical tradition’s preoccupation with the subjective origins of consciousness is, like 
Odysseus’ nostalgia, an evasion of adventure. Substitution rattles the core of the philosophical 
tradition guided by arche, it is a superior form of adventure, which discloses the responsibility that 
is “below” being, which culminates in an abnegation of self in its substitution with the Other. 
Levinas writes in “The Other, Utopia, and Justice,” “the possibility of sacrifice as a meaning of 
the human adventure! Possibility of the meaningful, despite death, though it be without 
resurrection!”916 Substitution exceeds the existence of the individual, a cause that goes beyond the 
I. Levinas explains, “there is a vocation of existing-for-the-other stronger than the threat of death: 
the fellow human being’s existential adventure matters to the I more than its own, posing from the 
start the I as responsible for the being of the other.917 In his later philosophy, the ultimate adventure 
of human subjectivity is giving oneself for the sake of the other.  
 After the barbs Levinas unleashed in “Wholly Otherwise,” Derrida would take several 
years before directly responding, almost as if to prevent their relationship from overheating. “At 
This Very Moment in This Work Here I Am” is the curious title of Derrida’s contribution to the 
1980 volume edited by François Laruelle entitled Texts for Emmanuel Levinas. The volume 
features texts from a dozen of Levinas’ most prominent interlocutors, beginning with Jabès and 
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Derrida—texts written for Levinas, about his work. Derrida’s text ostensibly responds to Levinas’ 
Otherwise than Being, but it is far from an ordinary interpretation or criticism—even for Derrida. 
Stéphane Mosès explains, “At This Very Moment” is a text “where the author expresses all the 
nuances of his subjectivity.”918 Derrida emphasizes his intimacy – personal and philosophical – 
with Levinas, even at the moments of their greatest differences. Extending the notion of the 
chiasmus which Levinas introduced in “Wholly Otherwise,” Hammerschlag writes, “Derrida 
imposed upon the image of the chiasmus, a further relation, a parasitic subversion that refuses to 
allow either Levinas or his religion to have the last word.”919 His enigmatic text is written in the 
first person, directly addressing Levinas while rarely speaking his name; its title, “At This Very 
Moment in This Work Here I Am,” stitches together three key expressions in Levinas’ work. 
Derrida’s text inhabits the Levinasian ethical Saying, testing its viability. The contradiction 
identified in “Violence and Metaphysics” between metaphysics and infinity is framed in “En ce 
moment” not as a critique, but rather as the operative logic of Levinas’ philosophy, the very 
“signature of his thought.”920 Through the implacable binds of the philosophy of identity, the 
alterity of the Other reveals an irresolvable tension, an aporia, which shapes his philosophical 
approach. Derrida asks, “How does he manage to inscribe or let the wholly other be inscribed 
within the language of being, of the present, of essence, of the same, of economy, and so forth, 
within its syntax and lexicon, under its law?”921 This tension between alterity and law pervades 
Levinas’ ethical philosophy, which Derrida explore in his analysis of the distinction between the 
Saying and the Said. Mosès explains, “The secret of this writing is interruption (interruption), 
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disruption (dérangement), through which a language – that of the face to face and of dialogue – 
comes to disrupt another – that of the philosophical Logos.”922 Derrida operates an inversion, 
where he disrupts Levinas’ ethical philosophy by inhabiting and working through its shortcomings.  
Derrida repeats an expression he attributes to Levinas: “il aura obligé,” “he will have 
obligated.” For Levinas, this construction in the future anterior (or future perfect) tense illustrates 
a formal ethical Saying, which opens a breach in ontology and interrupts the order of being, the 
Dit, in a futural demand. Derrida favored the future anterior for its ability to project beyond the 
metaphysics of presence in a speculative future. Simon Critchley explains in The Ethics of 
Deconstruction, “The future anterior is the temporality of the trace of illeity: it is perhaps the time 
of ethics.”923 This ethical performative which Derrida prolongs in the opening words of “At This 
Very Moment” illustrate the futural orientation of ethics as adventure. The possibility of fulfilling 
this ethical demand, il aura obligé, with respect to the “wholly other” is the challenge issued by 
Derrida’s text. Critchley provocatively asserts, “what is at stake here is nothing less than the 
success or failure of Levinasian ethics”:  
For Levinas’s work to work, it must be directed towards the wholly other, the trace of Illeity 
signaled in the phrase ‘Il’ aura and must not be allowed to return to the Same. To return to 
the Same is to return to the name, the proper name of Emmanuel Levinas. Conversely, if 
Levinas’s work does not work, then it will return to, or at least be indistinguishable from, 
the name of Levinas.924  
 
There is a challenge in the very act of writing a text “for” him, as Derrida and the other contributors 
were asked to do for the volume Texts for Emmanuel Levinas. If Levinas’ ethical philosophy 
“works” as it is supposed to, as an ethical act towards the Other without return, then Derrida’s text 
“for” Levinas must not simply return the favor, so to speak, by repeating his concepts to honor or 
																																																						
922 Stéphane Mosès, “At the Heart of a Chiasm,” 267. 
923 Simon Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), 116. 




beatify him; this would be tantamount to Odysseus’ Nostos—a return to the self and sameness. 
Indeed, after juxtaposing Odysseus’ adventure of sameness to Abraham’s departure without return 
as the mark of the ethical in “The Trace of the Other,” Levinas describes the ethical as therefore 
demanding ingratitude from the other: “A work conceived in its ultimate nature requires a radical 
generosity of the same who in the work goes unto the other. It then requires an ingratitude of the 
other. Gratitude would in fact be the return of the movement to its origin.”925 Consequently, and 
perhaps counterintuitively, if a text “for” Levinas is able to take up his ethical demand, it must be 
one of ingratitude: to respect his ethical philosophy, Derrida must respond with criticism. “In order 
to maintain the ethical moment,” Critchley explains, “Derrida must commit an ungrateful violence 
against Levinas’s work: he must show how the work does not work.”926 The possibility of this 
ethical performative extends from the text’s opening words to its dehiscence, “where the work 
bursts open and goes unto the other without return, allowing it to perform the ethical.”927  
Derrida’s text slips between different authorial registers and addressees. In a text 
presumptively written “for” Levinas, he addresses his interlocutor through a series of self-effacing 
interpolations, which he calls “sériature,” combining série and rature. The text begins by 
addressing “il,” then “EL,” and ultimately the text addresses “elle,” the feminine Other of Levinas’ 
philosophy. In the first moment of Derrida’s text, a masculine voice undertakes a reiteration of 
Levinas’ ethical philosophy, illustrating how the logic of his philosophy work, according to a logic 
of sameness. The second moment of the text displaces the “il” to a feminine voice, an “elle,” which 
is the Other of Levinas’ philosophy. Returning to the complaint expressed in the final footnote of 
“Violence and Metaphysics,” where Derrida describes Levinas’ adventure as the first time 
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explicitly gendered metaphysics in history, the second moment of “At This Very Moment” 
interrupts the logic of Levinas’ thought, as Critchley writes, the feminine voice “shows how his 
work does not work.”928 This sériature confronts Levinas’ philosophy with its feminine other, and 
threatens to unravel its meaning—as a means of respecting its demand for ingratitude: 
The work of EL seems to me to have always made alterity as sexual difference secondary 
or derivative, to have subordinated the trait of sexual difference to the alterity of a wholly 
other that is sexually unmarked. It is not woman or the feminine that he has made 
secondary, derivative, or subordinate, but sexual difference. Now, once sexual difference 
is subordinated, it always so happens that the wholly other who is not yet marked happens 
to be already marked by masculinity (he-before he/she, son-before son/daughter, father-
before father/mother, etc.).929  
 
If Levinas’ ethical philosophy cannot respond to its feminine other because it subordinates or 
ignores the question of sexual difference, it undermines its universality. Derrida asks, “How can 
one mark as masculine the very thing that is said to be anterior or still foreign to sexual difference?” 
By subordinating sexual difference, Levinas makes masculinity the default mode of his thinking, 
as if woman were a subsequent category.930 Levinas, the great thinker of the Other and alterity, 
“remains blind to the priority of feminine alterity by circumscribing the feminine within the 
economy of the ethical and by inhuming her within the crypt of the Same,” Critchley explains, 
consequently, “the de-sexualization of the wholly other is a way of making the feminine 
secondary.”931 If the first moment of “At This Very Moment” rehearses the ethical Saying in 
Levinas’ thought through the performative “il aura obligé,” its second moment illustrates the 
failure of his thought to “work” in the register of “elle aura obligé.” By inhabiting Levinas’ text 
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en sériature, Derrida depicts the failure of Levinas’ gendered philosophy to account for sexual 
difference. It is as if “at the very moment when, with one hand, I weave the delicate fabric of the 
ethical text,” Critchley writes, “another hand, a woman’s hand, undoes my work.”932 
The sériature of voices in Derrida’s text comes to a head in a final moment where the male 
and female perspectives confront, which suggests the impossibility of a final verdict that can 
overcome the double-reading endowed by sexual difference. The male and female voices meet in 
a moment of simultaneous proximity and distance:  
—I no longer know if you are saying what his work says. Perhaps it comes back and comes 
down to the same. I no longer know if you are saying the contrary, or if you have already 
written something wholly other. I no longer hear your voice, I have difficulty distinguishing 
it from mine, from any other, your fault suddenly becomes illegible to me. Interrupt me.933 
 
This confusion of self and other most immediately expresses the difference between the masculine 
and feminine voices in Derrida’s text, but it is also an expression of his own differential and 
deferential relation to Levinas. Following the command, “interrupt me,” the ethical order of 
Levinas’ Saying, Derrida’s text concludes with a monologue written in capitalized letters with 
scant punctuation which testifies to the impossible synthesis of the voices in sériature:  
~ HERE AT THIS VERY MOMENT I ROLL UP THE BODY OF OUR INTERLACED 
VOICES FAULTY CONSONANTS VOWELS ACCENTS IN THIS MANUSCRIPT ~ I 
MUST PUT IT IN THE EARTH FOR YOU ~ COME BEND DOWN OUR GESTURES 
WILL HAVE HAD THE INCONSOLABLE SLOWNESS SUITABLE TO THE GIFT AS 
IF IT WERE NECESSARY TO DELAY THE ENDLESS FALLING DUE OF A 
REPETITION ~ IT IS OUR MUTE INFANT A GIRL PERHAPS OF AN INCEST 
STILLBORN TO AN INCEST PROMISED ONE MAY NEVER KNOW ~ BY FAULT 
OF HER BODY SHE WILL HAVE LET HERSELF HE DESTROYED ONE DAY AND 
WITHOUT REMAINDER ONE MUST HOPE ONE MUST KEEP HOPE FOR/FROM 
ONESELF EVEN THAT THUS SHE WILL GUARD HERSELF BETTER FROM 
ALWAYS MORE AND NO MORE JEALOUSY ~ NO LONGER ENOUGH 
DIFFERENCE THERE BETWEEN THEM BETWEEN THE FEMININE INHUMED OR 
THE ASHES OF A BURN-EVERYTHING ~ NOW HERE EVEN THE THING OF THIS 
LITURGY KEEPS ITSELF LIKE A TRACE O THERWISE SAID LOSES ITSELF 
BEYOND PLAY AND EXPENDITURE ALL IN ALL AND ALL ACCOUNTING FOR 
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OTHERS DONE ALREADY SI I E LE TS HERSELF BE EATEN ~ BY THE OTHER 
BY YOU WHO WILL HAVE GIVEN HER TO ME ~ YOU ALWAYS KNEW THAT 
SHE IS THE PROPER BODY OF THE FAULT SHE WILL ONLY HAVE BEEN 
CALLED BY HER LEGIBLE NAME BY YOU AND IN THAT IN ADVANCE 
DISAPPEARED ~ BUT IN THE BOTTOMLESS CRYPT THE INDECIPHERABLE 
STILL GIVES ONE TO READ FOR A LAPSE ABOVE HER BODY THAT SLOWLY 
DECOMPOSES ON ANALYSIS ~ WE NEED A NEW BODY ANOTHER WITHOUT 
ANY MORE JEALOUSY THE MOST ANCIENT STILL TO COME ~ SHE DOES NOT 
SPEAK THE UNNAMED ONE YET YOU HEAR HER BETTER THAN ME AHEAD 
OF ME AT THIS VERY MOMENT WHERE NONETHELESS ON THE OTHER SIDE 
OF THIS MONUMENTAL WORK I WEAVE WITH MY VOICE SO AS TO BE 
ERASED THERE THIS TAKE IT HERE I AM EAT ~ COME CLOSER ~ IN ORDER 
TO GIVE HIM/HER ~ DRINK.934 
 
~ VOICI EN CE MOMENT MÊME J’ENROULE LE CORPS DE NOS VOIX 
ENTRELACÉES CONSONNNES VOYELLES ACCENTS FAUTIFS DANS CE 
MANUSCRIT ~ IL ME FAUT POUR TOI LE METTRE EN TERRE ~ VIENS PENCHE-
TOI NOS GESTES AURONT EU LA LENTEUR INCONSOLABLE QUI CONVIENT 
AU DON COMME S’lL FALLAIT RETARDER L’ECHEANCE SANS FIN D’UNE 
REPETITION ~ C’EST NOTRE ENFANT MUET UNE FILLE PEUT-ETRE D'UN 
INCESTE MORT-NEE A. L’INCESTE SAURA-T-ON JAMAIS PROMISE ~ EN 
FAUTE DE SON CORPS ELLE SE SERA LAISSE DETRUIRE UN JOUR ET SANS 
RESTE IL FAUT LESPERER IL FAUT SE GARDER DE LESPOIR MEME QU'AINSI 
TOUJOURS PLUS DE JALOUSIE ELLE SE GARDERA MIEUX ~ PLUS ASSEZ DE 
DIFFERENCE LA ENTRE ELLES ENTRE L’INHUMEE OU LES CENDRES D'UN 
BRÛLE-TOUT ~ MAINTENANT ICI MEME LA CHOSE DE CETTE LITURGIE SE 
GARDE COMME UNE TRACE AUTREMENT DIT SE PERD AU-DELA DU JEU ET 
DE LA DEPENSE TOUT COMPTE POUR D’AUTRES FAIT ELLE SE LAISSE DÉJÀ 
MANGER ~ PAR L’AUTRE PAR TOI QUI ME L'AURAS DONNÉE ~ TU SAVAIS 
DEPUIS TOUJOURS QU’ELLE EST LE CORPS PROPRE DE LA FAUTE ELLE 
N’AURA ÉTÉ APPELÉE DE SON NOM LISIBLE QUE PAR TOI EN CELA 
D'AVANCE DISPARUE ~ MAIS DANS LA CRYPTE SANS FOND 
L’INDECHIFFRABLE DONNE ENCORE A LIRE POUR UN LAPS AU-DESSUS DE 
SON CORPS QUI LENTEMENT SE DECOMPOSE A L’ANALYSE ~ IL NOUS FAUT 
UN NOUVEAU CORPS UN AUTRE SANS PLUS DE JALOUSIE LE PLUS ANCIEN 
ENCORE A VENIR ~ ELLE NE PARLE PAS L’INNOMMÉE OR TU L’ENTENDS 
MIEUX QUE MOI AVANT MOI EN CE MOMENT MÊME OU POURTANT SUR 
L'AUTRE CÔTÉ DE CET OUVRAGE MONUMENTAL JE TISSE DE MA VOIX POUR 
M'Y EFFACER CECI TIENS ME VOICI MANGE ~ APPROCHE-TOI ~ POUR LUI 
DONNER ~ BOIS935 
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The passage concludes, “Bois”: a word that is both the imperative form of the verb “drink” as well 
as the substantive “wood,” or more precisely in this context, a “wooden” child—a stillborn. This 
infinitely ambivalent final word divulges what Critchley calls the “clôtural reading” of Derrida’s 
text. “Drink” echoes the words of hospitality which Rebekah speaks to a stranger, Abraham’s 
servant, in chapter 24 of Genesis, offering succor to the patriarch’s family and camels.936 It is this 
hospitality without expectation of reciprocity which convinces Abraham that his son Isaac should 
marry Rebekah. It is a gesture of radical generosity, an ethical act of substitution in which one 
gives sustenance to the Other at the expense of the self and the Ego. Derrida concludes his text by 
invoking the ethical Saying, effacing the speaker in the face of the interlocutor: “I WEAVE WITH 
MY VOICE SO AS TO BE ERASED THERE THIS TAKE IT HERE I AM EAT ~ COME 
CLOSER ~ IN ORDER TO GIVE HIM/HER ~ DRINK.”937 Derrida’s final words thereby suggest 
the ethical act of substitution that Levinas develops in Otherwise than Being. By concluding his 
text with the effacement of the self in the encounter with the other, then, Derrida seemingly inhabits 
Levinas’ ethical perspective by effacing itself into the very fabric of the text. In this sense, 
Derrida’s final word is conciliatory to Levinas’ ethical philosophy, it is the ethical Saying. Yet this 
is precisely the gratitude which undermines the ethical Saying by returning to self and its sameness. 
 The second meaning of “Bois” annuls this apparent gratitude, effacing Rebekah’s 
hospitality in an act of violence. The female voice in “At This Very Moment” takes a detour in her 
reading to recall Levinas’ commentary in ‘The Name of God According to Some Talmudic Texts”: 
According to the Treatise Chevouoth (35a), it is forbidden to erase the names of God, even 
in the case where a copyist has altered its form. One must in that case bury the whole 
manuscript. The manuscript, EL says, “has to be put in the earth like a dead body.” But 
what does it mean to put in the earth [mettre en terre]? And what does a “dead body” mean, 
since it is not erased or destroyed but “put in the earth”? If one wanted simply to annihilate 
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it—to keep it no longer— one would burn the whole thing, one would erase everything 
without remains. One would replace, without remainder, the dysgraphy with orthography. 
By inhuming it, on the contrary, the fault against the proper name is not destroyed; at 
bottom one keeps it, as a fault, one keeps it at the bottom. It will slowly decompose, taking 
its time, in the course of a work of mourning that, either successful as a spiritual 
interiorization, an idealization that certain psychoanalysts call introjection, or else 
paralyzed in a melancholic pathology (incorporation), will keep the other as other, 
wounded, wounding, impossible utterance. The topic of such a faulty text remains highly 
improbable, like the taking-place of its remains in this theonymic cemetery.938  
 
This female reader highlights Levinas’ reflections on the connection between textuality and 
corporality, and their shared fate in the Talmudic tradition. Just as the body must be buried when 
a person dies, a text too must be buried if it is damaged beyond use. Consequently, to annul the 
sympathetic reading of Levinas’ text offered by its masculine reader, to put under erasure its 
closing ethical performative “Bois” as an act of hospitality and gratitude, the feminine reader 
buries the text as one would a dead body. Displacing Levinas’ notion of illéité by substituting its 
“il” with an “elle,” the woman reader effaces the initial reading of Derrida’s final word, “Bois.” 
The text, like a dead body, is placed in the ground to decompose. Critchley writes, “in order to 
annul or destroy this fault, this text for Emmanuel Levinas must be placed in the earth and allowed 
to decompose. Thus, the faulty text is given to Levinas by burying it in the earth, where it is 
preserved in a process of slow decomposition.”939 Where in the final capitalized paragraph of 
Derrida’s text we read, “‘IT IS OUR MUTE INFANT A GIRL PERHAPS OF AN INCEST 
STILLBORN TO AN INCEST PROMISED ONE MAY NEVER KNOW,” the text is 
characterized as a stillborn daughter who must be buried. Hammerschlag explains, “Derrida treats 
the text itself as their offspring, an incestuous offspring, given that Derrida positions himself as 
the son. Given that reading, Derrida repeats and distorts Levinas’s text.”940 Pursuing the corporeal 
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metaphor connecting body and text, Derrida continues, “IN THE BOTTOMLESS CRYPT THE 
INDECIPHERABLE STILL GIVES ONE TO READ FOR A LAPSE ABOVE HER BODY 
THAT SLOWLY DECOMPOSES ON ANALYSIS.” The second register of Derrida’s final word, 
“Bois,” is of the stillborn child, who must now be buried to decompose in the ground – all in an 
act of ingratitude which is requisite for Levinas’ ethical imperative.  
 “Bois”: an act of generosity and hospitality to the stranger, “Drink!” or the stillborn 
daughter born of incest, who must be buried. The haunting ambivalence of Derrida’s final word 
expresses his double reading of Levinas, which is always “at the heart of a chiasmus.” 
 
 
VI. Jabès, Levinas, and the Declaustration of the Trace 
 
The relation between Jabès and Levinas has always been the most tenuous side in the triad, often 
with Derrida positioned as the mediating third. In fact, Derrida had sought to foist a dialogue 
between them from the start, insisting on the comparison between Jabès’ question of the book and 
Levinas’ Other. Their correspondences reveal a distant relationship marked by disagreements, but 
also a certain sympathy. What interests Levinas in Jabès’ writing are his energetic metaphors and 
dynamic language – the adventure of his writing – rather than the narrative of The Book of 
Questions. Following the publication of Yaël in 1967, Levinas wrote Jabès, “I read your book, but 
not as a book.”941 Rather, in its “indelible words,”  
Vocables take over, which do not speak but pre-speak [qui ne disent pas mais pré-disent]. 
I am surprised that it must compose a story. I didn’t read it that way, nor did I miss it – 
these pre-dictions do not become narrative. Perhaps this is poetry as well: we are closer to 
one another than the name and naming [nom-nommer]. One without one.  
																																																						





Levinas suggests the “pre-dictions” in Jabès’ poetry express the ethical language of the Saying, 
which interrupts the ontological order of the Said, avowing an unexpected proximity. After the 
publication of Elya in 1969, Levinas wrote to applaud Jabès’ latest book, beginning with its title: 
Here is Elya, anagram or meta-book of Yaël, hesitation between gratuity and gravity, 
between play and destiny. But isn’t this a definition – one more definition – of poetry? I 
like your poems, but probably not for the same reasons as the important critics and 
philosophers. I like your incessant words, and how they touch and swoon or faint… 942 
 
The description of Jabès’ writing as between gratuitousness and gravity, game and destiny, recalls 
Jankélévitch’s observation that adventure relies on the tension between play and seriousness. After 
the publication of Jabès’ Book of Margins in 1987, in what proved his final letter to the poet, 
Levinas wrote, “thank you for having amiably included me in this agreement of disagreement [cet 
accord du désaccord].”943 This contradictory formulation is a fitting description of their exchange.  
Prompted in the 1972-1973 issue of Les Nouveaux Cahiers to describe Jabès’ “place” in 
contemporary literature, Levinas suggests his poetry “loses its place, ceases occupation,” it is 
rather “the very opening of space.”944 Through this return to the creation of place, Jabès’ poetry 
inspires “the de-claustration of all things, the de-nucleation of being – or its transcendence – from 
which nothing more is missing but one's fellow man. ‘I am nothing but the spoken word,’ says 
Jabes. ‘I need a face.’” He recalls an origin that is otherwise than being, it is an exercise in losing 
its place, dis-placing poetry, and getting lost in words. Jabès “uncorks the words […] undergoing 
fission, they may be broken up into their sense and letters and give off the non-place of an 
absolutely unprotected space, a kind of intra-nuclear space devoid of images.”945 Levinas 
emphasizes the ocular metaphor of sight in Jabès’ writing, which articulates a language “without 
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mirages or prestige or imaginary foyers of extension for a dioptrics, but a field besieged by God.” 
The displacement has a disorienting effect: “when I have his texts before me I forget that his 
writing has writing as its theme, […] I forget that Jabès has his part in the world and trends of 
modern letters.” This forgetting is for Levinas part of the dissimulating, analgesic quality of Jabès’ 
poetry. Gary D. Mole explains in Lévinas, Blanchot, Jabès: Figures of Estrangement, “Lévinas 
reads his own transcendence of subjectivity into Jabès,” just as he associates Jabès’ ‘denucleation’ 
of being with Heidegger and Derrida.946 However, his comment is indicative of his mistrust of 
poetry. Mole explains, “Lévinas can read a philosophical position into Jabès, and can thus forget 
that Jabès is only a poet.” He “will not see either God or the Jew as metaphors,” whereas Jabès 
treats these figures as just that. The metaphors of God and the Jew threaten to destabilize the ethical 
commandment. Therefore, “Lévinas is both admiring and reserved in his reading of Jabès, 
admiring because there is a break from subjectivity, reserved because the break lacks an ethical 
content.”947 Mirroring his ambivalence towards Derrida, Levinas reads Jabès as a magisterial poet, 
but nonetheless a poet, whose creative exploration of language never accedes to the ethical 
transcendence he demands of the philosopher. 
Levinas nonetheless indulges this forgetting, setting aside the question of the book, to read 
Jabès poetry as he would a philosophical position. Levinas interprets the opening lines of Aely as 
projecting an ethical transcendence into Jabès’ metaphors for God: 
“Do you know that the final period of the book is an eye,” he said, “and without lid?” 
Dieu, “God,” he spelled D'yeux, “of eyes.” “The ‘D’ stands for desire,” he added. “Desire 
to see. Desire to be seen.” 
[“Sait-tu, dit-il, que le point final du livre est un oeil et qu’il est sans paupières?” 
Dieu, il ecrivait D'yeux. “D pour desir, ajoutait-il. Désir de voir. Desir d'etre vu.”]948  
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Jabès “makes the word Dieu suddenly appear […] as ‘d’yeux,’”949 entwining God and the 
metaphors of sight. Jabès’ writing discloses a vision crafted in language and by language. “With 
Jabes, the writer is a catalyst only,” explains translator Rosmarie Waldrop: 
He lures words onto the page, but they come following their own law. Their own law is 
partly semantic, but is even more the law of their material being, their body of sound, their 
letters. Again and again, a pun, a rhyme, an assonance, or an alliteration will draw the 
words together and determine the course of a phrase. “Verité” will lead to “vertige,” 
“dialogue” to “diamant.”950  
 
By declaustrating words, emptying them of the weight of being, and leaving behind their 
alliterative husks, Jabès allows writing to follow its own adventurous course. Levinas describes 
Jabès’ writing as “declaustration as delivery to a lidless Eye,” it is “exposure, without defense, to 
an attention the hyperbole of which is exigency.” Following the chain of associations whose only 
law is hyperbole, Jabès depicts God through the ocular metaphors of seeing, prompting the 
question of God’s face. In Totality and Infinity, Levinas proffers, “the Other […] resembles God,” 
prompting the question of whether this face is comprised of words and metaphors, or a kind of 
vision. 951 Jabès’ commitment to hyperbole reveals the lidless eye of “d’yeux,” leading Levinas to 
ask, alluding to Psalms 121, “is that not what the ‘sleepless’ attention of the ‘guardian of Israel’ 
is?”952 Levinas refuses the prompt concerning the Jewish themes in Jabès’ writing. Mere themes 
fail to capture the essence of great poetry, and the question of attributing “Jewish” qualities to 
Jabès’ poetry is a particularly fraught question. Nonetheless, his relentless commitment to the 
hyperbole of writing is, Levinas writes, “the Jewish moment of Jabès’ work.”953 He references the 
Talmudic interpretation of Psalm 139, in which Adam is “created with two faces: with one head – 
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all face – without any background, any shadow for secret thoughts or mental reservations, without 
any possible break with this God.” According to Midrash Schocher Tov, Psalm 139 was written 
by Adam himself. Where Adam addresses God, “Back and front You fashioned me, and laid Your 
hand upon me,” he refers to his androgynous creation with two faces on one head, before the 
splitting of the genders with the creation of Eve.954 Adam’s double face – undivided between God 
and the human being – illustrates the ever-watchful eye of Jabès’ hyperbolic poetry. 
 Jabès’ text “Il n’y a de trace que dans le desert,” “There is Only a Trace in the Desert,” 
appeared in the 1980 volume Textes pour Emmanuel Levinas. Just as Levinas’ reading in Les 
Nouveaux Cahiers projects ethical transcendence into Jabès’ poetry, Jabès operates a similar 
inversion on Levinas’ ethical philosophy by subjecting it to the vertiginous question of the book. 
Mole explains that Jabès “fragments and scatters Lévinas's discourse […] redeploying Lévinas's 
notions of the trace, the face, the saying, passivity, desire, the Good, God, and responsibility into 
his own discourse of the desert, errancy, absence, silence, death, and nothingness.” 955 Jabès 
describes the presence of this Other as an unrecognizable face, “a forgotten, found face,” and “the 
Saying [dire] of this voice which is perhaps only the unspeakable Saying [indicible dire] who says 
its misfortune, thus who says nothing.”956 Whereas Levinas highlights the transcendence in the 
subjective encounter with the face of the Other, Jabès dissimulates the Other as absence and 
dissimulation. It is a failure of communication, “from the unspeakable to the unspeakable [de 
l’indicible à l’indicible],” like Levinas’ invocation of lech lecha, a movement that goes forth into 
the unknown: “To leave a place that is known, lived (the landscape, the face) for an unknown place 
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(the desert, the new face – the mirage?).”957 Against Levinas’ transcendence of the face, Jabès 
describes its dissimulation and its nothingness: “the infinite face of Nothing, with its weight of 
Nothing, of all the passages reduced to one – mine – lost.” Just as Levinas described how Jabès 
“declaustrates” or “denucleates” language, exposing the hollowness of being in the metaphor, in 
“There is Only a Trace,” Jabès deploys this strategy against Levinas’ ethical philosophy. 
The trace of the Other is a presence beyond presence disclosed in the transcendence of the 
face. By contrast, Jabès describes the trace as abyssal: “if I am the trace, I can only be so for the 
other; but if the other is Other, another other, who will raise the trace? The Other is, perhaps, the 
abyss of the trace. Thought in the abyss, writing of the abyss. At the edge. [Pensée en abîme, 
écriture de l’abîme. En bordure].” Jabès highlights an ambiguity between the face of the Other, 
and what Levinas calls the “illéité” of the third person, leaving the trace to tarry in ambiguity. The 
phenomenon of the face is disclosed in Jabès’ text as an irremediable absence:  
From this trace, a face. Which ? Everything is in the face and nothing ; in the effacement 
of the face which is reborn from its effacement, which emerges from nothingness from its 
traits forgotten, lost, restituted by death ; as if death knew the face, all faces, in their 
particularities or their confounding banality, a test of resemblance. With their name: face 
of the pronounceable or unnamable name. 
 
By replacing the transcendence of the face with its effacement, Jabès reads the Levinas’ adventure 
against its ethical message, emphasizing the erasure of the Other which interrupts the ethical 
demand of the face. Mole writes, “Jabès suspend Lévinas's ethical discourse in order to privilege 
a questioning of the written and the self-effacement of the writer it entails.”958 He interrupts the 
ethical order of the trace by emptying the phenomenon of the face of its content, leaving 
dissimulation and absence: “To trample the trace is to trample the face [Piétiner la trace, c’est 
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piétiner le visage].”959 The ethical order provoked by the face of the Other has, for Jabès, “become 
nothing once more; but also the mirror of Nothing, the reflection of its broken mirror, its broken 
oval in a reflected distance.” The face is dissimulated in the broken mirror of nothingness, 
evacuating the transcendental or infinite character of the Other: 
God, like the wholly Other of the other and as if it first had to familiarize us with the face 
of the Other, shares the responsibility to join, by its vector, the wholly Other without a face; 
as if all the swallowed faces gleamed, now, with the loss of Yours; as if He had paid with 
His face, the loss of all of ours. [comme s’Il avait payé de Son visage, la perte de tous les 
nôtres].960 
 
He conflates Levinas’ idea of infinity with God but, Mole explains, “Jabès blocks the 
transcendence,” leaving behind writing as metaphor.961 What remains is the sonority of writing. 
“To question is to be without belonging, the time of its formulation; it is to be without belonging 
in belonging, without connection in the connection,” Jabès writes, “it makes of the inside a 
perpetual outside.” The oscillation between inside and outside provoked by the question reveals 
the instability of the written sign, its wandering in exile without return. Jabès emphasizes the play 
between white and black in literary creation: 
Writing is erased in writing. Black whitened in black. White remains.  
White is contagious. Black opens to white which fills its opening. Duration is white. 
The said does not leave a trace. It is, always, already said, the enjambed (neglected?) 
trace. 
To go to the discovery of the trace is, perhaps, to continue to write, to turn around the 
untraceable trace. 
Every trace of the word is in the word. 
The word is supercharged with nothing. 
 
[L’écrit s’efface dans l’écrit. Le noir blanchit dans le noir. Le blanc demeure. 
Le blanc est contagieux. Le noir s’ouvre à la blancheur qui comble son ouverture. La 
durée est blanche. 
Le dit ne laisse pas de trace. Il est, toujours, le déjà dit, la trace enjambée (négligée ?). 
Aller à la découverte de la trace c’est, peut-être, continuer à écrire, tourner autour de 
l’introuvable trace. 
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Tout trace de mot est dans le mot. 
Le mot est surcharge de néant.] 
 
Evoking the play of the blank page and the written sign, Jabès evacuates the transcendence of 
Levinas’ face and its trace, and the Saying and the Said, displacing his ethical philosophy by 
emptying the transcendence of the face. Levinas and Jabès’ readings of each other’s work reflect 
their ambivalence and misgivings. As Mole explains, “Lévinas's mistrust of poetry as a philosopher 
corresponds to Jabès's inability as a poet to submit the poetic word to anything other than itself as 
other.” 962 Levinas’ skepticism of poetry and Jabès’ questioning of transcendence form a chiasmus, 
where their mutual ambivalence is expressed through their counter-readings that domesticate the 
other’s thinking. Nonetheless, following the publication of “There is Only a Trace,” Levinas wrote 
to thank Jabès for his words of friendship: “Know how much the testimony of your friendship 
touched my heart, which I felt in each of your words.”963 Just as Derrida is connected to Levinas 
by way of a chiasmus, Levinas and Jabès speak through the blinds of disagreement concerning 
philosophical and poetic modes of “Being-Jewish.” Both confront the adventure of the Other, yet 
their disagreement on the priority of the word and the face precludes final reconciliation. 
In “Violence and Metaphysics,” Derrida challenged Levinas’ description of the trace of 
God in the face of the Other by recalling Jabès’ words: “would Levinas subscribe to this infinitely 
ambiguous sentence from The Book of Questions by Edmond Jabès: ‘All faces are His; this is why 
HE has no face’ [Tous les visages sont le Sien; c'est pourquoi IL n'a pas de visage]?”964 In “There 
is Only a Trace,” Jabès inserts this same ambivalence into the presence and absence of the face, 
challenging, displacing, and raising Levinas’ ethical Saying in the “denucleation” of being.  
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Against the rationalist philosophical tradition that seeks to export the literary experience of 
adventure from the domain of rational experience, Jabès, Levinas, and Derrida are emblematic 
“adventurers of the concept,” for whom the adventure is inflected in the question of the book. The 
character of their respective adventures differs, but Levinas, Jabès, and Derrida are inextricably 
tied together in dialogue, extending from their personal correspondences to their published 
commentaries on each other’s work, over the course of many years. They share in the adventure 
of the book, a rejection of the rationalism that excludes so-called “metaphysical adventures,” and 
an embrace of the uncertainty and futurity of the text whose outcome remains crucially undecided. 
They confront one another’s work by displacing its foundations, exiling their interlocutors from 
their writing, and forcing them to occupy the territory of their critic. The figure of the chiasmus, 
originally proposed by Levinas to describe his relationship with Derrida, similarly typifies his 
distancing from Jabès’ poetry; the transcendence of Levinas’ ethical subjectivity is undercut, 
challenged, but also reaffirmed by Derrida’s sériature, just as the “denucleation” of meaning in 
Jabès’ poetry of metaphor to blur the identity of “being-Jewish” and its ethical commandment. 
Questioning each other’s writing, parasitically inhabiting one another’s voices and reading their 
work against its original meaning, Derrida, Levinas, and Jabès engage one another as friends and 
philosophical interlocutors, for whom writing reveals the call and allure of an adventure: it is an 





Conclusion: Hospitality and the Book 
 
 
I. Buber and Rosenzweig’s Gastgeschenk: Hospitality and the Book 
 
The adventure of the book is an expression of exile: entering the book is akin to being swept away 
from one’s homeland, a stranger thrust into unknown and treacherous territory. The book 
articulates the peregrinations of thought in movement, and the displacement of writing from its 
mythic or divine origin. Reciprocally, the adventure of the book also poses the question of 
hospitality: the book can invite or welcome its reader to cross its threshold, to open its cover and 
enter its world, or, the book can refuse its reader—just as the reader can refuse the book. Books 
can be given – or even written – as gifts, as acts of gratitude or admiration, they can include 
dedications or appreciations, but they can also be effaced, desecrated, or destroyed. Hospitality 
always entails the risk that it is transformed into hostility, that the host’s welcoming words prove 
deceptive or malevolent, and the guest becomes a hostage. The book also carries this risk. 
Welcoming the stranger, the foreigner, the Other is through and through an affair of 
language. Levinas declares in Totality and Infinity, “the essence of language is friendship and 
hospitality.”965 Language is not something that is owned or possessed, rather it is something that 
is shared. “Laguage is hospitable [hospitalière],” Jabès writes in The Book of Hospitality, “it does 
not consider our origins. Being only what we can we take from it, it is nothing other than what we 
expect of us. [Ne pouvant être que ce que nous arrivons à en tirer, elle n’est autre que ce que nous 
																																																						




attendons de nous].”966 Rejecting the givenness of language undercuts its proprietary belonging: 
language is hospitable because it invites anyone to use it. “There is no given language,” Derrida 
asserts in Monolingualism of the Other, “like the hospitality of the host even before any invitation, 
[language] summons when summoned.”967 The offer of hospitality is mediated by the 
“monolingualism” of the host and the guest, which includes but is not limited to a shared tongue, 
as well as the broad array of perspectives that inform their words and deeds. Derrida elaborates in 
Of Hospitality, “the language in which the foreigner is addressed or in which he is heard, if he is, 
is the ensemble of culture, it is the values, the norms, the meanings that inhabit the language.”968 
Welcoming of the other is bound up in language, writing, and documentation. Language is 
“implicated, in endless ways, in the experience of hospitality. Inviting, receiving, asylum, lodging, 
go by way of the language or the address to the other.” He evokes the welcoming of immigrants 
and those who arrive “sans papiers,” whose contingent status as foreigner calls upon the question 
of writing and its privation in multifarious ways.969 For Jabès, Derrida, and Levinas, the question 
of hospitality is expressed both in and by language, and the book is its privileged gift. 
A specific book can represent a gift of hospitality. In the shadow of Luther’s translation of 
the Bible, Martin Buber and Franz Rosenzweig collaborated to write a new German translation of 
the Hebrew Bible during the 1920s. They were not able to complete the project before 
Rosenzweig’s death in 1929, but Buber published the full translation in 1961. The Buber-
Rosenzweig Bible is a word-for-word, “concordant” translation, which heavily leans towards 
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literality, creating a notably awkward German prose. Some critics have described as 
“unspeakable,” creating “a barrier between the reader and the meaning of the text,” or described 
its literality as “unnatural.”970 However, the strangeness of the prose in the Buber-Rosenzweig 
Bible is not an accident but a feature of their approach. Rosenzweig writes that the task of the 
translator is to “replicate the foreign tone in its foreignness,” that is, a process of Umfremdung, 
which as Dana Hollander explains “leaves the language in a changed state.”971 All language is a 
process of translation, of reproducing the foreignness of language in a new tongue, and all 
translation already contains commentary; the obstacle posed by Luther’s canonical translation 
must be “leaped over,” übersprungen, through the jarring foreignness of the Buber-Rosenzweig 
Bible.972 Rosenzweig describes their German translation of the Torah as a “Gastgeschenk” to 
Germany, a gift given from the Jewish “guest” as a token of gratitude to the German “host.” The 
Buber-Rosenzweig Bible is a book of hospitality, inviting Germans into the Jewish book, in their 
language. “Rosenzweig noted his unreserved attachment to the German language, the language of 
his country,” Derrida observes in Monolingualism of the Other, their translation of the Bible 
represents “a respectable and terrified rivalry with Luther, ‘Gastgeschenk,’ acknowledgments, and 
token of the guest who is giving thanks for received hospitality.”973 Rosenzweig belonged to the 
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final generation who believed in the possibility of the elusive synthesis of “Deutschjudentum,” and 
his translation of the Bible is a testament to this eradicated dream. 
Rosenzweig and Buber’s translation was completed in a very different world than the one 
in which it was first conceived: the hospitality of the German “hosts” to their Jewish “guests” 
would appear quite differently after the Shoah. At a 1961 ceremony in Jerusalem celebrating the 
translation’s completion, Gershom Scholem confronted Buber, suggesting the “gift” of their 
translation “is no longer a Gastgeschenk of the Jews to the Germans but rather – and it is not easy 
for me to say this – the tombstone [Grabmal] of a relationship that was extinguished in unspeakable 
horror. The Jews for whom you have undertaken this translation are no more. Their children, who 
escaped from this horror, will no longer read German.”974 Decades earlier, Scholem had fallen out 
with Rosenzweig after a discussion of “the very Deutschjudentum which I rejected.”975 For 
Scholem and those who questioned the viability of the German-Jewish symbiosis even before the 
rise of Nazism, the Buber-Rosenzweig Bible was a relic of a dead culture, a gift to an undeserving 
recipient. Its completion was received like an orphaned child. But even if the Buber-Rosenzweig 
Bible is a tombstone rather than a gift, it represents a unique cenotaph, a memorial to the ill-fated 
monolingualism of Deutschjudentum. Derrida explains: 
A translation of the Bible as a tombstone, a tombstone in the place of a gift from the guest 
or a gift of hospitality (Gastgeschenk), a funerary crypt given in thanks for a language, the 
tomb of a poem in memory of a language given, a tomb which contains several other ones, 
including all the ones from the Bible, including the one from the Scriptures (and 
Rosenzweig was never far from becoming a Christian) , the gift of a poem as the offering 
from a tomb which could be, for all one will ever know, a cenotaph, what an opportunity 
to commemorate a monolingualism of the other! What a sanctuary, and what a seal, for so 
many languages!976 
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The book is a written trace that commemorates and memorializes the past beyond the limits of 
human finitude, it is the receptacle for the memory of the past. A book can be offered as a gift, just 
as writing or reading a book can be a gift; a book can be inviting or foreboding, it is a gift that may 
be met with gratitude or hostility. Scholem warned Buber, “'As to what the Germans will do with 
your translation, who could venture to say?”977 The book, like the tombstone, is a memorializing 
trace whose future preservation relies on the hospitality of others. In happy ignorance of the 
catastrophe that befell Germany’s Jews in the years after his death, Rosenzweig’s Gastgeschenk 
discloses a book of hospitality, inviting the German hosts into the Jewish book, in the language of 
the German people where Jews have long been guests. The Rosenzweig-Buber Bible is perhaps 
the highest achievement of the German-Jewish synthesis, a testament and memorial to an 
annihilated culture, a book which reflects the possibility and risk for the book of hospitality. 
If the dialogue between Derrida, Jabès, and Levinas was inaugurated by reflections on 
writing and the condition of exile, their final exchanges returned to this question from its inverse 
perspective—that is, the question of writing and hospitality. The adventure of the book tarries in 
exile, and it relies on the hospitality of the Other for its survival. During their ultimate exchanges 
in the early 1990s, Derrida, Jabès, and Levinas turn to the question of hospitality to reflect on the 
political challenges of the day. They confront the persistence of anti-Semitism in France, Israel 
and Palestine, as well as questions of immigration, xenophobia, and racism in Europe, which call 
for reflection on the hospitality and welcoming of the stranger. The book of hospitality holds both 
promise and risk: it can be received as a gift, what Rosenzweig describes as his Gastgeschenk, but 
it can also be receive with hostility, which Scholem cast as a Grabmal, a tombstone. 
 
																																																						





II. L’Affaire Carpentras, Anti-Semitism, and the Future of Europe 
 
On the night of May 8, 1990, the Jewish cemetery in Carpentras was desecrated by anonymous 
vandals who destroyed thirty-four headstones, and exhumed and grotesquely defiled the body of a 
recently buried elderly man. Carpentras, a town in the Vaucluse department of the Côte d’Azur 
which served as a trading post dating back to the Roman Empire, has an outsized role in the 
religious history of France. The town’s Jewish community traces its roots to the 14th century, and 
it is home to the oldest active synagogue in France. During the Avignon Papacy, the period from 
1309 and 1376 during which seven successive Popes resided not in Rome but in nearby Avignon, 
Carpentras became the home for the “juifs du pape,” who were banished from France by Philippe 
le Bel in 1306 and Charles IX in 1394 but offered refuge by the Pope. The historic roots of its 
Jewish community made the desecration of the cemetery all the more shocking. After the news 
emerged, Interior Minister Pierre Joxe traveled to Carpentras to survey the destruction, where he 
strongly denounced “racism, anti-Semitism, and intolerance.”978 The following week on May 14, 
President François Mitterrand led 200,000 people in marches across France “against hate, 
exclusion, and intolerance.” Across the French political spectrum, leaders denounced the anti-
Semitism in Carpentras—with the exception of Jean-Marie Le Pen, leader of the Front National. 
The same evening the cemetery was vandalized, Le Pen had spoken on his preferred television 
program L’Heure de Vérité, where he accused the media of organizing a conspiracy against the 
FN practically in the same breath that he asserted that Jews had too much power in media. As the 
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search for the perpetrators began, Pierre Joxe pointed the finger directly at Le Pen who, “like all 
those who have expressed their anti-Semitism explicitly for decades, […] is among those 
responsible, not for the acts in Carpentras, but for everything that has been inspired by racist 
hatred.” Le Pen speculated that the cemetery was desecrated by agents of the KGB, foreign 
extremist organizations, and especially by “Pierre Joxe and the socialist State” as part of the 
conspiracy against the FN. The investigation focused on local FN members, but after following 
several false leads, the police failed to uncover the perpetrators. Once public attention turned to 
the next scandal, silence – concerning those responsible for desecrating the cemetery in Carpentras, 
but more broadly France’s history of anti-Semitism – resumed. The “affaire de Carpentras” was 
only solved in 1996 when a repentant twenty-six-year-old turned himself in for the crime and 
denounced his three Neo-Nazi collaborators.979 
 The incident in Carpentras occurred in the context of the growing – and still unresolved – 
debate in France over immigration, race, and religion. Following an influx of immigrants after the 
Second World War in response to the massive demand for labor to rebuild France, and another 
wave of immigration from Western Africa, the North-African Maghreb, and Eastern Asia during 
the era of decolonialization, France tightened the limits on immigration during the 1970s under 
conservative President Valéry Giscard D’Estaing.980 Following a series of reforms introduced by 
socialist President François Mitterrand in 1983, and spurred by tectonic shifts in global politics, 
there was a sharp rise in immigration to France during the late 1980s and early 1990s.981 The 
Schengen Agreement was signed in 1985, beginning the consolidation and gradual abolition of 
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internal borders across Western European member nations, leading to a wave of Northward 
migration from Southern European countries into France. Concurrently, the splintering of the 
Soviet Union led to a wave of asylum claims from the Eastern bloc. After spiking in the 1950s at 
the end of French colonial rule, immigration from the Maghreb to France increased during the 
1980s as Europe expanded and its internal borders became more porous.982 The influx of new 
arrivals in France, particularly those from West Africa and the Maghreb, fueled the massive growth 
of the Parisian banlieux and its towering “HLM” (“Habitation à Loyer Modéré”), which are 
chronically plagued by massive economic disadvantage and racial segregation. The increasing 
racial and religious diversity of French society was met with the rise of the anti-immigrant FN; Le 
Pen would call for “immigration zéro" by the early 1990s.983 Mitterrand’s government and the 
French left responded to Carpentras by underlining the need for solidarity in the combat against 
anti-Semitism, xenophobia, and racism.  
 Despite widespread calls for unity and solidarity to fight the common scourge of racism, 
anti-Semitism, and xenophobia, in “Europe, the Jews and the Book,” which appeared in Libération 
a week after the cemetary desecration, Jean-François Lyotard insisted Carpentras must be 
understood through the specific historical lens of European anti-Semitism. Without minimizing 
the horrors caused by xenophobia and racism, the etiology of anti-Semitism is unique. Lyotard 
viewed the incident in light of the long-standing theological conflict between Christianity and 
Judaism: “The desecration of the graves and the display on a stake of a corpse torn from its coffin 
in the Jewish cemetery of Carpentras say something specific: it's that, after the Shoah, the Jews 
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don't have the right to their dead nor to the memory of their dead.”984 If European anti-Semitism 
has long been driven to erase the memory of Jewish people and even the written traces of their 
graves, it is because “the Jews represent something that Europe does not want to or cannot know 
anything about.” For Lyotard, the public shock in response to Carpentras represents the momentary 
realization of its unconscious desire for the erasure of the Jewish people from Europe. Whereas 
the nations of Christian Europe are rooted in the land they inhabit, so the story goes, “the Jews 
aren't a nation. They don't speak a language, their own. They don't have any roots in a nature, like 
the European nations. They appeal to a book.” Beyond conspiratorial charges, the salient 
disagreement with Christianity stems from what the Jew’s book says.  
“It’s an old story,” Lyotard writes, but the theological disagreement is rather elementary:  
The Book of the Jews says: God is a Voice, one never has access to His visible presence. 
The veil which separates the two parts of the temple by isolating the Holy of Holies can 
not be crossed (except once a year by the sacrificant, designated by God). Everything that 
presents itself as divine is an imposture: idol, charismatic leader, supreme guide, false 
prophet, Son of God. The law of justice and peace cannot be embodied. It doesn't show us 
an example to follow. It gave you a book to read, full of history to interpret. 985 
 
By contrast to the interdiction on the visible traces of the divine in the Jewish book, the incarnation 
and resurrection of Christ redeems the holiness of the visible, incarnated God: 
Yet, Paul says: not at all, the temple's veil was torn apart “once and for all” at the moment 
when Jesus died on the cross. His sacrifice redeemed your sins, "once and for all," repeats 
the apostle. The law has pardoned you, God gave you his Son and the death of His Son as 
a visible example. Through him the voice was shown. It said clearly: love one another as 
brothers. That was a revolution. It's the beginning of modernity.  
 
This fundamental disagreement is the origin of the “permanent undertaking” in Christian Europe 
to “neutralize the Jewish message and banish the community of disbelievers.” Far from a historical 
accident or misadventure, thwarting the message of the Jewish book is “the anti-Semitism 
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constitutive of Europe.”986 Viewed in this light, there is nothing extraordinary or surprising about 
the vandalized cemetery. Rather, Lyotard concludes, “What was cause for indignation, in the 
desecration of the cemetery at Carpentras, is, I fear, that it was from another age. Abject in view 
of contemporary ‘values.’ But how do the latter stand in view of the book that the dead of 
Carpentras were reading?” The mistake is to believe that these acts do not express contemporary 
values, as if anti-Semitism were not an expression of the present as well. The vandalism in 
Carpentras stems from the same pathology that has driven European anti-Semitism for centuries: 
the will to erase the Jewish book, and the written trace of the Jew which preserves her memory, 
from cemetery desecrations and book burnings to the incineration of millions of people in the 
Shoah. The survival of the Jewish book shares its fate with that of the Jewish gravestone.  
 Jabès was moved to write a response to Carpentras entitled “Un Jour de Vie,” “A Day of 
Life,” which appeared in Libération in the summer of 1990. The text forms the centerpiece of his 
final and posthumously published book, Le Livre de l’hospitalité. For Jabès, Carpentras was 
further evidence that the anti-Semitism on display during the Nazi occupation had never 
disappeared from France, but merely receded into the shadows. The Book of Hospitality intertwines 
a reflection on hospitality and death with Jabès’ most politically engaged text, where he reflects 
on anti-Semitism, Zionism, and the refugee question in Europe. Didier Cahen describes Jabès’ 
final book as an “authentic incursion into the thought of elsewhere, the work retraces in its subtext 
the double separation of God and man, sky and earth. Thus its double register which combines the 
most spiritual essay with the most quotidian engagement.”987 Jabès’ text divagates between 
reflections on “the relationships of space and the void, elsewhere and nothingness” in metaphors 
of the desert and sky, and contemporary political questions from Carpentras to “the most vibrant 
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call for dialogue between the Palestinians and Israelis.” The double register of Jabès’ book folds 
the political into the poetic, and vice-versa, through the vector of hospitality. Writing in the 
summer of 1990, Jabès approaches the question of hospitality through the burial of the dead, 
illustrating the parallel between the respect for cemeteries and welcoming the Other. The memory 
inscribed on tombstones connects the cemetery to the question of writing and the trace. Jabès opens 
by remarking that writing outlasts death: “Writing, now, only to make it known that one day I 
ceased to exist [Écrire, maintenant, uniquement pour faire savoir qu’un jour j’ai cessé 
d’exister].”988 Writing survives its authors disappearance, it offers hope for a future where living 
memory fails. Confronting the inevitability of death with the hope of the written trace, Jabès writes, 
“the book is useless when the word is without hope [Inutile est le livre quand le mot est sans 
espérance].” This written trace can be inscribed in a book, or the words inscribed on a tombstone 
memorializing the deceased. Jabès reflects on the fragility of the written trace for the Jew, and the 
fear that one day this trace will be desecrated: 
For my death, said a Jew, I would not like to be buried, but incinerated: because I do not 
wish to have a tomb, for fear that any passing malevolent might inscribe, one day, in black 
and red letters, on the flat slab which shelters me, an anti-Semitic slogan of his own. I could 
not tolerate this. 
[A ma mort – disait un juif – je ne voudrais pas être enterré, mais incinéré: car je ne 
souhaite pas avoir de tombe, de crainte qu’un quelconque passant malintentionné, 
n’inscrive, un jour, en lettres noires ou rouges, sur la plate dalle qui m’abriterait, un 
slogan antisémite de son cru. Je ne le supporterais pas].989 
 
The Jew’s tombstone constitutes a written trace that confronts the permanently at risk of future 
desecration. The tombstone is a test and a testament to hospitality and the welcoming of the Other.  
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That public discussion of anti-Semitism in France had receded to silence during the decades 
following the revelation of the Shoah was hardly evidence that this history had reached its 





Trois sont les blessures. 
Trois, les déterminations.990 
 
Like Lyotard, Jabès cautions against ignoring the specificity and relevant differences between anti-
Semitism, racism, and xenophobia. These wounds are determinations of violence, and while their 
common theme is the violent denial of the Other’s humanity, their specific pathologies are unique. 
After the initial shock and the cascade of reporting on the cemetery desecration in Carpentras, 
silence resumed once the scandal had faded: 
Following the protests of outrage brought on by the profanation of the Jewish cemetery in 
Carpentras, silence ensued. How could it have been otherwise? We believe that everything 
has been said about an ignoble act when we have condemned it with all our soul, and with 
all our force. But this odious, repugnant act is only the logical and predictable consequence 
of a discourse, of an expertly, deviously maintained series of discourses; conveyed, 
amplified, denounced, sometimes by some; most of the time it is tolerated in the name of 
the freedom of expression that a democratic country affords its citizens.  
 
[Aux manifestations d’indignation soulevées par la profanation du cimetière juif de 
Carpentras, a succédé le silence. Et comment peut-il en être autrement ? On croit avoir 
tout dit d’un acte ignoble lorsqu’on a condamné de toute son âme, de toute ses forces. Mais 
cet acte odieux, répugnant, n’est jamais que la conséquence logique, prévisible d’un 
discours, d’une série de discours habilement, sournoisement entretenus ; véhiculés, 
amplifiés, dénoncés, à l’occasion, par quelques-uns ; la plupart du temps tolérés au nom 
de la liberté d’expression qu’accorde un pays démocratique à ses ressortissants].991 
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The desecration of the cemetery in Carpentras by the young Neo-Nazis is the symptom of a deeper 
and broader antipathy nourished in silence, festering in the freedom of expression enshrined by 
democratic states. Evoking a well-known anti-immigrant slogan of the FN, Jabès asks, 
France for the French: what does this mean if not France for France? That’s normal. Isn’t 
the destiny of France in the hands of the French? But, still, shouldn’t we know which France 
this is about? 
 
[Que signifie : La France aux Français sinon : La France à la France ? Et c’est normal. 
Le destin de la France n’est-il pas aux mains des Français ? Mais, encore, faut-il savoir 
de quelle France il s’agit ?]992 
 
Implicit in the slogan is the belief that “France” belongs to the “franco-français” – that is, the ethnic 
group whose lineage traces back to Clovis and Charlemagne, and who hold a mystical connection 
to the fertile land of the hexagone – and no one else. Despite the ethno-nationalistic views espoused 
by the French far-right, Jabès recalls that in his earlier life in Egypt, “it was the Jewish minorities 
[…] but also Copts, Christians, of Egyptian nationality or foreign, who maintained the presence of 
France,” who spoke its shared language of a “universal culture,” and who revered “the image of a 
country built on three words: Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité.” Such is Jabès’ admiration for French 
Republican values, despite the implacability of anti-Semitism, racism, and xenophobia that stand 
in their way. Echoing Lyotard’s insistence that Carpentras must be understood as an event of its 
era, for Jabès the folly is believing that France had ever progressed beyond its anti-Semitic history, 
as if silence were equivalent to forgiveness and reconciliation: 
To think, along with those who repeat it probably to convince themselves, that anti-Semitic 
discourse is less virulent today than before the war of 1940, for example, is a grave error. 
Because there was Auschwitz in between. The question is the following: how can such 
discourse gain acceptance? If the horror of Auschwitz couldn’t break it, how can we believe 
that Carpentras could?  
 
[Penser, avec ceux qui nous le répètent, pour probablement s’en convaincre eux-mêmes, 
que le discours antisémite est moins virulent, aujourd’hui, qu’avant la guerre de 1940, par 
exemple, est une grave erreur ; car il y a eu Auschwitz, depuis. Et la question est la 
																																																						




suivante : Comment pareil discours peut-il avoir encore droit de cité ? Si l’horreur 
d’Auschwitz n’a pu le briser, comment croire que Carpentras le pourrait] ?993 
 
To denounce the Shoah and anti-Semitism of earlier times while ignoring the actuality of anti-
Semitism in France is a version of denialism or negationism. Anti-Semitism in France has not been 
vanquished, it has merely receded into whispers and shadows: if Dreyfus, the Vél d’Hiv, and 
Auschwitz failed to break France’s silence, Jabès asks, how could Carpentras? 
Levinas resisted the sensationalism surrounding the desecration in Carpentras. In an 
interview published in L’Express in July 1990, he seemingly downplayed its significance. “I was 
dismayed like everyone else,” Levinas recalls, but “you know, desecrations are practically 
commonplace.”994 Rather than emphasizing the deep historical roots of the incident, what 
astonished him were “the dimensions the deed took, the way it was emphasized,” and how it was 
provoked by Le Pen’s appearance on television (Levinas questioned the television presenters’ 
response to Le Pen: “how could they let themselves be led on in such a way by ‘jokes’ disguised 
as arguments?”) But when asked if the incident in Carpentras was evidence of a climate where 
“racism and […] anti-Semitism can flow freely,” Levinas offered a rather curious answer: 
When Hitler came to power, there were some rival candidates, and opposition which was 
fighting for a better society and called for a revolution wherever it might take place. Do 
not be mistaken. I am shedding no tears over the fall of communism. But the result is that 
this competition no longer exists today. There is nothing more lamentable or which elicits 
compassion more than this. When the leader of the communist Party of France speaks now 
there is nothing left to say. […] it is in this context, the end of a certain era, that the 
Carpentras incident appears serious to me. There was a positive aspect: sincere reactions 
that did not stop with merely proper or fitting words. On the Christian’s side, the reactions 
confirmed the efforts towards a better Judeo-Christian understanding, which is, after all, a 
new phenomenon in postwar Europe. If one seeks consolation, this is it. As to predicting 
what’s in store for us, I have no prophetic gift, even if, sometimes, I read the prophets.995 
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Given the far greater traumas of Levinas’ earlier life, it is understandable that he did not overreact 
to the cemetery desecration, even emphasizing the good that came of it in terms of interfaith 
understanding. Yet his remarks regarding the end of the Soviet Union bear further analysis. He 
suggests that the vandalism in Carpentras should be understood in terms of the end of a certain era 
in which an alternative to the status quo political order seemed possible. For all the problems of 
the Soviet Union, Levinas implies the existence of a global counterweight to the West afforded a 
certain stability in the world order. The ascension of liberal democracy as the monopolar order 
with the fall of the Soviet Union has left no space for ideological competition, leaving vandals like 
those in Carpentras to rebel against these values by lashing out in such an exaggerated manner. 
Levinas salutes the encouraging response from Christian leaders following the incident – evidence 
of progress? – though he refuses to speculate what might follow for the Jews. 
Derrida did not directly comment on the cemetery desecration in Carpentras, but days after 
the incident at a conference on “European Cultural Identity” in Turin, he delivered a version of 
“The Other Heading,” which elliptically responded to the incident through a reflection on the 
future of Europe. A full version of the text appeared in October in Liber, a unique European 
newspaper published as an insert in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, L'Indice, EI Pais, Times 
Literary Supplement, and Le Monde in their respective languages. Derrida suggests that the future 
of Europe is at stake in the response to the growing tensions over immigration, religion, and race:  
Hope, fear, and trembling are commensurate with the signs that are coming to us from 
everywhere in Europe, where, precisely in the name of identity, be it cultural or not, the 
worst violences, those that we recognize all too well without yet having thought them 
through, the crimes of xenophobia, racism, anti-Semitism, religious or nationalist 
fanaticism, are being unleashed, mixed up, mixed up with each other, but also, and there is 
nothing fortuitous in this, mixed in with the breath, with the respiration, with the very 
"spirit" of the promise.996  
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The stirrings in Europe inspire contradictory responses, “hope, fear, and trembling,” disclosing 
both an opportunity and a danger. Derrida notes the multifarious forms of violence on display 
across Europe have the tendencies of blurring the distinctions between xenophobia, racism, anti-
Semitism, and so on. At the heart of these conflicts is the dissimulation of the meaning of Europe. 
He calls upon “the duty to respond to the call of European memory,” and “to re-identify Europe.”997 
Europe is an idea, before it is a given geographical area. Contrary to those who would claim for 
Europe a specific (white, Christian) identity, whose reactionary and xenophobic beliefs have 
fueled the growth of right-wing identitarian political parties across the continent, the idea of 
Europe is in fact constituted by its relation to the Other. Derrida argues that the duty to understand 
Europe’s identity as a cultural and legal demarcation “also dictates welcoming foreigners in order 
not only to integrate them but to recognize and accept their alterity: two concepts of hospitality 
that today divide our European and national consciousness.”998 Despite the reactionary forms of 
xenophobia, racism, and anti-Semitism that continue to fester, Europe’s identity is one shaped by 
the responsibility to the Other, and therefore the question of hospitality. Michael Naas explains, 
“Derrida argues not only that Europe must be responsible for the other, but that its own identity is 
in fact constituted by the other.”999 The anti-Semitic desecration in Carpentras – like xenophobic 
and racist violence committed in the name of defending a privileged and exclusive notion of 
European identity – is a test of the European idea, and its commitment to hospitality to the stranger. 
The questions unearthed by the desecration of the Carpentras cemetery maintain an 
unfortunate contemporaneity. Delphine Horvilleur remembers the incident as the first indication 
of the resurgence and banalization of anti-Semitism in France in recent decades: 
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Anti-Semitism haunts my family history, but I long thought my generation would be safe 
from it. In May 1990, there was a change with the desecration of the cemetery in 
Carpentras. I often think back to the national demonstration that it prompted. Nearly thirty 
years later, when Jewish graves are defaced, as was the case in Strasbourg a month ago [in 
December 2018], hardly anyone mentions it. Something absolutely abnormal has today 
become a banality. 1000 
 
Carpentras was neither the first or last desecration of a Jewish cemetery in France, but it did mark 
an inflection point. Most recently, in April 2021, Jews across France have protested the court’s 
shocking decision to dismiss the charges against the murderer of Sarah Halimi, who was beaten 
and thrown from the window of her Paris apartment in 2017 while her assailant hurled anti-Semitic 
invectives. This, of course, is only the latest scandalous act of violence perpetrated against Jews 
in France “parce que juif,” including the strikingly similar murder of Mireille Knoll in 2018, the 
2015 attack on the Hypercacher supermarket, the 2012 attack on the Ozar Hatorah school in 
Toulouse, and many more. In this sense, as a symptom and a warning, the vandalism of the 
Carpentras cemetery recalls Adorno and Horkheimer’s words in “Elements of Anti-Semitism”: 
“the despoiling of graveyards is nor an excess of anti-Semitism; it is anti-Semitism itself.”1001  
 
 
III. Sinai and the Paradox of Hospitality 
 
The notion of pure hospitality, as the host’s unconditional welcoming of the stranger as a guest, is 
no sooner considered than it is denatured by practical and political considerations which place 
limitations or conditions on its realization. The paradox of hospitality is that the conditions which 
																																																						
1000 Delphine Horvilleur, “L’antisémitisme n’est jamais une haine isolée, mais le premier symptôme 
d’un effondrement à venir,” Libération, Jan 8, 2019, https://www.liberation.fr/debats/2019/01/08/delphine-
horvilleur-l-antisemitisme-n-est-jamais-une-haine-isolee-mais-le-premier-symptome-d-un-effo_1701671 . 




limit and constrain the welcoming of the stranger are also what make it possible. In The Book of 
Hospitality, Jabès recalls the gesture of hospitality shown to him by an anonymous Bedouin man 
in the Sinai desert, which illustrates the conditioning of hospitality. He recounts driving in the 
Sinai with an unnamed companion, presumably Arlette, when his car breaks down, leaving them 
stranded in the desert sun. Appearing as if from nowhere and startling the couple, they encounter 
a Bedouin man who offers them shelter in the town of El-Shatt. As if to put them at ease, the man 
adds, “N’êtes vous pas mes hôtes?”1002 In French, hôte has the peculiar quality of signifying both 
host and guest, suggesting the contingency of the welcome and the welcomed. The Bedouin man 
offers Jabès succor, for which he is grateful, and his car is repaired. Two days later, they see the 
same Bedouin once more, but when they stop to greet him, the man treated his former hôtes as if 
they were strangers. Initially, Jabès recalls, “this attitude seemed abnormal to us,” but, he adds, 
“we had not reflected enough, evidentially, on what hospitality is for the Bedouins.”1003 Rather 
than a sign of disrespect, the Bedouin man’s feigned ignorance preserves his unconditional 
hospitality to the stranger, as a singular encounter without precedence or precondition—and which 
depends on the total anonymity of the hôte: 
If our hôte received us while feigning ignorance of us, it was to mark that we remained, 
both of us, in his eyes, anonymous voyagers, who he had to honor as such in the name of 
the ancestral hospitality of his tribe. Because otherwise, our improvised visit would have 
rapidly looked like an ephemeral reunion. 
 
[Si notre hôte, nous avait reçu, en feignant de nous ignorer, c’était pour marquer que nous 
restions, l’un et l’autre, à ses yeux, les anonymes voyageurs qu’il lui fallait, au nom de 
l’ancestrale hospitalité de sa tribu, honorer en tant que tels car, autrement, notre visite 
improvisée aurait, rapidement, fait figure d’éphémères retrouvailles.] 
 
The Bedouin man’s feigned ignorance preserves the novelty and singularity of the encounter with 
Jabès as a stranger—even, as Derrida would say, plus qu’une fois. This is the condition of his 
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welcome. Pure hospitality exceeds mediation through law and language, it demands that the hôte 
– both host and guest – put faith in the good will of the stranger, beyond any delimitation and 
without condition. Guest and host must put trust in the other, in a leap of faith that the offer of 
hospitality is sincere. "To bend to the unformulated demands of hospitality [Se plier aux exigences 
informulées de l'hospitalité],” Jabès writes, “is, in a way, to learn our dependence on the Other 
[c'est, en quelque sorte, faire l'apprentissage de notre dépendance à autrui].”1004 This dependence 
on the Other is highlighted by the hospitality of the Bedouin man in the Sinai.  
Hospitality and the Sinai also form the central question and location for Derrida’s 
“Welcoming Address,” which he presented at the conference “Face and Sinai,” organized by 
Danielle Cohen-Levinas as a part of the Collège International de Philosophie in December 1996 – 
a year after Levinas’ passing. The event was held in the Richelieu Amphitheater of the Sorbonne 
where, Derrida notes, “not only a great professor at the Sorbonne, but a master, once taught.”1005 
This prolonged reflection on welcoming, accueil, recasts Levinas’ philosophy in a new light. “Has 
anyone ever noticed?” he writes, “although the word is neither frequently used nor emphasized 
within it, Totality and Infinity bequeaths to us an immense treatise of hospitality.”1006 Derrida’s 
address explores its pivotal if under-examined role in Levinas’ text, beginning with its preface 
where he writes, “this book will present subjectivity as welcoming the Other, as hospitality; in it 
the idea of infinity is consummated.”1007 The idea of infinity reveals the insufficiency of Being, 
and it takes the form of a transcendence – an à-Dieu – in the encounter with the face, the exemplary 
moment of hospitality towards the Other. Levinas adds, “metaphysics, or the relation with the 
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other, is accomplished as service and as hospitality.”1008 He notes in the conclusion, “the essence 
of language is friendship and hospitality.” 1009 Derrida’s reading discloses the ethical responsibility 
to the Other and the question of hospitality as two sides of a coin, two axes that work through 
Levinas’ entire philosophy. “Far from representing a problem that is narrow and limited in scope,” 
explains François Raffoul, hospitality “represents the very access to Levinas’ thought of ethics as 
a whole, and its problematic relation to politics.”1010 If absolute hospitality welcomes the Other as 
the expression of an infinite responsibility, it cannot tolerate limitations or conditions; yet, this is 
precisely what is imposed by law and politics. Derrida’s question for Levinas therefore concerns 
“the relationships between an ethics of hospitality (an ethics as hospitality) and a law or a politics 
of hospitality.”1011 He asks whether hospitality can be conditioned – or translated – as law, such 
that it “would be able to found a law and a politics, beyond the familial dwelling, within a society, 
nation, State, or Nation-State,” without sacrificing its ethical purchase.1012 
  “Sinai” has two registers which reflect the hiatus between the ethical and political valences 
of hospitality. First, Sinai irrevocably names “the place where the Torah was given,” where “the 
tablets of the covenant written by the hand of God” the episode of the golden calf where Moses 
shatters the tablets and then recasting new ones, and the entire self-interruptive drama of the 
revelation of the law in the Book of Exodus.1013 But “Sinai” also has a second valence, as “a 
metonymy for the border or frontier between Israel and the other nations, a front and a frontier 
between war and peace, a provocation to think the passage between the ethical, the messianic, 
eschatology, and the political.” As the political borderland at the limit of sovereign states, Sinai 
																																																						
1008 Ibid, 306. 
1009 Ibid, 305. 
1010 François Raffoul, “On Hospitality, between Ethics and Politics,” Research in Phenomenology, 1998, Vol. 28 
(1998), 277. 
1011 Jacques Derrida, Adieu, 19. 
1012 Ibid, 20. 




names the marginal space where “all these hostages – the foreigner, the immigrant (with or without 
papers), the exile, the refugee, those without a country, or a State, the displaced person or 
population” are subjected to “cruelty without precedent.” Sinai therefore names the place of the 
interruptive revelation of God’s commandment, and the lawlessness of the political order for the 
persecuted Other. Derrida recalls Levinas’ reading of Psalm 117 in “The Nations and the Presence 
of Israel,” where he posits, “a recognition of the Torah before Sinai?”1014 The positing of the ethical 
message of the Torah received before the revelation of the commandments is also a question of 
hospitality without law. For Derrida, at this moment Levinas appears to admit “election is 
inseparable from what always seems to contest it: substitution.”1015 In other words, the fact of 
election which discloses the commandment to hospitality must also question the fact of election: 
the host and guest prove infinitely substitutable. Derrida pairs expressions from Levinas’ two 
major works that illustrate this logic of substitution in hospitality: "The subject is a host" (Totality 
and Infinity) and "the subject is hostage" (Otherwise than Being).1016 Between the subject as the 
receiving host of the Other, and his or her substitution – perhaps his substitution as her, or vice-
versa – as the hostage, the stranger, the Other, Derrida describes “a structural or a priori 
messianicity. Not an ahistorical messianicity but one that belongs to a historicity without a 
particular and empirically determinable incarnation.”1017 Sinai is the name for the structural 
messianicity that maintains the hiatus between the ethical and political, where the substitution of 
host and hostage, or host and guest, is conditioned by history. 
If, as Derrida suggests, no adequate translation is possible between the ethical concept of 
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hospitality and the demands and conditions imposed by law, then Levinas’ philosophy introduces 
a hiatus between ethics and law. Hent de Vries explains in Religion and Violence that “no unilinear, 
hierarchical order of foundation, derivation, or causation regulates the relation between these two 
orders,” rather “Levinas’s thoughts on hospitality leaves in suspense the question of what comes 
first. It does so in a paradoxical gesture that bears a remarkable resemblance to the classical 
procedure of the phenomenological epochē.”1018 Between the infinity of ethics and the demands 
of law and politics, hospitality must toggle between these orders via a kind of phenomenological 
reduction. Through the hiatus of ethics and politics, “the language of hospitality, like that of 
literature, dislodges phenomenology from its supposed ‘certainties.’” The aporia of ethics and law 
therefore introduces an apparent paradox in Levinas’ reflection on hospitality, where the 
actualization of hospitality as law denatures and renders it inoperative. Absolute hospitality 
demands that the host accede to the infinite demand of the guest, to the point of giving his or her 
home to the guest, substituted as host. Derrida elaborates,  
The hôte who receives (the host), the one who welcomes the invited or received hôte (the 
guest), the welcoming hôte who considers himself the owner of the place, is in truth a hôte 
received in his own home. He receives the hospitality that he offers in his own home; he 
receives it from his own home-which, in the end, does· not belong to him. The hôte as host 
is a guest.1019  
 
Absolute hospitality implies the endless substitution of guest and host, host and guest, with neither 
ever acceding to primacy. Raffoul explains, “a logic of substitution here takes the place of a logic 
of subordination or subjection,” leaving the host as hostage of the guest in her own home.1020 If 
hospitality attempts to overcome the exclusion of the Other, its precondition is the very separation 
that it will bridge. Beyond the substitution of host and guest, the very possibility of hospitality 
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presupposes a home, a chez soi, a form of interiority and its separation from an Other, a stranger, 
a foreigner: there must be separation for it to be henceforth overcome. De Vries explains: 
To open one’s doors unconditionally, one must reign over the house in full authority. 
Before one can solicit the other to step across a threshold and become a guest, this threshold 
(of the house, the family, the temple, the nation, a language community, and so on) must 
be in place and be maintained for the welcome to be what it is. And yet the threshold is 
also what forever ipso facto puts a limit to the acceptance of the other. What constitutes 
hospitality in its essence or structure destructures it in every instance. Wherever it shows 
its face, hospitality deconstructs itself.1021  
 
The impasse is that hospitality exhibits a kind of “auto-immunity,” where the very realization of 
hospitality constitutes its unraveling. Derrida writes in Of Hospitality, “it is as though hospitality 
were the impossible: as though the law of hospitality defined this very impossibility, as if it were 
only possible to transgress it.” 1022 The possibility of hospitality without conditions, without the 
corruption by the limitations and exceptions imposed by political demands, is essentially beyond 
definition. Jabès frames the point in The Book of Hospitality in a short, evocative dialogue: 
-What definition suits hospitality ? Asked the youngest discipline of his master. 
-A definition is, itself, a restriction and hospitality does not bear any limitations – 
responded the master. 
 
[-Quel définition pourrait convenir à l’hospitalité ? – demanda, à son maître, le plus jeunes 
de ses disciples. 
-Une définition est, en soi, une restriction et l’hospitalité ne souffre aucune limitations – 
répondit le maître.]1023 
 
The aporia of hospitality lies in its self-mediation in a definition which limits its purview; 
hospitality is conditioned by the demands of law which also make it possible.  
The apparent impossibility of hospitality is an opening and an opportunity. Raffoul 
explains, “The hiatus, far from leading to some paralysis of political action, becomes, on the 
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contrary, the possibility for an ethical perfectibility of politics and law.”1024 Absolute hospitality 
risks asserting its claim everywhere, and thereby undermining the specificity of its task; in other 
words, hospitality relies on its limitation by its constitutive opposite. “If hospitality does not let 
itself be circumscribed or derived,” Derrida explains, “then it would have no contrary: the 
phenomena of allergy, rejection, xenophobia, even war itself would still exhibit everything that 
Levinas explicitly attributes to or allies with hospitality.”1025 It is only through its delimitation by 
a constitutive opposite that hospitality can have meaning, which implies refusing its absolutism. 
De Vries comments: “If hospitality, in its very absoluteness, is somehow, in a singular way, 
everywhere—in hospitality and in hostility, in friendship and enmity, in our relation to other 
human beings and in the openness to any intentional (ideal, material, animal) object whatsoever—
then it is also nowhere to be found.”1026 This double-bind links hospitality to law while nonetheless 
insisting on their separation, preserving its internal oppositional structure.  
The demand in the face for absolute hospitality is interrupted by the presence of a third 
party. “Without waiting,” Derrida writes, “the third comes to affect the experience of the face in 
the face to face.” 1027 Levinas’ tiers, the “third person,” intervenes and interrupts the infinite ethical 
order of the face-to-face, and comes to stand for justice. Derrida writes, “this ‘thirdness’ [tertialité] 
turns or makes turn toward it, like a witness (terstis) made to bear witness to it, the dual [duel] of 
the face to face.” The third party presents both an intervention and a violation of the face to face, 
de Vries explains, it both “divides and diminishes – but also intensifies and exalts – the absolute 
relationship between the one ‘me’ and the one ‘other.’”1028 The third party demonstrates the 
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insufficiency of the dialogical relationship of the host and guest. Translating the insufficiency of 
the ethical face to face to the hiatus between hospitality and law, the third person interrupts the 
infinite substitution of absolute hospitality. This interruption by the third, Derrida remarks, “the 
illeity of the third is thus nothing less, for Levinas, than the beginning of justice, at once as law 
and beyond the law, in law beyond the law.”1029 The third “protect[s] against the vertigo of ethical 
violence” by interrupting the absolutism of the face-to-face, parasitically occupying the place of 
host and guest, exposing the insufficiencies and contingencies of these categories.1030 In this sense, 
de Vries writes, “the figures of the immigrant and the seeker of asylum evoke not only the stranger 
but also the third, the one who not only deepens my responsibility but also gives me a break and 
thus makes responsibility, if not bearable or masterable, then at least less violent.”1031 Between the 
singularity of the face and the plurality of the third, Derrida writes, it is “as if the unicity of the 
face were, in its absolute and irreducible singularity, plural a priori.”1032 This ambivalence forces 
hospitality to reckon with the conditions imposed by law. 
The paradox of hospitality maintains the ethical structure of messianicity even as it is 
denatured in its codification or conditioning as law. In Derrida’s reading of Levinas – which is 
prolonged and accentuated by de Vries – the ethical face to face is interrupted and heightened by 
the presence of a third party, the neglected other Other, who stands for justice. The third bears 
witness to the scene of hospitality between host and guest, but he or she reveals its inadequacies. 
In this project, I have suggested that we read Derrida, Jabès, and Levinas according to this same 
logic of the singular plural, or thirdness, as thinkers whose relationships are based on the 
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singularity of the face to face, or the epistolary exchange, but whose dialogues unfold in the 
presence of the third who interrupts but also testifies to their friendship.  
 
 
IV. Israel, Palestine, and the Test of Hospitality  
 
When Levinas alludes to “a recognition of the Torah before Sinai,” he poses, Derrida writes, “a 
test of hospitality.”1033 The possibility of ethics before law appeals to a hospitality beyond 
revelation, “a question of recognizing a universal message for which it has responsibility before 
or independently of the place and the event of the gift of the law.” This test of hospitality reveals 
its complexity in the questions posed by the state of Israel, which is called to follow the ethical 
demands of a messianic history as well as the political demands of the world history of nation-
states. Levinas writes in Beyond the Verse, "What is promised in Jerusalem is a humanity of the 
Torah."1034 This promise of the Torah is based in the messianic vision of Jerusalem, yet this is at 
some remove from the actuality of Jerusalem. The hiatus between these two visions of Jerusalem 
risks muddling the political questions provoked by Israel and its policies, and those related to 
Jewish people across the world. In his text on Carpentras, Jabès writes, “anti-Israel speech has, 
little by little, grafted itself onto anti-Semitic speech.”1035 Different sides share an interest in 
confusing these discourses. For Jabès, Levinas, and Derrida, as products of galut whose strongest 
attachment is to the French language, the conflict between Israel and Palestine represents the most 
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intractable test of hospitality, at the theological-political crossroads of identity and affiliation, but 
also the prevailing question of justice.  
The creation of the state of Israel had in a certain respect shifted its relation to Jewish 
books: if they were the “people of the book” in lieu of a national homeland, a text-centered religion 
in the absence of the Holy of Holies, what to make of this expression now? Whereas the Talmud 
is considered the Jewish writing of exile, Moshe Halbertal explains, “the Zionists preferred the 
Bible to the Talmud as the national literature, for the Bible tells a heroic story of the national drama 
whose focus is the Land of Israel. […] Unlike the Talmud, they held, the Bible had the potential 
to become a national epic.”1036 The Zionist focus on the Bible as the centralized book of the Jewish 
state alters the “text-centeredness” of the Jewish people as a kind of national literature based on 
the heroic tales of the Bible. To offer an indication of the importance of this shift: in 1953, in 
response to writer Avraham Kariv’s claim that the Bible should be understood through the lens of 
Midrash and Talmud, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion denounced the argument “with all my 
moral and Jewish force” as bordering on “blasphemy,” and he emphatically affirmed the Bible 
“existed before there was a Midrash and is not dependent on the Midrash.”1037 This reorientation 
of Jewish “text-centeredness” towards the national epic in the Bible illustrates how the question of 
the book is imbricated in the theological-political constitution of the state of Israel.  
Reflections on the place of Israel accompany the prolonged dialogue between Jabès, 
Derrida, and Levinas on the question of the book. During a 1965 trip to Jerusalem, Jabès sent 
Derrida a postcard of the Western Wall, with a short note signed by both Edmond and Arlette: 
“Here, every stone calls us back to ourselves…and friendship is present! [Ici, chaque pierre nous 
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rappelle à nous-mêmes…et l’amitié est présente].”1038 This brief comment is brimming with 
reverence for this special place in Jewish memory and history. It also evokes the frequent 
geological metaphors in Jabès’ writing, which express the sedimentation and fragmentation of 
stone in terms of the desert sand, the tablets of the law and their shattering, but also the tombstone 
and its desecration. He suggests a connection between Jerusalem, the Egyptian desert of his youth, 
the shattered fragments of the tablets in the Sinai, but also the broken tombstones in the Jewish 
cemetery in Carpentras—Jabès evokes the historical narrative of the Jewish people in galut as an 
adventure of sand and stone. As he writes in Aely: “Heap of stones. For centuries, God spoke 
through stone [Pierres amoncelées. Dieu parla, pour les millénaires, dans la pierre].”1039 
Amidst the Six Day War in June 1967, Derrida wrote to Levinas that he had been “glued 
to the radio” since the beginning of the conflict, and for some time he had been “obsessed by what 
was happening over in Israel.”1040 This, Benoit Peeters speculates, “certainly helped to bring him 
closer to Levinas.” While he rarely writes directly about political questions, the future of the Jewish 
state is of crucial importance for Levinas. In his 1967 text “Space is Not One Dimensional,” 
Levinas examines the mentality of French Jews at this moment of Israel’s latest conflict with its 
neighbors. He does not mask his attachment to his adopted country. “Adherence to France is a 
metaphysical act, of course,” Levinas writes, “it had to be France, a country that expresses its 
political existence with a trinitarian emblem which is moral and philosophical, and is inscribed on 
the front of its public buildings.”1041 Liberté, égalité, fraternité represent more than a political 
slogan, this trinity is the keystone to the political religion of the French Republic. For Levinas, 
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these values are in no way in conflict but rather complement being Jewish. While the Dreyfus 
affair marked a psychological turning point for French Jews, opening cracks in their faith in 
Republican ideals, the Shoah and the foundation of Israel were events of another order of 
magnitude, “human events which tear open their own envelope” which “burn up the concepts that 
express their substance.”1042 Levinas describes these events as religious due to their extraordinary 
character: “the Nazi persecution and, following the exterminations, the extraordinary fulfilment of 
the Zionist dream, are religious events outside any revelation, church, clergy, miracle, dogma or 
belief.”1043 He evokes the creation of Israel and the Shoah in terms of a “passion” beyond 
humanity’s capabilities. After two millennia of diaspora, these events precipitated the dramatic 
entry of the Jewish people into Hegelian history as a newly formed state.  
For Levinas, Israel is charged with the special duty of acting both out of the interests of 
state, but also as a righteous example for humanity. He writes in “Promised Land or Permitted 
Land,” “there is no other country like it; the resolution to accept a country under such conditions 
confers a right to that country.”1044 This suggests that Israel can only survive if it lives up to this 
prophetic duty. The tension between its holy mission and its political realities is the source of great 
risk: “The resurrection of the State of Israel, its dangerous and pure life, can no longer be separated 
from its doubly religious origins: a Holy Land resuscitated by the State, in spite of the profane 
forms it assumes.”1045 He concludes “Space is Not One Dimensional” by expressing the unresolved 
conflict between universal history and holy history at the moment of the Six Day War: 
To be a fully conscious Jew, a fully conscious Christian, a fully conscious communist, is 
always to find yourself in an awkward position within Being. And you too, my Muslim 
friend, my unhated enemy of the Six-Day War! But it is from adventures such as these run 
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by its citizens that a great modern State — that is to say, one that serves humanity - derives 
its greatness, the attention it pays to the present and its presence in the World. 
 
The “awkward position within Being” that Levinas describes discloses the hiatus between the 
ethical and political. The troubling formulation, “My Muslim friend, unhated enemy,” suggests 
that in the domain of the political, the self-constitution of a state or nation accompanies the 
designation of an Other, who is prone to become an enemy through the affairs of state. We might 
recall Montaigne’s paradoxical turn of phrase in “De l’amitié,” “O mes amis, il n’y a nul ami,” 
which is central for Derrida’s reflections on the contingency of friend and enemy in “The Politics 
of Friendship.”1046 Levinas’ belief in Israel’s prophetic charge to act as an example for humanity 
certainly seems incongruous with the political reality of the Israel-Palestine conflict, which is 
unfortunately animated by far worse than “unhated enemies.” Howard Caygill comments, “it 
becomes necessary to ask about those who were displaced by the ‘place in the sun’ taken by a 
‘great modern state’ and of those others who are sacrificed to its political adventures.”1047 
Pertaining to the test of hospitality, Derrida asks, “Who are the hôtes and the hostages of 
Jerusalem?”1048 Levinas’ notion of substitution looms large. If the Jewish people is shaped by its 
long history of exile in galut, its entry into world history as a state accompanies the exile of the 
Palestinians. In his essay “Reflections on Exile,” Edward Said remarks on the 1948 Palestinian 
Nakba, “perhaps this is the most extraordinary of exile’s fates: to have been exiled by exiles—to 
relive the actual process of up-rooting at the hands of exiles.”1049 Here, we might consider 
Mahmoud Darwish’s poem “A Lover from Palestine” on the experience of exile: 
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But I am the exile. 
Seal me with your eyes. 
Take me wherever you are - 
Take me whatever you are. 
Restore to me the color of face 
And the warmth of body, 
The light of heart and eye, 
The salt of bread and rhythm, 
The taste of earth... the Motherland. 
Shield me with your eyes. 
Take me as a relic from the mansion of sorrow; 
Take me as a verse from my tragedy; 
Take me as a toy, a brick from the house 
So that our children will remember to return.1050 
 
Darwish expresses the sense of exile through the loss of contact and nourishment from the earth. 
The hiatus between the ethical and political meanings of hospitality in Levinas’ thought reaches 
its highest tension in the substitution of Jewish and Palestinian exiles. Between “pre-originary 
hospitality” and “the politics of modern States,” Derrida points to “the politics underway in the 
‘peace process’ between Israel and Palestine” as the ultimate test of hospitality.1051  
 The tension between Israel’s prophetic duty and its political reality was further heightened 
when Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982 to dismantle the infrastructure of the PLO and install a more 
amenable government in Beirut. Prime Minister Menachem Begin argued, “the alternative to 
fighting is Treblinka.”1052 As Israeli forces arrived in West Beirut, Phalangist Militia entered the 
Chatila and Sabra camps and slaughtered between one and two thousand Palestinian refugees. 
Amidst international condemnation for Israel’s complicity in the massacre, Begin dismissed the 
criticism: “Goyim kill goyim, and they immediately come to hang the Jews.”1053 Days after the 
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massacre, Levinas took part in a radio broadcast with Shlomo Malka and Alain Finkelkraut where 
they discussed Israel and ethics. Levinas was, it seems, quick to dismiss the Israeli complicity in 
the massacres, noting “the lack of guilt here [in France] – and probably there [in Israel], too.”1054 
Malka asked the crucial question: “Emmanuel Levinas, you are the philosopher of the ‘other.’ Isn’t 
history, isn’t politics the very site of the encounter with the ‘other,’ and for the Israeli, isn’t the 
‘other’ above all the Palestinian?” Levinas’ answer lays bare the hiatus between ethics and politics: 
My definition of the other is completely different. The other is the neighbor, who is not 
necessarily kin, but who can be. And in that sense, if you’re for the other, you’re for the 
neighbor. But if your neighbor attacks another neighbor or treats him unjustly, what can 
you do? Then alterity takes on another character, in alterity we can find an enemy, or at 
least then we are faced with the problem of knowing who is right and who is wrong, who 
is just and who is unjust. There are people who are wrong.1055 
 
 Levinas highlights the place of the third party who intervenes or interrupts in a dispute between 
neighbors; the third exceeds the dialogical ethical relationship between self and other, and 
introduces the question of politics, and indeed, justice. Where ethics pertains to the singularity of 
the relation between neighbors, once this situation expands to include the neighbor’s neighbors, 
other others, the face to face relation becomes inadequate. In some sense, as neither Israeli or 
Palestinian, Levinas comments on the conflict in the Middle East as a kind of third party; this does 
not mean he intervenes as a neutral or objective arbiter, rather it suggests that he responds 
politically. Rather than treating these comments as a blind-spot in his ethical philosophy, Caygill 
argues “a harder thought is that Levinas’s claim is rigorously consistent with his philosophy, which 
we have argued recognizes the inevitability of war.”1056 If peace is the exception to war rather than 
its inverse, then any neighbor is susceptible to become an enemy. Several years later, François 
Poirié asked Levinas what the state of Israel represented for him. “You are touching there on too 
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many strong feelings!” he told Poirié. But, Levinas added, it is only “as a State,” that “Israel – the 
people and the culture – can survive.” 1057The quiet realism of this remark finds common cause 
with certain strains of revisionist Zionism, according to which the survival of the Jewish people is 
contingent on the state of Israel. Nonetheless, speaking in galut, he avoids directly addressing 
Israel’s policies: “I will say to you that there are many things about which I cannot speak because 
I am not in Israel. I forbid myself to speak about Israel, not being in Israel, not living its noble 
adventure and not running this great daily risk.”1058 His refusal to confront Israel’s “noble 
adventure” on French soil – a fascinating choice of words given the double legacy of adventure in 
his thought as both Odysseus’ nostalgia and Abraham’s departure – discloses the point where the 
universal history of statecraft abuts the messianic history of Israel. 
 Events surrounding the Lebanon War would occasioned a dispute between Jabès and 
Levinas. On November 30, 1983, Jabès was invited to give a reading at the inauguration of the 
Centre Rachi, a center for Jewish thought connected to the Sorbonne. Jabès’ English translator and 
friend Rosemarie Waldrop recalls of the evening, “at the door we are frisked. I know there have 
been a number of anti-Jewish manifestations recently, a bomb in Goldberg’s restaurant, swastikas 
in the cemeteries, but I am still a bit taken aback. It turns out the Israeli ambassador is here will 
speak first.”1059 Jabès entered the auditorium to find himself seated between the director of the 
Centre and the Israeli ambassador to France, who was to give an unscheduled speech. From there, 
Didier Cahen describes, “the evening quickly ‘degenerated.’”1060 The ambassador began his 
address by describing the Palestinians as “those assassins,” provoking members of the audience to 
leave the auditorium in protest. “A few more hawkish sentences,” Waldrop recalls, “and Arlette 
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Jabès, in the first row, gets up and leaves.” Jabès systematically refused to speak on behalf of any 
nationalist political agenda, and he was visibly blindsided by the ambassador’s speech as he 
uncomfortably sat at the dais. Recalling well-worn nationalist tropes, “the ambassador invokes the 
Masada, Judas Maccabeus, ‘the hammer,’ and again, ‘those assassins, those criminals, those new 
Nazis.’ He calls for a Holy War.” At this point, Jabès stood up and left the auditorium as well.1061 
When the ambassador concluded his speech and left the auditorium, Jabès returned to deliver his 
address, “Judaism and Writing,” which was received by the returning audience with a standing 
ovation.1062 Jabès was upset for the imposition, and felt he had been manipulated; the directors of 
the Centre Rashi wrote him to apologize for the awkward situation the event had occasioned.1063 
Nonetheless, Jabès was excoriated by segments of the Israeli press, and he received numerous 
phone calls and letters questioning his decision to walk out on the ambassador. In particular, 
Levinas expressed his disagreement with Jabès’ actions, provoking an argument between the 
two.1064 Waldrop explains Jabès was “deeply concerned with Israel and its fate,” but he 
“distinguished between the dream of a Jewish land and the actual State of Israel, which he did not 
consider above criticism.”1065 Following the controversy at the Centre Rachi, in January 1984, 
Jabès sent Levinas his newly published Livre du Dialogue; Levinas thanked him for his “more 
than friendly dedication” to the book, which was “for me, quite meaningful even before its first 
pages.”1066 Like many authors, Jabès sent copies of his new books to friends and interlocutors—
this was how he first contacted Levinas in 1963. More specifically, Jabès’ sending this book to 
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Levinas only weeks after their disagreement was a notable gesture of hospitality and welcoming.  
In his 1980 interview with Marcel Cohen, Jabès described his ambivalence regarding Israel 
as both “a lively admiration and an infinite worry.”1067 On the one hand, he remarked, “a Jew today 
cannot refuse solidarity with Israel, first, because before it was a State, this minuscule part of the 
globe was already a land of refuge.”1068 Jabès’ exile from Egypt in 1957 was provoked in part by 
accusations that Egyptian Jews were loyal to Israel during the Suez Crisis, but he had briefly found 
refuge in Jerusalem during the Second World War, when the British evacuated him from Egypt as 
Rommel’s army approached Cairo. After the Shoah and the uprooting of Jews across North Africa 
and the Middle East, a refuge for Jews had become all the more necessary. On the other hand, for 
Jabès, the very existence of the State of Israel represents the failure of Western liberalism to protect 
Jews from violence: “this State, modeled by the suffering of so many martyrs, is the reflection of 
the exemplary failure of Western liberalism. That it was necessary to create it to save the Western 
Jews is, and remains, the shame of the West.” Israel therefore reflects “less a point of fundamental 
justice” and more so “the only and predictable response of scarred Judaism [judaïsme meurtri] to 
a generalized injustice.” Yet the scars of past trauma are not redeemed in further suffering. Jabès 
writes in 1990 in The Book of Hospitality amidst the first Intifada, “Never will the wound heal the 
wound [Jamais la blessure ne guérira la blessure].”1069 He urges Israel not to silence the 
Palestinians, “a nation without hope but who, for its survival, continues to hope [un pays sans 
espérance mais qui, pour sa survie, continue d’espérer].” In a prayer for dialogue, Jabès writes:  
That the Palestinians, united behind their chosen representative, make themselves heard, 
by their authorized voice. That the Palestinians who do not have a representative make 
themselves heard by their wounds. That the Israelis who know that the only way out, for 
them, is dialogue, are mobilized.  
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[Que les Palestiniens, unis derrière le porte-parole de leur choix, se fassent entendre, par 
sa voix autorisée. Que les Palestiniens qui n’ont pas de porte-parole se fassent entendre 
par leurs blessures. Que les Israéliens qui savent qu’il n’y a, pour eux, d’issue que dans le 
dialogue, se mobilisent].1070 
 
Jabès concludes his response to Carpentras with this plea for understanding, tolerance, and 
hospitality towards the Other, Israeli or Palestinian, because “our responsibility dictates it.” The 
question of hospitality mobilized by the desecrations of tombstones in Carpentras, but also the 
possibility of peace between Israel and Palestine, ultimately returns to a question of responsibility. 
Speaking in Jerusalem in 1988, Derrida evoked his “concern for justice” and his 
“friendship for both the Palestinians and the Israelis,” as well as a “respect for a certain image of 
Israel” and “hope for its future.”1071 As a philosopher whose enterprise concerns the deconstruction 
of binary oppositions, but also as a French citizen from a Jewish family, the Israel-Palestine 
presents the most intractable theologico-political division. Perhaps Derrida’s most expressive 
statement on Israel came in a January 2002 letter to his friend Claude Lanzmann, editor of Les 
Temps Modernes and creator of the documentary Shoah. Derrida avows a certain partiality in his 
situation: “The ‘French citizen’ that I am,” he affirms that his critical attention is focused primarily 
on French politics, but “the ‘Jew,’ even if he is equally critical of the policies of Israel’s enemies, 
will be more prepared to express his anxieties about an Israeli policy that endangers the safety 
[salut] and the image of those it is supposed to represent.”1072 He leaves just enough ambiguity to 
avoid directly affirming “le juif que je suis,” but he nonetheless implies he is “le ‘juif’” who feels 
represented by the image projected by Israel is more likely to expression trepidations about its 
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policies. Keeping these subjective predispositions at arm’s length, there is no politics that is 
beyond reproach and dissent. Following the 9/11 attacks and the international frenzy to find and 
capture its culprits, Derrida notes the chilling of criticism of the United States as well as Israel, 
and the widespread attitude according to which one – particularly a Jew – should feel guilty for 
criticizing Israel or American policies at this difficult time. “Guilty,” Derrida explains, “under at 
least four headings: anti-Israelism, anti-Zionism, anti-Semitism, Judeophobia,” as well as “visceral 
anti-Americanism.” According to this argument, since the United States was the victim on 9/11 to 
crimes committed by Islamic terrorists, the same forces that have long besieged Israel, to criticize 
Israel or the United States for its response to the attacks would amount to victim-blaming. To this, 
Derrida tells Lanzmann, “no, no, no, and no! Four times no. That’s exactly what I wanted to say 
to you, and that’s why I’ve written to you.” He urges Les Temps Modernes to reject this anti-
critical stance, which he describes as “totalitarian procedures of intimidation” intended to stifle 
dissent. This apportioning of guilt for dissent is based on a false dichotomy, as if criticism were 
contrary to democratic governance, rather than its essence. Derrida refuses to take the bait: “I want 
to be able to undertake this critical analysis, to make it more complex here, nuance it there, 
sometimes radicalize it, without the slightest Judeophobia, without the least anti-Americanism, 
and, as if I needed to add it, without the least anti-Semitism.” In his final interview in 2004 with 
Jean Birnbaum, Derrida offered a starker expression of this belief when he denounced “the 
disastrous and suicidal politics of Israel and of a certain Zionism,” while insisting, “in spite of all 
that and so many other problems I have with my ‘Jewishness,’ I will never deny it. I will always 
say, in certain situations, ‘we Jews.’”1073  
																																																						




 Enduring peace between Israel and Palestine remains the ultimate crucible of hospitality. 
Derrida, Levinas, and Jabès’ reflections on Israel are, in each case, guided by their situations as 
citizens of the French Republic, as Jewish thinkers for whom this state has particular significance, 
but also by an abiding concern for justice. These questions prove inseparable from the question of 
the book. Levinas proclaims “the Torah is justice,” and “Jerusalem will be defined by this Torah.” 
In response, Derrida adds, “A complete justice, Torah-of-Jerusalem, but a justice whose extreme 
vigilance requires that it become effective, that it make itself into law and politics.”1074 It is a 
dispute between neighbors – two sons of Abraham, two editions of the Book – but it is also a 
conflict between enemy States, dictated by considerations of politics and power; it calls for a 





“Tout livre s’écrit dans la transparence d’un adieu,” Jabès writes in the closing chapter of The Book 
of Hospitality.1075 The book has an unmistakable testamentary character. Cahen writes that it 
“proclaims with troubling clairvoyance his death, prescribed by-and-in the book.”1076 Jabès’ text 
is a meditation on death, beginning with his reflections on the Jew’s tombstone and the desecration 
of the cemetery in Carpentras to his concluding “adieu,” which intersects with his reflections on 
hospitality and the possibility of the unconditional welcome of the Other. In its final chapter 
“L’Adieu,” he rhymes silence with interment: “Se taire. Se terrer.”1077 The book closes with a 
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couplet that rhythms the farewell, “adieu,” and the address “à Dieu”: “To God, the burden of all / 
To man, a small share [A Dieu, le fardeau du tout / A l’homme, la part du peu].”1078 Edmond Jabès 
died of a heart attack on January 2, 1991; The Book of Hospitality was published in April. Just as 
Jabès’ Egyptian birth certificate incorrectly recorded his birth two days late, by uncanny 
coincidence, the author biography in The Book of Hospitality records Jabès’ death as January 
fourth – that is, Cahen notes, “once again, forty-eight hours after the real date!”1079 This 
providential error was all too befitting of Jabès’ “adieu”: a deferral of writing beyond death, and 
even a deferral of death beyond death. 
Derrida sent a moving letter to Arlette Jabès on January 4 following the news that “Eddie” 
had passed. Writing from Nice, where he was visiting his mother who was bedridden and suffering 
from the advanced effects of Alzheimer’s, Derrida describes turning over his memories of Jabès, 
rereading his texts in search of the memory of his voice: 
In a state of immense sadness, for the past two days, I have lived in my memory, I easily 
lose focus of almost everything and remember, remember Eddie and the moments that we 
shared. So long ago, it is true, but these memories remain alive – they have remained alive 
even across great distances and silences, thanks to texts which I have continued to ponder, 
certain which I am rereading today (in Nice, where I arrived yesterday to see my mother, 
who is barely hanging on and who hasn’t recognized me in two years) because I brought 
them with me. I am trying to hear his voice, and at certain moments I think I can accurately 
hear it, maybe more accurately than ever [plus juste que jamais], and it is very painful to 
hear in this strange hallucinatory experience. When I started reading Eddie, nearly thirty 
years ago (in 1962 precisely), I didn’t know his voice. Now it vibrates in every word I read. 
And I miss it, his voice resonates in me, it calls and whispers, and I also hear your voice, 
dear Arlette, because I always felt you were so present at the origin of what he wrote: your 
voice and your hand are truly at work. 1080  
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Juxtaposed with his ailing mother who no longer recognized her son’s face, Derrida expresses the 
fragility of memory, and the haunting – even hallucinatory – experience of reading Jabès’ poetry 
after his death, hearing his ghostly voice “maybe more accurately than ever.” He hears in Jabès’ 
poetry Arlette’s voice as well; as his first reader and critic, Arlette is a permanent feature of 
Edmond’s writing. In his letter for the 1992 event commemorating Jabès at the Collège 
International de Philosophie, Derrida casts their friendship as born of a reflection on death, and 
destined to survive them: 
When friendship begins before friendship, it touches upon death, indeed, it is born in 
mourning. But it is also doubly affirmed, twice sealed; this recognition, this gratitude 
before all knowledge, is, I believe, destined to survive. And already from its birth: in all 
the books of questions, those that bear and those that keep their name silent, beyond books 
and their titles, beyond blind words. Edmond Jabès knew that books are here to no avail, 
no more than questions are, not to mention answers.1081 
 
Jabès and Derrida’s friendship was born of a reflection on writing and death, and it was therefore 
bound to survive death: their friendship had encoded the “adieu” from its outset. 
 “Adieu” is not only a farewell, it is also an invitation to transcendence. Levinas’ 1981 essay 
"Bad Conscience and the Inexorable” describes the à-Dieu not as an ending, “adieu,” rather as an 
opening to what is beyond being, “à-Dieu”: 
Infinity would have no meaning for a thought that goes to the limit, and the à-Dieu is not 
a finality. It is perhaps this irreducibility of the à-Dieu or of the fear of God to eschatology, 
an irreducibility that interrupts within the human the consciousness that was on its way 
toward being in its ontological perseverance or toward death which it takes as the ultimate 
thought, that is signified, beyond being, by the word 'glory.' The alternative between being 
and nothingness is not ultimate.1082  
 
In Levinas’ later philosophy, the possibility of ethics lies in the interruption of Being and the order 
of Sameness: the ethical Dire disturbs the ontological Dit, and introducing the possibility of a 
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transcendence beyond ontology, the à-dieu. Levinas called this kind of expression a “question-
prayer,” which comes before all dialogue. It is also the theme of Derrida’s “Adieu,” which he 
delivered on December 27, 1995 at Levinas’ funeral in the Pantin cemetery on the outskirts of 
Paris. The text is an “adieu” to his friend and interlocutor for over three decades, and it is also an 
“à-Dieu,” a greeting of the Other that is beyond being, and a reflection on ethical transcendence. 
Levinas’ death marks an uncanny silence in their dialogue. Derrida ponders, “What happens when 
a great thinker becomes silent, one whom we knew living, whom we read and reread, and also 
heard, one from whom we were still awaiting a response[?]” The spectral presence of Levinas’ 
words is an ethical calling that remains in force even after his death; Levinas had described this as 
“droiture,” “uprightness,” that which is “stronger than death.”1083 Derrida remarks, “each time I 
read or reread Emmanuel Levinas, I am overwhelmed with gratitude and admiration.”1084 Framed 
in the future anterior tense of ethical responsibility, Derrida writes that Levinas “will have taught 
me to think or pronounce otherwise” the meaning of Adieu.1085 
 Following Jabès’ death in 1991 and Levinas’ in 1995, Derrida would “survive” and write 
for another decade, carrying on the adventure of the book even as many of his friends and 
interlocutors passed.1086 In his final interview with Jean Birnbaum in August 2004, with his health 
failing and intent on reflecting on his imminent death, Derrida disavows any special insight on the 
subject: “I remain uneducable when it comes to any kind of wisdom about knowing-how-to-die 
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back, incapable as it is of transcendence-a movement beyond anxiety and stronger than death. This uprightness is 
called Temimut, the essence of Jacob.” 
1084 Jacques Derrida, Adieu, 9. 
1085 Ibid, 1. 





or, if you prefer, knowing-how-to-live.”1087 Rather than surmising anything new about death, 
Derrida reflects on his situation as one of the last living representatives of his generation of 
philosophers: “since most of the thinkers with whom I have been associated are now dead, I am 
referred to more and more often as a survivor—the last, the final representative of a ‘generation,’ 
that is, roughly speaking, the sixties generation.” Though the term “generation” carries certain 
difficulties – to say nothing of the infinite complexity posed by the notion of the “survivor,” 
“survival,” and what Derrida calls “survivance” – the assemblage of thinkers from this era 
coalesced around a certain “ethos of writing and of thinking,” which we have explored in Derrida, 
Jabès, and Levinas as the adventure of the book.1088 Reflecting on the writing that might outlast 
him, Derrida describes a certain kind of death with every written trace that leaves his pen: 
I leave a piece of paper behind, I go away, I die: it is impossible to escape this structure, it 
is the unchanging form of my life. Each time I let something go, each time some trace 
leaves me, “proceeds” from me, unable to be reappropriated, I live my death in writing. It’s 
the ultimate test: one expropriates oneself without knowing exactly who is being entrusted 
with what is left behind. Who is going to inherit, and how? Will there even be any heirs?1089 
 
Derrida died on October 9, 2004. The adventure of the book, the written trace of the dialogue 




1087 Jacques Derrida, Learning to Live Finally, 32–33. 
1088 Ibid, 27 
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